| S.C. | Dec 11, 1890
Lead Opinion
The opinion of the court was delivered by
As stated by the plaintiffs, this was an action for damages against the defendant for alleged wrongful acts as wharf owner and wharfinger in the port and harbor of Charleston, in illegally and with malicious intent to injure plaintiffs “demanding from plaintiffs, merchants in the city of Charleston, engaged in purchasing and shipping cotton to correspondents resident abroad, payment of eight (8) cents per bale wharfage on all cotton shipped by them over wharves controlled by defendant, and after the sum of four cents per bale, which plaintiffs claim to be the lawful charge for such wharfage, had been by them tendered to defendant, and he had refused to receive it; for interfering with and wantonly obstructing the business of plaintiffs in the use of said wharves, until they were compelled, in order to carry on their business, to pay under protest the unlawful charge of eight cents per bale so exacted,” &c. * * * Plaintiffs further
The defendant in his answer admits that he demanded payment of his bills for wharfage from plaintiffs at eight cents per bale for all cotton of the plaintiffs passed over the wharves leased by him and already shipped, and that he had on a certain day forbid the removal of certain cotton without the payment of certain charges thereon, for which he claimed a lien. Defendant took issue as to all the other matters in the complaint, including the claim that eight (8) cents per bale on cotton shipped over defendant’s wharves was an unlawful charge, and that four (4) cents per bale on such cotton was a lawful charge; also, that the charge of eight cents layage and eight cents storage as made were unlawful charges, &c.
There was testimony tending to show that the defendant had charged the plaintiffs eight cents per bale for all their cotton passed over his wharves ; and that in consequence of the plaintiffs’ refusal to pay eight cents per bale wharfage, their business had been to some extent “obstructed.” The principal question in this case, however, was what amount as fees the wharfinger was entitled by law to charge for allowing cotton bales to be shipped over his wharves; and that depends upon the proper construction of the act of 1807, which is as follows, viz.: “An act to amend an act for amending an act, entitled an act for regulating and ascertaing the rates of wharfage of ships and merchandise; and also for ascertaining the rates of storage in Charleston, and for repealing the first clause of said act, or any other acts repugnant thereto.
“ Whereas it is proper and expedient to alter and amend an act regulating and ascertaining the rates of wharfage and storage in Charleston, passed the 29th day of March, 1778;
“1. Be it therefore enacted, that immediately from and after the passing of this act, the following rates and sums respectively shall be paid, and no greater shall be demanded or exacted by owners of wharves or any other persons for wharfage of ships or vessels, or for landing, rveighing, and storing of the articles of rice and cotton upon the tvharves in Charleston, to wit: for the
The learned Circuit Judge seemed to be much in doubt as to the true interpretation of this act, but he construed it as authorizing the charges of wharfage complained of, that is to say, four cents a bale for “landing,” and an additional four cents for “shipping” the same cotton, making the wharfage for “shipping” cotton, not four cents as expressed in the act, but eight cents per bale. Among other things, he charged the jury as follows : “In order to interpret the language of this act, we must take into consideration that it was dated 1807, about eighty years or more before the bringing of this action. We must take into consideration the condition of the country at that time; the modes of transportation of produce; the modes of reaching the wharves of this seaport, and depositing upon the wharves the produce of the country, namely, cotton, for purposes of shipment. We must take into consideration the fact that there were no railroads in those days, and both rice and cotton were brought to the city mostly by means of nature’s highway, water-transportation; that from those vessels bringing produce here, the produce was landed on the wharves for purposes of shipment and afterwards shipped. The object of the act was to give the right to the owners of the wharves of demanding compensation for the duty of receiving, that produce on the wharf for the purposes of shipment, caring for it while under the responsibility of the wharf owner, and the labor and trouble and expense of putting it aboard the vessel to be shipped. * * *
“It is in evidence that a charge of four cents has been made and is now being made by the owners of the wharves for the labor and expense of receiving cotton on the wharf from any vehicle of
“Whilst I am exercised about the true interpretation of the act, yet, taking the date of its passage, the object of the provisions, namely, the compensation to the wharf owners for the labor and expense for receiving and shipping this article of commerce; taking into consideration that the article is one of export and not of import, and was then ; taking into consideration the fact that the subsequent changes in the mode of' transportation from the interior to the city have been made, I will instruct you that the wharf owner had the right, as a compensation to him for receiving the bale of cotton here from a lighter, or flat boat, or a di^ on his wharf for the purpose of shipment, he had a right to charge 4 cents for that trouble, and he had a right to charge 4 cents for the trouble and expense of putting it aboard a vessel for shipment. That is my interpretation of the act, and that interpretation you will have to take,” &c.
Under the charge, the jury found a verdict for the defendant, and the plaintiffs appeal to this court, filing twenty-nine exceptions. They are long, and being all printed in the “Brief,” need not be restated here. From the view which the court takes, it will not be necessary to consider now any of them except those which charge error on the part of the judge in his construction of the act of 1807.
The object of all construction is to ascertain the true intention of the law maker; but, if possible, that should be done from the
Taking this for our guide, and reading the statute (1807) carefully, we cannot think there -is any serious ambiguity in it, or much need of construction. A wharf is defined to be “a firm landing place built by the side of the water, or extending into it, for the convenience of loading and unloading ships.” There is in commerce the double operation of importing and exporting articles of trade. The purpose of the act was to fix proper charges to be allowed the wharfinger for the use of his wharf for certain acts named, including, as matter of course, the use of the wharf in possible importation as well as in exportation, “in loading and unloading vessels.” This being clearly understood, the. statute, as to charges for the use of the wharf, in regard to cotton are as follows : “For landing every bale or case of cotton, four cents ; for weighing every bale or case of cotton, six cents ; for shipping every bale or case of cotton, four cents; for storing every bale or case of cotton,” &c.
