LESNER v LIQUID DISPOSAL, INC
Docket No. 116205
Supreme Court of Michigan
May 7, 2002
466 MICH 95
Argued November 7, 2001 (Calendar No. 5).
In an opinion by Justice YOUNG, joined by Chief Justice CORRIGAN, and Justices TAYLOR and MARKMAN, the Supreme Court held:
The formula for calculating worker‘s compensation death benefits for surviving partial dependents established in Weems is inconsistent with the governing statute,
1. An element of the calculation of benefits for a partial dependent is the benefit that would be paid if the survivor had been wholly dependent on the decedent. At the time of the death of the plaintiff‘s son,
2. Because there has been widespread reliance on the Weems formula in calculating worker‘s compensation benefits for partial dependents of deceased employees, and attempting to revisit the benefit levels finally determined or agreed upon during the period that Weems was controlling authority could have a detrimental effect on the administration of justice by imposing an enormous burden on the worker‘s compensation system and the reliance of the beneficiaries on the benefits previously awarded under Weems, the holding in this case is to be given only limited retroactive effect. The interpretation of
Justice KELLY, concurring, stated that the majority‘s plain meaning analysis is inadequate for determining the Legislature‘s intent in enacting
Remanded.
Justice CAVANAGH, concurring in part and dissenting in part, stated that the statutory minimum for death benefits applies to death benefits payable to partially dependent persons. Partially
In addition, leave was improvidently granted in this case. The case has been in the courts for over twenty years. It is time to put it to rest.
Justice WEAVER, dissenting, stated that the formula in Weems should not be overruled. It is a practical, workable formula that gives effect to the statute and is faithful to its intent.
John W. Simpson, Jr. for the plaintiff-appellee.
Cox, Hodgman & Giarmarco, P.C. (by Marsha M. Woods), for the defendants-appellants.
YOUNG, J. The plaintiff‘s son was fatally injured in the course of employment. Plaintiff, a partial dependent of the decedent, sought worker‘s compensation benefits. Through extended proceedings, there has been uncertainty with regard to the proper amount of the benefits to be paid to plaintiff under the formula established by this Court in Weems v Chrysler Corp, 448 Mich 679; 533 NW2d 287 (1995).
We hold that the formula for calculating worker‘s compensation death benefits for surviving partial dependents established in Weems is inconsistent with the governing statute,
We further hold that Weems correctly held that the minimum and maximum limits in
I. FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS
In January 1982, plaintiff lived with his wife and two adult sons. All four individuals made financial contributions to the household as plaintiff drew a small pension and the others earned money from employment. Plaintiff, then 57 years old and disabled from employment since 1978, was partially dependent on the contributions of his sons and wife. One of the plaintiff‘s sons died as the result of a work-related accident in mid-January 1982. The following month, plaintiff, as a survivor and partial dependent of the deceased son, sought benefits pursuant to § 321 of the Worker‘s Disability Compensation Act,
After both sides appealed to the former Worker‘s Compensation Appeal Board, a two-member panel affirmed the referee‘s decision, with some modification.1
While defendants’ application for leave to appeal was pending in this Court, we decided Weems, supra, which provided a formula for calculating benefits for a partial dependent. Then, in lieu of granting leave to appeal in the present case, we directed the WCAC to recalculate death benefits using the formula set forth in Weems. 449 Mich 901 (1995).
On remand, the WCAC once again recalculated the benefit amount. A further recalculation occurred when the case returned to the Court of Appeals.4
We granted leave to appeal in order to clarify this area of the law and consider whether the formula for the calculation of worker‘s compensation death benefits for surviving partial dependents established in Weems is consistent with the governing statute,
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
This case presents an issue of statutory interpretation, which we review de novo as a question of law.
III. ANALYSIS
A. THE STATUTE AT ISSUE
Death benefits for a dependent are governed by
If death results from the personal injury of an employee, the employer shall pay, or cause to be paid, subject to [
MCL 418.375 ], in 1 of the methods provided in this section, to the dependents of the employee who were wholly dependent upon the employee‘s earnings for support at the time of the injury, a weekly payment equal to 80% of the employee‘s after-tax average weekly wage, subject to the maximum and minimum rates of compensation under this act, for a period of 500 weeks from the date of death. If at the expiration of the 500-week period any such wholly or partially dependent person is less than 21 years of age, a hearing referee may order the employer to continue to pay the weekly compensation or some portion thereof until the wholly or partially dependent person reaches the age of 21. If the employee leaves dependents only partially dependent upon his or her earnings for support at the time of injury, the weekly compensation to be paid shall be equal to the same proportion of the weekly payments for the benefit of persons wholly dependent as the amount contributed by the employee to such partial dependents bears to the annual earnings of the deceased at the time of injury.
