History
  • No items yet
midpage
Lesikar v. Rappeport
33 S.W.3d 282
Tex. App.
2000
Check Treatment

*1 — Ajayi She instructed Appeal number of Sanctions for Frivolous

times to send her information Finally, requested AOU has about the event to which she or impose upon Angelou we sanctions her office respond. would a frivolous appeal of the trial court’s order overruling her special appearance. See — She instructed her office to send Tex.R.App. P. 45. The question whether information to be included in the to grant discretion, sanctions is a matter of program and for the event to be which prudence we exercise with and cau publicized. tion, only after careful deliberation. Diebolt, In this See light, her letter Casteel-Diebolt v. agreeing to be in th 302, (Tex.App.-Houston [14 Houston accept specific Dist.] award on a 1995, writ). Although imposing no sanc “random, fortuitous, date is far from discretion, tions is we will within our do so Rather, attenuated” contact. it was the truly that are egre circumstances culmination extended process, Robinson, gious. Bridges See which Angelou, directly and through her th 104, 114 (Tex.App.-Houston [14 agents, took an active up role that led h.); City pet. Dist.] no Houston v. her agreement to come to Houston to ac- Crabb, (Tex.App.-Houston cept award. [14 writ). Dist.] th Indeed, Angelou does not contend that Though we with the merits disagree trying the case in unduly Texas would be Angelou’s after appeal, considering the burdensome on her. She admitted her briefs, record we Angelou’s do not deposition Texas, that she specifi- comes to believe the circfimstances this case war Austin, cally “quite a appear- lot.” Her rant therefore sanctions. We overrule ances include at request least twelve AOU’s for Rule 45 sanctions. paid speaking engagements in Texas between 1995 and We affirm the trial court’s order.

1999. This paid includes four engage- ments in Additionally, 1999. Angelou has twenty-two print, books in all of which are

sold in Texas. She stated that the south- ern states are a large source of sales for Lynwood and Harriet LESIKAR her books. Texas has some interest Lesikar, Appellants, Lewis resolving a dispute where the contract was AOU, to have been performed in Texas. plaintiff, operating from the state of RAPPEPORT, Lou Lewis

Texas, has chosen Texas as the forum al., Appellees. et obtaining the most convenient and effec- No. 06-98-00126-CV. tive relief. Texas, Appeals Court of

The trial court’s finding specific juris- Texarkana. diction over Angelou does not tradi- offend April Submitted 2000. tional play notions of fair and substantial Sept. Decided 2000. justice. We therefore find that the trial Opinion Granting Appellee’s court did not in denying Angelou’s err Rehearing Motion for Overruling special appearance specific juris- based on Appellants’ for Rehearing Motion diction. We Angelou’s overrule specific Dec. 2000. jurisdiction this, issue. Because of we need not determine whether Texas courts general jurisdiction exercise over her. Tex.R.App.

See P. 47.1. *8 Werley, Law Gary Gary

S. Office of S. Worth, Smith, Werley, Gregory Fort D. Flock, Moore, Ramey Tyler, & Alison H. Chandler, Bradley, Jacquelyn D. A. Beth Coe, Irons, Dallas, Thompson, Cousins & appellants. for Harris, Watson, Jerry S. David R. Har- bour, Smith, Merritt, Longview, Harris & appellees. CORNELIUS, C.J., Before GRANT and ROSS, JJ.

OPINION

Opinion Chief Justice CORNELIUS. appeal Harriet Lesikar Lynwood and Rap- from an adverse impose peport’s suit them constructive and recover trust fiduciary relationship. fraud and breach of working In bought H.G. Lewis located in interest in the Lee oil lease T.W. Texas, half of the Longview, assigned operated interest to J.C. Robbins. Lewis L name & G Oil the entire lease under the until in 1980. Company his death assigned Lewis and each Robbins Thomas, Clark, Shapiro & law Winters Thomas), Austin, (Clark, firm Texas ¾2 working interest in oil wells and 5 on the n lease, In the collectively interest. 1970s, early drilled two new wells on Lewis lease, Thereafter, wells 3A and 7A. Clark, although assignment the 1964 only 2 and explicitly Thomas covered wells paid pro- Lewis Thomas for oil operating duced and billed the firm for expenses though working it owned a ½ also interest not in wells but in wells 3A and 7A. *9 1980,

In leaving Lewis died a will daughters, Jenny Rappe- named his two Lesikar, co-independent port and Harriet will, In Lew- executrices of his estate. his Jenny and Harriet each an undivid- gave fifty interest in his estate for percent ed children. life with remainders to their Among Lewis’s assets at his death was his 2 and 5 to lease, interest in wells assign would its in the Lee one-half interest T.W. alone; the letter estate, Jenny Lyn and Lew- through Harriet’s husband which the Lewis, widow, oper- calling Bishop to Fay continued would be Lyn is’s stated Company. July L & ate under the name G Oil offer.” On concerning a “settlement 1985, Clark, that it In Thomas determined Jerry 18, Jenny’s attorney, Bishop notified in to it of an interest assignment had no Harris, assignment, proposed about L 7A notified & G Oil wells 3A and and will- would be that the estate agreed who employ- An L G Company of that fact. & overpayment completely to settle ing Clark, stating that she ee wrote Thomas Clark, in- for Thomas’s exchange claim in assignment L & G’s files for an searched Jenny’s Despite in and 5. terest wells 7A, concerning wells 3A and but found interest, Werley agreed later with Bishop Nevertheless, L & G continued to none. the court had ordered that because Clark, expenses operating Thomas for bill closed, be unable the estate would estate 7A, con- wells 3A and and associated with in claim ex- overpayment to settle firm it owned pay though tinued to as Clark, Thomas’s interest change for an interest those wells. subject and 5 because that would wells Lyn- In Harriet and her husband any ongoing liability for the estate to Jenny, Fay, and (Lyn) wood Lesikar sued Clark, against claims third-party seeking declaratory judgment others Lyn’s They agreed interest. Thomas to in the Lewis party’s ownership each litigation exchange settling the In accounting. estate and Clark, interest in wells and 5 Thomas’s Clark, Lesikars added Thomas as defen- acceptable. would be dant, theory seeking to recover under trial, Harris, July preparation enrichment, unjust “overpayment” 19, 1994, stat- Lyn the Lesikars. deposed on wells and 7A. In estate had made 3A had to spoken that he deposition ed his Clark, response, attorney, Barry Thomas Clark, acquiring about the firm’s Thomas Bishop, attorney, contacted the Lesikars’ deposi- in wells and 5. After the interest Gary Werley. According Bishop’s to testi- tion, Werley Bishop and ad- Harris wrote Clark, mony, Werley agreed he and agreement to enter into an vising them not Thomas would disclaim its interest wells it. party made a On unless Clark, Werley would Thom- drop and 5 assignment amended the August Bishop and to recov- as from the lawsuit not seek that, among provi- other provisions add letter overpayment. Bishop er the wrote a Clark, sions, Thomas indemnify would Werley describing understanding, their for all overpayment “Rule 11 for the but parties referred to as the not Werley sign did not with wells agreement,” but claims connected 7A, agreement it at that time. The he sent a return with 3A and also wells Clark, only that Thomas would dis- That assignment Werley. stated copy of the have in might claim interest it wells assign- day, Werley agreed to same exchange “plaintiffs,” for the 3A and 7A A few Bishop. and returned it to ment over- Lyn, pursuing Harriet and their later, Werley signed and returned to days the firm. payment claim Bishop agreement Rule 11 Bishop the agree- to that pursuant required, still 14, 1994, the trial court or- April On Clark, ment, Thomas Werley dropped July estate closed. On dered Lewis August the lawsuit. On 13, 1994, Werley Bishop a letter to sent re- assignment and signed Thomas Clark, Thomas owed the estate claiming trial to Lyn. August it On turned the estate had made overpayment for the and the over- began, Lewis estate close the day, Werley 3A and 7A. The next on wells *10 Clark, against Thomas was payment claim as- Bishop proposed a letter with sent Clark, into its own suit. whereby Thomas severed signment attached 17, 1994, Lyn recorded the August On Clark,

assignment from Thomas. Later parties negoti- met to day, that same At the litigation. ate a settlement of the Lyn did wish to meeting, indicated he Clark, negotiations, discuss the Thomas any- not know and Harriet stated she did thing assignment. The discus- about of the liti- sions resulted a settlement the Lewis estate. On gation concerning request, at Harriet’s the over- October payment against claim Thomas was prejudice. without A final dismissed At- signed on October 18. mutual in which tached to it was a release party each released the other from liabili- however, ty; the release contained party provided clause which neither liability concerning the was released from overpayment. 1994, Jenny learned early October from the gotten permission had L replace Railroad & G as Commission operator of the lease. On October L Jenny, individually and on behalf of & G Company Oil and as “co-trustee testamentary pursuant trust to Lewis’s owners, working will” and several interest brought against suit the Lesikars injunction, alleg- for an overpayment and that the Lesikars had taken and con- ing income from estate verted to their own use Jenny property. On November brought capacity suit the same fiduciary duty Lesikars for breach of granted tempo- and fraud. The court Jenny rary restraining order that allowed L operate the lease and it as & to re-enter QUESTION [NO.] joined, together The suits were G. the suit from which the Lesikars they form commit fraud Lynwood Did Lesikar bring appeal. Rappeport? Lewis against Jenny Lou special ques- court

The trial submitted recovery on all theories of tions or “No” Answer “Yes” and defense. omit the 'instructions We ANSWER: Yes and definitions. The answered QUESTION [NO.] follows: fraud commit Did Harriet Lesikar QUESTION 1NO. Rappeport? Lewis against Jenny Lou her Did Harriet Lewis Lesikar breach Rap- Lewis fiduciary duty Lou or “No” Answer “Yes” following respects:

peport any of

293 Yes ANSWER: or “No” Answer Wes”

QUESTION [NO.] Yes ANSWER: following you Do find that part conspiracy parties Question were No. 8 you If have answered Rappeport? Jenny Lou Lewis damaged Question No. oth- Wes” then answer No. 10. Question not answer

erwise do NO. 10 QUESTION amount, any, you if do find What Clark[,] firm or its succes- Thomas law on overpaid Lynwood Lesikar was sor Lee Lease of the T.W. production QUESTION NO. a.) $298,547 October 1989 present? acquire Op- Lynwood Did Lesikar b.) For the calendar years through $239,152 1989? Lease de- of the T.W. Lee September erations Question No. 8 have answered you If ception? Question No. oth- Wes” then answer 11. Question No. do not answer erwise Answer “Yes” or “No.” QUESTION NO. ANSWER: Yes the Es- representative When did [QUESTION 6NO.] Jr. know or should tate of H.G. Lewis Clark, Thomas you Do find that the of a known of the existence they have firm law did not own interest Wells overpayment claim? potential 7A Lee Lease? 3A and on the T.W. by Month and Year Answer June ANSWER: “Did Not or “Did Own” Answer Own” QUESTION [NO.] Did Not Own ANSWER: intentionally in- Lynwood Did Lesikar QUESTION 7NO. existing operating terfere with Jenny Rapppeport you Do find that Lewis Jenny Lou agreement between estopped asserting over- [sic] Company L & G Oil Rappeport d/b/a Clark[,] Thomas, claim payment owners of the working and the interest 7A in any, if out of Wells 3A and Wells justified? that was not T.W. Lee Lease the T.W. Lee Lease? or “Did Not “Did Interfere”

Answer or “No” Answer “Yes” Interfere” No

ANSWER: Did Interfere ANSWER: QUESTION NO. 8 Question No. you If have answered Question 2, 3, 4, or 5 Wes” then answer Clark, Thomas find that the you Do Ques- not answer otherwise do No. in inter- firm it’s successor [sic] law tion No. 13. est, produc- any, overpaid was on the Lee Lease?

tion of the T.W. QUESTION NO. Trust “Yes” or “No” you Answer find that Constructive Do Clark[,] Thom- imposed should Yes ANSWER: trans- in the Lee Lease as interest T.W. Question No. 8 you If have answered Lesikar? Lynwood ferred 9, oth- Question No. “Yes” then answer Question No. 9. not answer erwise do No: Yes or Answer

QUESTION NO. 9 Yes ANSWER: overpayment that the youDo find QUESTION [NO.] of a mutual mistake? the result *12 QUESTION if if money, any, paid What sum of [NO.] cash, reasonably in fairly now would money, any, sum of if should be What compensate Jenny Rappe- Lou Lewis against Lynwood assessed Lesikar and port damages, any, for her if that result- Jenny Rappeport awarded to Lou Lewis you act wrongful ed from such have exemplary damages as for the conduct 1, 2, 3, 4, Questions in or 12? found 2, 4, Question[s] 1, in response found 12? or following Consider the elements of if

damages, any, and none other. separately Answer dollars cents, if any. Answer dollars and cents, any, if each of the following: million ANSWER: $2 in correcting 1. Costs incurred you by If have found clear and con- wrongful conduct? Ques- vincing your evidence answers [to] $12,000.00 ANSWER: 1, 3, Question tion Nos. or then answer reputation? 2. to business Ques- Loss not answer No. otherwise do tion No. 17. ANSWER: $0 QUESTION [NO.] Clark[,] Loss of the value of the

