LEWIS v. CITY OF NEW ORLEANS
No. 70-5323
Supreme Court of the United States
June 26, 1972
408 U.S. 913
Unless we are to distort the doctrine of overbreadth into a verbal game of logic-chopping and sentence-parsing reminiscent of common-law pleading, it cannot fairly be said here that either the New Orleans ordinance, or the New Jersey statute as construed by the highest court of that State, could reasonably be thought “unduly to infringe the protected freedom,” Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U. S., at 304.
I would dismiss these appeals for lack of a substantial federal question.
No. 70-5323. LEWIS v. CITY OF NEW ORLEANS. Appeal from Sup. Ct. La. Motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Judgment vacated and case remanded for reconsideration in light of Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U. S. 518 (1972).
MR. JUSTICE POWELL, concurring in the result.
Under Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U. S. 568 (1942), the issue in a case of this kind is whether “fighting words” were used. Here a police officer, while in the performance of his duty, was called “g-- d--- m------ f-----” police.
If these words had been addressed by one citizen to another, face to face and in a hostile manner, I would have no doubt that they would be “fighting words.” But the situation may be different where such words are addressed to a police officer trained to exercise a higher degree of restraint than the average citizen. See
I would remand for reconsideration only in light of Chaplinsky.
[For dissenting opinion of MR. CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER, see ante, p. 902.]
[For dissenting opinion of MR. JUSTICE REHNQUIST, see ante, p. 909.]
BROWN v. OKLAHOMA
No. 71-6535
Supreme Court of the United States
June 26, 1972
408 U.S. 914
No. 71-6535. BROWN v. OKLAHOMA. Appeal from Ct. Crim. App. Okla. Motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Judgment vacated and case remanded for reconsideration in light of Cohen v. California, 403 U. S. 15 (1971), and Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U. S. 518 (1972).
MR. JUSTICE POWELL, concurring in the result.
The statute involved in this case is considerably broader than the statute involved in Rosenfeld v. New Jersey, ante, p. 901, and it has not been given a narrowing construction by the Oklahoma courts. Moreover, the papers filed in this case indicate that the language for which appellant was prosecuted was used in a political meeting to which appellant had been invited to present the Black Panther viewpoint. In these circumstances language of the character charged might well have been anticipated by the audience.
These factors lead me to conclude that this case is significantly different from Rosenfeld v. New Jersey, supra. I therefore concur in the Court‘s disposition of this case.
[For dissenting opinion of MR. CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER, see ante, p. 902.]
[For dissenting opinion of MR. JUSTICE REHNQUIST, see ante, p. 909.]
