Lead Opinion
The opinion of the Court was delivered by
The question in this case is whether the unauthorized use of public property for private recreational activities thereby puts the property “in dangerous condition” under N.J.S.A. 59:4-2 of the New Jersey Tort Claims Act, N.J.S.A 59:1-1 to :12-3 (the Act or the New Jersey Act), when the recreational activities themselves are risky and pose danger to the participants. In this ease a man dove from a county bridge into shallow tidal waters, suffering a paralyzing injury. We conclude that however tragic the accident, its cause was not the condition of the bridge but the dangers of unsupervised recreational activity for which there is no public-entity liability under the Act.
For purposes of this appeal, we accept the statement of facts set forth in plaintiffs briefs. (For convenience, we refer only to the injured plaintiff, Richard Levin. The claims of the other plaintiffs are derivative.) On the evening of July 23, 1987, Levin and two companions stopped at the Garden Road Bridge (the bridge) between Pittsgrove and Vineland to swim in the Maurice River. They had аrrived by automobile from the Cumberland County side of the bridge and had parked in the turnoff on the north side of the bridge, the Salem County side.
Many others "were at or near the bridge on that evening. For decades local residents had used the bridge and the surrounding area along the Maurice River for swimming and diving. This local “swimming hole” spans the border between Vineland (Cumberland) on the east and Pittsgrove (Salem) on the west. When Levin arrived at the bridge, several people were diving from the bridge into the river, seven feet below the bridge span. After observing the divers, Levin went to the north side of the bridge. When he dove into the river, his head struck a submerged sandbar. As a result, he sustained a fracture of the sixth cervical vertebra and was rendered a quadriplegic.
The counties of Cumberland and Salem jointly own, maintain, and control the Garden Road Bridge and are responsible for the regulation of activities on or near it. At the site of the bridge, the Maurice River passes through a picturesque woodland area. Gently sloping banks descend to the river on each side, and a sandy bathing beach exists adjacent to it. The site has been used by the public as a local swimming hole and for other water-related activities, such as sunbathing, fishing, canoeing, swimming, and diving from the river bank. Levin, in fact, had frequented the site as a child, and his family had enjoyed several outings there. The present bridge was constructed to replace the steel truss bridge that had been on the site for many years. It serves a rural, two-lane road. The bridge has a parapet, or low wall, at its edge, separated from the road by a wide sidewalk. Visitors to the
The record contains evidence that defendants knew that the area surrounding the Garden Road Bridge was used as a recreational site and that the bridge itself was used as a diving platform. The artificial bathing beach, parking areas, footpaths, canoe-rental signs, and the large numbеrs of swimmers, divers, and fishers who congregated at the site were obvious indications to the public bodies that the bridge area had been used and was being used by the public as a recreational site. Recent photographs offered in evidence depicted young people diving head first from the bridge into the Maurice River below.
In 1978, seventeen-year-old Mary Lou Quesenberry had suffered a similar accident when she dove into the river. During the course of the subsequent lawsuit the defendants received an engineering report detailing the hazard inherent in the placement of a low bridge wall over a body of water known to be used for recreation. The report indicated that the hazard at the site was the product of constantly-shifting sandbars below that part of the bridge where one would believe the water was the deepest, combined with the coloration of the water. The waters of the Maurice River are of a reddish color, commonly referred to as cedar water. The sandbars resulted from the widening of the river channel when the bridge was constructed in 1971. The report had recommended that the counties (1) construct a protective screen or fence to bar access to the river from the bridge, (2) post effective signs on the bridge approaches and spans, and (3) police and supervise the recreational activities at the site. Notwithstanding those recommendations, at the time of Levin’s accident neither county had altered the structure or design of the bridge. Since the filing of this suit, Salem County has erected a six-foot-tall chain-link fence on both sides of the Garden Road Bridge within its jurisdiction. At the end of the fence vertical “wingwalls” extend across the parapet and over the water, preventing access to the parapet behind the fence.
Plaintiff sued both counties and the two towns within each county, Pittsgrove and Vineland, that border the bridge. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of all the public entities. Pittsgrove moved unopposed for summary judgment and was dismissed from the case. Plaintiff did not appeal that dismissal. Salem then moved for summary judgment. In granting Salem’s motion, the trial court specifically found that (a) warning signs had been posted on the bridge at the time of the accident, (b) Salem County had passed an ordinance prohibiting diving from county bridges, and (c) the sole intended use for bridges is for vehicular and pedestrian traffic. The court found “as a matter of law [that] this bridge cannot be deemed to be a dangerous condition of public property.”
