Lewis v. HopperLewis v. Hopper
Plaintiff, a subcontractor, recovered a judgment against defendant Peerless Casualty Company upon a labor and materialmen’s bond for the balance due him upon his subcontract in the construction of a building for Pacific Telephone and Telegraph Company in Auburn, California. Appellant’s bond contained the following provision:
“No suit or action on this bond to recover for labor performed or material furnished in respect to work herein referred to shall be sustained unless the same be commenced within the period provided by law after the claimant files his claim or lien, or if he files no such claim or lien, unless
The question presented is whether the installation of these four soap dispensers constituted the “completion of the work described in said contract” within the meaning of those words as used in the quoted provision of the bond. Actually, since the agreed statement of facts shows that installation of the soap dispensers was work specified in the contract, the work described in the contract was not completed until the soap dispensers were installed and hence the action was commenced “within six (6) months after completion of the work described in said contract.”
Appellant cites and relies upon cases construing the meaning of “completion” in the mechanics lien law and holding that the building is completed when there is a substantial completion and that trivial imperfections in performance do not operate to extend the time for filing a lien.
(Hammond Lbr. Co.
v.
Barth Invest. Corp.,
In
Fontaine
v.
Storrie, supra,
Given its natural construction the language of the bond “completion of the work described in said contract” includes the installation of the soap dispensers since that installation was “work described m said contract.” The Supreme Court pointed out in
Nelson
v.
Trounce,
By express provision of the code the bond which is the subject of this action “will be construed most strongly against the surety and in favor of all persons for whose benefit such a bond is given.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 1200.1, subd. (b), formerly §1183.) Furthermore “ (c)ontractual stipulations which limit the right to sue to a period shorter than that granted by statute, are not looked upon with favor because they are in derogation of the statutory limitation. Hence, they should be construed with strictness against the party invoking them.”
(Hauer Const. Co.
v.
City of New York,
Any ambiguity in its bond must be construed against appellant and the language “completion of the work described in said contract” should be given its natural and normal
Judgment affirmed.
Nourse, P. J., and Kaufman, J., concurred.