49 S.E. 882 | N.C. | 1905
From a judgment in favor of the plaintiffs for less than the (384) relief demanded, they appealed. On 14 November, 1902, the plaintiffs had shipped from Norfolk, Va., to themselves at Church Island, N.C. two tons of ice over the defendant's line. The ice was never delivered, although by due course it should have reached Church Island the same day it was shipped. It *286 was admitted the plaintiffs were dealers in fish and desired the ice for their own use.
The sole exception in the record presents the question as to the measure of damage. His Honor in the court below charged the jury that the measure of damage was the value of the ice at Church Island on 14 November, 1902. To this instruction the plaintiffs excepted. We find no error in the instruction.
The general rule for the measure of damage is tersely state in Ashev. DeRosset,
The plaintiffs' contention is that the measure of damage is the loss on fish. Such damages are too remote, and could not have reasonably been within the contemplation of the defendant company when it accepted the ice for shipment. "If every one were answerable for all the consequences of his acts, no one could tell what were his liabilities at any moment." 3 Parsons on Cont. (5 Ed.), 179. "Every defendant shall be liable for those consequences which might have been foreseen and accepted as the result of his conduct, and not for those he could not have foreseen, and therefore under no moral obligation to take into his consideration." Ibid., 180. *287
When the defendant accepted the ice at Norfolk for shipment, it could not foresee that the plaintiffs' fish would be spoiled or that the ice would be used for packing fish. The defendant did not know that plaintiffs had any fish at the time the ice was shipped. Nor is there any evidence that the defendant knew it at any time.
If the plaintiffs had shown by evidence that the defendant knew or should have known from facts and circumstances connected with the shipment, or otherwise, that the ice was intended by the plaintiffs for packing fish, the plaintiffs would have brought their case within the exception to the general rule.
We have examined the evidence with care and fail to find any (386) which could reasonably bring to the defendant's knowledge the fact that the shipment was other than an ordinary shipment. It had no knowledge of the special purpose.
Neal v. Hardware Co.,
In Sledge v. Reid,
Affirmed.
CONNOR, J., concurs in result.
Cited: Lumber Co. v. R. R.,
(387)