3. August Thomas interest on 1994? if money, any, What sum of should be Harriet Lesikar and assessed $88,000.00 ANSWER: Jenny Rappeport awarded to Lou Lewis pay operation- 4. Failure to reasonable exemplary damages for the conduct al on the Lee Lease? expenses T.W. 1, 3, Question or 4? response found $26,122.00 ANSWER: tax return Unpaid 5. estate income cents, any. Answer in dollars and preparation expense year for tax $500,000.00 ANSWER: 1994? QUESTION $1,750.00 NO. 18

ANSWER: Jenny Rappe- Lou you

Do find port Company and L & Oil ratified G QUESTION [NO.] Clark, Thomas, assignment by Win- is a reasonable fee for the nec- What Lynwood by Lesikar Shapiro ters & Lou Lewis essary Jenny services of and re- sending expenses, invoices for case, Rappeport’s attorney in this stated in- some of the ceiving payments on in dollars and cents? voices? with an Answer Dollars and Cents following: amount for each of the or “No” Answer ‘Tes” preparation

a. For and trial. No ANSWER: $253,444 ANSWER: QUESTION 19NO. to the appeal b. For Court you Jenny Rappe- Do find that Lou Appeals. Company and L & Oil have port G $30,000 ANSWER: assign- ability waived the contest to a making responding c. For Lynwood Lesikar ment petition Supreme for review Thomas, Shapiro by sending Winters & of Texas. Court expenses, receiving pay- invoices for $15,000 ANSWER: on some of the invoices? ments If found clear and con- you have Ques- your answers to vincing evidence or “No” Answer ‘Tes” 1, 2, 4, 5 or 12 then answer tion Nos. ANSWER: No Question No. otherwise do not an- QUESTION Question 16. NO. swer No. with an Answer in Dollars and Cents Rappe- find that Lou you Do n following: amount each of

port Company L & G Oil commit- and/or selling ted the oil from the T.W. waste price for a lower than

Lee Lease *13 available, of working to the detriment all owners? interest Answer “Yes” or “No” No

ANSWER: Question you If have answered No. Question based on oth- The court ‘Yes” then answer No. rendered Question jury’s answer 21. erwise do not No. answers.

QUESTION jury NO. 21 challenge The answers Lesikars of Jenny’s regarding breach fidu- favor money, if any, you sum of do What ratification, waiver, fraud, ciary duty, and damages find to be the sustained they are conspiracy on the basis that not Lynwood a proximate Lesikar as cause factually suffi- supported by legally and/or Jenny of Lou Rappeport? the conduct of challenge They cient also evidence. Cents, any. Answer in Dollars and if awards, damages including actual the con- ANSWER: $0 awards, overpayment structive trust and QUESTION 22NO. as well as the awards. punitive you Jenny find that Rappe- Do Lou AND BREACH OF DUTY FRAUD FIDUCIARY

port prosecution committed malicious of Lynwood proximately that Lesikar The that Harriet found breached Lynwood caused Lesikar to suffer dam- fiduciary many duty her to re- ages? Lyn and and spects that both Harriet were contend

guilty of The Lesikars that fraud. Clark, assignment Thomas to Answer ‘Yes” or “No” not Lyn did amount to a breach fiducia- No ANSWER: Harriet, duty they or and ry fraud Question you If answered have No. failing that court erred in contend the trial Question then answer oth- “Yes” No. la, lb, lc, Id, 2, disregard jury findings to Question erwise do not answer No. 23. and 3 there is no evidence or because QUESTION support to factually NO. 23 insufficient evidence They them. also contend Harriet’s money, if any, you sum of do What dismissing suit Thomas fairly reasonably find would com- overpayment for the did not amount to a pensate Lynwood Lesikar dam- for his fraud, duty they or fiduciary breach ages proximately and losses were erred in failing contend the trial court Rappeport by Jenny caused Lou on the ques- to disregard jury’s to answers any? question, occasion lc, 2, They tions 3. also contend that transfer of the operations of the T.W. in Dollars and Answer Cents Lee oil did not amount lease ANSWER: $0 fraud, and fiduciary duty they breach of failing erred in contend the trial court QUESTION 24NO. ques- disregard jury’s answers is a reasonable fee for the nec- What If, lh, 2, lg, 3. tions Lynwood essary services of Lesikar’s jury’s The attack all of attorney in this case reference to the Lesikars fiduciary findings to breach related dispute? title evidence, it duty. point, they clearly their first attack the ance of the Bain, unjust. legal sufficiency findings wrong and factual la Cain v. (Tex.1986). through point, they Id. In their third When under review, may legal sufficiency findings taking sufficiency attack If a factual we through point merely lh. In a later substitute our for that regarding opinion we damages, they legal actual attack the suffi- of the trier of fact and determine that ciency finding le. If one of the would reach a different conclusion. (Tex. Curtis, findings upheld, Merckling of breach be 911 S.W.2d 1995, writ de jury’s finding App.-Houston [1st Dist.] that Harriet breached her nied); duty may Capon, will Hollander v. upheld. We lc, judge is the finding speaks first address which 726. sole *14 case, weight the assignment credibility the heart of this and of the witnesses and dismissal, may given testimony, or of the to be their and we settling estate’s juror assessing overpayment claim. not act as a thirteenth credibility the evidence and the A that the trial challenge appeal Clubb, 7 witnesses. Seelbach v. S.W.3d disregard jury finding court failed to a 1999, 749, (Tex.App.-Texarkana pet. 755 a legal sufficiency must be construed as denied). challenge. See Brown v. Bank Galves of undisputed It is that Harriet and Ass’n, (Tex. ton, 140, 145 Nat’l 930 S.W.2d and beneficiaries were both co-executrices 1996), aff'd, 963 App.-Houston [14th Dist.] co-execu- of the Lewis estate. As both (Tex.1998). reviewing a S.W.2d 511 beneficiaries, the oth- trices and each owed legal sufficiency question, “no or evidence” fiduciary duty, er a and each was entitled light we consider all the evidence fiduciary obli- fulfilling to the other’s her jury finding, indulg most favorable to the gations. ing every reasonable inference favor of finding. Corp. Associated Indem. v. a An executrix of an estate is Inc., 276, Contracting, 964 S.W.2d CAT a of the estate beneficiaries. As fiduciary (Tex.1998); v. Transp. 285-86 Ins. Co. a fiduciary, she owes the beneficiaries Moriel, (Tex.1994). 10, If 879 S.W.2d 25 candor, duty of faith and as good strict competent there is more than a scintilla of general duty of full disclosure well as support jury finding, evidence to we respecting affecting matters the beneficia finding. sup affirm the The evidence will Kennedy, v. Montgomery ries’ interests. to more than porting finding amounts (Tex.1984); 309, v. Welder 669 S.W.2d 313 a if it a reasonable basis supplies scintilla Green, 170, (Tex.App.-Cor 175 985 S.W.2d differing for reasonable minds to reach denied); 1998, Hawthorne pus pet. Christi as to the existence of the cru conclusions (Tex. Guenther, 924, v. 934 917 S.W.2d Moriel, Transp. fact. Ins. v. 879 cial Co. 1996, denied); App.-Beaumont writ Chien Sander, 25; 824 Orozco v. S.W.2d Chen, 484, (Tex.App. 759 495 S.W.2d (Tex.1992). 555, 556 S.W.2d writ). 1988, existence of -Austin does sufficiency parties strained relations between the reviewing the factual When full and fiduciary’s duty of jury’s ver not lessen the support of the evidence dict, v. Ken complete Montgomery disclosure. we examine all of the evidence. Lof 804, of at 313. The executrix Corp., nedy, v. Texas Brine 720 S.W.2d 669 S.W.2d ton fiduciary (Tex.1986); high same 853 an estate is held to the Capon, 805 Hollander v. in the administration 723, duties and standards (TexApp.-Houston [1st denied). applicable estate that are writ After consider decedent’s Dist.] Austin & evidence, Soc’y Humane we to trustees. ing weighing and all of the Bank, 531 County v. Austin Nat’l only if the evi Travis will set aside the verdict (Tex.1975); weak, Evans v. First finding or the so S.W.2d dence is so Bellville, 946 S.W.2d Nat’l Bank great weight preponder- against it in through Lyn, acquired exchange she (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] O’Brien, Clark, denied); Thomas Ertel indemnifying writ denied). (Tex.App.-Waco overpayment. writ this claim In discussing the duties of trust- did that Harriet argue The Lesikars ees, Supreme Court has stated the Texas by doing her so because Jen- duty breach duty loyalty prohibits the trustee’s Clark, Thomas, ny, looking rather than him using advantage posi- of his Harriet, merely who Lyn could look to tion benefit for at the gain himself Thomas, for reim- “indemnified” trust and from him- expense placing of his If the overpayment. bursement of the self in where his any position self-interest valid, Harriet in- overpayment claim will with his obligations conflict obtain for duty deed had not to Trust, Slay v. Burnett Tex. trustee. in wells herself interest (1945). 621,187 377, 388 exchange indemnifying overpay- It is a well-settled rule that a trustee so, created doing ment claim. she By can profit make no out of his trust. The conflict of between herself interest duty springs rule such cases from his estate, which considers alone the law estate, the interests of protect fiduciary duty. As co-executrix breach *15 permit personal to his not interest estate, estate-creditor; the an she was to with in duty in wise conflict his required pursue she the claim was to for respect. that The intention is provide to overpayment on behalf of the estate. As against any possible selfish interest ex- wife, Clark, Lyn’s stepped she into Thom- ercising an influence which can interfere estate-debtor; as’s shoes and became discharge duty with the faithful of the valid, she overpayment claim was was owing fiduciary which in a capacity. is required to for the pay overpay- the estate Trust, Slay 388; v. Burnett estate-debtor, 187 S.W.2d at ment. As an Harriet had Soc’y accord Humane Austin Travis & aggressively pursue no incentive to Bank, County v. Austin Nat’l overpayment against claim for herself 531 S.W.2d which, estate-creditor, at 577. as an she was re- fact, to quired Lyn agreed to do. In do Generally, there is a presumption Thomas; Clark, indemnify more than he that property acquired during is marriage pur- Harriet would not agreed he and Wilson, community property. Wilson v. claim, overpayment sue Harriet (1947). 145 Tex. ultimately overpayment dismissed the liti- Clark, acquired in Lyn Because Thomas’s gation. terest in 2 and 5 as community prop wells erty addition, exchange overpay notwithstanding Lyn in for the claim of In ment, Clark, bargained in interest acquired Harriet also interest Thomas’s exchange overpayment wells 2 and 5 in to promising the claim of abandon claim, overpayment. The Lesikars that “there is argue Lesikars contend Clark, assigned overpayment interest Thomas to no evidence that an actual was not estate Lyn property, and therefore existed” that Harriet dismissed the Harriet, by obtaining overpayment litigation good it the as faith. through However, Clark, signment Lyn, to did not breach her fidu Thomas admitted no Clark, did ciary duty by acquiring property disputed estate one Thomas not yet 7A and agree violation of the statute. We own an in wells 3A and interest Clark, payment wells. The Thomas’s interest wells and 5 received for those belonging dispute regarding to Lesikars’ the validi- property not the estate. true estate, however, that the ty owned claim of is evidence overpayment 7A, factually prove overpayment on wells 3A and a valu was insufficient addition, amount overpayment. able Harriet did more right. simply than interest; Clark, if the claim acquire parties Thomas all the acted as had value; otherwise, they would not ex- in- rights have the decedent’s heirs changed bargaining it or used it as a tool terests of the decedent’s creditors. Pat- acquire Allen, (1878); the interest wells and 5. v. Tex. terson So. Harriet, therefore, a duty pursue had Lewis, Underwriters 150 S.W.2d 162 the claim on behalf of the estate and not to writ). (Tex.Civ.App.-Texarkana litigation. dismiss the Her faith is good probate The whole scheme of law favors duty. By irrelevant to her breach of ac- administration, speedy commensurate with quiring the interest wells and 5 and protection the reasonable of all interests dismissing overpayment litigation, then Flint, Ryan’s involved. 30 Tex. 382 Harriet created conflict of inter- (1867). We fail to how a see directive estate, est and the between herself but close the estate entitled Harriet and acquired property person- also she for her Clark, acquire Thomas interest for acting fiduciary. al benefit while as a in settlement of the themselves estate’s claim for overpayment.