Later, the section was amended by 1985 PA 103 and 1994 PA 271. One significant change was made to the final sentence of the section to provide an eighty-
B. THE WEEMS FORMULA IS INCONSISTENT WITH THE FORMULA PROVIDED BY THE PLAIN LANGUAGE OF THE STATUTE
As we have indicated with great frequency, our duty is to apply the language of the statute as enacted, without addition, subtraction, or modification. See, e.g., Helder v Sruba, 462 Mich 92, 99; 611 NW2d 309 (2000); Robinson v Detroit, 462 Mich 439, 459; 613 NW2d 307 (2000). We may not read anything into an unambiguous statute that is not within the manifest intent of the Legislature as derived from the words of the statute itself. Omne Financial, Inc v Shacks, Inc, 460 Mich 305, 311; 596 NW2d 591 (1999). In other words, the role of the judiciary is not to
Interpreting the plain language of
BPD = (BWD) (P), where
P = (C/AE), and
BWD = (.80)(WWAT).
Accordingly,
BPD = (C)(.80)(WWAT)/(AE), or
Benefit = (decedent‘s contribution)(.80)(decedent‘s weekly wage after taxes) / (decedent‘s annual earnings)
In our view, the statute on its face requires a factual determination of “the amount contributed by the employee” to the partial dependent, that is, the amount actually contributed by that deceased worker, in order to calculate the amount of benefits to which the partial dependent is entitled.
However, in Weems, supra at 695-697, this Court created its own formula for determining benefits payable to a partial dependent under
As explained by Justice CAVANAGH in his partial dissent in Weems, in order to determine the benefits due a partial dependent, a faithful application of
The Weems majority rejected such a factual inquiry, apparently primarily on the basis of the view that such a factual determination would be “unworkable“:
Such a determination is absolutely unworkable in practice. It would be impossible in most cases to even roughly estimate which portion of the decedent‘s income was used for the sole support of the dependent. [Weems, supra at 698.]
We acknowledge that, in many cases, the factfinder will be presented with a difficult task in determining what amount of money to consider as having been contributed by the deceased employee to the partial dependent. In large part, this is because household expenses are often paid in essentially a lump sum for items that benefit multiple members of the household.12 Yet the difficulty of an administrative tribunal in making a factual determination called for by a statute is not a justification for ignoring the statute. The reason is that the Legislature, the policy-making arm of our government, in taking up this matter, is held to have considered this issue and settled on this approach. It is not within our authority to disregard that choice. See, e.g., Helder, supra at 99 (when a statute is clear on its face, the judicial role is to apply the statute in accord with its plain language, not to articulate its view of “policy“).
Accordingly, we overrule Weems to the extent that it is inconsistent with this opinion. In particular, we
C. STATUTORY LIMITATIONS
In deducing the proper formula to be employed, consideration must also be given to the limitations stated in the opening sentence of
1. MAXIMUM AND MINIMUM BENEFITS
Recall that an element of the calculation for a partial dependent is the benefit that would be paid if the survivor had been wholly dependent on the decedent (BWD). If one were determining the benefit for a wholly dependent person, the first sentence of
The majority in Weems held that no separate adjustment should be made after the benefits for a partially dependent person are calculated. The majority said that “a partially dependent person‘s weekly benefits are inherently subject to the maximum and minimum rates of compensation because the calculation of a wholly dependent person‘s weekly benefit is included in the partially dependent person‘s calculation.” 448 Mich 684-685. We agree.
