131 Wash. App. 657 | Wash. Ct. App. | 2006
— Bruce Letourneau appeals an order affirming the suspension of his driver’s license, arguing that the administrative hearing officer erred by admitting the results of his breath tests into evidence. We are asked to decide whether a breath test simulator thermometer that was certified under former WAC 448-13-035
I
¶2 On April 29, 2004, a Washington State patrol trooper stopped Letourneau after he observed him driving his motorcycle over the speed limit and weaving within the traffic lane. The trooper conducted field sobriety tests, concluded that Letourneau was intoxicated, and arrested him for driving under the influence of intoxicants. At the police station, Letourneau provided two breath samples, which showed that his blood-alcohol level was over the legal limit.
¶3 The Department of Licensing (Department) suspended Letourneau’s driver’s license for 90 days. Letour-neau requested an administrative licensing hearing, which was held in July 2004. During the hearing, Letourneau argued that his breath tests were inadmissible under RCW 46.61.506(4)(a). This statutory provision, which pertains to the admissibility of breath tests in any civil or criminal proceeding arising out of an allegation that the defendant was driving under the influence, became effective on June 10, 2004. Letourneau argued that the Department could not show that the temperature of the simulator solution in the breath test instrument was measured by a
¶4 The hearing officer rejected Letourneau’s argument and sustained his license suspension. On review, the superior court affirmed. We granted discretionary review.
II
¶5 We are asked to interpret the meaning of the phrase “thermometer approved of by the state toxicologist” under RCW 46.61.506(4)(a)(iv). Statutory interpretation is a question of law, which we review de novo.
¶6 In 2004, the legislature amended former RCW 46-.61.506
(a) A breath test performed by any instrument approved by the state toxicologist shall be admissible at trial or in an administrative proceeding if the prosecution or department produces prima facie evidence of the following:
(i) The person who performed the test was authorized to perform such test by the state toxicologist;
(ii) The person being tested did not vomit or have anything to eat, drink, or smoke for at least fifteen minutes prior to administration of the test;
(iii) The person being tested did not have any foreign substances, not to include dental work, fixed or removable, in his or her mouth at the beginning of the fifteen-minute observation period;
(iv) Prior to the start of the test, the temperature of the simulator solution as measured by a thermometer approved of by the state toxicologist was thirty-four degrees centigrade plus or minus 0.3 degrees centigrade;
(v) The internal standard test resulted in the message ‘Verified”;
(vii) The simulator external standard result did lie between .072 to .088 inclusive; and
(viii) All blank tests gave results of .000.[
The amendments became effective on June 10, 2004.
¶7 The relevant portion for purposes of this appeal is subsection (4)(a)(iv), which requires the Department to show that “[p]rior to the start of the test, the temperature of the simulator solution as measured by a thermometer approved of by the state toxicologist was thirty-four degrees centigrade plus or minus 0.3 degrees centigrade.”
¶8 Before the 2004 amendments, the state toxicologist had established rules governing breath testing under the authority of former RCW 46.61.506.
¶9 Nevertheless, Letourneau argues that, because he was arrested and administered breath tests before June 10, the Department could not admit his breath tests into evidence because there was no such thing as a thermometer approved of by the state toxicologist at the time he provided breath samples.
¶10 In response, the Department argues that the thermometer which was used to administer Letourneau’s breath tests was approved of by the state toxicologist because the toxicologist had previously certified such thermometers. The Department concedes that certification and approval have different meanings, but it argues that certification necessarily implies approval. Alternatively, the Department argues that the toxicologist’s emergency rule, which amended former WAC 448-13-020 and expressly approved mercury-in-glass thermometers, applied retroactively.
¶11 We must decide whether a “thermometer approved of by the state toxicologist” under RCW 46.61.506(4)(a)(iv) includes a thermometer that had been “certified” by the state toxicologist under former WAC 448-13-035. The primary objective in statutory interpretation is to discern and implement the intent of the legislature.
¶12 The legislature has not defined “approved” for purposes of chapter 46.61 RCW. Everyday usage of the terms “approve” and “certify” indicate that, although they are often interchangeable, they are not always synonymous. Approve means “to judge and find commendable or acceptable.”