After Salem’s motion, defendants Vineland and Cumberland also moved for summary judgment. Vineland argued that because the
The Appellate Division affirmed, substantially for the reasons stated by the Law Division in ruling on the summary-judgment motions. The Appellate Division considered itself bound by Burroughs v. City of Atlantic City, 234 N.J.Super. 208,
II
We are required again to resolve the proper relationship between the liability and immunity provisions of the Act. Rochinsky v. State, Department of Transportation, 110 N.J. 399,
Plaintiff alleges that the absence of adequate warnings on the bridge or the failure to supervise the recreational activities or to erect a fence at the edge of the bridge caused his injuries. Defendants assert that the unauthorized and, indeed, illegal use of the property caused the injuries. Plaintiff realizes that liability
Chapter 4 of the Act, specifically N.J.S.A. 59:4-2, imposes liability on a public entity for injury caused by a condition of its property “if the plaintiff establishes that the property was in dangerous condition at the time of the injury, that the injury was proximately caused by the dangerous condition, [and] that the dangerous condition created a reasonably foreseeable risk of the kind of injury * * * incurred.” The plaintiff must also establish that the public entity was responsible either through its employees for creating the dangerous condition or had actual or constructive notice of the condition sufficiently before the injury to have taken measures to protect against the dangerous condition, provided that the entity will not be liable if the action taken to protect against the condition was not “palpably unreasonable.” Ibid. N.J.S.A. 59:4-1.a. defines “dangerous condition” as “a condition of property that creates a substantial risk of injury when such proрerty is used with due care in a manner in. which it is reasonably foreseeable that it will be used.”
Defendants’ principal argument before us is that to use property illegally cannot be to use it with due care, no matter how reasonably foreseeable the use. Applying that principle to Salem County, the fact that the public body had adopted a resolution forbidding diving from the bridge would immunize it from liability. We do not find that to be a satisfactory principle of decision. Were it so, a public entity could easily insulate itself from liability with respect to dangerous conditions of its property merely by
Rather, we believe that the issues here require us to identify the culpable cause of the accident and to ask if that “identified cause or condition is one that the Legislature intended to immunize.” Weiss v. New Jersey Transit, 128 N.J. 376, 380,
As noted, however, plaintiff rests his argument on N.J.S.A. 59:4-2. Plaintiff contends that the usе of the property as a recreational facility, when the public body knew of the use, created a dangerous condition of property. He claims that the absence of signs or other interdiction contributed to the dangerous condition. He submits that a jury should have been permitted to decide (1) if the property was being used with due care, in a way that was reasonably foreseeable to defendants, and (2) if such use created a dangerous condition on the property. Plaintiff relies on language in Burroughs, supra, that “whether a dangerous condition is present depends on a combination of factors relating to physical condition, permitted conduct, and objectively foreseeable behav
We are concerned that the premise of the Burroughs case on which plaintiff relies, namely, that a dangerous condition of property may arise from a “combination of factors relating to physical condition, permitted conduct, and objectively foreseeable behavior,” id. at 218-19,
In King by King v. Brown, 221 N.J.Super. 270,
Furthermore, we suspect that the Burroughs doctrine, on which plaintiff relies, would effectively eliminate the plan-or-design immunity conferred under N.J.S.A. 59:4-6. The counties designed the bridge to carry traffic and pedestrians. Usually the form of an object follows its function. See David Outerbridge, Bridges 8 (1989). The plan-or-design immunity shelters the bridge designers’ decision to accept or reject the concept of posting a chain-link fence along the sides of this rural span. Compare, Daniel v. State, Dep’t of Transp., 239 N.J.Super. 563,
III
In other essentials, however, the California Tort Claims Act was the model for the New Jersey Act. Speaks v. Jersey City Housing Auth., 193 N.J.Super. 405, 411-12,
Here the Promenade itself was neither dangerous nor defective. The harm in this case was caused, not by the condition of the Promenade or the want of barriers or signs barring its use by vehicles without a permit, but by the negligent operation of a motor vehicle. * * * The city owed the plaintiffs no duty to restrict the use nor to barricade against motorists who did not hold permits to use it. The Promenadeis not dangerous nor defective just because it is so constructed that motor vehicles can readily drive upon and along it.