For that reason, when (BWD) is more than the maximum or less than the minimum, it will be necessary to substitute the minimum or maximum for (BWD), which is calculated using the formula stated ante at 102. That change would mean that the usual value of (BWD), which is (.80) (WWAT) or 80% of the decedent‘s weekly wage after taxes, would be replaced by the statutory maximum or minimum (SM) under
BPD = (C)(SM)/(AE), or
Benefit = (decedent‘s contribution)(statutory maximum or minimum) / (decedent‘s annual earnings)
In a case arising under the amended language of 1985 PA 103 and currently applicable, it would be:
BPD = (.80)(C)(SM)/(AE), or
Benefit = (.80)(decedent‘s contribution)(statutory maximum or minimum) / (decedent‘s annual earnings)
2. 500-WEEK LIMITATION
The first sentence of
V. RETROACTIVITY
The general rule is that judicial decisions are given complete retroactive effect. Michigan Ed Emp Mut Ins Co v Morris, 460 Mich 180, 189; 596 NW2d 142 (1999). However, recognition of the effect of changing settled law has led this Court to consider limited ret-
The purpose of the rule adopted in this opinion is to correct what we believe to be the flawed construction of
For these reasons, we hold that the present opinion is to be given only limited retroactive effect. The interpretation of
In the present case, the WCAC and the Court of Appeals, as they were bound to do, attempted to apply Weems as binding precedent from this Court. However, for the above reasons, we overrule the portion of Weems that provides a formula for calculating worker‘s compensation death benefits for surviving partial dependents. The portions of this opinion that overrule the Weems opinion are to have limited retroactive effect.
We further hold that the minimum and maximum benefit limits do not require an alteration after the partial dependent benefits are calculated, but rather are to be inserted before that calculation. In addition, we hold that the 500-week limitation on benefits applies to partially dependent persons.
For these reasons, it is necessary to again remand this case to the WCAC. On remand, the commission shall calculate the plaintiff‘s benefits as a partial dependent in accordance with
CORRIGAN, C.J., and TAYLOR and MARKMAN, JJ., concurred with YOUNG, J.
KELLY, J. (concurring). I agree with the formula that the majority has adopted to be used for determining death benefits of a partial dependent. However, it is obvious to me that § 321 of the Worker‘s Disability Compensation Act1 is ambiguous. Consequently, the
The majority has adopted the formula proposed in Justice CAVANAGH‘S dissent in Weems v Chrysler Corp,2 except that it retains the Weems majority‘s application of the maximum and minimum rates of compensation for injuries. Sometimes, the formula yields a benefit for a whole dependent that falls above the maximum rate or below the minimum rate. In those cases the statutory maximum or minimum is substituted for the figure representing eighty percent of the decedent‘s after-tax weekly wage in the formula.3
When the maximum and minimum amounts do not apply, the majority‘s formula for a partial dependent is as follows:4
Benefit = (.80)(decedent‘s annual contribution)(.80)(decedent‘s after-tax weekly wage) / (decedent‘s annual earnings)
Whenever the maximum or minimum is substituted, the benefit for a partial dependent is computed as follows:5
Benefit = (.80)(decedent‘s annual contribution)(statutory maximum or minimum) / (decedent‘s annual earnings)
Justice CAVANAGH‘s formula in Weems differs in this respect: The death benefit for a partial dependent is calculated without regard to the maximum and minimum rates. Then, whenever the resulting death bene-
Both interpretations are reasonably derived from the language of the statute. Section 321 of the Worker‘s Disability Compensation Act states that a wholly dependent survivor‘s benefit is calculated as follows:
If death results ... the employer shall pay ... a weekly payment equal to 80% of the employee‘s after-tax average weekly wage, subject to the maximum and minimum rates of compensation under this act, for a period of 500 weeks from the date of death. [
MCL 418.321 .]
Another part of the same section then directs how the benefit is adjusted for a partially dependent survivor:
If the employee leaves dependents only partially dependent upon his or her earnings for support at the time of injury, the weekly compensation to be paid shall be equal to the same proportion of the weekly payment for the benefit of persons wholly dependent as 80% of the amount contributed by the employee bears to the annual earnings of the deceased at the time of injury. [
MCL 418.321 .]
The majority reasons that, because the clause “subject to the maximum and minimum rates of compensation” appears only in the whole dependents part of § 321, it refers only to the benefit paid to a whole dependent. On the other hand, the Weems dissent rejects that logic because the 500-week limitation of § 321 appears in the whole dependents part. Yet it applies to partial dependents and is not repeated in the partial dependents part. Also, the partial dependents part does not state that the partial benefit is
Both constructions are antagonized by additional ambiguity in the wording of §§ 355 and 356. Section 355(2), which defines the maximum rate of compensation, states:
[T]he maximum weekly rate of compensation for injuries within the year shall be established as 90% of the state average weekly wage ....
