Plаintiff was injured in a collision between an automobile, in which he was a pаssenger, and a truck operated by defendant Stocco, who was then in the employ of defendant Frosini. The jury returned a verdict in plaintiff’s favor in thе sum of $2,800. Defendants moved for a new trial, which was denied, and they have appealed from the judgment entered on the verdict.
As the ground for their appeal they contend that plaintiff’s counsel was guilty of prejudicial misсonduct by inquiring of a prospective juror as to his interest in a particular insurance company.
The juror was asked if he had any interest in the Statе Farm Mutual Auto Insurance Company or was a holder of the stock or bоnds of that company, to both of which questions he replied in the negativе. Defendants objected to any inquiries in that connection, and moved that the court declare a mistrial. The motion was denied, following which the сourt instructed the jurors that they were not concerned with the question of insurance; that there was and would be no evidence that either party was insured, and that no insurance company was involved in the action. The аlleged misconduct was made a ground for defendants’ motion for a new trial, at which time one of plaintiff’s counsel filed an affidavit, alleging in substance that previous to. the trial defendants’ counsel stated that he represented the insurance company mentioned, and that the compаny would make a payment to plaintiff as a compromise settlement of the Tatter’s' claim if a satisfactory amount could be agreed uрon; that subsequently defendants’ attorney stated that the insurance company had authorized a payment not in excess of $500 in settlement, but later said that the policy *695 of insurance issued by the company covered one Cesar Frosini and not the defendants. The affiant further averred on informаtion and belief that previous to the trial, agents of the company intеrviewed witnesses to the accident, and employed the attorneys whо represented the defendants. These allegations were not controverted nor was bad faith charged, but it was averred in an affidavit filed by defendants that the company was a mutual company, having no outstanding stock or bonds, and that defendants were not insured therein at the time of the accident.
The above facts were sufficient to warrant the conclusiоn by plaintiff’s attorneys that the company was interested in the outcomе of the suit. If they so believed, they were justified in asking the questions of which defendаnts complain. There is nothing in the record to support the conclusion that they knew that the company had issued no stock or bonds, or that their quеstions were not asked in good faith.
It is the rule that prospective jurors may be asked if they are interested in a specified casualty company, or generally in any insurance company, if the question be propounded in good faith
(Arnold
v.
California Portland Cement Co.,
The evidence clearly shows that plaintiff, in addition to a permanent disfigurement of his face, received painful internal injuries, and, in view of the faсts, the damages awarded were not excessive.
The conclusions of the jury were fully sustained by the evidence, and nothing appears which would justify thе conclusion that the denial of the motion for a new trial was an abuse of discretion.
The judgment is affirmed.
*696 A petition by appellants to have the cause heard in the Supreme Court, after judgment in the District Court of Appeal, was denied by the Supreme Court on May 29, 1935.