183 Ga. 687 | Ga. | 1936
On April 18, 1936, J. F. Lewis, in behalf of himself and others similarly situated, brought a petition against Lowndes County, the Board of Education of Lowndes County, the secretary of said board, the superintendent of schools of said county, the tax-commissioner of the county, and the First National Bank of Valdosta, alleging substantially as follows: The board is indebted to petitioner upon a promissory note, due April 28, 1933, in the principal sum of $2,200, plus interest and attorney’s fees, said, note being a renewal note given for the balance due after successive renewals of a certain note for $7,000 evidencing a loan by petitioner to the board pursuant to a resolution passed at the regular monthly meeting of the board on March 26, 1932. The amount due the board from the public-school fund of the State for the year 1932 was far in excess of the $7,000, and far in excess of moneys borrowed by the board during the year. The board is further indebted to petitioner on certain warrants issued in the years 1930, 1931, and 1932, for legal and authorized expenses of administering and operating the schools of the county. Each of the claims evidenced by the warrants has been approved and audited, and all are for legitimate items of expense which can and ought to be paid out of the common-school fund of the county. These claims are admitted to be due and correct by the school authorities. During the fiscal years 1930, 1931, and 1932, the board did not make any contracts, create any indebtedness, or issue any orders or drafts which involved the expenditure of funds in excess of the funds received by the board from all sources for the support
The petitioner is seeking the aid of a court of equity in the collection of his claims against the school board, on the grounds that he has no adequate remedy at law for the collection thereof; that he has a legal right to compel the payment of the obligations on which he sues, but the processes of the law are inadequate to meet the exigencies of the situation as set forth in the petition. "Equity jurisdiction is established and allowed for the protection and relief of parties, where, from any peculiar circumstances, the operation of the general rules of law would be deficient in protecting from anticipated wrongs or relieving for injuries done.” Code, § 37-102. However, "Equity is ancillary, not antagonistic, to the law;'hence equity follows the law where the rule of law is applicable, and the analogy of the law where no rule is directly applicable.” § 37-103. The rule that equity follows the law has become the first maxim of equity (Carter v. Jordan, 15 Ga. 76), and it can not override and control the positive enactments of the statutes. Persoll v. Scott, 64 Ga. 767.
Is there any statute of this State which, under the alie-' gations of the petition, would deny to petitioner the right to payment out of the school funds from which payment is sought in the present case? We think there is. See Ga. L. 1925, p.
Another duty rests upon counties qualified to receive State funds. “Each county and independent public-school system receiving funds from the State shall annually, through its executive officer, make out and submit to the State board of education an estimated budget of its receipts from all sources and its proposed expenditures for the next year, . . and the filing of such estimated budgets shall, be made before the State superintendent of schools may transmit to such public-school systems any of the State school funds for the year for which such budget is made.” § 32-945. “The budgets provided for in this law shall be so made out as to properly systematize and classify the estimated receipts and proposed expenditures for the year, showing whether estimated receipts will be from the State, from the county, the district, the city, donations, bonds, or from other sources; and the estimated expenditures shall definitely set up amounts to be expended for 'administrative expenses/ 'instruction/ 'operating expenses/ 'maintenance/ 'buildings/ 'equipment/ 'debts/ or such other classifications as the State Board of Education may prescribe.” § 32-946. When duly approved by the [State] board a copy shall be put on file in its office, and another copy sent to the State superintendent of schools, who shall then be authorized to send such funds as may be in his hands to the credit of the county or independent system, and such county or independent system shall, in their expenditures of all public-school funds from whatever sources, conform to said budget. No budget of expenses shall exceed its estimated income.” § 32-947. (Italics ours.) The section last quoted controls the instant case. The petition affirmatively alleges that the county board from 1932 up to the filing of the petition had so árranged its budget that all moneys received for each fiscal year would be consumed in the operation of the schools for that year, thus making it impossible to pay any creditors of previous years. It is also alleged that the funds now on hand and coming into the hands of the defendants will be consumed by the payment of the current obligations as provided in the budget. It necessarily follows from such allegations, that, after the disburse
The rulings here made are not in conflict with those in Baggerly v. Bainbridge State Bank, 160 Ga. 556 (128 S. E. 766), Board of Education of Monroe County v. Thurmond, 162 Ga. 58 (132 S. E. 427), Houston County v. Board of Trustees of Fort Valley Consolidated School District, 170 Ga. 509 (153 S. E. 214), Kite Consolidated School District v. Clark, 171 Ga. 650 (156 S. E. 618), and Hicks v. Grove, 177 Ga. 574 (170 S. E. 877). In Baggerly v. Bainbridge State Bank, this court decided that where money borrowed by the trustees of a school district was used in defraying the lawful current expenses of operating a school in such district for the year 1924, to the payment of which expenses school funds of the district for that year, derived from taxes and otherwise, could be applied, the lender of such money could enjoin the expenditure of funds from taxes assessed for the year 1924 for the payment of expenses of this school for the year 1925, and could compel the payment of such debt from the funds derivable from taxes for the year 1924. In the instant case, as we have construed the allegations of the petition, there are no funds on
Judgment affirmed.