16 N.M. 28 | N.M. | 1911
OPINION OP THE COURT.
In Shinn on Attachment, Section 304, pages 590, 591 and 592, it is said: When, for the purpose of releasing, attached property (or to prevent property from being-attached), a bond is given to pay the judgment which the attachment plaintiff may thereafter procure against the attachment defendant, the principal -effect of such bond is to dissolve the attachment (if levied) and discharge the-property from the attachment lien,, and the case will then proceed as if originally begun by summons. The bond stands in lieu of the rem. The property is gone from the court’s control. Idle bond is special bail and is a substitute for the property as regards all claims that may be made against it by the promoter of the suit. The attachment has expended its force and is no longer operative. The bond dissolves the attachment entirely. It is not given for the property itself, but for the payment absolutely of the judgment when recovered in the suit, whatever may be the amount, if within the penalty named in the bond. It is a security for any judgment which would have been satisfied out of the attached property. And this, although there may be, by leave of court a discontinuance as to all the defendants named in the bond except the administrator of one deceased. In fact, it has been said that a bond given to the plaintiff, to pay the judgment that may be recovered by him operates not only to release the levy, but to destroy the writ itself, and that thereafter a. motion to dissolve the attachment as being irregular or improvidently issued will not be entertained. There is no levy to be quashed after the bond is given and the property is released.” U. S. v. Ames, 99 U. S. 35; Carpenter v. Turrell, 100 Mass. 450; Inbusch v. Farwell, 1 Black, U. S. 566; Fox v. McKenzie, 47 N. W. Rep. 386; Morrison v. Alphin, 23 Ark. 136; Fergusson v. Glidewell, 48 Ark. 195, 2 S. W. Rep. 711; Rachelman v. Skinner, 46 Minn. 196, 48 N. W. Rep. 776.
By reference to the bond which was given in this case the following provisions clearly show that it was given for the purpose of securing the discharge of the attachment, and as an obligation to pay any judgment that might bo rendered in the case: “Now, therefore, we, the undersigned residents of the county of Bernalillo, Territory of New Mexico, in consideration of the premises and in order that the attachment in such action shall be discharged and restitution made of any property taken under it or the proceeds thereof, do hereby jointly and -severally undertake and promise to the effect that if the said plaintiff should recover judgment in said action we will pay to the said plaintiff upon demand the amount of said judgment and promise that the defendants will in every manner perform the judgment of the court in said action. (Signed) Milton H. Edwards, Lena Edwards, Harry Carter, D. J. Rankin, J. E.'Haines.” There being a general appearance for the defendants in this case, and this bond having been entered into which the statute specifically says shall discharge and dissolve the attachment and the lien thereof, we are of the opinion that the assignments of error relied upon as to the attachment proceedings cannot be considered on this appeal.
The judgment of the court is affirmed, with costs. And it is so ordered.