Lead Opinion
delivered the opinion of the court:
On November 10, 1993, the plaintiff, Henry P. Leweling, filed a complaint against the defendant, Schnadig Corporation (Schnadig), for retaliatory discharge. In his complaint, plaintiff alleged that defendant terminated Ms employment because be insisted that defendant comply with an Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) regulation that requires motor contract carriers to enter into written contracts with shippers.
On December 16, 1993, defendant filed a motion to dismiss under section 2 — 615 of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2 — 615 (West 1992)). On March 3, 1994, the trial court granted defendant’s motion to dismiss.
On appeal, plaintiff contends the trial court erred in dismissing his complaint for retaliatory discharge since he was fired for exercising legal rights protected by a clearly mandated public policy of Illinois.
BACKGROUND
Defendant is a Delaware corporation, with its principal place of business in Chicago, Illinois. It is engaged in the nationwide manufacture, distribution and sale of furniture. Defendant, in connection with the sale and distribution of furniture throughout the United States, regularly uses the services of motor carriers. Defendant hired plaintiff in August 1989 on an “at-will” basis, as director of traffic and distribution. Plaintiffs duties included, but were not limited to, selecting motor carriers used by defendant, monitoring their performance, monitoring their freight charges, and reviewing the arrangements by which they served defendant.
During his employment with defendant, plaintiff observed that defendant did not execute written, bilateral contracts with the interstate contract carriers, but instead was operating on the basis of oral agreements. Therefore, plaintiff advised defendant that Federal regulations, issued by the Interstate Commerce Commission, mandated the execution of written, bilateral contracts when using interstate for-hire contract carriers. Plaintiff also advised defendant that if defendant used an interstate contract carrier without a written, bilateral contract, only the tariff rates filed with the ICC were the lawful rates that such carrier could charge defendant for transportation service, and not any rates based on an oral agreement.
Plaintiff prepared drafts of written, bilateral contracts for execution by defendant in connection with its use of interstate contract carriers and circulated the draft contracts for review and adoption by defendant’s personnel, including plaintiff’s supervisors. However, defendant informed plaintiff that it would neither agree to the execution of written, bilateral contracts with any of its for-hire interstate contract carriers, nor rely on any published tariff charges in paying for motor carrier services. Defendant fired plaintiff on the same day, without written notification of his discharge or any written explanation.
On November 10, 1993, plaintiff filed a complaint against defendant for retaliatory discharge. In the complaint, he alleged that the defendant discharged him in retaliation for plaintiff’s insistence that defendant not violate Federal laws and regulations in the use of interstate motor carriers. Plaintiff further alleged that his termination violated the clear and strong policy of the United States in regulating for-hire motor carrier transportation as issued by the ICC.
On December 19, 1993, defendant filed a motion to dismiss, stating that plaintiff failed to state a claim for retaliatory discharge because the Federal Interstate Commerce Act (the Act) (49 U.S.C. § 10101(a)(8) (1988)) does not reflect a clearly mandated public policy of the State of Illinois. Defendant also contended the statutory provision on which plaintiff relies does not apply to defendant because the provision regulates the conduct of carriers, not shippers, such as defendant. On March 3, 1994, the trial court granted defendant’s motion to dismiss, stating that the acts alleged in the complaint were not sufficiently serious violations to give rise to the tort of retaliatory discharge.
We affirm.
