Lessee of Glancey v. Jones

4 Yeates 212 | Pa. | 1805

Per Cur. Cited in 10 Watts 23 to sliew that when the acknowledgment of a sheriff’s deed is once taken, everything which has been done is considered as done by the previous order or subsequent sanction of the court, and cannot afterwards be disapproved of collaterally. Referred to in 2 W. & S. 290. Distinguished in 3 W. & S. 319. Cited in 14 Pa. 79 where the court considers what defects may be cured by the acknowledgment of a sheriff’s deed. Cited in 15 Pa. 94 in support of the decision that though parol evidence is not admissible to contradict or vary a sheriff’s return to a writ, yet, where ambiguity exists in it, parol proof of facts consistent with and not appearing on the face of the return may be heard in explanation, and to show the truth of the case. A person may be estopped by circumstances in evidence, from attacking the title of purchaser of land at sheriff’s sale, under a vend, ex., without inquisition or formal waiver: 1 Sup. Court Dig. 304. See Baird v. Lent, 8 Watts 422; Porter v. Neelan, 4 Yeates 103; Critchlow». Critchlow, 2 Pa. Sup. Court Dig. 281. Messrs. Bowie and Watts, pro quer. Messrs. Duncan and Hopkins, pro def.