Proponents of the Weems dissent can rely on the fact that the rate referred to is called the maximum rate of compensation. That suggests that they should adjust the result of all benefit calculations, whole or partial. On the other hand, the statutory language can reasonably be read to mean that placement of the maximum rate within the formula is determined by § 321.
The language of § 356(3) also can be read in two different manners. It states:
The minimum weekly benefit for death under section 321 shall be 50% of the state average weekly wage as determined under section 355.
Proponents of the Weems dissent argue that, because the minimum weekly benefit is referred to as the minimum “for death under section 321,” it should replace any death benefit calculated under § 321 that is lower than it. It should be the smallest sum that a partial or whole dependent could possibly receive. On the other hand, one can again point to the minimum benefit as only one factor in the partial dependent‘s benefit calculation.
It is undisputed that the overarching intention of the Legislature was to award a death benefit that is less than the amount that the employee contributed to the dependent. If the Weems dissent formula reflected legislative intent, it would yield that result. However, the contrary is true. Using it, in cases where an employee contributed a small but not de minimus amount before his death, a partial dependent would receive the minimum rate of compensation. Thus, the benefit could be significantly higher than the amount the decedent contributed to the dependent during his lifetime.6
By contrast with the Weems dissent‘s formula, the majority‘s formula yields a death benefit that is normally eighty percent of the amount that the employee contributed to the dependent.
CAVANAGH, J. (concurring in part and dissenting in part). While I agree that the formula the majority adopts today for calculating worker‘s compensation death benefits for surviving partial dependents is the correct formula under
The procedural history of this case is substantial. Plaintiff first sought benefits in connection with his son‘s death in 1982. In 1995, after this Court decided Weems v Chrysler Corp, 448 Mich 679; 533 NW2d 287 (1995), this case was remanded to the Worker‘s Compensation Appellate Commission to recalculate death benefits using the formula set forth in Weems. 449 Mich 901 (1995). Today, the majority overrules the Weems formula and remands for yet another recalculation using a new formula.
This case has been up and down the worker‘s compensation and appellate court systems for over twenty years and has been remanded once already to calculate benefits under the now abandoned Weems formula. While I remain committed to the formula set forth in my partial dissent to Weems, which this Court adopts today, I believe that it is time to put this case
WEAVER, J. I dissent from the majority‘s decision to overrule the formula established by this Court in Weems v Chrysler Corp, 448 Mich 679; 533 NW2d 287 (1995). As noted by the Weems majority, in most instances it is difficult, if not impossible, to calculate the amount contributed by the decedent solely to the support of the partial dependent. Id. at 698. The formula articulated in Weems, which takes into consideration the dependent person‘s regular and substantial income, represents a practical, workable formula that gives effect to the statute,
Notes
If death results from the personal injury of an employee, the employer shall pay, or cause to be paid, subject to [
... [I]f, for instance, twenty percent of Mr. Weems’ after-tax earnings were contributed to Mrs. Weems, the formula yields:
80% X $ 8,558 X $822.91 = $131.66
$42,791However, applying § 356, which sets the statutory minimum for death benefits, the payable death benefit would be $207.35, the applicable minimum rate for these parties. [Id. at 718, n 17 (CAVANAGH, J. dissenting).]
In this example, the calculated benefit of $131.66 was raised to $207.35 a week, which was the minimum rate for death benefits in 1986. However, the employee had contributed only $8,558 annually before death. Hence, under the Weems dissent formula, the dependent received only $164.57 a week from the decedent and would receive $207.35 a week after.
With that change, P = (.80)(C)/(AE), so that:
BPD = (.80)(C)(.80)(WWAT)/(AE), or
Benefit = (decedent‘s contribution)(.64)(decedent‘s weekly wage after taxes) / (decedent‘s annual earnings)
This modified formulation, currently applicable, would have been appropriately applied in Weems, where the fatal accident occurred in March 1986, well after the effective date of 1985 PA 103. In the present case, however, the accident occurred in 1982, so the statutory modification is not applicable.