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Lewis v. Emory University
235 Ga. App. 811
Ga. Ct. App.
1998
Check Treatment

*1 Dеcided November 18, 1998 December denied Reconsideration Lehman, Chason, appellant. L. Porter, & Thomas Lehman Lane, for appellees. Ronnie J. EMORY UNIVERSITY. LEWIS v.

A98A1351. (509 SE2d Judge. Beasley, jury on a verdict entered appeals judgment

Judith Lewis out Long Hospital arising University d/b/a Crawford Emory favor of he received a heart attack which following of her husband’s death four errors of Lewis enumerates hospital. treatment at defendant jurors regard with qualify prospective to allow her to refusing court: carrier; to failing excess insurance Emory’s to their with who died before by of statements made witness allow with a docu- expert of a defense trial; cross-examination prohibiting relied; jury and prejudicing ment or guess speculate. that could not charging they repeatedly lawyers asked the to selection, to the trial court 1. Prior counsel Emory’s explained carrier in the case. identify any insurance $3,000,000 that St. Paul for the first that was self-insured coverage excess there- Marine Company provided Fire & Insurance if a mutual to which company, after. The court asked St. Paul was it a stock company. defense counsel responded the jury are not judges required qualify it understood explained Lewis’ counsel companies. to insurers that are stock respect was, it regardless type company what objected argued as to whether qualify prospective court was required finan- stockholders, officers, directors or had a employees, Lewis’ coun- disagreed Paul. The court but allowed cial interest St. juror’s each prospective comprehensive questions sel to ask background. employment up asked the to award argument,

During closing Lewis moved for a new $4,800,000 but it awarded none. damages, the motion was denied.1 trial but decision in Atlanta Coach Co. Court long-standing Supreme parties improper are addressed conduct of “Motions for new trial because discretion, appel trial'judge. Unless there is an abuse

to the sound discretion of (Citations punctuation upset judge’s omit the trial determination.” late court will nоt ted.) Landers, Bean v. competing pol- v. Cobb2mandates reversal. The Court considered the plaintiffs right panel impartial jurors icies of the to a from which prohibiting indemnity to select a and the rule mention of con- during proceedings.3 non-party tracts It reasoned that a litigation appear insurer’s “own interest in the result of the would equal greater to, be it once if than, not even that of the defendant; and when *2 appears indemnity particular that an contract does in exist purging jury case, the matter of the as to to such com- pany party.”4 important company is not less than if the were an actual employees, officers, Court held that and stockholders and non-party company relatives of stockholders of a insurance judgment disqualified be liable for a in rendered the case are as serving refusing a matter of law from as and that to allow plaintiff’s qualify jury presumption counsel to so the creates a of injury.5 presumption This cannot be overcome after the verdict asserting jurоr disqualified.6 affidavits that no These rules have recently Arp Payne.8 been followed in Dalton v. Vo7and The trial court misunderstood the difference between how companies jury mutual and qualified stock are handled. The must be types regard employees, for both of insurers with to officers, jury qualified stockholders and their relatives.9 The need not be as to policyholders companies policyholders in stock because such do not any company; company have interest in poli- the assets of the mutual cyholders are shareholders or otherwise have an interest in the jury.10 assets of the insurer and therefore none can serve on the qualified insists a need not be as to an excess carrier. Certainly sought damages here, exceeding primary where Lewis the coverage, ground excluding there is no the excess carrier from application non-party Atlanta Coach rule. Both insurers were companies potentially judgment. insurance liable for a The answer to apply whether sought dаmages the same rule would if the primary coverage an amount less than day. must await another qualify The trial court’s failure to as to St. Paul was error. 2 SE 3 Id. at 549-550. 4 Id. at 550. 5 Id. at 551. 6 Id. at 552. (2) (497 245) (1998) (non-precedential), and cases cited therein. (non-precedential), and cases cited therein. Vo, supra. See Dalton v. generally Lauderback, See Patterson v. (1994), grounds, Ballard, overruled on other Warren v. Coach, the error “presumptively Atlanta explained by