[Id. 51 Cal.App.2d at 629-30,
Other California cases, interpreting that state’s Tort Claims Act, have followed the Campbell court’s interpretation of dangerous condition of public property.
A study of the cases interpreting section 830 [of the California Tort Claims Act covering a dangerous condition of property] and its predecessor acts shows that they interpret section 830 as requiring the physical condition of the public property to be in a dangerous or defective condition involving reasonable risk to the public. In Campbell v. City of Santa Monica * * *, [51 Cal.App.2d 626 ]125 P.2d 561 * * * the court said, * * ■* “harm in this case was caused, not by the condition of the Promenade or the want of barriers or signs barring its use by vehicles without a permit, but by the negligent operation of a motor vehicle.”
[Sykes v. County of Marin, 43 Cal.App. 3d 158, 161,
117 Cal.Rptr. 466, 468 (1974) (emphasis added).]
Bartell v. Palos Verdes Peninsula School District, 83 Cal. App.3d 492, 147 Cal.Rptr. 898 (1978), is a case much like ours. Even though the school district allegedly knew that children used its playground for skateboarding and took no measures to prevent the activity, the court found that plaintiffs failed to state a cause of action for a “dangerous condition of public property” beсause the injury was the direct result of the childrens’ dangerous conduct, not a defect in the physical condition of the property.
The California Supreme Court has tilted in both directions. In Hayes v. California, 11 Cal.3d 469, 113 Cal.Rptr. 599,
The corollary of the proposition — that we look to effects to determine whether a dangerous condition of property exists— would be that whenever danger exists, so does a dangerous condition of property. Heretofore our cases have not taken that approach. To do so now would require disapproval of many prior decisions both of this Court and lower courts, such as Weiss v. New Jersey Transit, supra, 128 N.J. 376,
Of course, a physical defect in the property, for example, a missing window, combined with the foreseeable neglect or misconduct of third parties, may result in the imposition of liability on the public entity because the combination renders the property unfit. Some conditions of the property itself impair the safety of its intended or foreseeable uses. See, e.g., Speaks, supra, 193 N.J.Super. at 412,
IV
In this cáse, there was no missing plate, no broken bolt, no defect in the bridge itself that caused or contributed to cause the tragic accident. The danger arose because the bridge was where the shallow water was. No other activity or inactivity of the public entities in this case forms a basis for liability under the Act
The judgment of the Appellate Division is affirmed.
Notes
In Torkelson v. City of Redlands, 198 Cal.App. 2d 354, 17 Cal.Rptr. 899 (1961), the court found a dangerous condition of property to exist when a child at play was swept by storm waters into an unfenced drain. However, the Bartell court later distinguished Torkelson on the grounds that the cause of the injury was an "inherent danger or dangerous design of the property itself,”
In so ruling, the Hayes court vacated the Court of Appeals decision, which had ruled that
[t]hc statute [allowing recovery based on a dangerous condition of property] is not restricted to the inherent quality of the property itself, but rather focuses on the impact of the condition upon the environment or users. It is the effect which determines whether a dangerous condition exists, not the inner nature of the property. Whether a dangerous condition exists can only be determined by examining the total quantum of facts pertinent to a controversy.
[Hayes v. California, 111 Cal.Rptr. 856, 862, (1973) (citations omitted).]
Dissenting Opinion
dissenting.
The majority holds that the Garden Road Bridge (“the Bridge”) did not constitute a dangerous condition at the time of Levin’s accident because the Bridge was not physically flawed. In reaching that result, the majority concludes that as a matter of law a dangerous condition cannot exist under N.J.S.A. 59:4-la unless a physical defect exists in the public property. That conclusion is not suрported by the language or the legislative history of the statute. The majority’s limitation on public-entity liability under the Tort Claims Act, N.J.S.A 59:1-1 to :12S (“the Act”), denies plaintiffs a jury trial to determine the possibility of compensation for injuries sustained ima tragic accident arising out of what plaintiffs assert was a reasonable and foreseeable use of the Bridge.
I.
