Ric LESTER d/b/a Fair Play Video, Petitioner, v. SOUTH CAROLINA WORKERS’ COMPENSATION COMMISSION, Respondent.
No. 24923
Supreme Court of South Carolina
Decided March 22, 1999
514 S.E.2d 751
Heard Jan. 6, 1999.
Finally, appellants raise numerous evidentiary challenges to the findings of the trial judge which form the basis for the injunctive relief granted respondent. We find no evidentiary or constitutional error in the injunction issued here. Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network of Western New York, 519 U.S. 357, 117 S.Ct. 855, 137 L.Ed.2d 1 (1997); Madsen v. Women‘s Health Center, Inc., 512 U.S. 753, 114 S.Ct. 2516, 129 L.Ed.2d 593 (1994). Accordingly, the order appealed from is AFFIRMED.
Janet Godfrey Wilson, of South Carolina Workers’ Compensation Commission, of Columbia, for respondent.
BURNETT, Justice:
We granted a writ of certiorari to review the decision of Lester v. South Carolina Workers’ Compensation Commission, 328 S.C. 535, 493 S.E.2d 103 (Ct.App.1997). We affirm in part and reverse in part.
FACTS
Petitioner Ric Lester d/b/a Fair Play Video (Lester) opened a video casino in November 1992. He had no payroll in 1992. In January 1993, Lester began hiring a series of temporary and “rollover” employees. In May 1993, an employee was shot during a robbery of the video casino. In May 1994, Lester acquired workers’ compensation insurance coverage for his employees.
Lester was directed to appear before Respondent South Carolina Workers’ Compensation Commission (the Commission) to show cause why he should not be found in violation of
The single commissioner concluded Lester was not exempt under
ISSUE
Did the Court of Appeals err by construing the minimum payroll exemption provision of
DISCUSSION
This Title shall not apply to:
(2) Any person who has regularly employed in service less than four employees in the same business within the State or who had a total annual payroll during the previous calendar year of less than three thousand dollars regardless of the number of persons employed during that period.
(emphasis added).
The Court of Appeals interpreted the minimum payroll provision of
Lester agrees the Court of Appeals correctly held the purpose of the minimum payroll provision is “to avoid adminis-
The cardinal rule of statutory construction is for the Court to ascertain and effectuate the intent of the legislature. Mid-State Auto Auction of Lexington, Inc. v. Altman, 324 S.C. 65, 476 S.E.2d 690 (1996). If a statute‘s language is plain and unambiguous, and conveys a clear and definite meaning, there is no occasion for employing rules of statutory interpretation and the Court has no right to look for or impose another meaning. Miller v. Doe, 312 S.C. 444, 441 S.E.2d 319 (1994). Where a statute is ambiguous, however, the Court must construe the terms of the statute. Workers’ compensation statutes are to be construed in favor of coverage; any exception to workers’ compensation coverage must be narrowly construed. Peay v. U.S. Silica Co., 313 S.C. 91, 437 S.E.2d 64 (1993). Any reasonable doubts as to construction of the Act should be resolved in favor of coverage. Mauldin v. Dyna-Color/Jack Rabbit, 308 S.C. 18, 416 S.E.2d 639 (1992).
The minimum payroll exemption provision of
Since we must resolve any reasonable doubt as to construction of the Act in favor of workers’ compensation coverage, id., we conclude employers who have no payroll in the previous calendar year do not meet the terms of the minimum payroll exemption provision of
We disagree, however, with the Court of Appeals’ conclusion that, in order to be exempt under the minimum payroll provision, the employer must also reasonably expect a similarly low payroll during the current calendar year. While the requirement is logical, no language in
The decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED IN PART AND REVERSED IN PART.
FINNEY, C.J., TOAL and WALLER, JJ., concur.
MOORE, J., dissenting in separate opinion.
MOORE, Justice:
I respectfully dissent. In my opinion, the minimum payroll exemption provision of
If a statute‘s language is plain and unambiguous, and conveys a clear and definite meaning, there is no occasion for employing any rules of statutory interpretation and the Court has no right to look for or impose another meaning. Paschal v. State of South Carolina Election Comm‘n, 317 S.C. 434, 454 S.E.2d 890 (1995). We need not “divine” intent when statutory language is clear and unambiguous, but instead need simply apply the statute‘s literal language. Gaster v. Evatt, 326 S.C. 33, 483 S.E.2d 197, 198 (1997). Where the terms of the statute are clear, the Court must apply those terms according to their literal meaning. This Court cannot construe a statute without regard to its plain and ordinary meaning, and may not resort to subtle or forced construction in an attempt to limit or expand a statute‘s scope. Paschal, supra. Furthermore, it would be improvident to judicially engraft extra requirements
An employer without a payroll should not be prevented from claiming this exemption simply because he has no payroll rather than any amount less than $3,000. Pursuant to the majority‘s opinion, a payroll of $1.00 the previous year would allow an employer to claim the exemption. Reading into the statute a requirement that there must have been some payroll the previous year is simply a forced construction of the statute and judicially engrafts extra requirements to this statute, which is clear on its face. Accordingly, I would reverse the Court of Appeals on this issue.