As harmful.”11 indicated presumption Supreme Court Although rebutted, guide it did not оut to determine the could be set possibly court manner which the criteria to satisfied. The method or analogous rebut the harm is presumption case Coach. made Atlanta attempt the unsuccessful following dia- the verdict announced the Immediately after I you. All want to thank Right. Again, “THE COURT: occurred: logue — Now, leaves. let them it before that around to see Take you this if And as lawyers to ‍‌​​​‌​‌​‌‌​‌​‌‌‌‌‌​​‌‌​​‌‌‌​‌​‌‌‌‌‌​​‌‌‌​​​‌‌​‌‌‍talk choose. you’re free information, anything [it] not that to do with the case had matter now, I you want to ask we question and the case over an any you employed by, employee, on. Are early debated officer, Company? Any with the St. Paul Insurance or stockholder THE immediate Anybody your THE JURY: No. COURT: you? (No THE All Response). COURT: family company? work go. All free to right, you’re none of them. Let record show right. I And, you very sincerely.” thank again, related

First, failed to ask whether Paul, which is under required who was a stockholder St. anyone *3 Vo,13 recently “controlling Coach.12 in Dalton case Atlanta As stated right policyholders not this to to mutual inquire law does limit оfficers, any- it to stockholders employees, but extends companies Second, like company.” one related to stockholders insurance Coach, made in court’s offhand at inquiry, the affidavits Atlanta the only ambiguous a not after the verdict but also as to whether time excused, True, a had been failed to for dire. it the substitute voir post-purge in court and the but that open jury dispersed, before remedy pursue for omission of the “to right was an insufficient the procedure jury.”14 the lawful in the selection of a Atlanta Coach held there asserting grounds disqualification that affidavits are no are after trial insufficient jury panel the which offered to among verdict, the could jurors the of error. “After presumption rebut own not even by showing disqualification, their their impeach finding verdict, to others have testified vindication of the reply who indeed, mistake nor, by any might error or have explaining affidavits, made in their and which have been original might been plaintiff right “[T]he on further examination.”15 had the to discovered Coach, supra, Atlantа 178 Ga. at 551. 549, 552. Id. at 13 Supra at 413. Coach, supra Atlanta at 550. Coach, supra Atlanta at 552. jurors panel impartial jury.”16 . . from which to a of. select the “[I]t apparent. plaintiff after . . that verdict the did not have the discovering proving possible opportunity disqualifica and same trial, tions which she was entitled to exercise the the same hav ing seriously by been curtailed the rendition of the verdict and the consequent application jurors impeach of the rule that can not their finding.”17 question competency impartiаlity “The as to the jurors parties begin is thus to be determined the strike before jury.”18 post-verdict inquiry procedure counterproductive Third, the justice by creating unnecessary to the efficient administration of validity risk. As stated Atlanta Coach:19“The of a trial should not by possible relationship upon theory be hazarded the that the plaintiff protected by grant could be the new trial it should appear juror disqualified.” verdict after was so dialogue the between court and the after the verdict infirmity this case from suffers the sаme the as affidavits Atlanta importantly, given by the Coach. Most answers the were after subject jurors verdict therefore to the rule that cannot impeach findings. Emory argues jurors their own were still in questions. oath court under when answered the court’s How- operative juror’s answering ever, we see no difference between questions submitting court’s after the verdict a sworn affidavit presumption sometime thereafter. Neither overcomes the of harm. thing, subjects jurors by For one counsel. effort neither to examinаtion jurors incompetent testify counters were not testimony supported after the verdict because their the verdict.20 argument plaintiff Atlanta Coach addressed this as well. “If the open entitled to have the examination as to conducted in testify competent court and before while verdict qualification, denying as their well the error in right by procured by submission was not cured of affidavits legally verdict, defendant out court and after when the could testify only way question, permit offering one on the countеr-showing. materially to make a This was to fall short *4 16Id. at 549. 9-10-9; Id. at exceptions. 552. This rule is still the law with certain limited OCGA § (1) (c) (493 900) Turpin Todd, 820, (1997); State, 678, v. 268 Ga. SE2d Watkins v. 237 Ga. 465) (1976). 683-686 SE2d 18 (Emphasis original.) public policy keep jury Id. at 555. “The of this State is to trials suspicion irregularity such, impropriety assuring free from or of conduct. A method for expression policy right, (1) (390 provided Fidelity of the as a § in OCGA 15-12-133.” Nat. 55, Kneller, Bank v. 194 Ga. 19Id. at 550. 20 OCGA §9-10-9. ruling, an erroneous away by had been taken restoring what A ... mere the substitute. accept the was not bound to plaintiff words, In the other satisfy does not whole.”21 right of the fragment answer, an oppor- factual without negative itself the provides the law addition, In the factually it is true or not. to discover whether tunity who requiring overruled case law specifically Court Supreme of the the of relatives the court failed to purge complained jury.22 was on the or relative allege prove other to either party, of identify- case meets the timing problem problem way gather must a better suggested This Court has there ing. without prospective information from necessary is interested the out- company them that an insurance informing here, plaintiff’s the court to allow although come.23 But dire, propose some voir the court did leeway during counsel the relevant comprehensive unearthing solution implement company from the that an insurance mentioning facts without court, duty proper application, had an interest. It is “the on provide competent impartial jury.”24 “[A]n [in to follow Atlanta Coach: interest