All transactions between a fidu ciary and his principal presumptively are The Lesikars further contend that when void; therefore, fraudulent and the burden Harriet dismissed the claim fiduciary lies on the to establish the validi 17,1994, Thomas on the claim had October ty any particular transaction in which he already been distributed to estate benefi- Chen, is involved. Chien v. ciaries who could make their own choices exists, fiduciary relationship 495. Where a prosecuting argument about it. Their the burden is on the to show that August that the estate had been closed in fairly he acted and informed the other of 1994 and therefore the claim was not party of all relating material facts claim of the estate. The final settlement *16 Brown, challenged Hoggett transaction. estate, however, was not filed until 487 (Tex.App.-Houston 18, 1994, day October one after Harriet denied). 1997, pet. [14th Dist.] The Lesi- addition, dismissed the claim. In in that attempts presump kars’ to overcome this agreement, parties settlement execut- tion fail. party ed a mutual release in which each As evidence of the fairness of But that liability. released other from question, the actions in the Lesikars con party document stated that each was re- tend Harriet’s actions do not amount liability exception leased “with the fiduciary duty to breach of or be fraud or ... obligations opera- claims related to cause Harriet’s was to primary duty “wind subsequent tion of the T.W. Lee Oil Lease up” April the estate. the trial August and the interest of the gave lingering court directives that Clark, Thomas, Shapiro Winters & Law According estate be closed. to the Lesi- Firm in the T.W. Lee Oil Lease and debts kars, up only that winding required Har So, overpayments relating and thereto.” pay prop riet estate debts and distribute that claim remained a claim of the estate. erty. While it is true that the purpose co-executor, duty it Regardless, is of a administering satisfy estate is beneficiaries, claims prosecute not claims of the decedent’s creditors and to owed to the estate. Tex. Pkob-Code Ann. the remainder of the distribute estate 233(a). § heirs, among the decedent’s included with contend that the many duty the executor’s duties is the The Lesikars further failing disregard to collect all claims and debts due the trial court erred possession findings and to recover of all and in which the found estate fraud. Lyn to which its owners that Harriet and committed property the estate assignment insist that the and dis- They have claim or title. See Tex. Prob.Code 233(a) (Vernon § did not amount to fraud. The court Supp.2000). Ad missal Ann. when: both the instructed the that fraud occurs protects ministration therefore information, a. a party ly partial conceals or fails to disclose a discloses but fails to (3) truth; knowledge material fact within the disclose the whole where one that party, and fails to dis representation makes close new information that makes the ear b. party party knows the other untrue; representation misleading lier or ignorant of the fact does not and (4) and one disclo equal partial have an where makes opportunity to discov- Id.; truth, conveys er the sure and a false impression. (cit Brown, Hoggett v. 971 S.W.2d at 487 c. party intends to induce the other ing Corp. Formosa Plastics v. Presidio party to take some action con- Contractors, Inc., Eng’rs & 941 S.W.2d at fact, cealing failing to disclose the 146-47). party injury d. the other suffers as a Although Harriet notified and col- of acting knowledge result without laborated with her to some extent with of the undisclosed fact. regard negotia- to the initial settlement fraud findings were broad and were Clark, Thom- tions between estate not particular based on act. A chal- as about exchanging interest wells lenge appeal that the trial court failed claim, overpayment and 5 for the when disregard jury’s finding must be con- negotiations those broke down Harriet did a legal sufficiency challenge. strued as notify Jenny Lyn acquiring Natl, Galveston, Brown v. Bank See Clark, Thomas interest for himself un- Ass’n, Thus, 930 S.W.2d at 145. looking til well after the fact. only at the jury’s evidence that favors the

findings ignoring Considering only all evidence to the the evidence contrary, question jury’s findings ignoring before us is that favors the whether there is more than a all competent contrary, scintilla of evidence to the we find some evidence to support jury finding support jury’s evidence to findings Lyn Harriet and fraud. committed Harriet committed fraud on Jen ny and the estate failing to disclose requires Fraud a material mis dealings exchanging overpay their false; representation that was was either ment for Thomas’s interest in wells *17 known to be false when made or was as 2 and 5. truth; serted without knowledge of its on; on; intended to be acted was relied The Lesikars contend that the trial injury. and that caused Formosa Plastics failing disregard jury court to erred Corp. v. Eng’rs USA Presidio & Contrac 1f, 1h, 5, findings by 1g, which the tors, Inc., (Tex.1998). 41, 960 S.W.2d 47 jury found that Harriet fidu breached her equivalent Silence is to a representa false ciary duty Jenny by, to tion where circumstances a impose duty to 1f transferring operating the interest speak and one deliberately remains silent. in the T.W. Lee Lease to her husband Tours, Inc., Spoljaric v. Percival 708 consideration; without payment of 432, (Tex.1986). So, for there 1g transferring operating the interest fraud, to be actionable nondisclosure there in the T.W. Lee Lease to her husband duty must a to be disclose. v. Bradford without all previously disclosing to Vento, 713, (Tex.App.-Cor 997 S.W.2d so; her beneficiaries intention to do 1999, pus Christi pet. granted); Hoggett v. Brown, secreting operat 971 S.W.2d at 487-88. Whether 1h the the transfer of duty such a exists is a question ing of law. interest in the T.W. Lee Lease to Vento, v. A 997 S.W.2d 725. her husband until such time as the Bradford duty to may challenge disclose arise four situa beneficiaries could not such (1) special tions: where there is a or fidu with Railroad transfer the Texas (2) ciary relationship; where one voluntari- Commission. 5, question Lyn the found that plies a reasonable basis for reasonable

acquired operations by differing of the lease to reach to minds conclusions as deception. the existence of the crucial If fact. Id. support finding, there is no to evidence already

We have determined there is then an examination of the entire record legally support sufficient evidence to the contrary propo- must demonstrate that findings fiduciary duty of breach of in find- sition is as matter of law. established la, lb, le; therefore, le, Id, ings we Clubb, v. Seelbach 7 S.W.3d at 755. If the not will address whether the evidence is proposition by the appellant asserted is If, legally support findings lg, sufficient to law, point established as a matter lh. and We also find sufficient evidence to be Id. error will sustained. support answer 5. jury’s question to points weight Great are factual Ratification WaiveR sufficiency Only challenges. one standard learning After Thom is in reviewing of review used factual suffi assignment as’s of its interest wells ciency challenges, regardless of whether Lyn, Jenny began and 5 to to bill nega the court of appeals reviewing operating expenses associated with those jury finding tive or affirmative or whether 19, In questions wells. had complaining party the burden of failed to find that conduct proof on the issue. M.J. Sheridan & Son the assignment right ratified or waived her Co., Pipeline Co. v. Seminole 731 S.W.2d complain assignment. appeal, to On 620, 623 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] challenge and factu legal Lesikars writ). Therefore, apply no we support al failure sufficiency jury’s review, we appropriate standard which find ratification or waiver. have set out above. Ratification and are af waiver adoption Ratification is the or firmative that the must defenses defendant person, knowledge confirmation with The prove. party proof with burden of facts, did prior of all material act that legal sufficiency sup challenges who then legally person bind port the failure to must sur jury’s find person right repudi which that had mount two hurdles. Sterner v. Marathon Corp., ate. Facciolla v. Linbeck Constr. Co., (Tex.1989); Oil 767 S.W.2d (Tex.App.-Texarkana 968 S.W.2d Clubb, 755; 7 S.W.3d at Neese Seelbach either pet.). Ratification Dietz, (Tex.App.- it result from express implied, but must denied). [1st Houston writ Dist.] rati clearly evidencing acts an intention to party must show that no evidence fy. relinquish Id. the intentional Waiver is that the supports the failure find and *18 or con right, ment of a intentional known finding the evidence establishes desired claiming right. that duct inconsistent with Stores, Ramsey Lucky matter of v. a law. Benton, Exploration & Prod. Co. v. Sun Inc., (Tex.App.-Houston 623 S.W.2d (Tex.1987). Thus, 35, like 728 S.W.2d denied). First, 1993, we Dist.] writ [1st ratification, of largely question waiver is the in the fa light review evidence most 149, Bender, Kennedy intent. v. 104 Tex. jury finding, indulging every vorable to the (1911). can be no 135 S.W. There the find reasonable inference favor of by party waiver so intended one unless ing. Corp. Associated Indem. v. CAT by and so understood the other. Vessels Inc., Contracting, 285-86. 964 S.W.2d at (Tex. 762, 765 Corp., Anschutz 823 S.W.2d compe If there is than a scintilla of more denied). App.-Texarkana writ finding, support jury tent to the evidence the Although brief to this Court finding. we will affirm the Orozco their Sander, argue many of great at 556. Evidence Lesikars that a Jen- sup- and waiv- ny’s than a scintilla if it actions evidence ratification amounts more er, questions the to the ratifica- of by based to waive Harriet’s breach Lyn’s tion fraud. Her Jenny’s having duty and waiver and Harriet’s by Lyn accepted sent lack of intent to waive is indicated the having invoices to brought against fact she suit the Lesi- payments him. do not that from The Lesikars began Lyn before she to bill argue kars well they that submitted a different expenses. Waiver was not established as question that jury, to the the court refused law, of find a matter and we do not that their request, question or that the submit- failure to find jury’s against the waiver ted was or specific improper. too otherwise weight of Thus, great the the evidence. issue wheth- narrow before us is Jenny’s sending er Lyn invoices to Conspiracy accepting payments from him established question either ratification or waiver as a matter found that law, Harriet, Lyn, were jury’s part whether failure find and “others” of a Jenny. that conspiracy damaged ratification or waiver on of that The Le- the basis great complain legal conduct is sikars factual weight sufficiency support of the evidence to evidence. Harriet, jury’s finding Lyn, and “oth Ratification as a was established They ers” engaged conspiracy. first merely matter of law from Jenny’s billing no liability contend there can be Lyn receiving pay- for lease expenses and un conspiracy because there was valid ments from him. Jenny’s actions tort. derlying They also contend that the regard could have reflected she only that finding negates conspira evidence Lyn knew had received a purported as- cy because the evidence established the signment of Thomas’s interest law, as a contrary great matter of or the wells 2 Certainly, and 5. assignment weight of evidence demonstrated that Lyn notice to her to own claimed Lyn knowingly neither nor Harriet con interest, but even if Jenny’s acts were spired commit wrong. We overrule a recognition Lyn had acquired title these contentions. interest, her dealing with him on legal The Lesikars both the challenge not, law, that basis did as a matter sufficiency sufficiency and the factual ratify Lyn’s fraudulent acquiring acts in support jury’s finding. the evidence to interest. If had acquired apply appropriate We standards of directly Jenny, interest from acts in her review, already which we have set out dealing with him as the owner have would above. constituted a ratification of his But title. acquired since he the title from a third A civil is a conspiracy combina owner, party, Jenny could treat him as the persons tion two or more or entities to but still seek recover him accomplish purpose, unlawful or a law because of his fraud in acquiring the inter- ful means. purpose Massey unlawful est, impose seek constructive trust Co., v. Armco Steel Culbertson, on the interest. See Ford v. (Tex.1983); Facciolla v. Linbeck Constr. (1958); 158 Tex. Corp., 968 S.W.2d 444-45. ele Anschutz, Vessels v. 823 S.W.2d at 764-65. (1) a civil are: conspiracy ments of two or *19 jury’s We also find that the to find failure (2) object more an to be persons; accom great weight ratification is not (3) (4) minds; plished; meeting of of the evidence. acts; (5) unlawful, one more and or overt Similarly, Lyn proximate Massey the fact that billed as the result. Co., 934; expenses for and otherwise him at dealt with v. Armco Steel 652 S.W.2d Clark, Corp., as if he v. Linbeck were the owner of the Facciolla Constr. 968 establishing agreement Thomas falls short of 445. It is interest S.W.2d at not itself, as a an injury plaintiff matter of law that she intended there- but result- 302

ing pursuant Schlumberger Surveying from act done to the com aware. Well purpose gives mon rise to a cause of Corp. v. Nortex & 435 Corp., Oil Gas for civil v. Tim conspiracy. 854, (Tex.1968); action Carroll S.W.2d 857 Pairett v. Gu Chevrolet, Inc., 922, mers 592 925 tierrez, 512, S.W.2d (Tex.App. 969 S.W.2d 516 (Tex.1979). words, recovery is denied). In other 1998,pet. -Austin instead, it conspiracy; not based on the is may by Conspiracy established underlying based on an Tilton v. tort. circumstantial evidence. Int’l Bankers Marshall, (Tex.1996); 925 S.W.2d 681 Holloway, Ins. Co. v. 567 368 S.W.2d Life (Tex. Yates, v. Fisher 953 S.W.2d 381 Yates, (Tex.1963); Fisher v. 953 S.W.2d 1997), pet. cu App.-Texarkana per denied The Supreme 379. Texas has stat Court (Tex.1998). riam, Types S.W.2d ed, “A conspiracy may be as well proven or acts on of torts unlawful which a cause by conspirators, by the acts of the in conspiracy may of action be based anything they may say, touching they what fraud, clude breach of a and duty intended do.” Int’l Bankers Ins. Life See, e.g., Phippen as in this case. v. Deere Holloway, (quot Co. v. 368 S.W.2d at 581 Co., (Tex.App. & S.W.2d (1870)). Allen, ing Whitmore v. Tex. Yates, pet.); -Texarkana Fisher Supreme The has Court further stated: 381; 953 S.W.2d at Vinson & Elkins Moran, general conspiracy rule is that (Tex.App. 411-13 liability sufficiently by is [14th -Houston dism’d established Dist.] writ of proof showing concert action or other agr.). facts and circumstances which the from We have held that the evidence natural inference arises that the unlaw- is legally support case sufficient to ful, in fur- overt acts were committed jury’s findings duty of fiduciary of breach intention, design, therance of or common fraud; therefore, we hold that valid purpose alleged conspirators. of the underlying capable torts were established required .... It each and is providing conspiracy of the basis for the every conspirator act of a be shown finding. have been in with the others or concert The Lesikars also that neither contend it be established direct evidence Lyn knowingly conspired Harriet nor given prior that all combined at a time any wrong. Specifically, they commit con- con- to each transaction. Inferences tend that Harriet did not know of the joint from certed action be drawn Clark, assignment of the interest Thomas in the transactions and participation Clark, she from when dismissed Thomas from of the fruits of enjoyment They Lyn the lawsuit. contend that acted transactions.... well, knowledge independently as without Clark, dismissing Harriet’s Thomas Holloway, Int’l Bankers Ins. Co. v. Life (citations omitted); from the lawsuit. 368 S.W.2d at 581-82 Yates, at 379. accord Fisher v. One re of the essential elements conclude that the evidence is suffi- We quired conspiracy to establish a civil support Lyn cient to an inference that object meeting the minds knowing- participated jointly, Harriet Massey course action. v. Armco Steel we conspired wrongs. to commit As ly Co., Therefore, at 934. noted, while Harriet testified have conspiracy, participants must at least did not assignment she know about the object knowledge purpose have Lyn until well af- Thomas knowledge a conspiracy. One without executed, that she ter it was she admitted object conspiracy purpose of a interested knowledge had co-conspirator; cannot be a he cannot *20 Clark, interest. tacitly, acquiring to the Thomas agree, expressly either any actually that she read wrong stating of a of which he is Without commission 303 correspondence assignment, about conclude that there is sufficient evi- We Lyn knowingly Harriet Harriet dence copies also testified conspired to breach Harriet’s correspondence Werley regarding from duty to and other estate beneficia- the estate would have been sent to her. Clark, ries, fact, fraudulently acquire and to In Werley the record reflects that 2 in Thomas interest wells and 5 ex- “Mr. and on copied Mrs. Lesikar” both claim. change overpayment for the estate’s 14, the proposed assignment July dated 1994, he Bishop, which sent to and the CONSTRUCTIVE TRUST 11 agreement” accepted

