187 P. 609 | Or. | 1920
Lead Opinion
“Full faith and credit shall be given in each state to the public acts, records, and judicial proceedings of every other state. And the Congress may by general laws prescribe the manner in which such acts, records, and proceedings shall be proved, and the effect thereof. ’ ’
Congress exercised the power conferred upon it and by statute prescribed the mode of attesting the records of one state so as to entitle them to be proved in the courts of another state and enacted that records so authenticated should have such faith and credit in every court within the United States as they have by law or usage in the state from which they are taken: 15 R. C. L. 922. This constitutional provision does not confer upon Congress power to give such judgment all the legal properties, rights and attributes to which it is entitled by the laws of the state where rendered. To give it the force of a judgment in another state it must be made a judgment there and can only be executed in the latter as its laws permit: 15 R. C. L. 926; 23 Cyc. 1516. "While the judgment of one state is entitled to receive the same faith, credit and respect that is given to it in the state where rendered, it is not entitled to any greater effect or finality than would be accorded to it in the state where rendered; and, therefore, if the judgment is conclusive in the home state it is equally conclusive in the sister state; but if it is inconclusive in the home state, it is likewise inconclusive in the sister state: 15 R. C. L. 928. Expressed in general terms the rule is that in order to maintain an action in one state upon a money judgment recovered in another state, such judgment must be a final adjudication in full force
If that part of the Minnesota decree which relates to a money award is shielded by the full faith and credit clause, then in this jurisdiction, where the distinction between actions at law and suits in equity are preserved, the plaintiff may resort to an action at law for the enforcement of the debt created by the Minnesota decree: De Vall v. De Vall, 57 Or. 128, 145 (109 Pac. 755, 110 Pac. 705).
As already stated the Minnesota decree, to the extent that it is final and not subject to modification, is entitled to the protection of the full faith and credit clause of the Federal Constitution and must be enforced in this state. If, however, a part of the Minnesota decree is not final but is subject to modification by the court which rendered it, then neither the United States Constitution nor the principle of comity compels the courts of this state to enforce that part of the decree, for no court other than the one granting the original decree could undertake to administer relief without bringing about a conflict of authority: 1 R. C. L. 958. Language used in Lynde v. Lynde, 181 U. S. 183 (45 L. Ed. 810, 21 Sup. Ct. Rep. 555, see, also, Rose’s U. S. Notes), is responsible for a few adjudications which apparently proceed on the mistaken theory that a final judgment can include only moneys payable presently; as, where the decree allows a gross sum payable at once upon the rendition of the decree, or where, as was done in De Vall v. De Vall, 57 Or. 128, 132 (109 Pac. 755, 110 Pac. 705), the court which granted the original decree, allowing alimony payable in installments, at some subsequent time, acting upon the petition of either party, finds that specified installments have accrued since the rendition of the original decree and adjudges that, on account of such arrears, a definite sum is payable presently. In other words, there seems to have been an impression, more or less general, that the fact of an original decree allowing alimony payable in the future in installments plus the fact of an accrued installment did not produce such a judgment as was protected by the Federal Constitution; but that before the full faith and credit clause could operate there
In a subsequent decision, however, the whole subject was clarified and made certain. In Sistare v. Sistare, 218 U. S. 1 (54 L. Ed. 905, 30 Sup. Ct. Rep. 682, 20 Ann. Cas. 1061, 28 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1068, see, also, Rose’s U. S. Notes), it was held that generally speaking the right to an installment payable in the future becomes vested contemporaneously with the maturity of the installment, provided the decree allowing alimony has not been modified prior to the accrual -of the installment, and that therefore such an accrued installment is protected by the full faith and credit clause; but this comprehensive statement made in general terms is subject to an exception, for if under the law of the state where the decree is granted there is reserved to the court which passed the decree discretionary power to modify the original decree so as to affect not only installments yet to become due but also the amount of any installment which has become due and is unpaid, then such accrued installment does not constitute a final judgment, and on that account is not protected by the full faith and credit clause of the Constitution. In other words, the fact that alimony is payable in installments is not necessarily a controlling factor; but the question as to whether an accrued installment of alimony is to be treated as a final judgment entitled to the protection of the full faith and credit clause must be determined by the law of the state in which the decree is entered; and hence if by the law of the state in which the original decree is entered the court is given discretionary power to modify an accrued installment, then that installment does not come within the embrace of the full faith and credit clause of the Federal Constitution: Rowe v. Rowe, 76
“The court may, by order upon the application of either party to the action, after due notice to the other, to be given in such manner as the court shall prescribe, at any time after final judgment, annul, vary or modify such directions.”