We constrained to do mystery, can not be conceаled or shrouded where litigation] of a the lawful abridge right pursue proce- so would trial, dure in the jury.”25Throughout parties selection did as to St. Paul. juror disqualified not know whether was enumerations are addressed to avoid recurrence remaining on retrial should there have been error.

2. Jim from chest hospital suffering pains early Lewis was on the 1992. He in a room for emer- morning placed April At gencies monitoring equipment. approxi- and attached to cardiac 4:40 a.m. in a mately cyanotic, apneiс pul- Lewis was discovered Milner, on respiratory therapy supervisor seless state. Sheila to a call for duty, among personnel responded the medical who during attempt and she is the who intubated Lewis help person to resuscitate him. was filed and before

Ms. Milner died three months after this suit sought trial. Her was never taken. Plaintiff to introduce deposition one allegedly colleague therapists, statements made Milner two other, on and the Lewis’ twin duty morning when he came the next Coach, supra, Atlanta 178 Ga. at 552-553. 22 Id. at 554-555. Tackett, (Beasley, See Franklin v. (1) (1995); J., Daus, concurring specially); Byrd Dalton P. Vo, supra. Coach, supra Roberts v. Atlanta at 551. See also (1939) (trial impartial jury). judge responsibility has for a fair and 25 178 Ga. at 549-550. *5 episode. brother, the within week or so evidence, after the disallowed, was as follows: (the morning): Witness James Todd next “I had asked her did she getting have a hard time intubated, ‍‌​​​‌​‌​‌‌​‌​‌‌‌‌‌​​‌‌​​‌‌‌​‌​‌‌‌‌‌​​‌‌‌​​​‌‌​‌‌‍Jim no, and she said that he was very easy intubation. And she commented on the fact that he was — anybody. she said he was as blue as she had ever seen say anything jaw being

“Q. Did she at all about Jim’s clenched? “A.No. “Q.

Anything being at all him in seizure?

“A.No.” — (Milner) phone Witness Thomas Lewis: “She told me over the during night you I had called shift her, and asked the thera- pist night, supervisor, yes. just on that rather, and she said IAnd you asked, do know what went on in the ER. And she said she responded quickly, to the doctor 99 she ran into the room and it awas recognize zoo, she saw Jim on a stretcher and didn’t him at first very because from the waist to his head he was She blue. said she went to the head of the stretcher to intubate him because the ER physician slip had not been able to I tube. asked her if he was a dif- eаsy, limp. ficult said, no, intubation. She he was he was She said it looked like he had been down for awhile and that she had never seen anyone any bluer than he was.” “necessity exception” statements were offered under the (b). hearsay statutory §

the rule exceptions rule. OCGA 24-3-1 “The to the hearsay the admission of are not exhaustive and exclu- exception necessity’ sive all other cases. An will be allowed ‘from ‘necessity’ ‘particularized guarantees where of trustworthiness’ are established.”26 urges necessаry Milner’s because whether helps long intubation was difficult show how her husband had

