The libellant Is' the owner of one-third, the claimant of two-thirds, of the steamboat. The object of the libel is to obtain a decree for the sale of the boat and a division оf the proceeds. The district court decided that the case stated in the libel did not entitle the libellant to a de-eree for a sale. The libellant is doubtless entitled, on an application for that purpose, to require a stipulation from the respondent, if the latter insists on employing the vessel in voyages or upon ventures against the judgment and remonstrance of the libellant, to return the vessel, or in default to pay the value of the libellant’s interest therein. As the respondent is the owner of the larger interest, he has, according to the settled doe-
The statement in the present libel that the respondent is using the boat in voyages аnd in trades against the wish of the libellant, is identical with that made in the case before the supreme court. The respondent as part owner has the legal right to use the vessel, subject to giving a stipulation, if required. The fraudulent expehses incurred by the respondent would not be binding on the libel-lant. If the respondent is under a liability to account to the libellant in respect to the use or operation of said boat, the proper court will compel him to do so. As I cannot but regard the judgment of the supreme court in the сase cited as conclusive in the present libel, I do not deem it necessary to go into the learning applicable to the question presented. It will be found summarized in Stоry, Partn. §§ 415-439; T. Pars. Partn. 55S-563; Smith, Merc. Law, 184-187; Abb. Shipp, pt. 1, c. 3, p. 98 et seq.; Freern. Coten. §§ 389-392. The general doctrine of the maritime law, as well as the decisions in Great Britain and in this country, are stated in Tunno v. The Betsina [Case No. 14,236], which also holds that the owner of a minority interest has no right to a decree for a sale of the vessel against the wishes of the majority.
It would be extrеmely difficult to formulate rules for the adjustment of the relations of part owners of a vessel when discord arises between them, which would always be just in their operation. The majority may oppressively and unjustly use their conceded preferable right to employ the vessel. The minority owner may be cross-grained and unreasonable. Public policy requires that the vessel shall be employed and not suffered to lie idle, if any of the owners will use her. Neither the major nor minor interest should be armed with a club to hold in tej-rorem over the other. To allow the owner of a small fraction of the vessel to demand a sale as of right, would give him an undue advantage. To allow the majority to force a sale of his interest at pleasure,would put him too much in their power. The unreasonable refusal of the minor share-owner to unite with the majority interests in employing the vessеl may be a hardship upon them by requiring more than their share of capital for equipment and outfit.
The consideration does not, however, have the same force with respect to western steamboats as in the case of sea-going vessels. The majority, because of their preferable right to the use of the vessel, and their right to prеvent a sale, and, also, to use the vessel without compensation, if such right exists, have an inducement to act unfairly towards the minority. The only relief to the latter, if unfairly dealt by, would be to have a sale of the vessel or to get some more beneficial stipulation than a mere engagement to return the vessel. But a right to a sale at all is denied by the English courts. Equity has refused to decree a sale of a vessel, as it may do between part owners in respect to other indivisible chattels, but turned the parties over to the admiralty; and it is denied that the admiralty courts in England can ever decree a sale. In this country the practice is not to decree a sale except where the dispute is between the owners of equal shares, and there is, therefore, no other possible way of terminating it.
These considerations show the necessity for, as well аs the difficulty of, settling the disputes which arjse among part owners. What tribunal would be so competent to do this on broad and equitable principles as the admiralty courts, if they сould exercise the comprehensive and flexible powers which are acknowledged to belong to the court of equity, and which ought equally to pertain to the аdmiralty?
I cannot say, therefore, that I am quite satisfied with the uncertain or limited protection which the English and American cases give to the-minority interest, especially if the dоctrines there maintained are applied without modification to steamboats on our western rivers. If, in case of irreconcilable
Thе average life of a western steamer is very short, probably not exceeding eight or ten years, and if the majority interest, having the preferable right to all of the boat, сan prevent a compulsory sale under any circumstances, and can also use the boat as long as it wishes by simply giving a stipulation for its safe return, this course may be pursuеd until the boat is worn out. The subject is full of difficulties, as Lord Tenter-den and others have pointed out (Abb. Shipp. 98; The Margaret, 2 Hagg. Adm. 275, per Sir Christopher Robinson; The Marengo [Case No. 9,065], рer Lowell, J.); but many cases may easily be supposed, and doubtless are constantly arising, in which it would be more equitable to the minority, and neither unjust to the majority nor incompаtible with the interests of commerce and the policy of the law which favors the employment of the vessel, if the court, in its discretion, guided by the circumstances of the pаrticular case, could, instead of the usual stipulation for a return of the boat, require a stipulation for an ascertained reasonable compensation fоr the value of the use of the minority interest, the owner of the latter interest in such case to be his own insurer. The power of the court to require such a stipulation is doubtful (The Apollo, 1 Hagg. Adm. 306, 312; The Marengo, supra), and I do not decide it or even intimate an opinion upon it; but that such a power ought to exist in respect of boats navigating our western rivers, however it may be in respect of sea-going vessels, would seem to be easy of demonstration. The libel, as acted on by the district court, presented only the question as to the right of the libellant, upon the facts therein stated, to a decree for a sale, and, for the reasons above given, my judgment is that its decree dismissing the libel was right, and the same is accordingly affirmed. Affirmed.