According plaintiffs the favorable inferences to which they were entitled on the motion for summary judgment, I find that the record discloses the following factual context for the issue before the Court. The Garden Road Bridge spans the Maurice River. The eastern end of the Bridge is in Vineland in Cumberland County and the western end is in Pittsgrove in Salem County. For decades, local residents have used the area around the Bridge as a bathing beach and have dived from the Bridge parapet into the river seven feet below. The Bridge has a parapet that is twenty-seven inches high and twelve inches wide. The parapet was designed to protect the edgе of the Bridge and runs parallel to the road. It is elevated slightly above a wide sidewalk that lies between the parapet and the road. In 1978, Mary Lou Quesenberry, a seventeen-year-old, broke her neck and became a quadriplegic after having dived into the Maurice River from the Bridge.
Salem County passed a resolution prohibiting swimming, fishing, or diving from any bridge. Cumberland County took no official action prohibiting the use of the Bridge for swimming and diving. Neither County implemented any of the suggested corrective measures.
As a child, plaintiff Richard Levin had enjoyed summer outings at this swimming hole with his family. He had been unaware of the Quesenberry incident. Having perceived no danger, he had dived from the Bridge on several occasions. Nearly five years ago, Richard and two friends had stopped at the Garden Road Bridge for an early evening swim. After watching several other bathers dive off the Bridge, Richard dived from the north side of the Bridge into the river. He hit his head on a sandbar below the water’s surface, broke his sixth cervical vertebra, and became a quadriplegic. Richard Levin and his wife filed an action against Cumberland and Salem Counties and the Cities of Vineland and Pittsgrove.
In support of its motion for summary judgment, Salem County submitted several sworn statements asserting that “no swimming” and “no diving” signs had been posted at the Bridge. The County also relied on its ordinance prohibiting diving from the Bridge.
In opposition to defendant Salem County’s motion for summary judgment, plaintiffs’ expert certified that on several different days after Richard’s accident numerous families had used the Bridge site for recreational activities. They had swam in the river and
The trial court determined that “there is no genuine issue of material [ ] fact and as a matter of law, [the] Bridge cannot be deemed to be a dangerous condition of [] public property.” Accordingly,' the court held that the County was immune from suit under the Tort Claims Act. The Appellate Division affirmed substantially for the reasons stated by the trial court.
II.
N.J.S.A. 59:4-2 imposes liability on a public entity if
the plaintiff establishes that the property was in dangerous condition at the time of the injury, that the injury was proximately caused by the dangerous condition, that the dangerous condition created a reasоnably foreseeable risk of the kind of injury which was incurred, and that * * *
b. a public entity had actual or constructive notice of the dangerous condition f * * a sufficient time prior to the injury to have taken measures to protect against the dangerous condition.
A public entity, however, is not liable unless the action it takes or fails to take is palpably unreasonable. N.J.S.A. 59:4-2b. A dangerous condition is defined as “a condition of property that creates a substantial risk of injury when such property is used with due care in a manner in which it is reasonably foreseeable that it will be used.” N.J.S.A 59:4-la. There are two distinct prongs to the statutory definition of dangerous condition. First, the property must be “used with due care.” Second, the property also must be used in a manner that is reasonably foreseeable. Each of these definitional prongs has distinct implications. However, the threshold inquiry is whether plaintiffs have raised a genuine issue of material fact in respect of the existence of a dаngerous condition. Because the New Jersey Tort Claims Act was modeled after the California Tort Claims Act, an inquiry into California law is instructive. Chatman v. Hall, 128 N.J. 394, 411,
The California Tort Claims Act, adopted in 1963, illustrates what I believe is the correct interpretation of the requirement that property be used in a manner that is reasonably foreseeable. The majority equates reasonably-foreseeable use with intended use. The California Act, however, suggests a more expansive interpretation of the definition. Its definition of dangerous condition is virtually identical to that in N.J.S.A. 59:4-la. Section 830(a) of the California Government Code defines dangerous condition as “a condition of property that creates a substantial (as distinguished from a minor, trivial or insignificant) risk of injury when such property or adjacent property is used with due care in a manner in which it is reasonably foreseeable that it will be used.” In its comment to that section, the California Law Revision Commission stated:
A “dangerous condition” is defined in terms оf “foreseeable use.” This does not change the pre-existing law relating to cities, counties and school districts. These entities are liable under Government Code [former] Section 53051 for maintaining property in a condition that creates a hazard to foreseeable users even if those persons use the propeiiy for a purpose for which it is not designed to be used or for a purpose that is illegal Acosta v. County of Los Angeles, 56 Cal.2d 208, 14 Cal.Rptr. 433,363 P.2d 473 (1961); Torkelson v. City of Redlands,198 Cal.App.2d 354 , 17 Cal.Rptr. 899.