¶13 But an approved thermometer under RCW 46-.61.506(4)(a)(iv) necessarily includes one that was certified under former WAC 448-13-035. Before June 10, 2004, the state toxicologist was charged with approving the instruments for administering breath tests. A thermometer was a necessary component of a simulator, and a simulator was a necessary component of a breath test instrument. Under former WAC 448-13-035, the state toxicologist required that simulator thermometers be certified for accuracy under particular standards. In effect, any thermometer certified under former WAC 448-13-035 was approved of by the state toxicologist.
f 14 The clear intent of the legislature in adopting subsection (4) supports this interpretation. The legislature’s purpose for amending former RCW 46.61.506 was to “ensure swift and certain consequences for those who drink and drive.”
¶15 Letourneau points to the state toxicologist’s emergency rule as proof that a certified thermometer under former WAC 448-13-035 was not approved of by the toxicologist for purposes of RCW 46.61.506(4)(a)(iv). He argues that if a certified thermometer constituted an approved thermometer, then there was no need for the toxicologist to adopt the emergency rule. We interpret the toxicologist’s action as an effort to be thorough and reject Letourneau’s attempt to turn the use of both a belt and suspenders into a sword.
¶16 Alternatively, the toxicologist’s emergency rule, which approved of the type of thermometer used during Letourneau’s breath testing, applied retroactively because it was curative and remedial. There is a strong presumption that statutes and rules apply prospectively only. However, this presumption may be overcome “if it is shown that (1) the legislature intended the amendment to apply retroactively, (2) the amendment is curative, or (3) the amendment is remedial.”
¶17 But “the effective date of an administrative regulation does not prohibit the regulation from applying retroactively where the purpose of the regulation is curative or remedial in nature”
¶18 In State v. MacKenzie,
¶19 The Department produced prima facie evidence that the temperature of the simulator solution in the breath test instrument that was used to administer Letourneau’s breath tests was measured by “a thermometer approved of by the state toxicologist,” as required under RCW 46-.61.506(4)(a)(iv).
¶20 Affirmed.
Grosse and Becker, JJ., concur.
Former WAC 448-13-035, repealed by Wash. St. Reg. 04-19-144 (Oct. 23, 2004).
State v. Schultz, 146 Wn.2d 540, 544, 48 P.3d 301 (2002).
Former RCW 46.61.506 (2004), amended by Laws of 2004, ch. 68, § 4.
RCW 46.61.506(4)(a). Under subsection (4), challenges to the reliability or accuracy of a breath test may be considered by the fact finder and go to the weight of the evidence, but cannot be considered by the court when determining the admissibility of the test once the State has provided prima facie evidence of the factors listed in (4)(a). RCW 46.61.506(4)(c).
RCW 46.61.506(4)(a)(iv) (emphasis added).
Wash. St. Reg. 04-12-051 (June 10, 2004). The approval of breath test instruments is now found in WAC 448-16-020.
The toxicologist has adopted new rules in accordance with the amendments and repealed the former rules.
Former WAC 448-13-020, repealed by Wash. St. Reg. 04-19-144 (Oct. 23, 2004).
See former WAC 448-13-030(22), repealed by Wash. St. Reg. 04-19-144 (Oct. 23, 2004) (defining “simulator”).
This thermometer is now “approved” under WAC 448-16-020(2).
State v. J.P., 149 Wn.2d 444, 450, 69 P.3d 318 (2003).
J.P., 149 Wn.2d at 450.
J.P., 149 Wn.2d at 450 (quoting Dep’t of Ecology v. Campbell & Gwinn, L.L. C., 146 Wn.2d 1, 11, 43 P.3d 4 (2002)).
Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 106 (3d ed. 1993).
Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 367 (3d ed. 1993).
Laws of 2004, ch. 68, § 1.
Laws of 2004, ch. 68, § 1.
In re Pers. Restraint of Stewart, 115 Wn. App. 319, 332, 75 P.3d 521 (2003).
State v. MacKenzie, 114 Wn. App. 687, 699, 60 P.3d 607 (2002).
Magula v. Benton Franklin Title Co., 131 Wn.2d 171, 182, 930 P.2d 307 (1997).
MacKenzie, 114 Wn. App. at 699.
MacKenzie, 114 Wn. App. at 700 (quoting Bayless v. Cmty. Coll. Dist. XIX, 84 Wn. App. 309, 312, 927 P.2d 254 (1996) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
114 Wn. App. 687, 60 P.3d 607 (2002).
MacKenzie, 114 Wn. App. at 700.