1 Blackf. 220 | Ind. | 1822
Lewis commenced an action of debt against Bracio enridge, on his recognizance, as special bail for Oliver. The capias was returned executed, on the 1st day of the March term, 1820., After various continuances were had, and several issues made up, the defendant, on the 9th day of the March term, 1822, moved to dismiss the suit at his costs, on the ground that Oliver, the principal, had surrendered himself into custody, in discharge of his bail, before judgment was rendered against the bail: which surrender, agreeably to a bill of exceptions, .was made during-that term. The Court sustained the motion and dismissed the suit.
This suit was dismissed by virtue of an act of assembly, approved December 26th, 1821, which provides, that, in all cases
. The principal question, arising out of those proceedings, is, Is this case embraced by this act of assembly? The suit was commenced in February, 1820, and the act passed in December, 1821; and will this act operate to destroy the claim which the plaintiff had been pursuing, by a legal course, for nearly two years? This question is of very high importance; and in order to give it an answer we will divide it, and inquire, first, whether an act of assembly should be so construed as to destroy a vested right of action; and, secondly, whether the plaintiff, at the time this act was passed, was in possession of such a vested right.
In prosecuting the first inquiry, we find that the 18th section of the 1st article of the constitution provides, that “no law impairing the validity of contracts shall ever be made.” From which we learn, that all contracts, that is, all obligations created by them, and all rights arising under them, are to be held sacred, and forever to continue unaffected by legislative interference. The law, under which the contract was executed, is to be and remain the only rule by which the contract shall be construed. The obligations shall not be increased, nor the rights diminished, by any act of future legislation. Thus far the case appears clear. But what rights are thus secured from legislative interposition by this guarantee of the validity of contracts? There can be no question but this guarantee extends to all rights, arising under all contracts, whethér written or parol, whether express or implied, whether arising from the stipulation of the parties, or accruing by operation of law. There can be no question but it extends to all rights which are said to arise ex contractu, as contradistinguished from those arising ex delicto.- Without inquiring whether it will admit of a further extension, we would take this view of the constitution, as a rule to guide us in the construction of any act of assembly which should seem to contravene this constitutional provision. And this rule would prohibit the passage of an act, which would destroy any vested right of action that had arisen under any pre-existing contract; or if an act were passed in such general terms as should apparently embrace any such vested right of action, it would give it such a limited construction as to allow it a prospective and not a retro
But, independently of this clause in the constitution, it is a general rule, that statutes should be so construed as to have a prospective operation only. There are many exceptions to this general rule, which it is at present unnecessary to enumerate, inasmuch as the question is not how far an act of assembly maybe retrospective, but whether it should be construed to have-such a retrospect as to destroy a vested right of action. That it should not be so construed as to operate retrospectively in destroying such a vested right, is a principle clearly maintained by writers of the highest authority, and conclusively settled in a variety of decided cases. See 6 Bac. 370. — 1 Bl. Comm. 46. — Hale, 346. — Wilkinson v. Meyer, 2 Ld. Raym. 1352. — Calder v. Bull, 3 Dall. 386. — Ogden v. Blackledge, 2 Cranch, 272. Besides which, we shall notice three cases which rest solely on this principle, and establish it in unequivocal terms. The first is the case of Gilmore v. The Executor of Shooter, which seems to be a leading case. It is reported in 2 Mod. 310, 2 Lev. 227, 1 Ven. 330, 2 Show. 16, Jones, 108; and is referred to as unquestionable, both in England and the United States. See 6 Bac. 370. — 4 Burr. 2460. — 7 Johns. R. 477. After the passage of the statute of 29th Car. 2, declaring that after the 24th of June, 1677, no action should be brought to charge any person on any promise made in consideration of marriage, unless the same were in writing — and after the 24th of June, 1677 — this action was brought by Gilmore, on a verbal promise, in consideration of a marriage made before the statute. It was then held by the Court, that, although the expressions of the statute were positive that no such action should be brought, the statute should not have a retrospect to take away an action to which the plaintiff was before entitled. The next is the case of Couch, qui tam, v. Jeffries, 4 Burr. 2460. After a verdict in an action for the penalty for not paying the stamp duties on an indenture of apprenticeship, a statute was made discharging from the penalties, provided said duties were paid before a particular days
It is never to be presumed that a legislative body would transcend its powers, or act contrary to the rules of universal justice. It is equally beyond the rules of a fair presumption, to suppose it would interfere with private rights, so as to do a manifest injury to one individual for the benefit of another. We have therefore just ground to presume, that the legislature, in the passage of this act, did not intend to destroy any right that had arisen under pre-existing laws. They were aware of the provisions of the constitution. They no doubt understood the general rule, that acts of assembly are to operate prospectively
The judgment is reversed, with costs. Cause: remanded for further proceedings.
The very essence of a new law is a rule for future cases. Nova constitutio futuris for mam imp mer debet, et non prateritisi Bract. lib.4, fol. 228. An ex post facto law, in the strict technical sense of the term, is usually understood to ap
A suit was instituted in the C. Court, U. S., 1st circuit, for a tract of land in New-Hampshire. The defendant insisted on a compensation, under a statute of the state authorizing the claim, for improvements made before the existence of the law. Held, that, so far as it applied to past improvements, the statute went to impair the value of the plaintiff’s right in the premises, vested previously to its passage; — was repugnant to the constitution of New-Hampshire, which prohibits the enactment of retrospective laws, both in civil and criminal cases; — and was therefore void as respected the case before the Court. Society, &c. v. Wheeler, 2 Gall. 105.