130 Iowa 423 | Iowa | 1906
On August 25, 1903, Julia E. Crockett, being tbe owner of tbe W. % of tbe S. E. % of section 8, township 90 N., of range 35 W., in Buena Vista county, Iowa, and lot No. 3 in block 42 in the city of Storm Lake, Iowa, conveyed tbe same to “ Calliway 'Curnutt, trustee.” Tbe conveyance was by warranty deed in tbe usual form and for the expressed consideration of “ one dollar and tbe execution of the trust hereby created.” At tbe same time as a part of tbe same transaction the grantor made and delivered to Curnutt another written instrument in-the following form:
I, Julia E. Crockett, of tbe city of Storm Lake, in Buena Vista county, and state of Iowa, do hereby make, constitute, and appoint Calliway Curnutt, of Buena Vista county, Iowa, a trustee, for and in behalf of myself to receive, acquire, take, and bold title to tbe following real es*425 tate, situated in the county of Buena Vista and state of Iowa, to wit: The west half (%) of the southwest quarter of section eight (8) in township ninety (90), range thirty-five (35), west of the 5th P. M. Also lot number three (3) in block number forty-two (42) in the city of Storm Lake, according to the recorded plat thereof, from and after my death, and not before, to execute, transfer, and convey perfect title to the above real estate, and also any and all personal property of which I may die seised or possessed, and I hereby empower him to do any act which I could do if present, subject to the following conditions: (1) At my death said trustee shall immediately take possession and have control of all my property both real and personal, and he shall first out of the proceeds of the land above described he shall pay the expenses of my last sickness, funeral expenses, and settlement of my-estate in full. (2) To the Board of Ministerial Belief of the Church of Christ, corporation organized under the laws of the state of Indiana, he shall pay the sum of one thousand ($1,000) dollars, to be applied and used for the relief and support of aged ministers of the gospel of Christ of said Christian Church and their wives. (3) I hereby direct said trustee to give to the National Woman’s Board of Missions,' also a corporation under the laws of the state of Indian, one thousand ($1,000) dollars, said money to be used by them solely in the work of negro education evangelization. (4) I hereby direct that out of the proceeds of said property the said trustee shall pay to my great grandson, Herbert Ainos Lewis, of Storm Lake, Iowa, eight hundred ($800), to be used by his parents in his education. . (5) I hereby direct said trustee that out of the proceeds of said property he is to pay to the Northwestern Missionary Society for the Christian Church seven hundred ($100) dollars, to be used by them only in the northwest district of Iowa, and said sum is to be paid to its secretary. (6) I. hereby direct the trustee named to pay to my grandson, Scribner Herbert Lewis, of Storm Lake, Iowa, all the rest, residue, and remainder of my property after the above provisions are complied with, be the same real, personal, or mixed, and wheresoever located to be his property absolutely, after the five provisions are fully complied with. Lastly, I hereby direct said trustee to sell the real estate above described or so much thereof as is necessary, and first apply the proceeds thereof to the payment of the five first*426 provisions hereof, and when they have been complied with to turn over to my grandson all moneys and property then on hand. Dated at Storm Lake, Iowa, this 25th day of August, A. D. 1903. Julia E. Crockett.
In October, 1903, the trustee quitclaimed the above-mentioned lot in Storm Lake to Mrs. Crockett, and thereafter she sold and conveyed it to a third person not a party' to this suit. On December 9, 1903, Mrs. Crockett died intestate, leaving the plaintiff, Scribner Herbert Lewis, as her only heir at law. Thereafter, proceeding on the assumption and claim that the deed and declaration of trust to Curnutt were void, plaintiff brought this action to quiet the title to the eighty-acre tract of land in himself. By their answers and cross-bills the defendants deny the plaintiff’s claim of title and ask to have the deed and declaration of trust confirmed and established according to the expressed intention of their grantor. Replying, the plaintiff alleges that the conveyance to the trustee and the written instrument defining the trust do not in fact create a trust as known or defined by law, but are in the nature of a last will and testament, and, not being executed and witnessed as the statute requires, such testamentary provision is void, and no right or title in the property can be predicated thereon. Upon the issues thus joined the trial court found for the plaintiff and entered a decree quieting the title in him as prayed. The defendants appeal.
