Opinion of the court, by
The question of greatest difficulty in this case arises from the fact, that our statute, the second section of which embodies, in part, the substance of the second section of the 13th, and the second section of 27 Elizabeth, contains no express words *confining its operation to creditors, nor any proviso in favor of pur
The statute contains no other provision bearing on the subject.
It will be recollected that the statutes of 13 and 27 Elizabeth not •only contain provisos, that restrain them from operating against conveyances made for a good consideration and bona fide, but also restrictions, by which conveyances intended to defraud creditors and purchasers are made void only as against the persons intended to be defrauded.
If the language of our statute is to receive a literal construction, the direction given to the jury was correct, but a majority of the court are of opinion that it ought not to receive such an interpretation, as it would lead to consequences not contemplated by the legislature, and would, in part, defeat the intent of the law, which was, not only to prevent the effect of fraudulent conveyances, but to remove, аs far as possible, the inducement to attempt them. The literal meaning of the language used, would render the covenous deed void, not only as to the persons intended to be defrauded, but also as to strangers, and even the grantor himself. If the deed be utterly void and of no effect, in the literal acceptation of those terms, the title must remain in the grantor, and he may, at any time, reclaim the proрerty, by proving his own fraud. The consequences of such a doctrine, and the impmnity which it offers to those who may attempt to evade the statute, could not have been contemplated by those who framed the law, nor do we believe the rules prescribed for construing statutes require, or admit of such an interpretation.
It frequently becomes the duty of courts, in order to give effect to the manifest intеntion of the statute, to restrain, or qualify, or enlarge the ordinary meaning of the words that *are used. It is said that the power of construing a statute is in the judges, who have authority over all laws, and more especially over statutes, to mold them, according to reason and conscience, to the best '
The intention of the law-makеrs may be collected from the cause, or necessity of the act, and statutes are sometimes construed contrary to the literal meaning of the words. It has been decided, that a thing within the letter, was not within the statute, unless within its intention. The letter is sometimes restrained, sometimes enlarged, and sometimes the construction is contrary to the letter. 4 Bac., title Statute, J. S. 38, 45, 50. The object of our statute appеars, from its title, to be the - prevention of frauds and perjuries, and although it is said, that the title forms no part of the act (1 Ld. Raym. 77), yet the reason of this dictum seems to be the practice of Parliament, by which thе title is prefixed to the statute, at the discretion of the clerk of the house, in which the bill originated, but such is not the practice with us. The title is framed in the same manner as the bill, and is sanctioned by the vote of bоth branches of the legislature; we may, therefore, consider it as explanatory of the object of the law, and it may safely be said that the object disclosed by the title in this case, does not rendеr it necessary to treat a fraudulent deed as utterly void against the grantor, or against strangers who have no interest, claim, or demand, either on the property or on him who has conveyed it. The same inference may be drawn from the language of the section which declares the conveyance, etc., made to defraud creditors or purchasers, to be utterly void. "VYhy should it be void? Because it operates as a frаud on the persons named, not on strangers, who have no interest in the transaction, nor on the maker of the deed, who is the principal or only agent in the fraud. The intention of the statute, then, was' to protect creditоrs and purchasers, and, to effect this purpose, it can not be necessary to extend it to any other description of persons. The rights of this defendant are not affected by the deed to Elizabеth *Burgett — it was not made to defraud her — she had no interest in the transaction — she was neither a creditor nor a purchaser, and consequently not one of those for whose protection the statute was made. Every statute should be construed with a
The rules laid dоwn in Heydon’s case, 3 Rep. 7, which direct a reference to the common law, before the statute — the mischief complained of — the remedy provided, and the true reason of that remedy, are sufficient to authorize the construction claimed on the part of the plaintiff.
Although the principles of common law are strong against fraud in every shape, yet we find it decided in Twine’s case, 3 Reр. 83, that an estate made by fraud, can only be avoided at common law by him who had prior right, title, interest, debt, or demand, and not by one whose right or demand was more puisne or subsequent to the conveyance. The common law, also, of which the statute is said to be declarative, professed to protect only creditors, purchasers, and those having right. It did not extend its care to trespassers, or to persons pretending to claim without right, or to those who might be caught in their own toils. It was moreover considered, in reference to those for whom it professed to give a remedy, too tender in presuming fraud from circumstance, and too rigid in requiring proof.
This was the scope and extent of the common law, and it shows that the mischief to be remedied by the statute, was the difficulty of proof, and the frauds that might be successfully practiced on persons having right, title, interest, debt, or demаnd, accruing after the conveyance. Neither the condition of strangers, or persons without right or demand, nor the safety of the fraudulent grantor, entered into the consideration of the common law, nor did their case constitute any part of the mischief to be remedied. Hence we may conclude that the statute was intended, exclusively, for the benefit of creditors and purchasers, and was made to increase the facility of avoiding frauds, on such as were creditors and purchasers prior to the conveyance, and to extend the relief to those whose rights might accrue after thе conveyance, consequently the interest of the fraudulent ^grantor, and the pretenses of those who have no right, were not within the mischief, and, therefore, not entitled to the remedy.
It being the duty of courts to give such a construction to statutes, as will suppress the mischief and advance the remedy, we are constrained to say that our statute, as it applies to the case
On the authority of Anderson v. Roberts,