73 Ala. 148 | Ala. | 1882
— There are cases which go so far as to maintain that the declarations or admissions of the principal, without restriction as to the time or circumstances under which they were made, are evidence against the surety. — -3 Phill. on Ev. (C. & IT. notes), 261. There are other cases affirming the proposition pressed in the argument of the counsel for the appellee, that when principal and surety are jointly
In the case before u’s, we lay no particular stress upon the fact, 'that prior to the making of the declarations or admissions of Lewis, his term of office as county treasurer had expired. There remained 'the duty of stating his official account, and of delivering to his successor all tire money, books, papers and property of the county, which had come to.his possession, and his declarations or admissions accompanying either of these acts, and explanatory of them, would be competent original evidence against his sureties, though his official term had expired. The point of objection to the competency of the evidence of his declarations, as against his sureties, is, not that they were made after his term of office had expired, but that they were not made while he was doing any act, transacting any business, or performing any duty for which the surety was bound. They were subsequent in point of time to all official acts or duties to which they refer, and are simple admissions that in his official capacity he had received moneys of the county. As against himself they were competent original evidence. — Lewis v. Lee County, 66 Ala. 480. As to his sureties, they were mere hearsay, creating no inference or presumption of liability for which they were bound to answer. The circuit court erred in refusing the instructions requested, limiting to the principal the operation and effect of these admissions.
The relevancy of the evidence sought to be elicited by the several questions propounded to Lewis, while under examination as a witness, is not perceived. It is not the use of the money of the county, or the failure to keep it safely, or the place at which he kept it, or the having it on hand at the expiration of the official term, which are relied on as breaches of the official bond, but the failure to account for it legally and properly, or to .pay it over to his successor.
Whether the certificates or receipts, issued by the Governor under the authority of the act approved February 19, 1867, (Pamph. Acts, 1866-7, p. 657), or the obligations issued in pursuance of the act approved December 19, 1873, (Pamph.
The duty of Lewis, the principal, on the termination of his official term, was to pay to his successor in office the public moneys he had received and had not disbursed according to law, and all such moneys as he had neglected to collect. These formed a.specific sum, to which the county was then justly entitled. The detention of it was wrongful, and for the detention the law gives interest in the nature of damages.— Cheshire v. Howland, 13 Gray, 324. In this State, interest according to the statutory rate is regarded as but just compensation for withholding the principal; and when the principal is ascertained to be due at a particular time, and without sufficient excuse remains unpaid, interest follows as an incident.— Whitworth v. Hart, 22 Ala. 343. Until there was a successor to Lewis, qualified, and authorized to receive the moneys of the county, there could be no payment of them, and interest would not accrue. Whatever of indefiniteness there may be in the evidence upon this point, as it is stated in the bill of exceptions, can hereafter be obviated.
The committee examining the books and papers of Lewis, as county treasurer, were not appointed in pursuance of the statute. — Code of 187(5, § 849. They were appointed by the court of county commissioners, not by the judge of probate. The purpose of their appointment was doubtless to obtain for the court information as to the condition of the finances of the county. When the report was received bj7 the court, they could have made it the basis of whatever action may have been deemed expedient for the public interests. But it could not
There are several rulings of the circuit court not consistent with this opinion, and because of them the judgment must be reversed, and the cause remanded.