OPINION
In considering a motion to dismiss, a reviewing court must accept as true all well-pleaded facts alleged in the complaint and all reasonable inferences that can be drawn from those facts. (Wieseman v. Kienstra, Inc. (1992),
Retaliatory discharge is an exception to the general rule that "at-will” employment is terminable at any time for any or no cause. (Palmateer v. International Harvester Co. (1981),
To establish a valid claim for retaliatory discharge, an employee must show that he was (1) discharged; (2) in retaliation for his activities; and (3) that the discharge violated a clear mandate of public policy. (Hartlein v. Illinois Power Co. (1992),
There is no clear-cut definition of public policy. In general, it can be said that public policy concerns what is right and just and what affects the citizens of the State collectively. (Palmateer,
However, merely stating a constitutional or statutory provision is not enough. The policy identified in the complaint must either "strike at the heart of a citizen’s social rights, duties, and responsibilities before the tort will be allowed” (Palmateer,
On the other hand, public policies associated with social and economic regulation are less likely to be held sufficient to support a claim for retaliatory discharge. (Fowler v. Great American Insurance Cos. (N.D. Ill. 1987),
Similarly, in Hicks v. Resolution Trust Corp. (7th Cir. 1992),
A recent seventh circuit case is strongly dispositive of this case. In Long v. Commercial Carriers, Inc. (7th Cir. 1995),
Plaintiff claims his discharge violated the underlying public policy of the Interstate Commerce Act, which is to "ensure the development, coordination, and preservation of a transportation system that meets the transportation needs of the United States *** and national defense.” (49 U.S.C. § 10101(a) (1988).) This public policy is exemplified by the statutory purposes set out in 49 U.S.C. § 10101(a)(1) (1988):
"(A) to recognize and preserve the inherent advantage of each mode of transportation;
(B) to promote safe, adequate and economical, and efficient transportation;
(C) to encourage sound economic conditions in transportation, including sound economic conditions among carriers;
(D) to encourage the establishment and maintenance of reasonable rates for transportation, without unreasonable discrimination or unfair or destructive competitive practices;
(E) to cooperate with each State and the officials of each State on transportation matters; and
(F) to encourage fair wages and working conditions in the transportation industry.”
As plaintiff states, the Illinois General Assembly has adopted an almost identical public policy, with virtually identical goals, in the Illinois Commercial Transportation Law (625 ILCS 5/18c — 1103 (West 1992)). The expressed public policy of the State of Illinois is to "actively supervise and regulate commercial transportation of *** property within this state.” (625 ILCS 5/18c — 1103 (West 1992).) The statutory purposes set out in the provision are also virtually identical to the statutory purposes of the Federal statute.
Defendant contends the Interstate Commerce Act is economic legislation serving primarily commercial interests. We agree. The Interstate Commerce Act is national in scope because it affects citizens collectively; however, it is clear the Act’s purposes, as well as the purposes of the Commercial Transportation Law, are financial in nature, and the policies neither "strike at the heart of a citizen’s rights, duties or responsibilities” nor advance health and safety. As in the Long case, the ICC regulations deal primarily with certain noncrucial financial and contractual interests that do not rise to a sufficient level for a retaliatory discharge claim. Long,
Furthermore, on May 5, 1992, the Interstate Commerce Commission repealed the regulations governing mandatory contracts between carriers and shippers. The ICC stated that "the contract regulations *** have outlived their usefulness and are causing more harm than good.” (Contracts for Transportation of Property (1992),
It is the public policy in effect when the employee is discharged that counts. (See McKay v. Pinkerton’s, Inc. (1992),
Plaintiff also contends he acted as a "citizen crime fighter” in trying to prevent Schnadig from disregarding carrier tariff rates. Public policy favors the exposure of criminal activity, and the cooperation of citizens possessing knowledge thereof is essential to effective implementation of that policy. (Palmateer,
Similarly, in Johnson v. World Color Press, Inc. (1986),
Schnadig contends that it did not commit a crime because the relevant provisions impose liability on shippers and common carriers which knowingly observe less than the tariff rate. However, we must take the facts as alleged in the complaint as true. In this case, Leweling alleges that Schnadig violated 49 C.F.R. §§ 1053.1(b), (c) (repealed by ICC in Contracts for Transportation of Property (1992),
However, not all criminal activity advances a public policy sufficient to warrant protection from a retaliatory discharge claim. Again, the policy must give rise to a social duty or responsibility, or promote the health and welfare of the citizenry. The public policies in Russ and Johnson protect citizens from fraudulent and misleading information that could ultimately affect their welfare, whereas the public policy advanced in the ICC provisions does not affect the overall welfare of citizens. The provisions only affect the relationship and responsibilities of shippers and carriers. Therefore, we conclude that although plaintiff contends he acted as a "citizen crimefighter,” such action in the instant case does not advance a public policy sufficient to warrant protection from a retaliatory discharge claim.