Now, here are four separate and distinct services to be rendered by the wharfinger, for each of which a particular charge is allowed. No question is made as to the meaning of “weighing” or “storing.” Then what was meant by “landing” and “shipping” ? It wmuld seem that there should be' scarcely less doubt as to them. Worcester says “landing” is a “coming to land; act of going or putting on shore, as from a vessel;” and “shipping”
But it is earnestly contended that, cotton being only- an article of export and not of import, there was really no necessity for the act to use the word “landing” in its ordinary sense of putting on land; and inasmuch as the act was passed eighty years ago, when, as alleged, most of the cotton which reached Charleston, was “landed” on the wharves from boats, we may infer that the word “landing” in the act meant such landing from the lighter boat; and further, that the modes of transportation having in the mean time changed, we may now substitute for such “landing any delivery at the wharf for shipment, whether that delivery be from drays, railroad cars, or any other vehicle of inland transportation, and therefore the wharf owner has the right, as a compensation to him for receiving the bale of cotton here from a lighter or flat boat or a dray on his wharf for the purpose of shipment, to charge four cents per bale for that trouble and he has the right to charge four cents for the trouble and expense of putting it aboard a vessel for shipment,” &c.
We cannot concur in this uncertain and conjectural construction for several reasons. We do not think that was the intention of the legislature. In the first place, the act on its face indicates that “landing” and “shipping” are two separate and distinct things, to be done, not by the owner, but by the wharfinger. There is not in the act the remotest hint that they could be different parts of the same transaction. To say nothing of the want of satisfactory proof as to some of the circumstances relied on to change the plain meaning of the word “landing,” and especially as to the alleged custom at one time of landing cotton on the
But in order to reach the construction contended for by the respondent, it is necessary to change the plain meaning of the word “landing” by the force of extraneous circumstances in several particulars: first, in construing it to mean landing from the lighter boat, instead of from the vessel itself, the latter being the proper statutory meaning, and nothing appearing to authorize the change; and second, in transferring that interpretation to a delivery by a dray from the land. The words, “For landing every bale or case of cotton,” indicate clearly that the movement contemplated was to the land, not from it; and to be made, not by the owner, but by .the wharfinger, for which service the act gives him a certain fixed compensation. It seems to us that it would be very strained construction amounting to something like a solecism in terms to hold that the delivery of cotton at the wharf from drays on land, must be. considered as “landing” in the sense of the act, so as to give the wharfinger the four cents per bale for “landing,” and also four cents for “shipping,” making the charge for “shipping” not four, as the act declares, but eight cents per bale. We do not understand that the charge
It seems that there has been occasionally what is called “a rebate” of these charges, but whether the compound charge of eight cents per bale, including both “shipping” and “landing,” is reasonable or excessive, is not for us to consider. That is a matter exclusively for the legislature. Our province does not extend beyond construing the law as we find it spread upon the statute book.
The judgment of this court is, that the judgment of the Circuit Court be reversed, and the case remanded to the Circuit for a new trial.
Dissenting Opinion
dissenting. It seems to me that the
construction of the term “landing,” as used in the act, is the deposit of the article in question on the wharf from the vehicle, whatever may be its character, in which it is transported to the wharf, whether such vehicle reaches the wharf by being propelled either over water or land. Any other view would, it seems to me, render the word “landing” in the act, when applied either to cotton or rice, absolutely useless; for it is well known that, at the time of the passing of the act, neither of those articles ever had been imported, and hence to confine the meaning of the word “landing” to the reception on the wharf of an article of import, would be to attribute to the legislature the absurdity of providing a rate of charge for a use of a wharf which they knew never had been made, and, so far as could then be seen, was never likely to be made.
The fact that there was some testimony in the “Case” tending to show that, at the time of the passage of the act of 1807, cot
There can be no doubt that the construction of a wharf and keeping it in repair involves very considerable expense to the wharf owner, and there is as little doubt that such a structure affords great facilities for the receipt and shipment of the produce of the country. It is therefore eminently right and proper that those who avail themselves of such facilities, by the use of the property of another, should make reasonable compensation for such advantages. The object of the act, as I understand it, was, not to prescribe the rate of compensation for services rendered the shipper by the wharf owner, but for the use of his property, and the act proceeds to specify what shall be the rate of charge for each particular use of the wharf. Thus, there is a separate charge for the use of the wharf for landing goods, and another separate charge for the wharf in shipping the same goods. Hence when a person desiring to ship his cotton, either to some foreign or domestic port, deposits or lands a bale of cotton on a wharf for shipment, he may be required to pay four cents for that use of the wharf, and when he ships the same bale, he may be required to pay an additional sum of four cents for the facility which the wharf affords him in having his cotton placed on board of ship. I suppose there would be quite as much — perhaps more — “wear and tear” of the wharf in using it as a place of deposit or landing of cotton, whether from a boat or dray, as there would be in using the wharf as a means of placing the cotton on board ship, and hence there was manifest propriety in prescribing separate charges for each of these uses.
Judgment reversed.