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Leroy S. Seiler v. John A. Thalacker
101 F.3d 536
8th Cir.
1997
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*1 SEILER, Appellee, Leroy S. THALACKER, Appellant. A.

John

No. 96-1157. Appeals,

United States

Eighth Circuit. Sept.

Argued 26, 1996. Nov.

Decided 2, 1997. Jan.

Rehearing Denied

At evidence, of close instructed on three alternative theories of first degree felony murder: murder while participating in injury, willful felony murder participating while in degree first burglary, and and deliberate murder. McGrane, D. Attorney Thomas Assistant The general returned .a verdict of General, Moines, IA, argued, appel- Des for degree first murder. lant. On direct Seiler contested the ac- Volz, argued, A. Rapids, IA, Kaen Cedar curacy under state law of the fop appellee. felony for committing a first degree burglary.2 Supreme The Iowa Court BEAM, HEANEY, MURPHY, Before and held that the instruction was incorrect under Judges. Circuit Iowa, law because it physical omitted the injury degree element first burglary. MURPHY, Judge. Circuit Seiler, (Iowa State N.W.2d Leroy Seiler degree was convicted of first 1983) (en banc). Nonetheless, it affirmed the imprisonment. murder and sentenced to life conviction holding after in- erroneous Supreme After the Iowa Court affirmed his struction prejudicial was not because the conviction, petition Seiler filed for a writ of could not have failed to find the intentional corpus argu- § under 28 U.S.C. infliction of physical injury that trigger ing an error in the instructions violated Id. The dissent process his due and Sixth Amendment objected that holding the court’s in effect rights.1 The court conditionally district is- directed a verdict for the state on an issue it writ, sued the and the State of appeals. Iowa obligated prove reverse. We doubt and that the evidence was insufficient to overcome the presumption prejudice. I. Id. at 269. The evidence at trial showed Seiler Seiler then application filed an postcon- hidden a tavern to steal the cash on viction relief. He asserted ineffective assis- closing. hand after The tavern owner had tance of counsel at trial and on result- him, discovered and the struggle that fol- ing from the failure of appellate trial and lowed, grabbed Seiler a meat cleaver and object counsel to adequately to the in- struck him. The victim died of numerous application denied, structions. and injuries, including head two massive skull- Supreme the Iowa Court denied further re- penetrating from the blows cleaver. He had view. profusely bled many and inju- suffered other ries, including a multiple severed thumb and petition Seder next filed a for habeas cor- samples. cuts. Blood matching pus, those from arguing element, that the omission of an Seiler and the public victim were found in a felony the instruction for murder while shower at a hotel across the committing street burglary, violated bloody tavern. Seiler’s clothes and the mon- his due rights. Sixth Amendment ey from the were found apart- tavern asserted that Iowa law stayed ment where night state to he committed a first murder. Seiler had also been seen near the before murder rule could tavern at closing time on night apply. § Iowa Code 702.11. First killing. burglary required proof beyond a reasonable alleged 1. Seiler also equal protection 2. Seiler also constitutionality contested the was violated search instruction. warrant the clothes money rejected argument, were found. Iowa this and Seiler has rejected argument. . State v. appeal. abandoned it on (Iowa 1983) (en banc). N.W.2d Instead, the state remedies. to exhaust Seil- that while specific to “a federal refer applicant must weapon, or inten- “dangerous possessed er particular constitution- inju- right, a physical constitutional recklessly inflict[ed] tionally or case, or provision, al federal 713.3. Iowa Code ry any person.” raising pertinent federal con- a state ease stated: jury at The instruction the state in a claim before stitutional issue *3 un- Degree Murder First considering In Trickey, F.2d Kelly courts.” Doctrine, you are Felony-Murder Cir.1988) (8th Wyrick, 622 (citing Thomas v. when provides that that the law instructed (8th Cir.1980)). F.2d [sic] when a person commits by force or performed burglary is proeedurally de- argues The state Seiler will of the other. process and Sixth Amend- the due faulted claims are not because those that ment claims instructed You are further adequa- regarding his claim equivalent to felony. is a forcible Iowa burglary instruction under law cy of the re- this instruction contended Seiler appeal. in his direct Seiler raised all elements of proving the state of lieved effectively the consti- raised that he contends took an doubt and beyond a reasonable crime citing case claims tutional away from the of the crime element a fair trial. He stating he was denied found that the error The district court the Iowa Su- the dissent shows contends rights to jury instruction violated the constitutional aware preme Court was of trial, these and that a fair questions. harmless. The were not violations writ of habeas conditionally issued the court appeal that the argued in his direct Seiler com- state to either ordering the corpus, the neces- improperly instructed on jury was retry six- Seiler within proceedings mence for conviction sary under law Iowa custody. ty days him or release committing a first felony murder while of Seiler contended pro- arguing that appeals, Seder state burglary instruction could caused claims cedurally his constitutional defaulted him of the lesser jury to find appeal he raised in his direct degree burglary offense of second included in- concerning law issues of even convict him but still concedes The state struction. degree bur- Iowa law a second incorrect, but asserts instruction was underlying crime for glary cannot be instructions the context of other § 702.11. He felony murder. Iowa Code Seiler’s constitutional error did not violate ju- instructing the improperly concluded any con- argues also that rights. The state they to find rors on the elements light of was harmless in stitutional violation deprived him of fair concerning the overwhelming evidence trial. physical injury. intentional infliction cited Jack- court In his state II. 307, 318-19, 99 Virginia, 443 U.S. son v. (1979). 