been in cardiac arrest before he was discovered in that condition. allegedly beyond This in turn was material to whether Lewis was redemption life-threatening when discovered and his condition contrarily, should have been or, discovered earlier cardiac arrest had just timely. According occurred so the resuscitation was Emory’s expert: jaw tightly making “The was clenched it difficult for Again, my experience intubation very impor- to be dоne. that is a sign very early tant that one is in the resuscitation.” The con- extremely cluded quickly.” that Lewis’ cardiac arrest was “detected Emory argues the statements were not relevant because others witnessed these events. Before Milner arrived in room after Lewis’ 26 (Citations omitted.) (1993); McKissick v. Chrysler Corp. Davis, Motors 226 including personnel help medical arose, at least five other call for present. when she testified that One such witness one doctor were arrived, rigid, clenched, his head was his fists were Lewis was flung head and arched with his Another said he was stiff tilted back. back. teeth were rigid, seizing, arched, and his his back A third said he was during his several A nurse testified that clenched. jaw attempts This evidence Lewis, the was clenched. to resuscitate just arrest. had suffered the cardiac indicated that Lewis *6 hearsay exclusion of is whether the trial court’s The issue fitting necessity exception abuse of discre- is an as not evidence requires the evi- is abused law If the discretion tion.27 oppo- judge rules the excluded or admitted and thе dence to be doubtful Evidence of even site, this constitutes clear error.28 relevance should be admitted.29 necessity part satisfied if the evidence first of the rule is only (e.g., the unavailable the declarant is unavailable from some other source unattainable her), unique it; declarant has (e.g., it is to dead) If it contra- and, evidence, true of all it is relevant.30 as is testimony, Declarant here, it is relevant.31 dicts other witnesses’ meet these criteria. Milner’s statements part to the rule is that the evidence must be shown

The second trustworthy, degree to warrant a threshold of trustworthiness be admissibility degree although credibil- not to the ultimate achieve Emory argues ity mony may jury. Tom testi- with the that Todd’s and Lewis’ Any subject biased, be but cross-examination. merely go question regarding their interest in the case “should credibility admissibility witness, the declarant’s not to the statement.”32 statement, “the mere As to the trustworthiness of the declarant’s admis- fact that a witness is dead does not render his declarations although, cir- sible, if in addition to the death of a witness therе are hearsay verity declarations, cumstances which to his attribute permit relaxed to admission of rule such declaration.”33 27 (415 467) (1992). White, 168, v. 262 169 SE2d See White Ga. 28 (290 71) (1982) (whether State, 223, 249 Ga. SE2d evidence is See Andrews v. 227-228 judge,” involves “the discernment of the trial whose determination will not be admissible erroneous”). “clearly disturbed unless it is 29 362) (1997). Irvin, 760, Ga. Power Co. v. See, 267 Ga. 766 SE2d (493 169) State, (1997); State, e.g., Hayes v. v. 268 Ga. 28 268 Ga. 809 SE2d White (483 584) 338) (1997); State, (1997); State, Higgs v. SE2d Holland v. SE2d (2-5) (351 448) (1987); State, 231 Ga. Smith (1998); McKibbons v. cumulative, only Emory argues if it it would be cumulative evidence is but conformed to that of other witnesses. Albany, Bank Swain v. C & S 33 (Citаtions omitted.) Corp. Davis, punctuation Chrysler Motors “[T]he proponent only need show threshold trustworthiness. ... If unlikely the statement was made in circumstances in which it is aspect untrue, have been it meets this of trustworthiness. In other something present words, there must be which the law considers a substitute for the oath of the declarant and his cross-examination against hearsay [T]he whom the is offered. . . . ultimate [is] jury [where suitable]. jury, trustworthiness left to the It is for the appropriate weight instructions, under to determine the and credibil- ity “[A] finding of the deсlarations.”34 of trustworthiness must be totality based on consideration of the of the circumstances, . . but. only the relevant circumstances include those that surround the making worthy of the statement and that render the declarant belief. standard is whether the declarant’s truthfulness is so surrounding clear from the circumstances that the test of cross- marginal utility.”35 examination would be of only person Milner was the who intubated Mr. Lewis and was in position easy the best to know how it was. She was a friend of Lewis employee hospital, but alsо an and the statements were employer. the interest of her There is no evidence that her self-serving statements were or calculated to benefit Lewis. There suggestion has been no that she had a reason to lie. She made the respiratory therapist, professional Todd, statements to another in a *7 capacity duty morning after he came on after she had intubated testimony Lewis. Todd’s indicates that the statement was made in professional the course of their work in intubation. She made essеn- tially the same statement to Jim brother, Lewis’s twin who was also respiratory therapist, episode. within a week or so of the Thus consistency. there is typically Todd testified that difficult intubations were discussed among therapists. acknowledged He that ease of intubation was a subjective might conclusion and that his own conclusion differ based contradictory on the same circumstances. There is no information in the related written records, medical and difficult are intubations generally hospital recorded and should be noted on the chart. The chart showed no such indication.