But the disposition of property after the death of the owner, the uses to which it shall be devoted, and the designation of the persons who shall then come into its beneficial use and enjoyment, is often effectually accomplished otherwise than by will. Bor .example, the owner of real estate may without any valuable consideration make and execute an ordinary deed of conveyance to a designated grantee, and deposit the same in the hands of a third person, to be delivered to the grantee only upon the death of the grantor, and such conveyance is held to be operative, even though made without the knowledge, or express or formal consent or. acceptance, of the grantee. See Foreman v. Archer, 130 Iowa, -, and cases there cited. This is certainly true where the deposit is made without any reserve power to recall it; but even a reserved power to recall, which is not exercised during the life of the grantor, has been held
The same purpose to direct and control the disposition of property beyond the life of the owner is very frequently accomplished through a trustee, who may be appointed by will, or by deed, or other suitable declaration of trust. Subject only to the condition that the purpose of the trust be not in contravention of the command or policy of the law, the right and power of the owner of property' to thus dispose of it is elementary, and we need not stop here to cite authorities. In the language of Earl, J., in Hollis v. Drew Seminary, 95 N. Y. 166:
The general rule is that one may do with his property as he pleases. He may dispose of it by will in any way that suits his fancy or judgment. He may give it all to strangers, and disinherit his relatives. He may give it all to natural persons, or to corporations capable of taking. He may give it directly, or create trusts which the law allows; and this general power of disposition he possesses down to the last hour of conscious intelligent existence. It is not against public policy to allow gifts to charitable, benevolent, scientific, or educational institutions. The law allows and encourages. such gifts, and those who make them are commended as benefactors of their race. Such institutions, dotted all over our land, to succor, elevate, and educate men, and ameliorate their condition, are distinguishing features of our modern civilization]
Whether the trust be created by will or by deed, if it b.e lawful, and the intent can be' fairly^ ascertained from the examination of the instrument, the courts will uphold and enforce it. To that end they will not be restrained by narrow and technical rules of construction; but, if the intent of the grantor or donor be apparent, even though not expressed with technical nicety, the trust will not be avoided. “ The intent of the settlor in the creation of trusts is. what the courts look to, and not to any particular form of words;
No claim is made in the argument that the trust which the grantor in this case very clearly attempted to make violates any law or principle of public policy. So far as their legal effect is concerned, the characteristic distinction between a will and a trust is that, while the former becomes operative only at the death of the testator, a trust passes an interest to the trustee and beneficiary instantly upon the execution and delivery of the writing by which it is created. If, then, the transaction between Mrs. Crockett and Curnutt had the effect so instante to pass any interest in the property from the. former to the latter, or to the parties named in writing accompanying the deed, then the trust thus created is not to be avoided simply because such writing was not executed and witnessed in the form prescribed by statute for the making of a will. The grantor laboring under no disability, and there being no claim or pretense that she was impelled by fraud, and the deed being in apt and proper form for the conveyance of title to real estate, the necessary and unavoidable effect of its execution and delivery was to convey the legal title to this property out of the grantor and into the grantee. From that moment the grantee held such title -either in his own right or in trust for another. He does not claim to hold in his own right, and we must determine the nature of the trust and the identity of the cestui que trust by reference to the writings. This we may readily do. It is impossible to read these instruments, and give to their., language its fair and ordinary meaning, without understanding that, subject to her own life -use and enjoyment, the grantor intended and in apt words undertook to and did authorize her- trustee to convert this property into money and distribute it in defined proportions to the several parties therein named, and in the last analysis the case presents the single question whether the postponement of the
The same may be said of a case where a deed is deposited with a third party to be delivered to the grantee on the death of the grantor. Lippold v. Lippold, 112 Iowa, 134. It is even more clearly true in respect to property devoted to a trust, the benefit of which is postponed until the death of the owner. Nichols v. Emery, 109 Cal. 323 (41 Pac. 1089, 50 Am. St. Rep. 43). In the cited case the owner of land conveyed the title to a trustee, reserving the use of the property to himself during life, and authorizing the trustee to convert the same into money after the grantor’s decease and distribute the proceeds to named beneficiaries. This was held a valid trust. The court there says: “ It is important to note the distinction between the interest transferred and the enjoyment of that interest. . . . The language is appropriate to a conveyance, and the grantor’s execution and delivery of the deed, he being under no disability and impelled by no fraud, operated to vest so much
It needs no argument to support the proposition that the owner of land may sever 'the fee into a life estate and a remainder, and that he may reserve the former to himself and sell or give the latter to whomsoever he will. When he has done so, can it be said that the grantee of the remainder acquires no present interest in the land simply because he cannot come into possession and enjoyment of the property until after the grantor’s death ? We think no lawyer will answer this inquiry in the affirmative. ’ And yet such would he the necessary result if the contention of the appellee here be correct. Mrs. Crockett conveyed the property by an unconditional deed, and by an accompanying instrument provided that the trustee should not come into possession or control until after her death. . The legal effect of this was to create a life estate in her and a remainder in the trustee for the benefit of the cestui que trust.