“Rule that he 8, Bishop August returned to 1994. In challenge The Lesikars addition, Werley findings Harriet testified that had and the trial im court’s posing working advised her on several to dis- a constructive trust on the occasions overpayment acquired by Lyn miss the it interest in 2 5 litigation, but was wells Clark, days not until a few Thomas. We find there is Lyn acquired after justify imposition sufficient evidence to the interest that Harriet decided to do so. of a constructive trust. This is sufficient evidence that Harriet Clark, knew of acquire the scheme to A constructive trust is a device Thomas interest wells and 5 in ex- equity remedy wrong. uses to See change for the overpayment estate’s claim. Bierschwale, Meadows v. (Tex.1974); Cochell, v. Cawthon Although Lyn claims he acted indepen- 1938, (Tex.Civ.App.-Amarillo S.W.2d 414 dently of knowledge Harriet without dism’d). property writ When has been dismissal, in other relating matters acquired under circumstances where the estate he acted on Harriet’s behalf and legal good holder of title should not in with Harriet’s knowledge. example, For interest, conscience retain the beneficial at Harriet’s direction he reviewed the deed equity will convert the holder into a trust records and overpayment discovered the 81, Talley Howsley, ee. v. 142 Tex. claim. He also calculated the amount of (1943). A S.W.2d 158 classic case for the the overpayment, on which Harriet relied imposition aof constructive trust is where Clark, in filing against suit Thomas for the party fraudulently one something uses addition, overpayment. Lyn promised, belonging acquire value to another to title agreeing agreement,” the “Rule 11 property for himself. See Lotus Co. Oil Clark, that in exchange for Thomas’s inter- (Tex.Civ. Spires, 240 S.W.2d est wells not that he would n.r.e.); App.-El Paso writ ref 'd Col Clark, Thomas, simply indemnify but that (Tex.Civ. Griffith, lins v. 105 S.W.2d 895 he and Harriet pursue would not the over- writ). App.-Amarillo A construc Clark, payment claim Thomas. A tive imposed trust where one ac promise Lyn would not seek to collect quires legal property title to in violation of worthless, overpayment because fiduciary relationship. See Binford overpayment claim did not belong to Snyder, 144 Tex. 189 S.W.2d 471 him, Harriet, but belonged to the estate. (1945); Blackwell, Dilbeck v. estate, as a co-executrix of the was needed (Tex.Civ.App.-Texarkana writ fulfill Lyn’s purported independent ref'd). Clark, promise, which she did dropping just days Thomas from the lawsuit after im- ample justify There evidence to assignment Lyn was recorded. posing constructive trust on the interest This acquired by is sufficient evidence for the Although the Lesikars.

find that knew of the scheme to ac- working assigned title to the interest was quire Lyn, Thomas 2 to legal acquired by Lyn interest wells title was exchange and 5 in overpay- community property the estate’s of himself and Thus, ment claim. Harriet. Harriet also became *21 304 $207,842.69. 2 of an in the est and 5 was We property

holder interest wells in. recovery the assignment. previ- of the are aware that amount of the virtue We have it overpayment might suggest for the ously held that breached Harriet her fidu- n the the recovery valuable than duty dismissing in more ciary overpayment the 5; Clark, in wells 2 howev- working interest and and acquiring claim the Thomas er, we claim for must remember that the working Lyn guilty interest. was likewise or overpayment Jenny’s was not certain. procuring fraud and in deceit the inter- ability the all the al- estate’s recover est. leged was at best. overpayment speculative The judgment final awarded as Moreover, the current market value does not only a constructive trust over give future adequate consideration to Clark, the interest in 2 and Thomas wells which are revenues wells and part overpayment. but also the The wells, generate. In addi- producing will Lesikars the overpayment contend tion, conduct, all of their Harriet through award, in addition to the constructive trust Lyn working acted certainly and as the award, agree. is a windfall. We 2 and interest in wells 5 was more valuable overpayment. than claim for the

When funds or one’s other assets by a fiduciary acquire property are used overpay therefore delete the We himself, party the aggrieved may for seek uphold ment from the and judgment award property its value. D. itself or See trust, with imposition of constructive Ramsey, & Co. Sullivan v. S.W. final held the modification. Antonio (Tex.Civ.App.-San Clark, in the Thomas inter entire interest Hunt, writ); Ingenhuett 15 Tex.Civ.App. v. it trust distributed est constructivé (1897, ref'd); 39 S.W. 310 writ life, Jenny in. Harriet equal thirds to for (1955). Thus, § C.J.S. Trusts at 865 However, life, Fay simple. for in fee beneficiary remedy which elect Lee bought Lewis the interest in the T.W. Jenny pursue. prayed recovery for married; Fay lease he and were before alternatively for a con overpayment, therefore, property, his separate it was Clark, trust on the Thomas work structive gave equal portions which in his will he interest and 5. The ing wells Jenny. had to Harriet and If the estate Jenny overpayment awarded both Harriet and overpayment, recovered interest, neither working the es Jenny, under co-equal as beneficiaries Jenny those tate nor has elected between will, one would received Lewis’s each have authority of Birch recoveries. Under such, Clark, holds Thom Lyn half. As Mem’l Hosp., Texarkana in constructive as interest wells and 5 field (Tex.1987), Jenny we hold that Jenny’s Jenny half. only trust as to one rightful in the should recover her interest half, one Harriet should receive that while which the evidence shows to be property, keeps the other. greater of a value than her share of stated, argue As we have the Lesikars See overpayment. claim Birchfield Clark, Thom- not release the they did Hosp., Texarkana Mem’l claim, lost so the estate overpayment

367, holding prevailing par that where the working they acquired the nothing when ty fails to elect between alternative mea in- They argue Lyn interest. damages, court sures of should use Clark, demnified Thomas recovery findings affording greater now, overpayment, claims for the judgment accordingly. and render effect, overpayment still owes the disagree. and the estate. We The amount the awarded as $298,547.00. Lyn’s indemnification to Even if overpayment recoverable overpayment only on the substi- testimony was that the Thomas James Davis’s another, tutes that substitu- working market inter- one debtor present value

305 3, Jenny tion not authorized the by jury was or and found Harriet liable for estate, duty deprives and it a valuable breach of and Harriet and them of Lyn liable for fraud. The Lesikars con- availability recovery asset —the from Clark, fiduciary duty tend that the breach of and Additionally, Thomas. as we have noted, damage ques- fraud theories which the already substituting Lyn and Har- Clark, recovery tion limit place partly predicated riet as debtors in the by are damages proximately Thomas in- caused places Harriet a conflict of They their actions. contend that the sub- relationship terest to the estate. 14 question mission of was error because Damages the court from” Actual used the words “resulted require did find that jury not final judgment indicates that the damages proximately by were caused part trial court awarded overpay- acts, wrongful thereby lessening Jen- ment as actual damages. The Lesikars ny’s proof. burden of We overrule this raise several relating contentions contention. recovery. We have held that because of rule, Jenny the election of remedies cannot Actual damages available for property through recover both the a con- fiduciary duty breach of and fraud include structive trust and claim overpay- general damages special both or direct ment that was acquire proper- used to consequential damages. or See Airborne ty. recovery We have sustained the Enters., Inc., Freight Corp. v. C.R. Lee 847

working interest a constructive trust (Tex.App.-El S.W.2d Paso and will eliminate the recovery the over- denied). writ damages compensate Direct payment, making thus it unnecessary to plaintiff conclusively for loss that is discuss the Lesikars’ remaining conten- presumed to have been foreseen pertaining tions to that recovery. wrongful defendant from his act. Arthur question In jury awarded Perry Andersen & v. Equip. Corp., Co. 1) additional actual damages for “costs in- (Tex.1997). Consequen curred in correcting wrongful con- tial unlike damages, damages, direct are 2) duct,” “failure to pay operational ex- presumed to have been foreseen or to 8) Lease,” penses on the T.W. Lee “loss of necessary be the and usual result of the the value of the Thomas interest on Plaintiff wrong. plead prove must 4) 1994,” August “unpaid estate separately, they prem them must be income tax return preparation expense finding they proximately ised on a year tax 1994.” The indicates wrongful resulted conduct of the court, that the trial awarding rather than defendant. Arthur Andersen & Co. v. element, imposed the third a constructive 816; Perry Equip. Corp., 945 trust over the interest wells and 5. Freight Corp. Airborne v. C.R. Lee En The Lesikars contend that the form of ters., Inc., Thus, 847 S.W.2d at 295. Question first, 14 was error and that the speak proximate courts of a cause or a second, damage and fourth awards are un- foreseeability showing in the context of recoverable for various reasons. special consequential damages actual only, not the context of direct actual Question

