59 W. Va. 75 | W. Va. | 1906
A question of commercial law arises on this record. Lewis, Hubbard & Co., of the city of Charleston, doing a wholesale business in groceries, had, prior to the 24th day of September, 1900, sold goods to the Montgomery Supply Co., doing a retail grocery business in the town of Montgomery, and, on that day, there was due from said last mentioned concern the sum of $188.69. On that day W. G. Hubbard, a traveling
This action was brought by Lewis, Hubbard & Co. against the drawer of the check, in a justice’s court, and went from that court to the circuit court of Fayette county, where judgment was rendered in favor of the plaintiff for the sum of $26.60, the amount received by the defendant as a dividend on its deposits from the assets of the defunct bank. This judgment being substantially one for the defendant, the plaintiff has brought the case to this Court on a writ of error.
From the testimony in the case, it appears that Hubbard had authority to collect and to give receipts for his collections, but did not have authority to endorse checks in the name of his principal and receive money thereon. It further appears that, had he promptly mailed the check to his principal, it would have been received by it the following day, and, if discounted at Charleston on the same day and promptly forwarded back to Montgomery within-business hours of that day, it would have reached the latter place not earlier than Wednesday morning. The mails left Montgomery for Charleston three times a day, namely about noon, between three o’clock and five o’clock p. m. and between seven o’clock and eight o’clock p. m. The first two reached Charleston in about one hour’s time. But the last one, de
In some respects, the rights of the parties to a check, drawn by an individual on a bank, are governed by the principles applicable to the parties to an inland bill of exchange; but not in all respects. Notice of dishonor and non-payment of a check, and diligence in the presentation thereof are required, only when it is necessary to protect the drawer from loss by reason of the failure of the drawee, holding funds of the drawer sufficient to pay the check. Presumably the check is drawn upon funds in the hands of the drawee belonging to the drawer, and amounts to an appropriation thereof in favor of the payee on the check, and he owes to the drawer the duty of exercising a certain amount of diligence to obtain payment in order to prevent a loss to the drawer by reason of failure of the bank. In other words, if he fails to perform such duty, the loss falls upon himself and he is barred by law of any right to recover against the maker of the check. If, by delay in presentation, a loss occurs, the payee or holder is deemed to have extended credit to the bank, and must suffer the consequences. Cox v. Boone, 8 W. Va. 500; Compton v. Gilman, 19 W. Va. 312; Pursell v. Allemong & Son, 22 Grat. 739; 5 Am. & Eng. Ency. Law 1030; Parsons on Notes and Bills, Vol. II pp. 58, 59; Bank v. Bank, 10 Wall. 380.
For the reasons above stated, presentation of the check for payment, at the bank on which it is drawn, must be made within a reasonable time, and what is a reasonable time depends upon the situation of the parties with reference to one another and with reference to the bank, and all other material facts and circumstances entering into the transaction. When the drawee and payee are in the same town or city, presentation must be made not later than the next day after the reception of the check, unless there is some understanding or agreement to the contrary or some circumstance intervenes or is connected with the transaction sufficient to vary the rule; but it is sufficient to present it at any time on the next day within business hours. Alexander v. Birchfield, 1 Car. & Marsh. 75, (41 E. C. L. 47.) In that case, Tindal, C. J.,
In view of these principles, the way to a conclusion would
They are ably reviewed, and the result clearly stated, by Chief Justice Green in Burgess v. Vreeland, 4 Zabr., 24 N. J. L. 71. In that case, the controversy related to presentment, non-payment and protest of a note and notice thereof, but the principles governing that subject are applicable to checks, when loss occurs by failure to promptly present them. ‘ ‘In the more recent edition of Kent’s Commentaries, the rule is stated thus: ‘According to the modern doctrine,the notice must be given by the first direct and regular conveyance. * * * This means the first mail that goes after the next to the third day of grace; so that if the third day of grace be on Thursday, and the drawer or endorser resides out of town, the notice may, indeed, be sent on Thursday, but must be put into the post office or mailed on Friday, so as to he forwcurded as soon as ‘possible thereafter. 3 Kent’s Com.
Morse on Banking, in treating of the law of diligence in respect to the presentment of checks, says in substance, at section 421, the same rules and principles are alike applicable to them and the giving of notice of protest. In the absence of agreement or special circumstances, the time allowed is as it has been hereinbefore stated. In sub-section (c) 2 of said section 421, he says:- “The drawer cannot (exceptby agreement or under special circumstances as above) be held absolutely beyond the business hours of the day following his delivery of the check, if the bank is in the same
The reason for requiring the check or notice to be forwarded on the second day, if it- be practicable to do so, is apparent; for otherwise the effect would be to give the party three days instead of two and without any substantial reason therefor. The holder of a check cannot extend the time allowed him by depositing it in a bank for collection. Alexander v. Birchfield, 1 Cat. & Marsh. 75. It must be forwarded or presented on the next day after receipt, if reasonably practicable, whether it be done in person or by agent.
