Mooee, J.

The employee, Elbert Lewis, under orders from his employer, Tobacco Company, -served as -chauffeur, ao-ok -and valet for Thomas E. Taylor, -office manager for the Tobacco- Company, while the latter w-as o-n vacation at Nags Head for hie -own personal pleasure *412 ¡and 'on* no business far ¡the Company. For the purposes of this appeal iwe assume, but do -not decide, -that such Services to Taylor were performed in the course of Lewis’ employment by the Tobacco. Company, within the meaning of the Workmen’s Compensation Act. Even ¡so, it •is Oiur opinion that there is no competent evidence to support the Industrial ‘Oommiisision’e finding that the fatal ¡injury to Lewis arose out of his employment.

To obtain an ¡award of ■compensation for an injury under the Workmen’® Compensation Act it must be shown .that the employee suffered a personal injury which arose out of and -in the course of his employment. Anderson v. Motor Co., 233 N.C. 372, 374, 64 S.E. 2d 265. The purpose ¡of the act iis to provide compensation benefits for industrial injuries; it is not intended to he general health /and accident insurance. To be ¡compensable the injury muist spring ¡from the employment. Duncan v. Charlotte, 234 N.C. 86, 66 S.E. 2d 22. An injury to an employee while he is performing acts for the benefit of third persons is not com-pensable unless the acts benefit tbe employer to an appreciable extent. It is not compensable /if the acts are .performed ¡solely for the ¡benefit or purpose of the employee or a third person. Guest v. Iron & Metal Co,. 241 N.C. 448, 86 S.E. 2d 596. The fact that a pleasure trip- for the benefit of the employee is without expense to the employee does not entitle (him to compensation for injury received while on such trip even if all or ia portion of the expense is borne by the employer as a gesture of good will. Berry v. Furniture Co., 232 N.C. 303, 60 S.E. 2d 97; Hildebrand v. Furniture Co., 212 N.C. 100, 193 S.E. 294. Where an employee at the time of his injury is performing acts for ¡his own 'benefit, amid not ¡connected with his employment, the injury does not arise out of his employment. This is true even if the acts are performed with the consent of tine employer and the employee ¡is on the ¡payroll at the time. Bell v. Dewey Brothers, Inc., 236 N.C. 280, 72 S.E. 2d 680. If employee’s acts we mot connected with his employment 'but are for the benefit of ¡himself and third persons ¡at the time of ¡hie injury, ¡he is not entitled to compensation even if 'he is ¡injured while he is required by his employer to be away from ¡hie home 'and place of regular ¡employment for a period of time on a mission for his employer. Sandy v. Stackhouse, Inc., 258 N.C. 194, 128 S.E. 2d 218.

Lewis was not serving Taylor as chauffeur, cook or valet at the time of ¡the accident which ¡produced his fatal injury. He was on a hunting ¡trip for hi© ¡own pleasure ¡and the pleasure of Taylor’s sons. He was mot ordered 'by Taylor to go hunting. He went because the younger ¡son “wanted him to go with them.” Taylor gave ¡his consent. Lewis “didn't go along to teach them (Taylor’s sons) how to. hunt *413 . . . the ¡boys knew more about hunting than Elbert (Lewis.).” Tay'lor would .have trusted ibis sons to go. without Lewis. On the trip Lewis node in the elder son’s oar. He did not operate (the ear; he was in the rear seat. He was not furnished as 'chauffeur, cook or valet for Taylor’s sons. They were not agents of the Tobacco .Company and had no connection with it. Taylor did not accompany Lewis and the boys on the trip. The hunting trip was no part of Lewis’ employment.

It iis true that Taylor consented for Lewis to go with his sons and furnished ¡him a gun .and other equipment for hunting. Lewis was on the payroll of the Tobacco Company for the day, and he was at Nag.s Head on orders of hie employer. But, as stated above, these facts are not controlling and do not render the injury compensable. Sandy v. Stackhouse, Inc., supra; Bell v. Dewey Brothers, Inc., supra; Berry v. Furniture Co., supra. There was no causal oomnection between the accident and the employment; the accident was not a result of a risk involved in his employment.

The judgment below is

Reversed.