Moreover, it must be remembered that it is not necessary in any case to the establishment of a trust that any beneficial interest shall pass to the trustee. Erom its very nature a trust involves the idea of separation of the beneficial interest from the legal title. When a trust is executed by the delivery of a simple conveyance to the trustee, that act and instrument serve to pass an immediate present interest to the cestui que trust, no matter how far in. the future the enjoyment of the benefit thus provided may be deferred. In Forney v. Remey, 77 Iowa, 549, we expressly decided that a trust by which the property should be held for the use of
These instructions and trusts certainly have a very testamentary look, and, as the deed was executed only two days before the grantor died, we appreciate the strength of the argument that the parties must have understood that the instrument was to take effect only if the grantor died, and that is not a deed, but an ineffectual will. But On the face of the deed it is a conveyance operating at once and irrevocably, and there is nothing in the parol trusts which is not reconcilable with the same interpretation. It is perfectly possible to convey all one’s property upon a present irrevocable trust to pay one’s debts and so forth, as found in this case. If the trusts include gifts which do not pass into the possession of the cestui que trust, that is not conclusive against the instrument being a deed and valid as such.
See, also Wynn v. Wynn, 112 Ga. 214 (37 S. E. 378); 28 Am. & Eng. Ency. Law (2d Ed.) 894; Davis v. Ney, 125 Mass. 590 (28 Am. Rep. 272) ; Saunders v. Saunders, 115 Iowa, 275; Craven v. Winter, 38 Iowa, 472; Wilson v. Carrico, 140 Ind. 533 (40 N. E. 50, 49 Am. St. Rep. 213); Brace v. Van Eps, 12 S. D. 191 (80 N. W. 197); Massey v. Huntington, 118 Ill. 80 (7 N. E. 269) ; White v. Hopkins, 80 Ga. 154 (4 S. E. 863) ; Robinson v. Ingram, 126 N. C. 327 (35 S. E. 612) ; Kelly v. Parker, 181 Ill. 49 (54 N. E. 615); Love v. Blauw, 61 Kan. 496 (59 Pac. 1059, 48 L. R. A. 257, 78 Am. St. Rep. 334) ; Chrisman v. Wyatt, 7 Tex. Civ. App. 40 (26 S. W. 759) ; Graves v. Atwood, 52 Conn. 512 (52 Am. Rep. 610) ; Bunch v. Nicks, 50 Ark. 367 (7 S. W. 563); Kelley v. Snow, 185 Mass. 288 (70 N. E.
The case last cited is of value upon the effect which will be given to the writing accompanying the deed. There the grantor made and delivered to the grantees an unconditional deed, receiving from them a written agreement not to sell or convey the same during the grantor’s lifetime without his consent, and agreeing that all property should remain in his possession and under his control as long as he should live, with the right on his part to sell the same as though no deed had been given to the grantees, and that the grantees would sign deeds for the property when requested so to do by the grantor. Of these, facts it was held that an estate in prcesenti was conveyed to the grantees and that the instrument was not testamentary. It was further held, and we think upon sound principle, that between a deed of land and a collateral writing made at the same time, if repugnance be found, the latter must yield; for, while a paper so given may be used to lessen, enlarge, explain, or qualify the estate conveyed by the deed, it will not be permitted to totally destroy such estate.
It follows from what we have said that the district court should have sustained the cross-petition of the defendants and dismissed the petition of plaintiff. Decree accordingly will, be entered in this court, if the appellants so elect, within twenty days from the filing of this opinion; otherwise, the cause will be remanded for decree in the court below.— Beverséd.