What is an unreasonable hour depends upon circumstances. If the court could say, as matter of law, that nine o’clock or half past nine o’clock a. m. is an unreasonable hour, within the meaning of this law, then we could say it would have been sufficient to have forwarded it. in the mail of Thursday by depositing it in the post office at some time on Wednesday. No evidence was introduced showing the business hours of the banks in Charleston, nor-the situation, with reference to the post office, of the bank with which the plaintiff transacted its business. Therefore,, the question submitted to the jury was whether the time of departure of the mail, shown.by the evidence, was, under ordinary circumstances, unaffected by any local custom or mode of business, an unseasonable hour. It did not involve anjr inquiry as to whether, under a given state of facts, a thing could reasonably be done or accomplished. It- seems, there
In the exercise of the power to determine what is a reasonable time, or whether an act .is done within a reasonable time, according to the law merchant, the courts have always taken judicial notice of some of those customs, habits and practices which may be deemed to be a part of the knowledge and information of the people generally, and also of customs
As long ago as 1853, the supreme court of New Jersey, in Burgess v. Vreeland, 4 Zabr. 71, expressed the opinion that a mail closing at half past nine in the morning would be before usual business hours. If since that time there has been any change in this respect, it cannot be deemed to have been to the contrary of, or in conflict with, this proposition. The tendency is to limit, rather than extend, the business day in all branches of industry and commerce. A bank is not required to take 'advantage of a mail which closes before, or at the time of, the opening of business. In Chick v. Pillsbury, 24 Me. 458, it was expressly decided that a convenient time after the commencement of business hours of the day is allowed for the mailing of a notice of dishonor. In Haskell v. Boardman, 8 Allen (Mass.) 38, it was held that the mailing of a notice of protest at ten o’clock a. m. was not due diligence, it appearing that the only mail for that day departed at ten o’clock. It was sent by an individual to a prior endorser for the purpose of binding him. The rule in such case would be different, for the reason that there is no presumption that an individual engaged in business other than banking does not commence business at an early hour. On the contrary, it is a matter of common knowledge that merchants and traders open their places of business at an earlier hour than banks. Moreover, in this instance, the evidence shows the mail must have closed long before ten o’clock. “What is a reasonable time must depend upon circumstances and in many cases upon the time, the mode, and the place of receiving the bills, and upon the relations of the parties between whom the question arises.” Dan. Neg. Inst, section 605.
That the check in this case was not actually put in course of presentment can make no difference. It is enough to make the drawer liable, that, if it had been, the time allowed
In view of these principles the court clearly erred' in giving the following instruction: “The Court instructs the Jury that if they believe the plaintiff could by due diligence have presented the check in question to the bank upon which it was drawn before it failed, it was the duty of plaintiff to do so, and if the Jury further believe the plaintiff failed to qse due diligence in such respect, and its lack of diligence caused the loss of the amount of the check to the defendant, the defendant is not liable to the plaintiff for the amount of the check, but may find for the plaintiff for the sum of $22.60, Int. from Nov. 15, 1901.” There was no evidence of lack of diligence. On the contrary, the evidence showed that, by the exercise of due diligence, the loss would not have been averted.
An assignment of error is predicated ón the action of the court in giving the following instruction: “The Court instructs the Jury that if they believe from the evidence that W. G. Hubbard was the collector of the plaintiff and had authority to collect, agent and as such agent and collector accepted the check of the defendant, that his act in so accepting the said check was the act of the plaintiffs.” This, however, is a proper instruction. It was the duty of the agent to forward the check to his principal, that delivery to him was delivery to the principal, but it must have been contemplated that he would promptly forward it, and that the time allowed for presentment would be correspondingly extended. Rosenthal v. Erlicker, 154 Pa. St. 396; Bank of Grafton v. Buchannon Bank, 80 Md. 475; Balkwill v. Bridgeport &c. Co., 62 Ill. App. 663; Gifford v. Hardell. 88 Wis. 538.
The rejection of the following offer of evidence is also complained of: “Here plaintiff offered to prove by witness (W. G. Hubbard) that he stated to S. B. Morgan (manager of defendant) and that Morgan knew his regular course to be leaving Montgomery on Monday and go up on the C. & O. railroad and back on Friday evening on the same week to Charleston.” In this, no error was committed; for the materiality of the proposed evidence was not shown. If Morgan knew of this practice, it does not follow, that he
It is hardly necessary to say that, if a different state of evidence should appear on the new trial to be allowed, the rulings of the court will have to be varied so as to conform thereto. The law here declared is applicable only to the evidence in the trial which resulted in the judgment now under review.
For the reasons stated, the judgment will be reversed, the verdict set aside, a new trial allowed and the case remanded.
Reversed.