Form of the damages. Additionally, the Texas Pattern Question asked, Jury Charges suggest damage ques “What sum that a any, cash, if if money, paid assign now in would tion dam asking direct fairly and reasonably compensate Jenny ages resulting from fraud should use the from,” Rappeport Lou Lewis damages, question for her words “resulted while a any, wrongful asking that resulted such act assign consequential from Questions 1, 2, 3, 4, you have found in “proximate 5 or use the should words added). 1, 2, Comm, (emphasis by.” 12?” questions ly caused See on PatteRN of a lawsuit are not recovera prosecution BAR TEXAS CHARGES, TEX., STATE OF JURY 110.19, Turner, PJC 110.20 Turner v. Charges ble. Jury Pattern (1990). (Tex.1964). But, in attorneys’ fees in prior litigation party curred with a third court, objected In the trial the Lesikars *23 in a suit as subsequent are recoverable 14 simply that contained “no is- question Turner, damages.1 actual See Turner v. proximate appeal, they cause.” sues On 234; 14 question do not contend that asks 385 S.W.2d at Standard Fire Ins. Co. (Tex. or consequential to award special 81, Stephenson, v. 963 S.W.2d 90 Instead, they that damages. argue simply 1997, App.-Beaumont pet.); no & Crum fraud duty the breach of and Forster, Co., Inc. v. Monsanto 887 S.W.2d require finding theories a that the dam- (Tex. 1994, 103, App.-Texarkana 129 ac- ages proximately by were caused their w.r.m.); judgm’t vacated Nationwide Mut. objection Assuming tions. Lesikars’ Holmes, 335, v. Ins. Co. 842 S.W.2d 340-41 error, argument their is incor- preserved denied); (Tex.App.-San Antonio writ rect, and we the contention. overrule Ball, Energy, Baja Inc. v. 669 S.W.2d 836 1984, writ); no (Tex.App.-Eastland Powell in Correcting Costs Incurred Narried, (Tex.Civ.App.- v. 43 463 S.W.2d Wrongful Conduct n.r.e.). El Paso writ ref 'd The recov assignment After the of wells equitable in ery such a case is based on Lyn, applica and 5 to and on the Lesikars’ the claimant was re grounds because Jenny’s knowledge, made tion without as prosecute litigation or defend quired oper Railroad Commission transferred the wrongful act of the consequence of the Lee lease L & to ations T.W. G recovery in the traditional defendant. As result, Jenny As a attor Lyn. incurred fees, attorneys’ plaintiff may recover neys’ contesting fees in the transfer damages only attorneys’ as those fees operations before Railroad Commis necessary. Turner are reasonable and See 14(1), question awarded sion. Turner, 234; at Nationwide S.W.2d $12,000.00 Jenny correcting as “costs of Holmes, Ins. at Mut. Co. v. 842 S.W.2d wrongful parties stip The have conduct.” 340-41; Narried, Powell v. 463 S.W.2d wrong ulated that “cost of correcting in by appeals 46. As stated the court of ful conduct” refers the Austin award Powell, attorneys’ challenge The fees. Lesikars on attorneys’ the award of the Austin fees proximate con- the natural [W]here grounds. arguments One of several their sequence wrongful been of a act has failed, required, Jenny is but plaintiff litigation involve a with oth- testimony fees present expert ers, rule, may, general there as a necessary. were reasonable and Without recovery damages the reasonable addressing arguments, Lesikars’ other litiga- in such expenses prior incurred point ground. sustain the we ... ... must expenses tion but such necessarily have been incurred rale, unless ex general As must contract, good faith, the amount provided statute or pressly thereof attorneys’ or be reasonable. fees incurred the defense n.r.e.); Corp. S.S. appeals Several have held that the Paso writ ref’d Dalton 1. courts of Co., only recovery attorneys' fees is allowed W.R. 354 S.W.2d Zanes & contract, provided 1962, writ). statute even when or (Tex.Civ.App.-Fort We Worth no litiga- where such fees were incurred in other plain- agree with other courts and hold that See, sought damages. tion and are as actual attorneys' tiff recover fees Inc., Reynolds, e.g., Peterson v. Dean Witter wrongful conduct where defendant's (Tex.App.-Dallas 805 S.W.2d prosecute defend plaintiff forces writ); Cupples Pipe, Inc. v. Esco Coiled litigation proceeding. in another Co., (Tex.Civ.App.-El Supply (em Named, rec inadequacies Powell v. at 46 cause of several added); ord, phasis accord Nationwide Mut. testi suggested the court that some Holmes, Ins. Co. v. at 340-41. mony fees are reasonable Nar necessary required. is See Powell v. trial, Jenny’s attorney At asked ried, 463 S.W.2d at 46. Rather than ad whether she deemed the Austin attor- evidence, sufficiency dress the of her Jen services, neys’ fees, not reasonable ny argues pursuant to Section 38.003 necessary. Jenny answered that she did. of the Texas Practice and Remedies Civil objected [Jenny] Lesikars that “what Code, presumption she is entitled to the necessary deems reasonable and ... customary attorney’s that “the usual and They relevant.” did not offer contro- *24 type for a claim of the in fees described verting evidence. The Lesikars’ first con- Section 38.001 are reasonable.” Tex. Civ. tention is that the trial in court erred 38.001, §§ Prac. & Rem.Code Ann. 38.003 overruling objection their Jenny’s testi- (Vernon 1997). However, mony, Jenny’s in action they which claim she testified that before the Railroad attorneys’ her Austin were Commission was not fees rea- 38.001; therefore, sonable and necessary. They argue brought that under Section Jenny Jenny is not qualified testify any presump as to the cannot benefit from Further, necessity attorneys’ reasonableness and of tion that pre statute allows. fees. sumption showing necessitates some Here, customary. the fees were usual and We do not decide Jenny’s opin- whether testimony the record contains no that the ion that her attorneys’ fees were reason- attorneys’ Austin fees were usual and cus necessary, it, able and given had she is tomary. irrelevant to that Jenny’s testimony issue. only was that she considered the Austin addition, In Jenny Musgrave cites attorneys’ case, fees, work on her not their Ass’n, Prop. Brookhaven Lake Owners necessary. reasonable and Whether the (Tex.App.-Texarkana pet. S.W.2d 386 admission of particular testimony this was denied), proposition for the trial decide, generally, irrelevant we need not judicial court can take notice of records testimony because this certainly is irrele- deciding attorneys’ its court in fees vant to our determination of the Lesikars’ are necessary. Attorneys’ reasonable and second contention expert that without tes- Musgrave fees in by were awarded this timony, there is insufficient evidence of pursuant Court Section 5.006 of the necessary reasonable and attorneys’ fees. Code, Property inapplicable Texas which is Jenny, Other than no witness testified Musgrave to this case. See v. Brookhaven regarding the Austin attorneys’ fees. Ass’n, Lake Prop. Owners Thus, testimony, there was no expert or Moreover, case, 400. otherwise, regarding whether those fees fact, the trier of party enjoys while were necessary. reasonable and presumption of reasonableness and the other evidence related to the Austin attor- judicial availability of notice for claims neys’ fees were invoices the Austin attor- brought Chapter under 38 of the Texas neys Jenny payment, sent for which Code, Civil Practice and Remedies neither indicated the amount of the fees but did apply, Jenny does that statute has not not indicate the number of hours worked did, demonstrated that the trial court hourly or an rate. fact, judicial take notice of See anything. Jenny has cited authority, § no and we Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem.Code Ann. 38.001. none, have found expressly setting out a Finally, Jenny contends that her determining

standard for reasonableness testimony may in cases where uncontroverted be taken as attorneys’ sought fees are Powell, damages. general as We note that in in true as a matter of law. The rule denying recovery attorneys’ testimony fees be- that the of an wit- is interested

ness, contradicted, bills, though no does that the attorneys’ We conclude than expert more raise a fact issue to be deter the absence as to testimony fees, by Ragsdale mined jury. Progres necessity reasonableness and fees League, sive Voters insufficient evidence that were (Tex.1990); necessary. reasonable Disbrow v. We therefore Healey, Jenny’s reform the re- delete (Tex.App.-Houston Dist.] [1st $12,000.00 However, covery of incurred in pet.). costs there is an ex correcting wrongful conduct. ception to the rule: expert There cases in which Unpaid Expenses Operational testimony to the value an attor- 14(4), question recovered ney’s so free services is from inconsis- $26,122.00 “unpaid as actual tencies, so un- thoroughly supported operational the amount she evidence, expenses,” disputed clearly facts and so alleged the owed from 1996 Lesikars knowledge in accord experi- with through proportionate 1998 for their share ence which the must had and have lease, which expenses operating with the information them obtained Jenny sought under theories of reimburse trial, on the court would be *25 enrichment, ment, unjust quantum and in justified testimony that as accepting that meruit. Lesikars contend the The conclusive.... disregard trial court in to refusing erred Paving Lofstedt, Co. v. 144 Tex. Gulf operat jury’s unpaid the these award for (1945). Thus, 188 S.W.2d 161 they is imma ing expenses, contend which applies, in exception proving the context of theories of predicating terial the because fees, attorneys’ only compe- reasonable to fraud, duty, recovery, fiduciary of breach attorneys’ evidence fees. tent of reasonable not establish obli conspiracy do testified, Only Jenny only and she testified obli gation expenses, to but such pay the the attorneys’ that Austin were services hold gation in contract. that sounds We reasonable. the point has been waived. Jenny authority has cited no A disregard jury to find motion we why apply should not in this case may ing properly granted be pertaining established of law to the rules finding has in or support no the evidence fees, attorneys’ and we reasonableness of Eagle issue is Spencer immaterial. to, no because perceive simply reason not (Tex. Am., Ins. 876 154 Star Co. S.W.2d attorneys’ fees here been award have 1994). argue ques The that the Lesikars Thus, actual in damages. ed as cases expenses regarding unpaid operating tion attorneys’ pres where fees incurred in the not should have been submitted because it litigation sought, ent are while an attor improper damages under is an measure ney’s testimony as to reasonableness recovery the theories of This submitted. issue, proof fees is conclusive of that argument objection an amounts to testimony generally required. such is charge, which the Lesikars must have Paving Lofstedt, Co. v. Gulf court, in made the trial or it waived. 161; Nguyen Ngoc Giao v. Smith & Lesi- See P. 274. Because the (Tex. Crv. Lamm, P.C., Tex.R. question failed writ). object kars on this App.-Houston Dist.] [1st they ground, alleged have waived the er Generally, the issue of reasonableness ror. See id. necessity attorneys’ expert fees requires

testimony; an as to rea attorney testifies Return Unpaid Estate Income Tax sonableness, attorney testifying and the Expenses Preparation designated as an before he expert must be 1(e), found Young question jury See E.F. Hutton & v. In testifies. Co. (Tex.1987). blood, fiduciary duty by Harriet her breached improperly spending Jenny by deception intentionally funds that interfered deposited Werley agreement. trust with for the with on operating Based purpose paying questions through Harriet’s share of ac- the conduct it found in for counting jury costs the estate’s income tax awarded actual damages. preparation conduct, return jury 1994. Based on Based on that same finding, 14(5), $2,000,000.00 in question in punitive damages awarded $1,750.00 awarded for against Lyn. Harriet’s Based on the conduct it found (breach “unpaid 1, 3, estate income prepa- Questions tax return or 4 fraud, expense year ration for tax duty, conspiracy), 1994.” This represents $500,000.00 figure Harriet’s one-half share awarded in punitive damages Harriet, accounting Jenny, of the total costs which which the trial court re- estate, $200,000.00. ultimately behalf of the paid duced to con- Lesikars the accountants. The Lesikars concede tend awarding that the trial court erred in 1) Werley the funds any punitive damages held trust because there are payment of accounting Harriet’s share of defects in the actual damages awards and accountants, paid costs were not recovery underlying theories of 2) they awards, but contend that punitive damages Harriet cannot be Texas held liable for the failure to them. pay procedures assessing punitive damages They argue part process the funds are violate due protections. trust, being alternative,

still held in and that there is they punitive contend that the no evidence that Harriet spent the funds. awards are excessive.

We sustain the point ground. on this Supporting Defective Basis While there evidence Wer- *26 Damages Punitive ley and obligated Harriet were pay the The Lesikars contend that there must funds to the accountants but failed to do an damages be award of actual in tort so, agree we that there is no evidence that punitive before an award of damages is spent Harriet the point- funds. has proper, and further that the actual dam evidence, ed out no and we have found ages awards here not in were awarded none, showing that actually spent Harriet tort, punitive so we must reverse the dam in funds held trust. only question ages Citing awards. Lovelace v. Sabine on which the actual damages award for Consol., Inc., (Tex. 654-55

unpaid income tax preparation return ex- App.-Houston writ de [14th Dist.] penses could question have been based was nied), they also contend that there be must 1(e), which was a pointed question, asking finding liability theory of on a of recov specifically whether Harriet breached her ery supports punitive damages, fiduciary duty “in spending deposit- funds further, the punitive damages because agent ed with her in payment trust for of question disjunctive, was asked in the we professional accounting costs of the estate” punitive damages must reverse the awards added). (emphasis Because we find no recovery one of the theories of in evidence that actually spent Harriet questions through support 1 5 or 12 cannot funds, we reform to delete punitive damages. overrule con We these $1,750.00 Jenny’s recovery of unpaid tentions. estate income tax preparation expenses. The Lesikars first contend Damages Punitive damages none of the actual awards was tort, In 1 findings through 5 and in punitive awarded which defeats the fiduciary However, found Harriet breached her damages recovery. trial duty, that both Harriet and commit- granted Jenny’s court plea impose engaged conspiracy, ted fraud and in a trust 2 constructive on interest wells Lyn acquired operation wrongfully of lease and 5 that the Lesikars ac- 310 ”

quired. disagree ages.’ Longview We that a defect in the See Nabours Sav. & Ass’n, damages (quoting actual awards would defeat the Loan 700 S.W.2d at 904 case, damages awards in this be- punitive Holloway, Int’l Bankers Ins. Co. v. Life wholly 568). independent ground cause a for the in a 368 at We note that S.W.2d of recovery punitive damages exists. See case, appeals recent Procom En court Consol., Roach, Lovelace v. Sabine Inc. 733 ergy although equita L.L.A v. at 654-55. S.W.2d pertain ble did not to the return of relief lack of property, the court held that a must an Generally, there finding damages preclude actual not did damages award of actual tort before an opera an to an punitive damages award of proper. punitive damages award of See tor who recovered constructive trust on Homes, Reed, Inc. v. 711 Jim Walter overriding royalty acquired by interest (Tex.1986). But S.W.2d the Su gas fiduciary- producer, because recovery Court authorized the preme has gas pro breach and fraud relating in actions punitive damages sounding ducer’s interest promise jointly acquire equity, even where there is award of in the and its failure subsequent property damages. actual See typical Nabours Ener convey the interest. Procom See Ass’n, 700 Longview Sav. & Loan S.W.2d Roach, gy L.L.A. v. S.W.3d (Tex.1985); Int’l 904 n. 3 Bankers h.). 2000, no pet. (Tex.App.-Tyler Holloway, Ins. Co. v. at Life recovery We that the In conclude estate’s Holloway, plaintiff corpora 584. gained interest wells based profits tion elected sue for the fiduciary duty fraud fiduciary defendants in of their breach of breach damages. support punitive an award of duties. See Int’l Bankers Co. v. Ins. Life actu- Holloway, The fact that the awarded other uphold 584. al for the conduct it found damages an award ing punitive damages, stated, 12 does not questions through 5 and Supreme Court damages improper, render be- punitive equitable principles It is consistent with cause the estate property recovered equity corpo- to exact of a defaulting is an actual that will award of profits right- rate *27 support punitive damages. of an award fully belonging corporation but an additional exaction for unconscionable Next, citing Lovelace v. Sabine a conduct. There should be deterrent to Inc., Consol., contend that Lesikars conduct which condemns and for equity question punitive damages because the grant it will which relief. disjunctive, punitive in the asked Nabours, the Supreme Id. at 584. In any damages awards must be reversed rejected the contention that a mere Court recovery questions one of theories of injunctive support of relief will an grant punitive 5 or 12 cannot through support but punitive damages, award of stated its recovery the damages. only of theory confused an holding “should not be with theory fault is the in question Lesikars punitive damages refusal to allow absolute They fiduciary duty. of regarding breach case relief had.” equitable a where is theory sup of argue incapable that this Longview Nabours Sav. & Loan See porting damages an issue punitive because Ass’n, Recognizing a 700 S.W.2d at 905. requisite on the intent or malice needed “recovery property” exception of was not support punitive damages a award requiring damages, rule actual the court jury, improper to the it was submitted stated, re- equity requires the “[W]here finding for the trial court to make its own of ‘recovery turn of the con- property, element. a result of fraud consti- paid sideration as Lovelace, jury a In found actual and will serve as damages tutes contracts, had breached two recovery exemplary for the dam- defendant basis fiduciary duty, breached his and commit er acted with malice are the defendant something ted fraud. The then awarded actual immaterial. But more than a recovery damages simple required attributable to the defendant’s breach is for the conduct, separation damages punitive damages; constituting without ac of the acts fraudulent, cording theory liability, whether the breach must have been contract or tort. Finally, award at least intentional. Int’l Bankers See Life 584; damages. ed punitive ap Holloway, The court of Ins. at Inter Co. S.W.2d Dallas, Risser, peals reversed the award of dam N.A. v. punitive First Bank of Consol, ages. may See Lovelace v. Sabine at 907. An intentional breach Inc., 733 S.W.2d at 654-55. The court be intends to fiduciary found where stated: gain an additional benefit for himself. See Holloway, Int’l Bankers Ins. Co. v. appellant