Also, another factor which courts consider in deciding a retaliatory discharge claim is the availability of an adequate alternative remedy. In Fellhauer, a city employee was discharged for opposing the mayor’s politically motivated purchasing activities. Although the mayor’s conduct violated State criminal laws, the court held the employee did not state a retaliatory discharge claim. The court held the employee had not demonstrated a sufficient public policy because a countervailing public policy favored mayoral discretion in making employment decisions for the city and because the official misconduct statute provided its own deterrent through criminal sanctions. Fellhauer,
In this case, plaintiff has cited provisions of the statute that impose a fine of "at least $1,000, but not more than $20,000, imprison[ment] for not more than two years, or both” on a shipper as well as any employee who fails to observe the public tariff charges of motor carriers. (49 U.S.C. §§ 11903(b), (c) (1988).) Therefore, plaintiff asserts that he could face prosecution for Schnadig’s refusal to observe the tariff rates. However, we believe the strong deterrents contained in the statute provide for an adequate and available remedy.
For the reasons cited herein, we hold that plaintiff failed to state a cause of action for retaliatory discharge. Therefore, the order of the circuit court granting defendant’s motion to dismiss is affirmed.
Affirmed.
McNULTY, J., concurs.
Concurrence Opinion
specially concurring:
While I agree on balance with the conclusion of the majority, I have difficulty with the suggestion that where a sufficient deterrent exists to inhibit an employer from committing a given illegal act, there is no need to extend the retaliatory discharge remedy to protect an employee who is discharged for exposing that illegal act. Under that approach, assuming an overall positive correlation between the severity of punishment and the nature of the misconduct, there would be an inverse correlation between the gravity of an employer’s illegal conduct and the retaliatory discharge protection which would be afforded to an employee who is discharged for exposing it or for refusing to participate in it. Such a result would be ironic as well as unrealistic. It would mean that an employee’s exposure, for example, of an act of murder by his employer or of narcotics trading would go unprotected since the criminal penalties for such offenses are uniformally severe and that only exposure of minor misdemeanors would then qualify.
While there is language in the supreme court opinion of Fellhauer v. City of Geneva (1991),
Ultimately, however, even in Fellhauer, the court recognized that although deprived of the remedy of retaliatory discharge, the employee under legislative mandate still had recourse to a legislative remedy insofar as he could be restored to the position from which he was removed by a two-thirds vote of the city council. See Fellhauer, stating:
"The requirement that a meeting be convened shortly after the dismissal, and the power of two-thirds of the members of the city council to restore the officer to the position from which he was removed, protect the officer’s interest in securing a livelihood and provide an appropriate forum in which to resolve the merits of the dismissal.” Fellhauer,142 Ill. 2d at 509 .
Here, where we do not confront a countervailing statutory policy concerning the right of an elected official to remove Ms appointees and where no alternative remedy for the employee is available, the existence of independent sanctions to inhibit the employer from violating the ICC regulation should not be dispositive of the employee’s right to claim retaliatory discharge.
The case of Fowler v. Great American Insurance Cos. (N.D. Ill. 1987),
I’m also not fully aligned with the majority in holding that where an employee is discharged for exposing his employer’s illegal conduct to the proper policing authority, his discharge will not trigger a retaliatory discharge action unless the illegal conduct which he exposed is, itself, violative of a public policy. While the holding in Fellhauer v. City of Geneva does tilt in that direction, it would represent a substantial modification of the original position of our supreme court in Palmateer v. International Harvester. In Palmateer the supreme court appeared to suggest that the right to cooperate with the police in their investigation is in and of itself a protected public policy regardless of the nature or gravity of the underlying crime which was under investigation. See Fowler v. Great American Insurance Cos.,
However, in this case, unlike Palmateer, we need not confront that issue. Here, plaintiff did not allege that he was fired for whistle-blowing or for cooperating with a police investigation as in Palmateer. Rather, the complaint alleges that plaintiff advised and admonished his employer about compliance with ICC regulations and went further by preparing drafts of written contracts which he circulated among his employer’s personnel and supervisors for use in contracting with his employer’s interstate carriers. Thus here, unlike Palmateer, the plaintiff did not allege that he reported the alleged illegal activities of his employer to a government enforcement agency. Instead he alleged that he attempted, by himself, without his employer’s authorization, to internally override his employer’s business practices, albeit for the purpose of bringing about his employer’s compliance with ICC regulations. The facts here are therefore more analogous to Fowler rather than to Palmateer and would, therefore, not suffice to invoke the public policy which may well arise under Palmateer to protect an employee who "blows the whistle” or otherwise cooperates with a police investigation of any criminal activity.
Accordingly, subject to the foregoing qualms and qualifications, I concur with the conclusion of the majority.
