79 N.J. Eq. 630 | N.J. | 1912
The opinion of the court was delivered by
This is an appeal from a decree of divorce nisi, wherein it was adjudged and decreed by the court of chancery upon a petition for divorce, filed by John H. Letts, the petitioner, that the appellant, Mary E. Newbrand Letts, on the 17th day of March, 1908, had committed adultery with one George Connett, the co-respondent named therein, at Sayresville, in this state; and that the cross-petition filed in the suit by the appellant praying for a divorce from bed and board for extreme cruelty be dismissed.
The parties were married on the 19th day of September, 1898, at South River, Middlesex county, in this state. At the time of the marriage the petitioner was twenty jrears of age and the appellant not quite eighteen. An engagement to marry existed between the parties for some time prior to its taking place. It appears from the testimony that pending the engagement to marry, and about six months before that event happened, the petitioner seduced the appellant, and that three months after their marriage a female child was born to them, the only issue of the pair. The petitioner admits that the appellant was enceinte by him when he married her, and he supplements it with the 'statement that he married her because he had to. Thus, at the very threshold of the petitioner’s entering into the matrimonial state with the woman he had wronged and who was soon to become the mother of their child, a glimpse is obtained of his utter lack of moral sense and obligation, and of his state of mind and feeling toward the appellant. And the statement of the petitioner that he married the appellant because he had to becomes an intelligible key to the proceedings instituted by him against his wife.
From the testimony, it appears that immediately after their marriage the couple returned to Sayreville and lived with the wife’s parents for nearly two years, when they went to housekeeping in Sayreville on their own account, and where they lived together as husband and wife until the 17th day of March, 1908; and they continued to live together after that date, under the
There is a strong probability of the truth of the appellant’s version of what she suffered at the hands of her husband during her cohabitation with him, and that it was upon his order and threat of injury that she left her home, but it lacks that corroboration which the law requires upon which to base the affirmative relief prayed for in appellant’s cross-petition; neither was it sufficient in law to constitute a bar to the petitioner’s suit for divorce.
The testimony required to bar a petitioner’s right to relief in a suit for divorce must reach that degree of proof which is required to establish a matrimonial offence which would have entitled a defendant to affirmative relief, if it had been asked for. To that degree of required proof the testimony, on the part of the appellant, failed to attain.
But there is an aspect of the case in which the testimony, just adverted to, becomes all important and influential, and that is, in so far as it sheds light upon the springs of the husband’s conduct and in a measure supports the appellant’s contention that there lurked in the petitioner’s bosom ever since his forced marriage to the appellant, a settled and determined design to get rid of her.
The decree in favor of the husband against his 'wife is founded upon the testimony of an alleged paramour and whose testimony it is claimed has been corroborated by the husband. Vice-Chancellor Howell, in his opinion, says: “I have hesitated, and feel a hesitation now, about advising a decree for a divorce on the testimony of those two people,” but the vice-chancellor thought there were matters of corroboration in two particular instances: one
It does not follow, because a letterj written by a woman, designed for a particular man, contains ardent expressions, that the inference should be draAvn that she would be ready to fall into the arms of the first man who would present himself to her. The law requires an act more flagrant than that before a wife can be robbed of her reputation for chastity and virtue.
From the testimony in the case, it clearly appears that ever since her marriage the appellant has been a chaste, patient and suffering wife. There is not a spark of testimony to indicate that she has ever conducted herself improperly or immodestly, or that she ever was neglectful of her wifely duties, or that she- ever kept company with any stranger, or that she was lewd or lascivious. The only other circumstance to which the vice-chancellor attached great weight as being corroborative that the appellant
The decree of the court of chancery therefore must rest for its support upon the testimony of the alleged paramour and the petitioner.
A single act of adultery is charged against the wife. It is alleged to have been committed with George Connett in the petitioner’s home, between eight and nine o’clock, on the evening of the 17th of March, 1908. Connett drove a grocery wagon and delivered orders. He delivered groceries at the petitioner’s house almost daily for a period of thirteen months. He was eighteen and a half years old at the time his alleged adulterous intercourse with the appellant took place, and he tells with rather a boastful glee that at that time hé had already much experience with women. And it is from the lips of this self-confessed youthful libertine that proceeds the confession, in court, that he had committed a single act of adultery with the appellant on the night stated and upon which the proof of adultery in this case rests. His story, in substance, is that “somewheres around” the 16th of March, 1908, the appellant told him, “My husband is going up to the blow-out of the O. TJ. A. M.” “He won’t be home that night, come up to the house.” “I said, ‘All right,’ so I went.” That he went to the house about half-past eight; that there were two children there, one ten and the other about thirteen years old. The witness referred to the daughter of Mrs. Letts, who was then ten years of age and an adopted child, a niece of Mr. Letts, thirteen years of age. That Mrs. Letts invited him into the parlor
The story told by Connett is so contrary to the natural order of things and so contrary to the natural operation and manifestations of the human passions and feelings upon such an occasion, in which Connett claims to have been an actor, that it may be regarded as a highly improbable one. To entitle it to belief it should receive convincing corroboration.