An cannot be held accountable Life Holloway, In 583-84. for the failure of an appellee to secure Supreme suggested willful and Court separate jury findings upon which an presumed fraudulent acts are when the accurate could be based. Nor fiduciary, Holloway, gains as addi can an appellate imply finding court tional benefit for himself of his as result tort, actual damages because a court In breach. Texas Bank & Trust Co. v. appeals cannot make original findings Moore, (Tex.1980), fact; it can “unfind” For facts. Supreme held exemplary Court dam reasons, foregoing we hold that the ages are proper self-dealing when trial court erred in awarding punitive Where, here, fiduciary has occurred. damages indepen- where there was no gains in fact a benefit breach finding dent of actual damages in tort. ing fiduciary duty, her willful and fraudu (citations omitted). Id. at 655 Our case is fact, lent presumed. acts Lovelace, somewhat different from because jury found that Harriet her fidu breached here, the court awarded a constructive ciary duty and committed fraud. There trust for the conduct it in questions found amounting was no evidence of conduct 1 through 5 or which amounts to actual apart to fraud from the conduct found to damages, which in turn support punitive fiduciary duty. be a breach of Harriet’s However, damages. agree puni- we Thus, underlying the same conduct tive may not be sustained where finding of breach also amounted to fraud. one of the recovery theories of on which punitive damages were disjunctively Charge Omitted Element in the support awarded does not punitive dam- Question 1 asked whether Harriet ages. fiduciary duty breached her in various re *28 A defendant’s intentional spects. question whether Har No asked fiduciary duty breach of is a tort for which intentionally, willfully, riet acted or fraudu a plaintiff may punitive recover damages. lently, or an gain whether she intended See Int’l Bankers Ins. Co. v. Hollo Life additional In final benefit herself. its 583-84; way, 368 S.W.2d at Hawthorne v. judgment, supplied the trial court the al Guenther, 936; 917 S.W.2d at InterFirst element, leged finding omitted not Dallas, Risser, Bank N.A. v. 739 S.W.2d engaged Harriet in conduct in that breach 907 (Tex.App.-Texarkana no duty of her but also that she did writ). it a general While is rule that Tex willfully maliciously. so Even if a as courts allow the recovery punitive of question required on intent were in this defendant, damages where the in commit case, preserve the Lesikars have failed to tort, ting willfully, maliciously, a acted or the error. fraudulently, punitive damages where are fiduciary duty damages awarded for breach of the a jury Where awards actual charge motives of the defendant and wheth- on a that omits an element based recovery, a

necessary ground necessary heightened sustain of to sustain a damage McKee, may trial a the court either file -written award was omitted. In the Su- element, the finding regarding missing preme support or Court cited Holland in of judgment may If the that may render without one. its statement a trial court not finding, does not findings trial court file a written make of fact the where omitted element an independent ground the omitted is deemed found issue is of recov- support long ery. of the so as no In Holland the Antonio Court San made that objection requested, Appeals finding was or issue held a that the con- supports finding. the evidence a was either or willfully such version malicious 279; done, P. Farm recovery punitive See Tex.R. Civ. State essential to a Life Beaston, issue, Ins. Co. v. damages, plaintiffs S.W.2d was that (Tex.1995). the issue was in the absence of waived a request by plaintiff for submission of Lesikars the trial The contend Lesesne, See v. issue. Holland finding court’s and malice willfulness at 865. S.W.2d improper was because of the Texas Su preme holding Supreme Court’s in Martin v. McKee citation Despite Court’s (Tex.1984). Realtors, Inc., Holland, holdings more of the recent Su case, In suggest the trial awarded dis that the trial court preme court Court cretionary damages under the DTPA a intent when finding make omitted, jury finding puni it on plaintiffs where obtained a issue on is if an issue In “knowingly,” damages that the defendants tive State Farm acted submitted. Beaston, recovery for the requirement of discretion Ins. Co. 907 S.W.2d Life DTPA, ary damages under where the trial Supreme but Court stated they request court, jury expressly excluding failed issue dis award of damages. cretionary plaintiff-appel- anguish damages jury mental where that the “knowingly” finding lees contended since the awarded them without de it jury, knowingly, had been fendant acted must have issue submitted under Pro proper knowingly, was Texas Rule of Civil found that the acted defendant cedure 279 for the dam could have punitive although issue of the trial court so ages sup to have been found in Rule In Ramos Fri deemed found under 279. (Tex. Inc., port discretionary damages to-Lay, award. 1990), In rejecting argument, Supreme although the court held case, court appeals punitive damages despite Court noted a Hol awarded (Tex.Civ. Lesesne, 350 finding acting land v. that the his appellee n.r.e.), would App.-San finding Antonio Writ ref'd be managerial capacity, the objec punitive held to be found there was damages wherein were deemed since addition, theory of an Court of independent the nature tion. the Beaumont pre recovery Appeals squarely and could not awarded absent the issue addressed punitive The court then here and that where special issue thereon. sented held plaintiff that a to recover were for breach of fidu seeking damages held awarded intent, DTPA self- discretionary damages ciary duty, but issue of under support malice request dealing, necessary must issue on such *29 omitted, was recovery to avoid waiver of of those award was defendant re Realtors, object Martin the omission under damages. quired See v. McKee so, Inc., 279, 663 S.W.2d at 448. do the element fading Rule Rule under 279. could be deemed found sit- parallel present does McKee Guenther, v. 917 S.W.2d at Hawthorne See Here, dam- question punitive uation. 936. in the ages, being indepen- nature of an submitted, of a hold that even if the submission ground recovery, dent was We required of intent question aggravating question on an factor was but

313 case, (1994); punitive Corp. the submission of the dam TXO Prod. v. Alliance Res. 443, 2711, ages question along with the submission of 125 Corp., 509 U.S. 113 S.Ct. (1993); fiduciary duty the issue of breach of re L.Ed.2d 366 Pac. Mut. Ins. Life 1, 1032, quired object 111 Haslip, the Lesikars to to the omit Co. v. 499 U.S. S.Ct. 279; (1991). ted P. issue of intent. See Tex.R. Crv. L.Ed.2d 1 The recent 113 Court’s Beaston, however, Farm State Ins. Co. v. 907 do not opinions, provide specific Life 437; Inc., at v. Frito-Lay, process guidelines S.W.2d Ramos due for lower courts to 668; Moriel, 784 at Transp. S.W.2d Hawthorne v. Ins. 879 Guen follow. Co. ther, (Tex.1994). Instead, 917 at S.W.2d 936. Pursuant to Rule 12 n. 27 ground recovery where a consists simply has evaluated the consti- Court element, of more than one and one or tutionality punitive damages more awards on necessarily basis, essential elements referable case-by-case holding that certain thereto by are submitted and found procedures given states’ case either omitted, jury, but one element is comport process. ele violate or with due See may ment be found the court or Oberg, Honda Co. v. 512 at Motor U.S. deemed found in support (holding 2331 that Oregon’s S.Ct. opposing party object does not to its procedure, which failed to provide thereon, request omission or an issue and post-verdict puni- review of the amount of factually there is unconstitutional); sufficient damages, evidence tive TXO support the omitted finding. Crv. Corp. Corp., Prod. v. Alliance Res. Tex.R.

P. 279. The object Lesikars failed to (upholding U.S. at 113 S.Ct. 2711 issue, request an constitutional); so the trial court could award as Pac. Mut. Life properly find the 23-24, omitted element if there Haslip, Ins. Co. v. at U.S. is sufficient evidence to support it. See (upholding S.Ct. 1032 the award as consti- id.; Beaston, tutional). State Farm advised, Ins. Co. v. In Haslip, the Court Life at not, 437. detailing cannot, Without ‘We need and indeed we draw again fraud, the evidence supporting we bright a mathematical line between the find there is sufficient support evidence to constitutionally acceptable and the consti- the court’s finding. tutionally unacceptable that fit ev- would ery case.” Pac. Ins. Mut. Co. Life

Due Process Haslip, U.S. S.Ct. 1032. The Lesikars contend that Texas Moriel, Supreme The Texas Court procedures punitive for reviewing damages retrial, remanding the case for considered violate process constitutional due protec it procedural advisable to articulate stan- tions, (1) specifically because Texas trial dards for the trial applied courts to be required courts are not to affirmatively all subsequent punitive damages cases in justify punitive awards on the record Moriel, Texas. Transp. See Ins. Co. v. (2) Supreme the Texas Court does not S.W.2d at 26. The Moriel case contains consider the exeessiveness of punitive our procedural current standards. Be- awards, damage but considers only wheth it “bright guidance” cause had no line appeals er courts of applied erroneous Court, Supreme compared the court standard of review. We overrule this con procedures procedures Texas exam- tention. ined Supreme Haslip Court Supreme United States Court has Production. The court concluded TXO process held that due imposes procedures compare constraints that our did not favor- punitive on the size of damages ably. recognized disparate awards It as that Tex- courts, courts, procedures and on the under trial are not puni- which unlike other tive are awarded and reviewed. required to scrutinize each award and set *30 See Honda v. Oberg, refusing Motor Co. 512 U.S. forth reasons on the record for to 415, 2331, addition, 114 In our S.Ct. 129 L.Ed.2d 336 disturb a verdict.

314 Court, in

Supreme unlike its ries. Ellis Bank counterparts County See State v. states, Keever, 478, (Tex.1995); is precluded reviewing other 915 S.W.2d 479 Kraus, v. supporting punitive the evidence a dam- Alamo Nat’l Bank 616 S.W.2d 908, (Tex.1981). However, signifi- award for it ages sufficiency. factual See 910 is Moriel, Transp. Ins. Co. 879 at cant also Supreme v. S.W.2d that the Texas Court jurisdiction punitive 28. has to evaluate dam- ages light in of constitutional sub- awards Production, In Supreme TXO the Court claims, in this process stantive due as case. analyzed punitive damages a case where Owens-Coming Corp. Fiberglas See v. trial the court had not articulated on the 35, (Tex.1998). Malone, 972 S.W.2d 45 denying record its reasons for motions for judgment notwithstanding disparities bring the To the and verdict address in line Although providing for remittitur. the Court stated Texas ade procedure always safeguards helpful quate protect that it is for trial procedural courts awards, explain rulings, the for their it held excessive the Mor- grossly basis changes: this failure not a iel two following that was constitutional court made Corp. requirement, upon request, See Prod. It adopted violation. TXO v. Alli 465, Corp., damage ance Res. at trials punitive 509 U.S. 113 S.Ct. of bifurcated cases, appeals, 2711. The court also held that the Moriel addressed court argument. recog sufficiency the Lesikars’ first It when re conducting factual award, that other view jurisdictions expressly punitive damages nized re of a must why quire explaining the trial court to articulate rea detail evidence its the relevant for or does not refusing punitive supports sons to disturb evidence either award, Co. v. damages adopting support Transp. after award. Ins. most them addition, Moriel, In Haslip. it observed that sev at 31. Several courts 879 S.W.2d appellate reviewing pu appeals heightened eral federal courts have held that reviewing pu damages nitive have Haslip post-judgment procedure awards since trial Mor- damages remanded the to the court with nitive awards mandated cases iel process. instructions articulate reasons satisfies due See Convalescent Servs., Schultz, 731, Ins. v. upholding Transp. award. See Inc. Moriel, But, 1996, v. at Co. 879 S.W.2d 32. writ (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] I-Gotcha, Mclnnis, denied); requirement, rather than Inc. make this v. findings (Tex.App.-Fort court noted would obvi S.W.2d Worth such 844-45 denied). Moriel, helpful ously urged they writ Since held practicable. be made the extent has Supreme should United State Court for re procedures at 33. Oregon’s Id. post-verdict pro due damages violated viewing punitive regard argument to the- that our With Oberg, cess. Honda Motor Co. See Supreme not consider the ex- Court does L.Ed.2d 336. U.S. 114 S.Ct. awards, damages cessiveness of punitive however, procedure Oregon, puni- the Moriel court that while noted our significantly procedure dissimilar tive awards are scrutinized less Texas, would holding in that case and the closely appeal highest than court procedures find that we Texas require states, does process in other not re- due See Motor Co. unconstitutional. Honda two levels review. See quire appellate Oberg, 512 U.S. S.Ct. Moriel, Transp. Ins. Co. v. 336; Servs., L.Ed.2d see also Convalescent question note 29. We of exces- Schultz, Inc. v. at 740. factual purely inquiry siveness is Supreme Supreme juris- light Court’s of the United States beyond Texas jurisdiction Supreme holdings, and that court has Texas diction Court’s Moriel, opinion to determine whether courts Court’s reasoned appeals, we inqui- of other courts of properly review such factual decisions appeals *31 procedures Assessing hold that current Texas do not the criteria set out case, process protec- offend constitutional due the Kraus we find $2,000,000.00 punitive damages award tions.

