4 Rawle 123 | Pa. | 1833
The opinion of the court was delivered by
It has been contended for the plaintiffs in error, that the agreement under which they took the warehouse, amounted only to a specific letting for one year, and no more; and that according to the decisions of this court, in the cases of Boggs v. Black, 1 Binn. 335, and Logan v. Herron, 8 Serg. & Rawle, 459, they became immediately upon the expiration of the year, to wit, the 23rd of April 1829, tenants at sufferance, liable to be turned out of possession at will of the defendants in error; and were not bound therefore to pay for the use of the warehouse after that, longer than they continued to occupy it; and were at liberty to surrender the possession at any moment they pleased. The nature of the lease in the latter of the above cited cases has been relied on as being substantially the same with the lease in the present case.
I however think there is a difference which has been recognised by
Now the lease or agreement in the case under consideration is not expressly for any determinate period of time, and it is only by construction that a limitation can be affixed to it. It, at an early period in England, would have been considered a letting at will, but, as it is not so in express terms, it would at the time of our revolution have been deemed a lease from year to year; and more especially so, as an annual rent is reserved to be paid. 2 Bl. Com. 147, Chitty’s ed. and note (11). Adams on Eject. 102-3. Sir William Blackstone says, speaking of tenancies at will, “ Courts of late have rather held them to be tenancies from year to year, so long as both parties please, especially where an annual rent is reserved.” 2 Bl. Com. 147. In Bree v. Lees, 2 Bl. Rep. 1173, Lord Ch. Just. De Grey, says, “ All leases for uncertain terms ave prima facie leases at will; it is the reservation of an annual rent that turns them into leases from year to year.” And Sir J. Mansfield, Ch. Just, in Richardson v. Langridge, 4 Taunt. 131, lays down the same rule in a case put by him by way of illustrating it in the following words: “ If there were a general letting at a yearly rent, though payable half yearly or quarterly, and though nothing were said about the duration of the time, it is an implied letting from year to year.” Now this meets the description of the lease in question in every particular with the utmost precision, which is a general letting without any thing being said as to the duration of the time, at a yearly rent of eight hundred dollars payable quarterly. It
Whether it be a lease in the first instance for one or two years certain, is a question upon W'hich there has been some diversity of opinion.
Brooke, in his Abr. tit. Tenant, per copy de court roll; pi. 17, says, " By the best opinion it is a lease for years.” This according to what is laid down in the Bishop of Bath’s Case, 6 Co. 36, as necessary to constitute a lease for years would make it at least two years, as less would not satisfy the plural number. The case of Agard v. King,
On the other side in an anonymous case, 2 Salk. 413, it was held, if A. demised lands to B. for a year and so from year to year, that it was not a lease for two years and afterwards at will, but it was a lease for every particular year, and after the year was begun, the defendant could not determine the lease before the year was ended. S. C. Holt’s RepAlA, ruled by Chief Justice Holt, at the summer assizes at Lincoln, 1699. In Leighton v. Theed, 1 Ld. Raym. 707, Lord Chief Justice Holt ruled, that if A. make a lease to B. for a year, and so from year to year, quamdiu ambabuspartibusplacuerit, A. may determine his will at the end of any year, but if a new year be begun, it cannot be determined before the end ofit. He also ruled the same point accordingly at a trial upon the summer assizes at Lincoln, 1699, between Lely and Green.
In Dod v. Monger, 6 Mod. 215, S. C. Holt, 416, he said, “ If a lease be for a year, and so from year to year as long as both parties shall please, it is a lease binding but for one year; but if the lessee without countermand of the lessor, enter upon the second year he is bound for that year, and so on. And so in Fenwick v. Lady Grosvenar, 12 Mod. 610, he ruled the same to be a lease for one year absolutely; and if the lessee continues on the first day of the second year, he is bound for that year also: and so is the lessor if he has not warned him away before the beginning of the second year.”
I have adopted the opinion and decision of Ch. Just. Holt ; first, because I believe it was the settled law of his time ; nexl, because it comports best with the common and ordinary understanding and meaning of the terms employed in such leases; and lastly, because I consider it as agreeing best with the truegrammatical construction of them.
Indeed I feel altogether at a loss to conceive how the assent of the parties is to be made out for more at any time than one year prospectively and absolutely. But that it amounts to a positive agreement for one year I think is clear; and further, if the holding should continue until a second year has commenced without the dissent of either party, it becomes a lease for two years certain, and cannot be determined by either party before the end of the second year; and the meaning of the words “ from year to year,” is, that the holding shall only cease at the end of the year and at no other time: and if the
Believing the lease in question then to be a lease from year to year, the plaintiffs in error, having continued to hold the demised property until after the second year had commenced, without offering to surrender the possession to the defendant in error, or having received from him any notice to quit, became tenants under the agreement, entitled to hold it for another year, in despite of the defendant in error; but at the same time bound upon the principle of reciprocity to pay the rent of three hundred dollars quarterly. The defendant in error could only have put an end to the lease, by giving a notice to the plaintiffs in error, at least three months before the end of the year, to surrender to him the possession, as soon as that time should come around. This principle is settled or recognized in Bedford v. M'Elherron, 2 Serg. & Rawle, 50*. Brown v. Vanhorn, 1 Binn. 334, in note. Fahnestock v. Faustenauer, 5 Serg. & Rawle, 174. Thomas v. Wright, 9 Serg. & Rawle, 87. Indeed, wherever the lease is not for any precise, express and determinate period of time, notice seems to be requisite, as a reasonable and necessary protection against surprize, and the consequent loss or inconvenience that might result therefrom ; and has, in modern times, been extended to a tenancy at will, on account of its uncertain duration. See Parker v. Constable, 3 Wils. 25.
We think that the judgment of the District Court was right, and it is therefore affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.