In most of the jurisdictions where the question was for the first time presented after and not before the decision of the supreme court of the United States in Sistare v. Sistare, 218 U. S. 1 (54 L. Ed. 905, 30 Sup. Ct. Rep. 682, 20 Ann. Cas. 1061, 1067, 28 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1068, see, also, Rose’s U. S. Notes), the courts, when interpreting statutes like that of the New York enactment have followed the rule of construction applied in Sistare v. Sistare and held that where the statute
The plaintiff pleaded certain sections of the Minnesota statute and by so doing brought herself within the rule adhered to in Scott v. Ford, 52 Or. 288, 294 (97 Pac. 99), and approved in De Vall v. De Vall, 57 Or. 128, 138 (109 Pac. 755, 110 Pac. 705). We now turn to the statutes of Minnesota, and, after noticing them, we shall then seek to ascertain what construction that state’s highest court has placed upon its legislation.
It is expressly provided by statute in the state of Minnesota that the court, which has passed a decree divorcing the husband and wife and providing for the care, custody and maintenance of their minor children, may at a subsequent date modify the original decree
In the early case of Semrow v. Semrow, 23 Minn. 214, 216, it was suggested:
“That it is by no means certain that the provisions (of the statute) as to alteration and revision of alimony apply to a case in which alimony is awarded, * * in a gross sum.”
But there are many subsequent precedents in Minnesota holding that the power of modification applies to awards “in a gross sum.” We quote from Haskell v. Haskell, 116 Minn. 10, 13 (132 N. W. 1129):
*106 )‘Under the statute of this state the court awarding a judgment for alimony, whether such alimony be payable in a gross amount or in installments, has undoubted authority to revise or modify such judgment. This power may be exercised upon the application of either party for good cause shown. A substantial change from the situation that prompted or made proper the terms of the original decree justifies a change in those terms. An application for such change or modification is addressed largely to the discretion of the trial court. ’ ’
In Holmes v. Holmes, 90 Minn. 466 (97 N. W. 147), the plaintiff Mina L. Holmes secured a decree on February 13, 1893, which divorced the parties and allowed her alimony in the gross sum of $600 payable in one year. More than ten years afterwards, on June 27, 1903, the alimony not having been paid, the defendant Frank D. Holmes filed a motion to modify the decree by having that part of it vacated which required the payment of alimony. In the course of the opinion the court refers to the fact that counsel had exhaustively discussed the question of the power to modify the judgment for alimony, “in this case, it being only in gross ’ ’; and in response to the argument of counsel the court said:
“It is the law of this state that the court awarding a judgment for alimony, whether it be for a gross amount or payable in installments, has the power to modify such judgment on the application of either party, for good cause shown. * * The power, however, is to be. exercised only upon clear proof of new facts showing that the changed circumstances of the parties render proposed modification equitable. The question of such modification is one largely within the discretion of the trial court.”
If we correctly interpret the opinions of the Supreme Court of Minnesota, especially the holding in Holmes
“The original decree is conclusive upon the parties as to their then circumstances; and the power to make changes in the decree is not a power to grant a new trial or retry the same case, but only to adapt the decree to the new or changed circumstances of the par
“The decree of a court of one state, indeed, for the present payment of a definite sum of money as alimony, is a record which is entitled to full faith and credit in another state, and may therefore be there enforced by suit. ’ ’
Other eases of the same effect as the precedent last cited are Cureton v. Cureton, 132 Ga. 745, 751 (65 S. E. 65); De Vall v. De Vall, 57 Or. 128, 144 (109 Pac. 755, 110 Pac. 705). See, also, 23 Cyc. 1559. If a decree for the present payment of a fixed sum of alimony is, under the law of the state where rendered, in truth a final determination upon which the court cannot exercise the power of modification, even though conditions have changed since the date of the award, then the way is clear for the enforcement of the decree in a sister state: Taylor v. Stowe, 218 Mass. 248, 250 (105 N. E. 890); and, therefore, in jurisdictions where it is held on the one hand that decrees for fixed sums of alimony payable presently are finalities not liable to modifica
If, however, an award of alimony even though payable presently is not a finality, and if the court which granted it may nevertheless because of changed conditions vacate or alter the amount allowed, then quite a different situation is presented. If a decree for a fixed sum payable presently may, for exactly the same reasons which would be sufficient for the modification of installments accruing after the decree allowing them, be altered in the state where rendered, and if this decree in these circumstances must nevertheless be treated as a conclusive finality in a sister state, then the necessary result is that such decree is in the state of its origin liable to modification while in another state it is a finality, and hence is there given more faith and respect and greater credit than is accorded to it in the state which gave it existence. If, on the other hand, a sister state refuses to enforce a decree rendered in another state for a fixed sum of alimony payable presently merely because it is possible that conditions have changed upon which the court which rendered the decree may possibly in the exercise of its discretion change the decree, then the inevitable result is that such decree, although capable of enforcement in the state of its origin can never be enforced in the sister
If the possibility of modification must be entirely removed and if this fact must be affirmatively shown by the judgment creditor as a condition precedent before an unfaithful husband can in a sister state be compelled to pay alimony or an unnatural father forced to help to maintain his own children, then no decree for the present payment of alimony can ever be enforced in a sister state if the court in which the decree was rendered may, because of possible changes in conditions, in the exercise of its discretion see fit at some future but indefinite time to change the decree. In the very nature of things some period of time will always elapse between the rendition of the decree and the commencement of an action in the sister state where the fugitive husband or father may be found and this period of elapsed time will always afford a basis for the claim that this kind of a decree is not a finality, with the result that the sister state becomes an asylum for marital and parental slackers.
