OPINION
Dwаyne Levy was convicted of aggravated assault on a Department of Criminal Justice guard. His punishment, enhanced by a prior conviction, was set at twenty-five yеars’ imprisonment and a $10,000.00 fine. Levy alleges error only at the punishment stage, viz, the admission into evidence of details of a prior offense, submission of an incorrect penalty range to the jury, refusal to submit a definition of “reasonable doubt” to the jury, *212 and refusal of the trial judge to answer a question from the jury during deliberation. We overrule these contentions and affirm the judgment.
Levy first argues that the court erred by allowing the indictment for a prior conviction to be included with copies of the judgment and sentence in the pen packet admitted into evidence. He contends that the indictment contained details of the prior offense and its admission improperly introduced those details into evidence. We disagree. The indictment in a prior final conviction is admissible at the punishment phase of a trial.
Fairris v. State,
The two cases cited by Levy,
Stevens v. State,
Levy also contends that the trial court erred in charging the jury on a penalty range more severe than that allowed by law for a third degree felony aggravated assault. The range authorized for a third degree felony is: (1) imprisonment for any term of not more than ten years or less thаn two years; or (2) confinement in a community correctional facility for any term of not more than one year. Tex.Penal Code Ann. § 12.34 (Vernon Supp.1993). In addition, a fine not to exceed $10,000.00 may be imposed. Id.
Because of the enhancement paragraph in the indictment and Levy’s plea of “not true” to that paragrаph, ranges for both a second degree felony and a third degree felony were included in the jury charge. If the jury found the enhancement allegation true, the offense would be enhanced to a second degree felony. Levy objected because the charge omitted the option of confinement in a community correctional facility for not more than one year. The court overruled the objection when the State asked it to take judicial notice thаt the county had no community correctional facility. In eases where punishment is referred to the jury, either party may offer into evidence the availability of community corrections facilities serving the jurisdiction in which the offense is committed. See Tex.Code CeimProcAnn. art. 37.-07, § (3)(f) (Vernon Supp.1993). 1
The trial court instructed the jury that if it found the еnhancement allegation true, it should assess punishment at confinement in the penitentiary for not more than twenty years or less than two years, and in addition could assess a fine not to exceed $10,000.00. The court also instructed the jury that if it did not find that Levy had a prior conviction, it should assess punishment at confinement in the penitentiary for any term of not more than ten years or less than two years, and in addition could impose a fine not to exceed $10,000.00. This is the range authorized by Section 12.34 of thе Penal Code, except that the court did not instruct the jury that it could, as an alternative, assess confinement in a community correctional facility for any term of not more than one year, as provided by Section 12.34(a)(2) of the Penal Code.
Levy argues that the alternative punishment of confinement in a community correctional facility is not made conditional on there being a community correctional facility *213 in the county and that he, therefore, did not have an oрportunity to be assessed the lower penalty authorized by Section 12.34(a)(2). While that is true, in reality he had no opportunity even to be considered for confinement in a community correctional facility because the jury found the enhancement allegation true. Thus, the only range appropriate was from two tо twenty years’ confinement and a $10,000.00 fine. The jury assessment of twenty years’ confinement and a $10,000.00 fine was within the range authorized by the court’s instruction of the range of punishmеnt to use if the jury found — as it did — the enhancement allegation to be true.
We have found no case which addresses whether the trial court must charge the jury as to the аlternative of assessing punishment at confinement in a community correctional facility when no such facility exists in the county where the offense occurred. In this сase, the jury, once it found the enhancement allegation true, was limited to consideration only of confinement for not less than two nor more than twenty yeаrs, plus an optional fine of $10,000.00. There was, therefore, no possibility that Levy could have been assessed punishment at confinement in a community correctional facility, as confinement in such a facility is applicable only to a third degree felony. There was no error.
Next, Levy contends that the trial court erred in refusing his request to include a definition of “reasonable doubt” in its charge on punishment. The court submitted a definition of reasonable doubt in its charge in the guilt-innocence stage of the trial, as is required by
Geesa v. State,
The court in Geesa did not require that a definition of reasonable doubt be given at both the guilt-innocence stage and thе punishment stage. It merely directed that the definition be submitted to the jury during a criminal trial. Id. at 162. The purpose of including a definition of a word or term in the charge is to assist thе jury in making its findings during the guilt-innocence phase and in determining the penalty, if any, to be assessed. In this case, the jury was provided the definition during the first stage of the trial and was remindеd by the court in the second stage that it was bound by the earlier instruction. We find no error.
Finally, Levy contends that the trial court erred in refusing to answer the jury’s question whether Lеvy’s sentence would be served concurrently or consecutively.
During deliberation at the punishment stage of the trial, the jury sent a note to the trial judge asking what were the implications of possible parole and of concurrent or consecutive sentences. The note also asked who was responsible for рaying a fine. After a colloquy with counsel for both sides, the trial judge responded in a typed reply: “You are instructed that you’re not to consider the questions raised regarding possible parole or concurrent or consecutive sentences. The Defendant is responsible for paying any fine assessed.”
Tex.Code Crim.PROC.Ann. аrt. 42.08(b) (Vernon Supp.1993) requires that a sentence for an offense committed by a person while incarcerated in the Texas Department of Criminal Justice be sеrved consecutively with his other sentence. Levy contends that the court should have instructed the jury that the sentences would be served consecutively. Article 42.08 рrovides no support for this contention, and Levy has cited no other authority. In the absence of specific constitutional or statutory authority to do so, the court should not instruct the jury as to the effect of the parole laws or how long a defendant will be required to actually serve under a given sentence. The court properly refused to answer the question.
The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
Notes
. Section 3(f) added by Act of June 7, 1990, 71st Leg., 6th C.S., ch. 25, § 30, 1990 Tex.Gen.Laws 135, effective June 18, 1990.