[CalLaw Revision Comm’n cmt. to Gov.Code § 830 (emphasis supplied).]
In Torkelson v. City of Redlands, a child who had been playing in a drainage ditch drowned when she was swept into a water tunnel.
in determining whether public property constitutes a dangerous condition the use factor to be considered in making such determination includes not only its designed or originally intended use, but every other reasonably anticipated use and also any use actually being made of it, conditioned always upon thе fact that the owning agency has knowledge of its actual use, and conditioned further that such use is not a mere casual one but a customary use.
Although the drainage ditch was fit for its intended use, the court nevertheless concluded that whether a dangerous condition was created by the City’s acquiescence in the children’s use of the ditch was a question for the jury to resolve.
The California Supreme Court also considered the scope of public-entity liability for dangerous conditions. In Acosta v. County of Los Angeles, 56 Cal. 2d 208, 14 Cal.Rptr. 433,
The question under California law is not, as the majority suggеsts, ante at 46, 626 A 2d at 1096, whether there is some defect in the property that caused the injury. Rather, the question is whether, when used in a foreseeable manner, public property or a condition thereof may pose a substantial risk of injury to a foreseeable user. Torkelson, supra, 198 Cal.App. 2d 354, 17 Cal.Rptr. 899. The majority relies on Campbell v. City of Santa Monica, 51 Cal.App.2d 626,
The majority cites two California Supreme Court decisions, Hayes v. California,
This Court previously has not considered- whether a dangerous condition exists for the purpose of liability under N.J.S.A. 59:4-2 when a member of the public is injured while using public property in a foreseeable or tacitly-permitted manner. However, in Burroughs v. City of Atlantic City, 234 N.J.Super. 208,
The Court apparently rejects the holding in Burroughs that a dаngerous condition may arise from a “combination of factors relating to physical condition, permitted conduct, and objectively foreseeable behavior.” Id. at 218-19,
We note certain ambiguities in these decisions. These cases may be construed as barring public entity liability for negligent, reckless or criminal acts of a thirdparty on publicly owned land. However, they may also be interpreted as simply holding that where public property is not defective public liability will not be imposed for injuries which result from the dangerous acts of third parties.
[Daniel v. New Jersey Dep’t of Transp., 239 N.J.Super. 563, 588 n. 3,
Both interpretations focus on the activities of a third party. Although the cases referred to in Daniel and relied on by the majority may inform a discussion of public-entity liability in the context of third-party activity, they are limited to that context and are inapposite to the issue before us.
Daniel reaffirmed the court’s conclusion in Burroughs that “ ‘whether a dangerous condition is present depends on a combination of factors relating to physical condition, permitted conduct, and objectively foreseeable behavior.’ ” 239 N.J.Super. at 585,
In King by King v. Brown, 221 N.J.Super. 270, 274,
a сondition of public property which is safe for one activity may become a dangerous condition when the property is converted to a different activity. For example, a bridge designed solely for pedestrian use may become dangerous when converted to use by vehicular traffic if its structure cannot support the additional load. In most cases, application of the dangerous condition standard requires consideration of both the physical characteristics of the public property as well as the nature of the activities permitted on that property. Indeed, the definition of dangerous condition in N.J.S.A. 59:4-la requires consideration of the reasonably foreseeable use of the property.
[Id. at 274-75,
That King involved a permitted use of the public property does not diminish the persuasiveness of that court’s reading of N.J.S.A. 59:4-la.
The majority has focused almost exclusively on intended or permitted uses of property as they relate to dangerous conditions. However, by doing so, the Court strays from the actual definition of dangerous condition as provided by statute. As stated above, a dangerous condition, as defined by N.J.S.A. 59:4-la, arises when two factors are present. The property must be used in a manner that is reasonably foreseeable. As articulated in Burroughs, Daniel, and King, supra, I am confident that use in a reasonably foreseeable manner encompasses activities that are tacitly permitted as well as objectively foreseeable. That, of course, implicates an unintended use of public property as well as the intended use.
