Lester v. Elliott Bros. Trucking Co.
114 A.2d 8
N.J.
1955
Check Treatment

STATE v. MONAHAN

Supreme Court of New Jersey

15 N.J. 34

1954

Heher, J. (concurring in affirmance). For the reasons stated in the concurring opinion in

, I hold the view that the appellant is not restrained of his liberty under the judgment of conviction of a court of competent jurisdiction; and on that ground I would affirm the judgment dismissing the petition for a writ of habeas corpus.

On that hypothesis, the then Juvenile Court Act, R. S. 1937, 9:18-1 et seq., was not effective to deprive the old Court of Oyer and Terminer of jurisdiction of the criminal offense charged in the indictment under which the sentence of imprisonment was imposed; and the later substantive legislative changes in the Juvenile Act, serving to supply the constitutional deficiencies, would not on well-settled principles arrest the execution of the sentence.

Heher, J., concurs in result.

For affirmance—Chief Justice Vanderbilt, and Justices Heher, Oliphant, Burling, Jacobs and Brennan—6.

For reversal—Justice Wachenfeld—1.

SETH LESTER, PLAINTIFF-PETITIONER, v. ELLIOTT BROS. TRUCKING CO., INC., DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT.

Supreme Court of New Jersey

Argued May 2, 1955—Decided May 16, 1955.

Mr. Mortimer Wald argued the cause for the appellant (Messrs. Mayer and Mayer, attorneys).

Mr. Francis H. Pykon argued the cause for the respondent (Mr. Henry M. Grosman, attorney).

Per Curiam. The judgment is affirmed for the reasons expressed in the opinion of Judge Francis in the court below.

Wachenfeld, J. (dissenting).

The appellant‘s claim was discredited in the lower tribunals because they found he was not on his employer‘s premises in connection with his employment.

I come to an opposite conclusion. Regardless of Lester‘s motive in going to the terminal outside of working hours, he was clearly within the course of his employment when he responded to Helm‘s direction to “[c]ome in my (Helm‘s) office and straighten the thing out in there.” The manager was endeavoring, in furtherance of his employer‘s interest, to iron out the difficulties and to eliminate the friction existing between the two employees. This was a work-connected effort.

The ensuing injury was an immediate outgrowth of Helm‘s attempt to settle the dispute and thus comes within the “course of employment” rule we have already established.

;
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I would reverse and grant compensation.

Mr. Justice Heher and Mr. Justice Burling authorize me to say that they join in this dissent.

For affirmance—Chief Justice Vanderbilt, and Justices Oliphant, Jacobs and Brennan—4.

For reversal—Justices Heher, Wachenfeld and Burling—3.