765 So. 2d 629 | Ala. | 1999
Steve and Debra Lewis, owners of real property on Dauphin Island, sued Mobil Oil Corporation, Inc. ("Mobil"), alleging that the corporation had taken natural gas from their property without just compensation. The trial court entered a summary judgment for Mobil. We affirm.
In 1992, the State Oil and Gas Board issued a series of orders that created a natural-gas field unit on and around Dauphin Island and governed the extraction of natural gas from this field. In 1998, Mobil began remitting to these plaintiffs and to *630 all other owners of property within the field all sums due as royalties for the production of natural gas.
Mobil moved for a summary judgment, supporting its motion with sworn testimony indicating that it had paid the plaintiffs all sums lawfully due them. This testimony included the affidavit of David Lomax, Mobil's "auditor litigation accountant," who stated that Mobil had paid the plaintiffs, and would continue to pay them, all moneys due under the orders governing production established by the State Oil and Gas Board.
Rule 56, Ala.R.Civ.P., sets forth a two-tiered standard for determining whether to enter a summary judgment. In order to enter a summary judgment, the trial court must determine 1) that there is no genuine issue of material fact and 2) that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. In determining whether a summary judgment was properly entered, the reviewing court must view the evidence in a light most favorable to the nonmovant. See Turner v. Systems Fuel, Inc.,
When a party moves for a summary judgment and makes a prima facie showing that no genuine issue of material fact exists, as the defendant did in the present case, the burden shifts to the nonmovant to present "substantial evidence" supporting his position and creating a genuine issue of material fact. Bean v. Craig,
AFFIRMED.
HOOPER, C.J., and MADDOX, HOUSTON, SEE, LYONS, BROWN, JOHNSTONE, and ENGLAND, JJ., concur.