141 Iowa 585 | Iowa | 1909
In McCoy v. Clark, 109 Iowa, 464, the form of a decree was presented to the court, directing that the sheriff “effectually close said building against its use, for any purpose prohibited by title 12, chapter 6, of the Code of Iowa, as the same is now in force, and so keép it closed one year, unless sooner discharged.” To this was added by the court, “But not as against any other use or purpose”; and the decree entered as thus modified. Upon appeal, this court, in holding that the decree as presented should have been entered without the additional clause, said: “The building can not be effectually closed against the liquor traffic if it is open for the business that serves as a cover for that traffic. The language ‘against its use for any purpose prohibited by this chapter’ has reference to the cause for which the building is to be closed, rather than the manner of abating the nuisance. It is a nuisance because it is kept for purposes prohibited by that chapter, and the manner of abating the nuisance is by effectually closing it against all uses for the year, unless released under the provisions of section 2410. If this was not the legislative intent, why the provisions of section 2410 as to how the owner may release his property from the order ? He can not release it as to the unlawful sale of intoxicating liquors; and, if it is not closed as to other uses or purposes, there is no necessity for the owner availing himself of the provisions of section 2410. If the building is not to be closed as against all uses, why the provision punishing ‘any one who shall break or use the building so directed to be closed’ % And
2. Same: Cer: torréturnllure recordí review. As contended by plaintiff, the findings of the court proceed on the theory that the accused had been operating the building as alleged in the information, and that notwithstanding this they were not guilty, but it will be noted that there is no finding to this effect. No transcript of the “statements of counsel and the admission of the parties” on which the findings purport to have been based was returned, and, in the absence of any affirmative finding of facts on which the inference of guilt may rest, the discharge of the accused must be regarded as conclusive.