90 Ga. 802 | Ga. | 1893
1. It appears from the record that this case came on to be heard in Clarke superior court on the 27th day of April, 1892, during the regular term of that court, and that a special verdict was rendered on specific questions propounded to the jury. Subsequently, but during the same term, an order was passed by the court providing that a decree might be entered in the cause in vacation, which was accordingly done on the 18th of July thereafter. The bill of exceptions, sued out on the 17th of August, assigns as error, not only the rendering of this decree, but various rulings by the court during the progress of the trial before the jury. When the case came on for a hearing in this court, counsel for defendant in error raised the point that the errors complained of as having been committed on the trial could not properly be considered, exception thereto not having
It follows that the only questions affecting the merits of the case which this court can now consider, are those arising out of the errors alleged to have been committed in rendering the decree complained of, and in so doing, reference can be had only to the decree itself and the pleadings and verdict upon which it was based. In Dotterer, trustee, et al. v. Harden, 88 Ga. 145, it was held that none of the evidence adduced on the trial is requisite in reviewing the decree. In view of what has just been said, it is unnecessary to encumber this opinion with any statement or discussion of the numerous questions and points made and passed upon by the trial judge before the rendition of the verdict.
2. In the plaintiff’s declaration the defendant was described and designated as “ The Georgia, Carolina and Northern Railroad Company, a corporation of said State” (meaning the State of Georgia). It is manifest, beyond doubt, from the record, that the word “railroad” was inadvertently used for the word “railway,” and that the plaintiff intended to declare against “The Georgia, Carolina and Northern Railway Company.” This is . apparent for the reasons, (1) that this State, while it has
It appears from the'record that the States of North Carolina and South Carolina had each chartered a railway company under this identical corporate name, and that these two companies and the Georgia company of the same name had all (either de facto or de jure) been consolidated before the date of the plaintiff’s deed into a fourth corporation, itself bearing the name of “The Georgia, Carolina and Northern Railway Company,” the precise corporate name of each and all of ‘the companies entering into the consolidation. The statement in the beginning of the second head-note, to the effect that the plaintiff’s declaration described and designated the de
It was contended in the argument that inasmuch as the declaration alleges the defendant against whom suit is brought to be a corporation of this State, the corporation chartered by the legislature of Georgia must necessarily have been the one intended; but this argument is of little or no weight when it is remembered that the same descriptive words might and could have been used with equal accuracy and propriety, granting that the plaintiff deliberately intended to sue the consolidated company. It, as well as the Geoi’gia company, was undoubtedly, for the purposes of a suit like this, a corporation of this State.
The declaration being as already stated, The Georgia, Carolina and Northern Railway Company (consolidated), as such, came into court by its counsel, and filed a defence. Instead of objecting to the appearance of this corporation, and moving to strike its plea on the
3, 4. Under the pleadings and the verdict, the case finally turned upon the construction of the deed made by the plaintiff. As already stated, it bore date after the consolidation had taken place between the three companies above mentioned, and the grantee named •therein was “The Georgia, Carolina and Northern Railway Company,” the name borne by the consolidated company as well as by the Georgia company entering into the consolidation. It appears from the verdict and the recitals in the decree that the articles of consolidation had been duly filed in the office of the Secretary of State, of which fact the plaintiff’ had at least constructive notice, and consequently, he is presumed to
The decree rendered by the court was fully warranted by the verdict, construed in the light of the pleadings, and the judgment must be Affirmed.