In addition to the foreseeability requirement, a dangerous condition is one that poses a substantial risk of injury when the property is being used with due care. The majority seems to have avoided a closer scrutiny of this portion of the statutory definition. The phrase “use with due care” invites a jury to examine whether a given plaintiffs conduct while engaging in a foreseeable activity amounts to an objectively reasonable use of the property.
Our courts often have described “due care” with regard to dangerous conditions as a basic matter of “common sense.” See Hawes v. New Jersey Dep’t of Transp., 232 N.J.Super. 160, 164,
Whether a particular use of property constitutes use with due care “depends on the variable element of risk of harm inherent in any situation.” King, supra, 221 N.J.Super. at 276,
That court’s reference to a community ideal standard implies that a plaintiffs conduct must be reasonable, and in determining whether the conduct is reasonable, a consideration of standards or customs of the community would be relevant. Thus, it is important to ask not only whether it was foreseeable that Richard Levin and other persons had used the bridge as a diving platform with the knowledge of defendants, but also, whether diving off the bridge was a reasonable “use” of the property as measured by community standards. The term reasonable does not denote “intended” or “permitted,” but rather involves an assessment of whether persons similarly situated would tend to engage in certain conduct.
The definitional requirement of use with due care necessarily tempers the potential scope of a public entity’s liability. It is not sufficient that a public entity be cognizant that its property is being used in a foreseeable manner that creates a substantial risk of injury. The use of the property must itself be reasonable.
Conduct that is regularly engaged in by members of the public exercising due care and tacitly permitted by a public body may constitute a reasonably-foreseeable use and thereby establish a dangerous condition under N.J.S.A 59:4-la. Furthermore, a tacitly-permitted use that differs from the originally-intended use may convert “safe” public property into a dangerous condition if the property is not safe for the officially-permitted use. See Torkelson, supra,
Plaintiffs have presented material issues of fact with respect to their claims. The evidence proffered in opposition to defendants’ motion for summary judgment is probative of plaintiffs’ claim that the diving accident was proximately caused by a dangerous condition of public property. The record before the trial court reasonably suggests that a jury could find that diving from the Garden Road Bridge was a foreseeable use of the Bridge; that defendants had knowledge of that use; and that a reasonable person exercising due care might dive from the Bridge. In addition, whether defendants’ acquiescence in the use of the Bridge as a diving platform created a substantial risk of injury to foreseeable users is for a jury to determine. Finally, plaintiffs allege sufficient facts to support a jury determination that defendants were palpably unreasonable in their failure to warn against or remedy the asserted dangerous condition of public рroperty created by the Garden Road Bridge.
The Tort Claims Act was enacted “to reestablish a system in which immunity is the rule, and liability the exception.” Bombace v. City of Newark, 125 N.J. 361, 372,
N.J.S.A 59:4-2 exposes governmental bodies to liability for injuries caused by a dangerous condition if the conduct in respect of that condition was palpably unreasonable. That exception to the general rule of immunity can be traced to the justifiable public expectation that public entities will warn against or take action to prevent injury from known hazards. The failure to do so may suggest either that a particular activity, when engaged in with due care, poses no substantial risk of injury, or that the public entity’s conduct was negligent or even palpably unreasonable. In authorizing public-entity liability for dangerous conditions, N.J.S.A. 59:4-la, :4-2, the Legislature carefully balanced the competing interests of the public and the governmental units. See Report of New Jersey Attorney General’s Task Force on Sovereign Immunity 220-21 (1972). That authorization reflects the Legislature’s intention to secure to the public protection from government’s palpably-unreasonable conduct. Notwithstanding that legislative directive, the majority ignores the plain statutory language and extends public-entity immunity to circumstances not within the intended scope of the Act. The majority’s restrictive construction of the term “dangerous condition” detracts from the protection of the public contemplated by the Legislature’s authorization of public-entity liability for dangerous conditions. It finds no justification in the policy, language, or history of the Tort Claims Act.
I would reverse the judgment of the Appellate Division and remand to the Law Division for a jury trial on plaintiffs’ complaint.
For affirmance — Chief Justice WILENTZ and Justices CLIFFORD, POLLOCK, O’HERN and GARIBALDI — 5.
For reversal and remandment — Justices HANDLER and STEIN — 2.