The fact that the statements contradict the other does reliability. Emory inconsistency eliminate their contends such ‍‌​​​‌​‌​‌‌​‌​‌‌‌‌‌​​‌‌​​‌‌‌​‌​‌‌‌‌‌​​‌‌‌​​​‌‌​‌‌‍an indicates a lack support of trustworthiness. The cases cited in 691) (1970), quoted approval Swain, supra, with 258 Ga. 547. 34 (Citations omitted.) punctuation Swain, and Albany C & S Bank (Beasley, J., dissenting), approval by cited with Supreme Swain, supra, Court in 35 (Citations omitted.) punctuation Fenimore v. distinguishable.36 shown, has been of trustworthiness a threshold level

Because declarant’s introduce the deceased allowed to Lewis should be Mrs. jury, on the of others the recollections to the to counter statements scene and opinions Emory’s respect experts their concern- significance. ing length and its arrest and intubation of time between Emory’s attorney litigation, counsel sent a letter to Before the 3. summarizing her care husband’s information for Mrs. Lewis attempts hospital’s “As stated further: him. The letter to save and the summary being pro- discussed, confirm that we also vided will not bе this will litigation only purposes, ensue, it informational should for any purpose, by party direct whether as used either impeachment, After cross-examination, etc.”37 suit was evidence, Emory provided copy Ornato, one of letter to Dr. James filed, its analysis part experts, the case. it as a of his and he reviewed jury, During deposition read to the but trial, Dr. Ornato’s deposition objection portion of the to the the court sustained where Lewis’ attorney the letter. Lewis Ornato about cross-examined Emory аny right rely on erred waived contends the because agreement is entitled to cross- not to use the letter expert opinion. the factual basis for his examine an on ruling. right of its “The The trial court did not state basis belong every party thorough sifting shall cross-examination Supreme Court has to the witnesses called written: “a him.”38And as the may opinion not with- who relies a witness’ forming opin- upon in hold from the the facts that are relied [cits]. ion, upon Furthermore, know all of the facts is entitled to brought opinion and the facts witnеss’ rests [Cits.]”39 out on cross-examination. agreement

By giving expert, the letter to its violated ground parties litigation. not to use it in the No valid between doing. agreement presented so to show that it did not waive allowing by Emory’s requires report Reliance on the using deposition reveals that cross-examine the letter.40The Ornato preju- Emory’s argument in a to use the letter that Lewis dicial manner is without merit. *8 36 839) (1991) (other (409 Mallory State, no rea than there was See SE2d trustworthiness); Abi-Sarkis, lie, Boehm v. son for the declarant there were no indicia of (438 410) (1990) (declarant testimony gave about the App. inconsistent 211 Ga. 181 SE2d facts). critical 37 (Emphasis original.) 38 OCGA 24-9-64. § 39 (396 492) (1990); State, 445, also cases cited therein. see Eason v. 260 Ga. 446 SE2d 40 65) (1989) (reversible 759, State, error Jimmerson v. 761 based). jury opinion is

to withhold from the facts on which relied 820 jury unfairly prejudiced

4. Lewis contends the was in favor of Emory because the on instructed the five occasions they guess speculate that could not to reach conclusion in the In two of the the court instructing case. instances was about requirement support that finding pro- must instance, fessional In one other the court negligence. instructing was that it could defendant find for the even if the cause of death Lewis’ matter was a of speculation. “ ‘It is fundamental rule in that Georgia instructions must and be read considered as whole in whether determining charge ”41 contained error. . In that repetition . .’ context the did cause Nevertheless, reversible error. the court should not set impartiality at risk on select emphasis parts the instructions.42 J., J., Judgment P. Pope, reversed. and concur Ruffin, specially. Pope, Presiding Judge, concurring specially. agree