I doubt if there can be found in the history of the divorce court anywhere such a rara avis, a male co-respondent, who had volun
Connett’s story is contradicted in some of its essential features. It is evident that he desired to make it appear that when he arrived at Letts’s house that evening the two girls were there and that Mrs. Letts desired to get them out of the way by putting them to bed. Both girls testified that they did not see Connett on that night, which contradicts Connett’s story that Mrs. Letts put them, to bed when he came in, whereas the testimony of Mrs. Letts is to the effect that the girls had been put to bed before Connett came. Connett admitted that he told Louis Zach that he never had anything to do with Mrs. Letts. Several witnesses for the defence testified that Connett told them that he never had anything to do with Mrs. Letts. Connett says that he left the middle room to go to the front door and found Letts there and went back into the kitchen and told Mrs. Letts. This statement is important since it confirms Mrs. Letts in her statement that she was ironing in the kitchen when her husband came and had been there during the entire evening.
Mrs. Letts denied most emphatically the charge made against her.- She admits that Connett was in. the kitchen when Letts came there, and not in the cellar, and accounts for Connett’s presence by his coming to the house stating that he was sent to get Mr. Letts to come to the school election, which was being held that evening. Now, it appears that Letts was at the school election that evening. Mrs. Letts says that Connett had been in the kitchen not more than five minutes, where she was standing ironing some clothes, before Letts came, and that she let him in by the kitchen door which was locked, and that as soon as he entered he seized Connett, who was sitting in the kitchen, and threw him out of the door.
Mrs. Letts denies the story told by Connett in every particular,
Mrs. Letts denies the story told by Connett as to any previous-arranged appointment with her. It also appeared in the case that Mr. Letts had said on one occasion that he would pay anybody $5 who would catch his wife with a man. He had expressed on several occasions a desire to get rid of his wife. All this is evidently a consistent- outcome of the forced marriage into which Letts says he entered with Mrs. Letts, and it seems that the husband has, in a narrow view, treasured it up as a wrong. There is also testimony in the case that Connett told one Zaeh, a witness for t-he defence, that he had been sent by someone to Mrs. Letts’s house which accounted for his presence there that night. While there is no testimony from which it may be inferred with any
The vice-chancellor seemed to be of the opinion that if Connett was at the petitioner’s home by an arrangement with the husband, that the husband would have undoubtedly taken with him disinterested persons to be used as witnesses and since he did not do so, it convinced him that the event was not the result of connivance between the husband and Connett, but a genuine surprise to him.
But, on the other hand, it is equally, if not more probable, that the husband would not take witnesses with him unless he had anticipated to catch his wife flagrante delicto.
It would not have furthered the scheme of the husband to have witnesses find his wife and Connett in the kitchen, she pursuing her domestic duties and he sitting on a chair as she testified, but an unscrupulous husband would rather depend upon a story told by himself which would tend to corroborate that of Ms confederate.
The burden of proof was clearly not sustained by the husband. The wife absolutely denied the charge. In support of the truth of her denial she testified that before and at the time of the alleged adultery, she had been and was suffering from an ailment affecting her genital organs which made the act of coition extremely painful to her. In this she was corroborated by a reputable physician and no attempt was made by the husband to contradict it. If such a physical condition existed, as testified to by Mrs. Letts and the physician who examined her, it most effectu
There seems to be no conclusive reason why a decree for divorce may not be granted upon the uncorroborated testimony of a paramour, provided he is a credible witness and his story worthy of belief.
There appears <to be no valid reason why a different rule of law should exist governing the testimony of a paramour in a divorce case than the one relating to the testimony of a particeps criminis in a criminal prosecution.
Mr. Justice Knapp, in State v. Hyer, 39 N. J. Law (10 Vr.) 602, in discussing this class of testimony, says: “There has grown up in the courts a settled practice quite universal and entitled to its observance almost to the reverence of law, to advise jurors, in the strongest cautionary terms, not to convict defendants on such testimony, unless they can find corroboration in the testimony of other and unsuspected witnesses, upon such material circumstances as tend directly to establish the guilt of the accused.”
And for this rule of precaution the learned judge, on page 601, gives the following basis: “It was reasonable that courts should regard their testimony with suspicion, and look carefully into the secret motives that might actuate bad minds to draw in and victimize the innocent.”
The learned judge, after citing numerous cases, reaches the conclusion that a valid conviction may b.e founded upon the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice.
An exposition of the true rule of law, with the rule of practice engrafted upon it, as generally adopted by the courts governing the testimony of a particeps criminis, in suits for divorce, is tersely stated in 14 Cyc. 697, as follows:
“While the testimony of the alleged paramour may be considered in determining the fact of the adultery, it is liable to grave suspicion and should be acted upon with extreme caution; and, ordinarily, unless it is corroborated, it is not sufficient to establish guilt.”