LEVITON MANUFACTURING CO., INC v. GEORGE J. REEVE, JR., CHARLOTTE H. REEVE, THE LAW FIRM OF ARTHUR M. GAREL, and ARTHUR M. GAREL
11-CV-6238 (ADS)(ARL)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
SPATT, District Judge
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION AND ORDER
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION AND ORDER
APPEARANCES:
Littleton Joyce Ughetta Park & Kelly LLP
Attorneys for the Plaintiff
1 Manhattanville Road
Suite 302
Purchase, NY 10577
By: Bryon L. Friedman, Esq.,
Jason P. Sultzer, Esq., Of Counsel
Law Office of Maria del Carmen Calzon
Attorneys for the Defendants George J. Reeve, Jr. and Charlotte H. Reeve
1825 Ponce De Leon Blvd #249
Coral Gables, FL 33134
By: Maria del Carmen Calzon, Esq., Of Counsel
The Law Firm of Arthur M. Garel
Pro Se Defendant and Attorneys for the Defendant Arthur M. Garel
2701 S. Bayshore Drive
Suite 402
Miami, FL 33133
SPATT, District Judge.
On December 22, 2011, the Plaintiff Leviton Manufacturing Co., Inc. (“Leviton” or “the Plaintiff“) commenced this action against the Defendants George J. Reeve, Jr., Charlotte H. Reeve, The Law Firm of Arthur M. Garel, and Arthur M. Garel (collectively, “the Defendants“), asserting claims for breach of contract, fraud, and negligent misrepresentation. Previously, the
Specifically, the Court found that personal jurisdiction over the Attorney Defendants could not be exercised under New York‘s long-arm statute, so that the Attorney Defendants’ motion to dismiss the Defendants Arthur Garel and the Law Firm of Arthur Garel for lack of personal jurisdiction was granted. Therefore, the Plaintiff‘s Complaint as to the Attorney Defendants was dismissed with prejudice.
With regard to the Reeve Defendants, the Court found that they were subject to personal jurisdiction on the basis of a forum selection clause. Therefore, the motions by George Reeve and Charlotte Reeve to dismiss the complaint for a lack of personal jurisdiction were denied. In addition, the Reeve Defendants’ motions to dismiss the complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction were denied. Finally, the Reeve Defendants’ motions to dismiss the Plaintiff‘s fraud claims for failure to state a claim pursuant to
I. MOTION TO AMEND
On February 23, 2013, the Plaintiff filed a motion to amend the Court‘s order pursuant to
A motion for reconsideration in the Eastern District of New York is governed by Local Rule 6.3. “The standard for granting such a motion is strict, and reconsideration will generally be denied unless the moving party can point to controlling decisions or data that the court overlooked—matters, in other words, that might reasonably be expected to alter the conclusion reached by the court.” Shrader v. CSX Transp., Inc., 70 F.3d 255, 257 (2d Cir. 1995). “The major grounds justifying reconsideration are an intervening change of controlling law, the availability of new evidence, or the need to correct a clear error or prevent manifest injustice.” Virgin Atl. Airways, Ltd. v. Nat‘l Mediation Bd., 956 F.2d 1245, 1255 (2d Cir. 1992) (internal quotation marks omitted).
In this case, the Plaintiff relies on
- mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect;
- newly discovered evidence which by due diligence could not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial under
Rule 59(b) ; - fraud (whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation, or other misconduct of an adverse party;
- the judgment is void;
the judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged, or a prior judgment upon which it is based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable that the judgment should have prospective application; or - any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment.
Relief under
Here, the Plaintiff asserts that a dismissal based on lack of jurisdiction is not an adjudication on the merits. Thus, because the resulting judgment of dismissal is not a determination of the claim, but rather a refusal to hear it, a plaintiff should thereafter have the opportunity to pursue it in an appropriate forum or when the preconditions have been met.
The Court agrees that the Order dated February 7, 2013, should be amended to state that the dismissal of the Attorney Defendants is without prejudice. See 35B C.J.S. Federal Civil Procedure § 844 (“Where the court is without jurisdiction, it is improper to make any order in the cause except to dismiss the suit. . . A dismissal of an action or complaint cannot be with prejudice and the order should not contain a provision to that effect where it is on the grounds of
II. REQUEST FOR CERTIFICATE OF DEFAULT
The second issue the Court must address is that on March 7, 2013, the Plaintiff requested a Clerk‘s Certificate of Default as to the Defendants George J. Reeve, Jr. and Charlotte H. Reeve under
However, on that same day, March 7, 2013, the Reeve Defendants filed their separate answers to the Complaint. (Docket Entry Nos. 38 & 40.) In addition, on that same day, each of the Defendants filed a motion for an extension of time to file their answers to the Complaint. (Docket Entry Nos. 39 & 41.) These motions for an extension of time include an affidavit from the Reeve Defendants’ attorney, Maria del Carmen Calzon, Esq., which states that during the time when the answers were due to be filed, she was dealing with both the illness of her parent who is 99 years of age, as well as battling with her own personal illness that prevented her from filing the pleading as required by the Rules. She submits that her illness supports a finding of good cause to extend the time to file the answers and that the failure to act was the result of excusable neglect. Indeed, this is the second time that the Reeve Defendants have failed to comply with certain filing deadlines, and the same reason was provided for the previous delays.
In light of Counsel‘s affidavit, the Court now grants both George Reeve‘s and Charlotte Reeve‘s requests for extensions of time to file their answers, and therefore the Plaintiff‘s request for a Certificate of Default is denied. However, while the Court is of course sympathetic with regard to Defense Counsel‘s health issues, the Reeve Defendants should consider substitute counsel in order to avoid future filing delays that the Court may not excuse.
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, it is hereby:
ORDERED, that the Order dated February 7, 2013, is hereby amended to state that the claims against the Attorney Defendants are dismissed without prejudice; and it is further
ORDERED, that the Plaintiff‘s request for a Clerk‘s Certificate of Default is denied; and it is further
ORDERED, that the Reeve Defendants’ requests for extensions of time to file their answers are granted.
SO ORDERED.
Dated: Central Islip, New York
March 23, 2013
___/s/ Arthur D. Spatt______
ARTHUR D. SPATT
United States District Judge
