53 A.D.2d 833 | N.Y. App. Div. | 1976
Judgment, Supreme Court, New York County, entered March 1, 1976, dismissing plaintiff’s complaint and granting judgment for divorce to defendant husband is unanimously modified, without costs and without disbursements, on the law and the facts in the following respects: (a) the words "her abandonment of defendant for a period of more than one year, and her cruel and inhuman treatment of him” are stricken from the fifth decretal paragraph of the judgment; and (b) defendant shall not be entitled to any credits for payments made by him toward the maintenance of the farm property on the division of the proceeds of the sale of the farm property under the twelfth and thirteenth decretal paragraphs of the judgment. In all other respects the judgment is affirmed. Plaintiff’s claims for divorce presented issues of fact which the Trial Justice, sitting as trier of the facts in this nonjury trial, resolved against the plaintiff, on evidence reasonably supporting such determination. The Trial Justice did not abuse his discretion in refusing to permit plaintiff to reopen her case on her claim based on cruel and inhuman treatment after plaintiff had deliberately rested; no adequate excuse was given for plaintiff’s withholding any evidence before she rested; and the evidence proposed to be offered was either inadmissible or not particularly significant. Defendant’s claim for divorce on the ground of adultery again presented a question of fact which the Trial Justice resolved in defendant’s favor, on evidence reasonably supporting such determination. While the Trial Justice was in error in drawing an unfavorable inference against plaintiff from the male correspondent’s invocation of the privilege against self incrimination, it is apparent that the Trial Justice’s evaluation of the evidence would have been and was the same even without that inference. Defendant husband’s claim of cruel and inhuman treatment was based upon plaintiff wife’s unjustified charge of adultery against him. But while we cannot approve of it, the fact is that unjustified charges are constantly made in matrimonial pleadings; they are in no sense the cause of the marital breakup but frequently merely a reaction to the emotional stresses of the litigation. When such a charge is made only in the pleadings, we do not think that the making of the charge in the pleadings should or can be a basis for divorce, particularly where there is no showing of any permanent emotional or physical harm to the other party. We note that in this case the charge of adultery was only made by the wife in a counter