I with opinion; Divisions I sepa- write with rately respect to Division 1. agree

I with the that majority sought damages because coverage excess there no reason primary to exclude St. Paul, carrier, as the from excess of the rule application from Atlanta 131) (1934). ‍‌​​​‌​‌​‌‌​‌​‌‌‌‌‌​​‌‌​​‌‌‌​‌​‌‌‌‌‌​​‌‌‌​​​‌‌​‌‌‍Cobb, Coach Co. v. Ga. 544 SE I Accordingly, that agree court erred failing qualify jury as to officers, employees, stockholders and stockholder Paul relativеs of St. Fire And, & Marine Insurance I Company. agree that the court’s post-verdict inquiry to the failed to incomplete substi- for voir tute dire.

I write separately respect majority’s suggestion requisite should gathered information be from jurors during voir dire without them that an informing company insurance is involved in the case. enlightened “[I]n this age, it can should presumed be that prospective jurors already liability realize that insurance cover- age likely present cases involving [medical malpractice claims]. Paynе, [Cits.]” Arp

(1998) J.,P. (Pope, concurring specially).

“I believe that the best be to approach would continue to qualify any prospective might any have with insurer, interested Cobb, as is mandated by Atlanta Coach Co. v. After such [supra]. qualification, however, to avoid any potential prejudice might arise from the qualification itself, pro- or the Roker v. 857) (1984) (“ Rodriquez, See Jackson v. ‘it error to again repeat again portion charge of a which is favorable to one more than ” determinative). other,’ charge but the as a whole is *9 that the I would recommend knowledge, common own jurors’ spective existence or instructions limiting give specific trial court not to be con- material and is case is not given lack of insurance App. Payne, case.” v. Arp a decision reaching sidered Vo, also Dalton v. J., See concurring specially). P. (Pope, at 842 (497 J., concurring spe- P. (Pope, 413, 414 cially). in this joins special Ruffin Judge to state that

I am authorized concurrence. Decided November 18, 1998 denied December

Reconsideration Allen, Bird, L. Associates, Q. Karin & William Q. Bird William Jr., for appellant. Dwyer, & J. Matthew Dwyer, Sapp, White Jr., Wheelеr, Sager, N. & Frederick Weinberg, Ansley Long, TV, Krawcheck, for Johnathan T. Hudgins J. M. Rajan, Anandhi S. appellee. al. v. RAY et FABRICS & FIBERS COMPANY AMOCO

A98A1632. (510 SE2d Andrews, Judge. Chief of Amoco Fabrics 3,1998, appeal we dismissed the

On November (Amoco) enumeration ‍‌​​​‌​‌​‌‌​‌​‌‌‌‌‌​​‌‌​​‌‌‌​‌​‌‌‌‌‌​​‌‌‌​​​‌‌​‌‌‍failure to file a separate & Company Fibers Rule 22 Appeals 5-6-40 and Court required by of errors as (a).1 OCGA § of errors on November Amoco filed a enumeration separate of this dismissal. filed its motion for reconsideration and has expect compliance we do not condone this failure Althоugh Court, light to that motion and of this pursuant the Rules (510 SE2d Corp., v. Gen. Motors Acceptance Reeder 337) (1998) (whole court) Williams, and Leslie 130) (1998) (whole court), hereby opinion we vacate our following 3, 1998, opinion. and issue November Amoco alleg- employees action was filed former This class meruit. recovery quantum or, alternatively, of contract ing breach vacation bene- pay of Amoco’s refusal This result litigation until Amoco sold in 1992 period for the employees fits to its former they were worked, though even where manufacturing plant 411) (1971); Crozier, Windsor v. Southeast See, e.g., Crozier 228 Ga. 372 Adjusters, ern

Case Details

Case Name: Lewis v. Emory University
Court Name: Court of Appeals of Georgia
Date Published: Nov 3, 1998
Citation: 235 Ga. App. 811
Docket Number: A98A1351
Court Abbreviation: Ga. Ct. App.
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