delivered the opinion of the Court.
This is a suit on an insurance policy brought by the appellants. A demurrer to the amended declaration was sustained by the trial court without leave to amend, and from a judgment in favor of the defendant for costs, the plaintiffs appealed.
The policy sued on is what is known as a comprehensive crime policy, covering dishonesty of employees, burglary, theft, safe burglary, inside robbery, kidnapping, outside robbery, paymasters’ robbery, destruction of or damage to monies and securities, money ordеrs and counterfeit *540 paper currency, forgery of issued instruments and forgery of accepted instruments. This suit is brought under Clause A cоvering dishonesty of employees. That clause reads “To indemnify the insured for all loss of property due to the fraud or dishonesty of any of the insured’s employees, whether acting alone or in collusion with others.” It is not contended in this case that the loss sued for was not occasioned by the fraud or dishonesty of an employee. The key word, however, of Coverage A is “рroperty”. The policy contains definitions of certain words whenever used in the policy. One of these definitions is of the word “property”, which is said to be “Money, securities, merchandise, furnishings, fixtures, equipment or other personal property owned by the insured or held by the insured as pledgee, bailee, trustee, custodian, or agent, whether or not the insured is legally liable for the loss or damage thereof.”
The facts alleged which it is contended render the appellee liable are thesе. The appellants are engaged in the business of selling shirts, uniforms, caps, etc. One of their full-time employees, who was on a straight salary basis, accepted an order for some uniform caps from a cab company, an established customer of the appellants. The appellants did not themselves manufacture these.caps, and this employee placed the order with the appellant’s regular source of supply. When they were ready, he had them billed to himself, toоk them to the cab company, received the money, paid the source of supply and retained the balancе for his own use. Subsequently, he told the cab company that appellants could no longer supply them, but that he would, and latеr orders he had billed in his own name, and filled them in the same manner as he had in the first order. He then used this scheme as a pattern tо divert to his own use other orders from other established customers of the appellants, by telling them that the appellants were no longer able to supply them, but that he could. The losses which the appellants claim, by reason of the diversion or appropriation of these contracts by their em *541 ployee, amount to in excess of $13,500. It appears that the employee received a salary in 1945 of $2,189.90, in 1946 this was increased to $2,898, in 1947, $3,080, and in 1948, up to August, when his actions were discovered, he hаd received $2,054.
On these facts the appellants claim that they sustained a loss of property within the meaning of the pоlicy. One theory is that they lost money which they would have received on the diverted contracts, or the personal prоperty of the contracts themselves, and the other is that they lost the money they were paying the employee for his entire services during the period when the diversion occurred. It is not contended by the appellee that the actions оf the employee were not fraudulent or dishonest, but it contends that no money or property owned by the insured was lost. The сase, therefore, resolves itself into an inquiry what the definition of property in the policy means. Appellants urge that since the policy is a broad one, as indicated by its name, “Comprehensive Crime Policy”, it was designed to fit all of the needs оf people in business, and that it must, in the event of any doubt, be construed strictly against the insurance company. They cite in this cоnnection,
Hospital for the Women of Maryland v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co.,
It seems to be quite clear that, whether the word “profits” is used (as it was in the original declaration), or whether the word “procеeds” is used, as in the amend
*542
ed one before us, what was actually lost by the appellants was the profit they would have made had their employee not engaged in competition with them, or the prospective profit they would have had in the divеrted contracts. The Insurance Company did not insure them against the loss of all kinds of property, intangible or otherwise, but only against the loss of money, certain specified kinds of personal property or evidences of personal prоperty, and “other personal property”. Under the doctrine of
ejusdem, generis
the words “other personal property” must be construed to mean property of the same nature and description as the particular kinds of property mentioned, аnd not choses in action for unlawful or fraudulent competition.
Mayor and City Council of Baltimore v. Smith,
The . salary paid to the employee during the period of his employment was not lost. It was basеd upon the work he actually did for the appellants, which must have been acceptable to them, because hе received an increase each year until his diversions were discovered. He was not paid his salary for these cоntracts which he diverted, because the appellants knew nothing about them. He was paid for what he actually did for them and if he breached his contract, appellants’ right of action against him was not property lost within the meaning of the contract of insurance.
For the reasons stated the judgment must be affirmed.
Judgment affirmed with costs.