against Lyn experi is excessive. The loss Excessiveness enced the estate and because of financial, Lyn’s purely acts was and only The Lesikars contend not that the it, they fully we reform will judgment as trial court erred in awarding punitive dam- recover their financial loss and more. Un ages, punitive but also that the damages personal injury monetary like cases where awards are excessive. We have overruled damages replace cannot life or re lost contention, their first agree but we body, recovery store a maimed the actual punitive damages are awards exces- injured parties this case will make the sive. completely whole. no mental There was damages Punitive must be rea abuse, insult, physical personal outrage, or sonably proportional damages, to actual opprobrious Lyn’s conduct. acts were although there can be no set ratio between injure not anyone’s personal calculated to punitive damages actual and that will be sensibilities, Jenny certainly and had not considered reasonable. InterFirst Bank fact, reposed any personal In Lyn. trust Dallas, Risser, N.A. v. 739 S.W.2d at 909. parties have feuding been adversaries punitive The amount of damages largely is litigating nearly years fifteen over jury’s within the discretion. re We their family property. Lyn’s motive was punitive verse a damage suggest award or financial, spite. Considering posi remittitur we determine the evi tions of the and the parties ongoing legal supporting dence factually award is disputes involving proper them and their insufficient or against the verdict is so $2,000,000.00 ty, punitive damages award great weight preponderance of the against Lyn appears to be the result evidence to be manifestly unjust. as See passion objec rather than the result of an Moriel, Transp. Ins. Co. v. at S.W.2d tive assessment of the evidence. In See 30; Co., see also Pool v. Ford Motor Dallas, Risser, terFirst Bank N.A. v. (Tex.1986). S.W.2d (Cornelius, C.J., 739 S.W.2d at 909-10 con curring). suggest will therefore a re- Whether an award We punitive $1,400,000.00 mittitur damages punitive of the excessive is measured against Lyn, award leaving factors set out in Alamo Nat’l Bank v. Kraus, $600,- punitive damages him at at 910. Those factors (1) (2) include: the nature wrong, of the 000.00. (3) involved, the character of the conduct degree of culpability wrongdoer, of the Judgment in the Additional ERRORS (4) the situation and sensibilities of the The Lesikars contend that (5) concerned,

parties the extent judgment Spe contains additional errors. which such conduct a public offends sense cifically, they complain of the trial court’s Kraus, justice. Alamo Nat’l Bank v. injunction granting temporary order 910. being operator on the keeping In order to assess the reasonable lease, part T.W. Lee as well as that award, ness of a punitive damages we are G, L Jenny, that confirms & required to detail the relevant evidence Fay operators as the current of the lease. explain why sup the evidence either 1994, Harriet, ports or support punitive August capac- does not her damages award. County ity co-independent Ellis State Bank executrix of the Keever, 798; estate, Transp. 888 S.W.2d at Ins. Lewis submitted a “P-4” form to Moriel, seeking Co. 879 S.W.2d at 31. Railroad Commission *32 it, ing in change operator specific the of the T.W. Lee oil but order to obtain some lease on records from L against judgment Commission & G relief which the stands Lyn. ap- to The Railroad opinions Commission as a in recent has bar. Our Court proved change. November of concerning held that rules collateral Jenny to the Railroad Commis- appealed apply judgments attack to orders or of sion, that did arguing bodies, Harriet not have quasi-judicial such as the Railroad file the authority application. to The Rail- Commission, as to well as the courts. disagreed Jenny road Commission with Haywood, Rice & Exploration Arkla Co. (Tex. and that she did not her satisfy decided Venture, William 863 S.W.2d showing burden had a good- of that she by agr.). App.-Texarkana writ dism’d operate faith claim to the lease and that a The rule is that exception general Jenny did appealed not. the trial agency attack order upon collateral seeking temporary court this case a successfully one may on be maintained injunction against Lyn. granted court The is An ground alone-that void. the order order, pursuant a temporary restraining requisite in the agency order be void L operating which & G has been lease 1) the grounds: sense on either of two to date. The now that Lesikars contend agency order that shows on its face in granting trial court erred both 2) a jurisdiction, complain its or exceeded restraining stating order and temporary procured by ant that the shows order lease; operator that Jenny is extrinsic fraud. States Utils. Co. Gulf they part that we set that request Util. Coalition Cities for Affordable judgment They argue aside. these Rates, (Tex.App.-Aus rulings impermissible amount collateral 1994) (Powers, J., dissenting), tin rev’d on ruling. attacks on a Railroad Commission (Tex.1997). other rounds, 947 S.W.2d agree. We in this exceptions applies these Neither of the trial case. hold We therefore

Section 85.241 of the Natural Re- authority to circumvent court was without procedure sources sets out the Code re authority, and we rul- Railroad appealing from Railroad Commission Commission ing. part form to delete that provides: That section recovery. Jenny’s Any person interested who is affected this by the conservation laws of state or relating orders of the commission to oil FEES ATTORNEYS’ gas gas, or or and the waste of oil fees law or in Jenny sought attorneys’ who laws is dissatisfied with these equity, pursuant to Sections 37.001 and/or orders, may or file com- suit of the Texas Civil Practice 38.001 its in a mission or members court Remedies Code. & Tex. Prac. Rem.Code Civ. competent jurisdiction County in Travis (Vernon 1997). 37.001, §§ 38.001 Ann. or validity of the law order. test Judg- Declaratory is Section 37.001 (Vernon § 85.241 Tex. Nat. Res.Code Ann. Act, 38.001 allows ments Section 1993). Jenny has pro- not addressed this attorneys’ fees for various recovery of or pro- vision stated she followed this The trial submitted a broad claims. court Instead, sought temporary cedure. she jury: attorney-fee question to the “What Lyn in injunction against the trial court necessary a reasonable fee for the services below, sought ruling per- to have the attorney Rappeport’s Lou Lewis col-

manently set aside. These amount to case, cents?” stated dollars and lateral attacks. $253,444.00. Lesi- answered The Jenny’s kars claim judg A collateral attack contend while support attor- declaratory judgment its will attempt binding ment is an to avoid fees, neys’ remaining her tort claims will not instituted for the proceeding force Thus, the court correcting, modifying, they not. contend purpose of vacat- in awarding Furthermore, erred attorneys’ fees because although the Lesikars rec Jenny failed to segregate among her fees ognize in their legally brief that without her proof various claims or offer that her sufficient evidence that the in claims are sufficiently claims are *33 interrelated or so terrelated a of finding the amount of incapable segregation that she should immaterial, Jenny’s fees is the Lesikars excused from segregating Jenny them. object failed to to the submission of the contends that the Lesikars have waived attorney-fee question. broad As a result alleged error. The respond, Lesikars failures, they these have waived their arguing they preserved have error in this complaint regard. objec Where no appellate because their position is not that tion is made to the failure to segregate Jenny segregate, failed to but there is fees, attorneys’ either at the time evidence legally insufficient evidence that her claims attorneys’ fees presented is or to the interrelated, are which they pre- have Int’l, charge, the error is waived. Green served in their post-verdict motions. We Solis, (Tex. 384, Inc. v. 951 S.W.2d reject the Lesikars’ distinction and hold 1997); v. Hruska First State Bank De that the error has been waived. anville, 783, (Tex.1988); 747 S.W.2d rule, As a general a party Sterling, Stewart Title Guar. Co. v. seeking to recover attorneys’ fees carries at 11 (stating S.W.2d ap remand is proof burden of to establish that he is propriate refuses, a party “[i]f over objec entitled to them. Stewart Title Co. Guar. tion, to offer evidence segregating attor (Tex.1991). Sterling, v. 822 S.W.2d ney’s among fees parties, various claims or plaintiff When a seeks to recover attor appellate and an court determines that neys’ in fees a case in which he asserts segregation required” (emphasis add claims, multiple at least one of which sup ed), providing objection that an ports an award of fees and at least one of failure of the trial court to allocate or not, which does as the Lesikars contend is segregate the jury charge fees here, the case plaintiff must offer evi error); preserve sufficient to see also dence segregating attorneys’ among fees his various claims. Civ. P. 274. See id. at 10-11. An Tex.R. exception to duty to segregate arises The say argument Lesikars their is not attorneys’

when the fees are in connection that Jenny segregate to but that she failed with arising claims out of the same trans proof failed to offer that her claims are action and are so interrelated that their interrelated, they may which assert depends award or denial essentially on the post-verdict arguments motions. These circumstance, same facts. In that segre are effectively the same. rule requir The gation 11; required. is not Id. at Flint & ing segregation and the exception requir Steel, v. Assocs. Intercontinental Pipe & Inc., proof ing that the claims are interrelated S.W.2d 624-25 (Tex.App.- denied). Thus, Dallas writ have plaintiff “corollary” been called rules. See must either segregate among his fees his Supply Linen & Co. W.P. 4M Unif. claims or establish that his claims are suf Co., (Tex. Ballard & 793 S.W.2d ficiently interrelated. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] writ de nied); Flint & v. Intercontinental Assocs. Harris, Jenny’s attorney, Jerry Steel, Inc., Pipe & 739 S.W.2d at 624-25. testified to the hours worked and the hour Indeed, the Lesikars’ attempt to distin ly attorneys rate of several who worked on guish arguments they fails because behalf, Jenny’s and the amount he calculat state, ultimately plaintiffs “where to corresponded ed amount awarded. refuse segregate attorneys’ fees, Texas courts rou object The Lesikars failed to to his testi mony tinely deny any recovery” on the Jenny (emphasis basis that failed fee added). segregate among fees her various claims. waived appellant Conspiracy

Where has error, may disregard a trial court Werley engaged contends that jury finding unsupported it is with Harriet to conspiracy de- evidence or it is immaterial. Green of her fraud her interest reimbursement Int'l, Solis, Inc. v. at 389-90 overpayment for the Thomas. Eagle Ins. Co. (citing Spencer Star Werley conspired also contends that She Am,., 157); v. Aran Norrell breaching with Harriet assist her her 1, 1 County Navigation No. sas Dist. duties estate. We have set (Tex.App.-Corpus conspiracy 303-04 out the elements civil above. (1) (2) dism’d). They persons; are: two or more 1999, pet. Christi *34 (3) object accomplished; meeting to be a $253,444.00 attorneys’ fees. awarded in (4) minds; unlawful, one or more overt finding sup This was and was material (5) acts; proximate and as the ported testimony uncontroverted Co., Massey result. Armco 652 Steel We, therefore, Jenny’s attorney. overrule 933. S.W.2d at point Jenny the Lesikars’ and hold and summary recover these fees. In his motion on may attorneys’ judgment (1) an Werley contends that attor- appeal, (2) client; WeRley Judgment his ney conspire cannot with he The SummaRY an underlying did not commit fraudulent 1994, Jenny pleadings In amended her based; which could be conspiracy act on Werley as a as- to add counter-defendant (3) commit an Lyn and Harriet did not against Werley for civil con- serting claims underlying fraud or breach and spiracy, negligent misrepresentation, and, therefore, duty not have con- could Werley moved fiduciary duty. breach of with him to in those activi- spired engage summary judgment, the trial for which (4) ties; not suffer Jenny did a cross- granted. Jenny court has filed damage. ren- appeal complaining the trial court’s first Werley’s con Regarding summary judgment adverse dition of the tention, attorney be we hold that an Werley. against on her counterclaims if he conspiracy liable for to defraud know summary on a prevail To motion a with defraud third ingly agrees others to a movant establish that judgment, must II, Terrace Likover v. person. Sunflower genuine material fact there is no issue of Ltd., 468, (Tex.App.-Hous judgment is as a and that he entitled to writ). Regarding [1st Dist.] ton 166a(c). of law. Tex.R. P. matter Civ. contention, Werley if did his second even Summary judgment for a defendant is act, could a he not commit fraudulent ele negates when he at least one proper liable for assist the Lesikars conspiring to of each of the theories plaintiffs ment Bernstein v. perpetrating in their fraud. conclusively estab recovery, pleads Ass’n, 850 S.W.2d Portland Sav. & Loan element of de lishes each an affirmative n. 12 Christi (Tex.App.-Corpus Spectrum, Inc. v. Mar fense. Science denied), on other writ overr. (Tex.1997). tinez, 941 S.W.2d Casteel, 22 grounds, Crown Ins. Co. v. Life we reviewing summary judgment, When (Tex.2000). Regarding his true all evidence favorable to take as contention, already held that we have third Rhone-Poulenc, Steel, Inc. v. nonmovant. support sufficient there is evidence (Tex.1999). in We Harriet com jury’s findings Lyn and re fraud. dulge every reasonable inference mitted favor. any doubt the nonmovant’s

solve Negligent Fiduciary Duty Breach of the bur appeal, the movant still bears On Misrepresentation showing genuine that there is no den of Werley negli enti Jenny fact and that he is issue material contends facts misrepresented material gently of law. judgment as matter tled assign- the terms of misrepresented misrepresentations her and that those Martin, attorney. McCamish, her ment to damaged her. Inter Appling v. F.E.