In some respects a decree for alimony payable presently is different from a decree which provides for the future payment of alimony in installments, even though both decrees are liable to modification. One is res adjudicata up to the very moment of maturity, while the other is not. One is made on the theory that the money ought to be paid immediately, while the other is not. The statutes of Minnesota afford means for compelling the payment of alimony, for besides other processes the court may make the decree a lien upon real estate or authorize its enforcement by execution against property, real or personal. A decree for ali
The plaintiff Hildegarde Levine cannot claim for her decree the protection of the full faith and credit clause unless she alleges and proves that it is a finality. The holding in Rowe v. Rowe, 76 Or. 491 (149 Pac. 533), is authority for ruling that the installments which have accrued since the rendition of the decree are not entitled to the protection of the Federal Constitution until transformed into a final judgment for a definite sum payable presently, as was done in De Vall v. De Vall, 57 Or. 128 (109 Pac. 755, 110 Pac. 705); and when the accrued installments are so transformed they will possess a quality of finality exactly the same as the first installment which became due on the very day when the decree was rendered.
A decree for the present payment of a fixed sum as alimony, even though not absolutely final under the law of the state where rendered, is nevertheless, when unpaid, at least prima fade final in a sister state and, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, is sufficient to support a judgment in the sister state: Wells v. Wells, 209 Mass. 282 (95 N. E. 845, 35 L. R. A. (N. S.) 561); Section 695, L. O. L. Applying this rule to the instant case we are brought to the conclusion that the plaintiff is entitled to a judgment for the first installment.
10. The complaint does not contain a positive and direct allegation that the Minnesota decree was rendered on October 20,1913. There is, however, an averment that “on the twentieth day of October, 1913, and for more than two years prior thereto, the plaintiff and defendant were husband and wife,” and there is also a subsequent averment that the Minnesota suit terminated in a decree divorcing the parties, granting the care and custody of the child to the plaintiff, and awarding alimony to the plaintiff to be paid to her in installments, “the first payment to be October 20, 1913”; and when those two separate averments are taken together the unavoidable and necessary inference to be drawn from the pleading is that the first installment was payable on the date of the rendition of the decree; and hence this opinion assumes that the first installment was made payable the very day when the divorce decree was rendered. But in order to make “assurance doubly sure,” instead of entering a judgment here in favor of the plaintiff for the amount of the first installment as' we could do under the terms
The judgment is reversed and the cause is remanded for further proceedings. Reversed and Remanded.
Dissenting Opinion
(Dissenting). — In my judgment it is erroneous to assume that the date of the divorce decree
The complaint in the case before us does not expressly allege the date of the commencement of the suit for divorce or of the decree therein. In substance, its statement is that on October 20, 1913, the parties were husband and wife; that prior thereto the wife instituted the suit and that afterwards, without mention of the date, a decree was rendered requiring, among other things, that the first payment of alimony be made on the day mentioned. On demurrer, the pleading attacked is most strongly construed against the pleader. Nothing is taken by intendment. Seeing that the parties were husband and wife on that day, it is quite as permissible to assume that the date expressed for the first payment is void as undertaking to antedate the time of payment, as by a strained construction to impart finality to the pittance of'$12.50, and withhold the same sanction from the arrearages of $1,300 charged against the defendant. Again, at the commencement of this action on April 30, 1918, fifty-four months and ten days had elapsed since October 20, 1913. The installments payable in that period under the Minnesota decree amount to $1,350. The plaintiff sues here for only $1,300. Hence we cannot say, as of a certainty, that she demands the first installment.
Passing this, however, we find in the complaint that in Minnesota, having made an order for maintenance of children involved in a divorce suit, the court may from time to time subsequently revise or alter the order. The statute there makes no distinction between an amount payable presently and one payable in futuro.
If the complaint is sufficient to allow the plaintiff to recover the trifle of $12.50, it does state a cause of action and is good as against the general demurrer. The defendant ought to be restricted to his objection as stated. If it is bad at all, it is untenable in toto. In that view, the judgment ought to go for the full amount, a result seemingly more consonant with right and justice. Because of the precedents, however, I am of the opinion that the plaintiff should be remitted to obtaining a final judgment in Minnesota conclusively entitling her to such arrearages as the court there shall award her, as illustrated in the De Vail case.