Brown & Loeffler true, we assertions as Taking all of these (Tex.1999), ests, the Texas 991 S.W.2d 787 duty Werley did not have hold that a cause of ac Supreme recognized Court from distinguishable This case Jenny. misrepresentation negligent tion McCamish, in a transac- occurred which In this attorney by a nonclient. setting. tional, litigation, to a opposed case, misrepre Jenny contends that case, engaged had parties In this Werley’s failure originate sentations numerous, summary suits. protracted information, i.e., that certain to disclose reveals, ad- evidence Clark, inter acquiring Thomas’s mits, was aware that that she in wells and 5. est settling interested Thomas was each claim and had contacted overpayment duty Werley that he had no contends facts, these co-executrices. Under duty an attor- Jenny. argues He relying Werley’s justified was not on she ney context not extend to has does statements, they were material and even Jenny, opposing side plaintiff, like *35 rely that she on them. Werley intended there litigation. He also contends that duty misrepresenta- no because the was Werley Jenny also contends that tion, any, was not material and was not by failing to material facts misrepresented justified relying on Jenny such that was duty he had a to information when disclose it. attorney that as the argues speak. She he had a representative, the estate for McCamish, the court outlined the re that the estate could duty to disclose attorney scope duty imposed of the on an interest, Clark, thing a the Thomas cover Relying to a nonclient. on Restatement Werley that of value. also contends She 552(2) (1977), § (Second) of ToRts duty disclose the extent to which had a to (1) duty court held that the arises when Clark, acquire the Lyn attempting was to attorney aware of the nonelient and is says she was interest. She Thomas rely rep- that the nonclient intends on agreement to close by harmed her (2) resentation, justifi- the nonclient estate, belief that which was based on her ably attorney’s representation relies on the against the estate’s claims the issue of purposes of a material fact. For of deter- Clark, would be overpayment Thomas for justifiable whether there is reli- mining further proceedings. severed out for ance, reviewing court must consider the relationship nature of the between the at- to be actionable nondisclosure For there client, fraud, torney, duty and nonclient. must be a to disclose. there Vento, at 725. Bradford Werley made mis- Jenny contends that duty question exists is a Whether such attorney that leading statements to her duty may A to disclose arise law. Id. respect with nothing happening (1) one is in a fidu- four situations: when Clark, Lyn’s acquire effort Thomas (2) relationship; when one voluntari- ciary Werley also de- alleges interest. She that information, all but not ly discloses some Clark, Lyn’s contacting Thomas on nied (3) information; when new pertinent Werley later admit- behalf. She contends representa- makes an earlier information Clark, sending assignment an ted (4) untrue; or when misleading tion Thomas, having anything denied heard but conveys disclosure and partial one makes a thirty days of from them about it. Within impression. a false statements, assignment these Nevertheless, attorney has Clark, Thomas to was consummated. information about duty to reveal complet- further contends that after Jenny when that client party to a third Werley client arrangement, ing assignment nonviolent, perpetrating purely may financial Co-executrices have the same through duties, fraud silence. Bernstein v. Port opinions but their differ about Ass’n, Sav. & land Loan 850 S.W.2d at how fulfill best to those duties. Candid an attorney misrep 704. When does make advice from an attorney is invaluable in client, resentations on of a gen behalf weighing those competing options. We applies. eral standard fraud But the see no to risk diluting reason the value of attorney has no to correct duty represen by attorney requiring advice prove Id. tations to be false. holdWe effectively represent one co-executrix to Werley duty did not have a to disclose co-executrix. other Each co-executrix Jenny this fact to any repre or to correct protect by can herself adequately entering proved sentation be false. into a joint representation arrangement attorney with a that, single appropriate, where Jenny by contends assisting Lyn Clark, interest, employing attorney. her own acquiring the Thomas We Werley the trial court properly breached his conclude duty to granted judgment summary Werley. estate beneficiaries “to collect for them any money or thing other value that have been

might received in settlement Conclusion overpayment claim stated, modify For the reasons we predicates Thomas.” She the imposition trial duty Harriet, court’s to delete Werley’s duty of a $12,000.00 duty recovery as Rappeport’s Harriet’s co-executrix. as $1,750.00 costs and awarded admits, however, Jenny candidly As *36 unpaid in accounting expenses answer to are Texas holding there cases that a third 14(1) 14(4), questions to delete the party does not of in have cause action recovery Jenny “overpayment,” of by the negligence against attorney an when there $298,547.00according jury’s to answer the See, lack privity. e.g., is a of Thompson 10(a). question modify We also the Elkins, Vinson & judgment the to correct constructive trust (Tex.App.-Houston Dist.] writ [1st all of recovery to cover the Thomas denied). for an argues She extension of working interest in 2 and rather wells law under this the the facts of case be judgment than the interest shown in the as the symmetry cause of between each co- it now modify judg- stands. We also the responsibilities. executrix’s duties injunction ment the to delete award of arises, contends, Privity she because against Lyn regard operations with to the estate, prosecuting claim for the the lease, the provision of and to eliminate the attorney has the duty same he would have the Jenny the judgment restoring if employed the other co-executrix to position operator. modify further We what is to the recover owed estate. She $38,245.22 judgment Jenny to award that, in absence of privi contends prejudgment interest rather than the ty, protect one co-executrix cannot herself judgment. amount contained in the We fraud of from the the other. judgment will affirm the as modified making however, this argument, Jen- Jenny, days the date of within fifteen respective ny blurs the roles of an execu- opinion, our files remittitur attorney. trix and her The executrix’s $1,400,000.00 from the punitive duty prosecute is to claims on behalf If Jen- against awarded her Lesikar. estate; duty is to attorney’s give remittitur, ny judg- fails to file such candid advice. legal executrix The execu- reversed, will ment the cause will be trix is hable for duties fiduciary breach be remanded for a new trial. beneficiaries; attorney is liable for breach of duties to the execu- Concurring opinion by

trix. GRANT. Justice the Texas GRANT, Justice, precedent, basis of concurring. On the BEN Z. adopt ap- declined to Supreme Court Legislature I would recommend that study. by this proach recommended Code, Probate revisit Section 240 of the have do not Because most beneficiaries Executors or Administrators. Joint Tex. attor- rely on the attorney and them own (Vernon 1980). § I Ann. Prob.Code it is estate to see that handling the ney strongly suspect that most would law, I according properly administrated in a joint are named time when executors Supreme Court that the would recommend will, joint intends that these the testator legal obligation changing consider other. executors will be a check on each the recommendations accordance with indicates, case it does not work As this report. way. provides Section 240 (or administrators) in- may act executors REHEARING ON MOTION FOR creates a dependently of each other. This CORNELIUS, Chief Justice. hydra-headed administration of the estate guarantee in which there is no that there Werley and the law firm of Gary S. effort, duplication will be a as well Werley, L.L.P. Payne, Williams & Bishop, being attorney as each able to hire an a motion (collectively, Werley) have filed rehearing they in which contend paid out of the estate which would for (The to reflect clarify judgment our we should attorneys’ result in double fees. are assessed appeal that no costs on requires exception under Section Werley. judgment the case adminis- signatures of all executors or reads, that the “It is further ORDERED estate.) conveyance trators is in the of real pay one half of the costs parties each I would recommend Section 240 be amend- appeal.” reason of this We incurred joint require ed to executors equally be- intended that costs be divided jointly administrators act on all matters there- Jenny and the Lesikars. We tween involving the estate. provide that modify fore our My next concern is the construction of each and the Lesikars Rappeport *37 attorney by the law that the retained an by rea- half of the costs incurred pay one repre executor or administrator does not appeal. son of this estate, represents sent the but rather also filed a motion The Lesikars have executor or administrator. See Huie v. we they in which contend rehearing DeShazo, 922 S.W.2d 920 (Tex.1996). they pre- that failed to holding erred in attorneys’ the issue of fees. serve error on the Hide cited a opinion The court that the Lesikars waived We held study following: that recommended attorneys’ fees respect error with to fiduciary’s duty The is to administer the attorney’s testi- object Jenny’s to failing to estate or trust for the benefit failed to mony ground on the that she assign- lawyer beneficiaries. A whose among the fees her various segregate the fidu- provide ment is to assistance to they failed to also found that claims. We is also ciary during the administration at- of the broad object to the submission fiduciary, working, in tandem with the We further held torneys’ question. fee beneficiaries, and for the benefit of the disregard only trial court could that the unsupported by the discretion to reveal if lawyer jury finding has it was immaterial, neither of information to the beneficia- the evidence or was such found. which we ries .... Re- Special Study on Committee study by "a the Section of Real 2. Based on Professional Fiduciary. See sponsibility-Counselling Property, Law of the Amer- Probate and Trust (1994).” J. 823 Report 28 Real ican Bar Association entitled Prop., Prob. & Tr. were to consider their cita- rehearing, the Lesi- Even we In their motion for tions, Jenny’s contention that the Lesikars’ reporter’s showing to the record kars cite persua- stated is objected jury charge. objection plainly was not they where to Nevertheless, they objected contend contention on rehear- sive. The Lesikars their (1) grounds failed to viewed within the context of on the ing must be fees, attorneys’ ap- segregate request In initial brief on her appeal. their their (2) regard- there was no evi- that there was evidence peal, they contended Reviewing their citations Jenny’s ing segregation. or insufficient evidence that dence record, they objected that sufficiently agree intertwined to to the we claims were segrega- attorneys’ regarding fees there was no evidence requirement avoid the required to ob- they But also segregated among her various claims. tion. were of the attor- ject to the nature Jenny responded that the Lesikars failed broad-form error on they neys’ question preserve failed to fees preserve error because jury charge their contention that object to the evidence or to the brief, request the fee segregated should have charge. reply their the Lesikars among the The statement reasserted their no evidence and insuffi- claims. as an attorney their that can be construed cient evidence contentions with citations to nature of the objection mo- to the broad-form post-verdict post-judgment their tions, “As a jury’s jury charge came when he stated: apparently believing result, to submit this was immaterial there is no evidence attorneys’ verdict on fees question And the Jenny’s question jury. claims were without evidence intertwined, attorneys’ phrased their is not to cover pre- and thus motions itself as a mat- compensable But that would be served error. unless the Lesikars fees added.) The (Emphasis the trial court’s attention Jen- ter statute.” brought to ob- a no evidence clearly first sentence is ny’s responsibility segregate her attor- objec- jection. second sentence neys’ fees or to demonstrate that her The jury charge, but segregate phrasing tion claims were too intertwined to them, put the trial court arguably there not have it does not matter whether would objection. on nature of evidence that her claims were inter- notice Therefore, argu- the Lesikars’ twined. with the objection here contrasts (that objected they rehearing ment on Co. objection Title Guar. lodged Stewart with their jury charge) is at variance (Tex.1991), 1, 10 Sterling, (that there was insuf- argument appeal has objected, Title “[TJhere where Stewart Jenny’s claims were ficient evidence to the— been no breakdown or allocation intertwined). with this of the fees incurred connection *38 de- Moreover, defendant, numerous other the Lesikars had the burden as well as fendants, what is alloca- in the record in order to show point specifically out to prose- objection. amount they proper ble as a reasonable where made (h). Tex.R.App. 38.1(f), P. The Lesikars’ cution the suit defendant.” case, trial objection notified the In that citations to the record were before request court of Title’s appeal. appeal involved Stewart Court attorneys’ issues, charged segregate twenty-six totaling seven briefs case, the In this defendants. sixteen volumes of the fees between pages, over 260 must be record, attorney’s statement twenty-five volumes of Lesikars’ clerk’s objec- overall ci- in the context of their proper record. Without read reporter’s tion, clearly record, of which was objection the thrust tation to the the evi- sufficiency complaint about reporter’s to find charge is difficult Jenny’s claims record, whether objection regarding dence which is not indexed to avoid the Thus, sufficiently intertwined were improp- the issue was or otherwise. objection That requirement. segregation erly briefed. court notify the trial was insufficient her required prove was place, intertwined in the first

claims were required court or that the trial attorneys’ segregate charge the Jenny’s overrule among fees claims. We rehearing. motion for Lesikars’ MOLINA, Appellant, Musick Summer MOORE, Appellee. D. Randall No. 07-98-0364-CV. Texas, of Appeals of Court Amarillo. Sept. 2000.

Case Details

Case Name: Lesikar v. Rappeport
Court Name: Court of Appeals of Texas
Date Published: Dec 6, 2000
Citation: 33 S.W.3d 282
Docket Number: 06-98-00126-CV
Court Abbreviation: Tex. App.
AI-generated responses must be verified and are not legal advice.