2788-89, consid 61 L.Ed.2d may court Before a district Jackson, held petitioner corpus petition, the er a habeas required a federal Amendment remedies. U.S.C. Fourteenth must exhaust state the record evi- 2254(b). examine whether satisfy re To the exhaustion guilt reasonably support “fairly pres must dence could quirement, petitioner sufficiency reviewing the to the state courts ent” the federal claims at any petition. opportunity to give the state the correct regard- any issues prisoners’ federal The Court did address alleged violations of its — —, constitutionality instructions. ing Henry, rights. Duncan v. opinion, part to a —, did refer 865 Seiler however, general state- curiam). contained- a Presenting (per similar necessity proper instrac- ment right is about state claim to the federal insufficient (1990), tions reasonable doubt for all elements of because there is not a reasonable 318-19, a crime. Id. at 99 S.Ct. at 2788-89. jurors likelihood the convicted Seiler without finding he weapon had a or assaulted the sufficiently It is doubtful that Seiler raised victim. the constitutional appeal issue on his direct by citing to Jackson. Jackson did turn argues The state that analyzing the incor- on issues related to al- rect instruction in the context of the though it instructing contained reference to jury charge entire shows there was no consti- on reasonable doubt. Neither the tutional error. To convict Seiler of first de- majority opinion nor the dissent in Seiler’s gree burglary, Iowa law that while direct mentioned Jackson. ma- possessed “a jority opinion validity focused on the dangerous weapon, or intentionally or reck- burglary instruction under Iowa law and nev- lessly physical injury any inflict[ed] per- taMng er addressed an element of the crime *4 son.” Iowa Code 713.3. The trial court away jury any constitutional jury instructed the degree burglary issue. 342 at N.W.2d 268. The dis- required performed by “force or sent, relies, on which Seiler now also not did the will of the other.” The state any claim, refer to constitutional but it stated argues sufficiently jury informed the that the court’s equivalent decision “is the personal during violence a directed verdict for the State on an issue was to convict Seiler of mur- obliged the State was to a first degree burglary. reasonable doubt.” Id. at 269. Other jury instructions told the that Seiler Even on the only could be convicted of first mur- adequacy jury instructions under Iowa der if proved beyond the state law and his statement that the error in the doubt that Seiler struck the victim and that deprived instructions him of a fair trial had the victim died as a argues result. The state similarity some to the constitutional issues he jury that since the found that Seiler commit- asserts, similarity now mere is insufficient to ted both a and a — Duncan, exhaust state remedies. U.S. with understanding commonsense of all the at —, 115 S.Ct. Whether not would have failed to find that instruction is correct under state law is not Seiler committed an during assault the bur- the same issue as whether a instruction glary. this, Because of could not process violated the due clause. Anderson v. have convicted Seiler without finding all the Harless, 276, 277-78, 459 U.S. 103 S.Ct. of first (1982) curiam). 74 (per It is thus questionable sufficiently pre whether Seiler if Even the error in the first sented the constitutional issue on his direct burglary instruction rose to the level of a appeal, but we need resolve this issue violation, constitutional it be the basis cannot because we any find that error was harmless. for habeas relief if it is harmless. On Seil er’s direct the Iowa

III. examined whether the error in the in petition his corpus, for habeas prejudicial. Seil structions was a state When argued er error the first bur court has not reviewed on direct glary instruction violated his harmless, whether a constitutional error was rights because the state did not have this court examines the error to determine prove all elements of the beyond crime it beyond whether “was harmless a reason reasonable doubt Lockhart, and Sixth Amendment able v. doubt.” 998 F.2d Orndorff rights (8th 1426, Cir.1993). because it took an element 1430 The record is away crime novo, from the The state con reviewed de and the is issue “whether incorrect, cedes the instruction was but possibility” there is reasonable argues there was no constitutional violation contributed the conviction. v. Williams Boyde 370, California, 380, Clarke, (8th v. 1529, Cir.1994). 494 U.S. F.3d 1541 40 1190, 1197-98, 108 heavy L.Ed.2d 316 The state proving has burden in act intentional that Seiler’s found reasonable harmless an error Moreover, even death. victim’s caused the whether test is not Id. The doubt. did challenged instruction though the support a convic sufficient evidence requirement spell out specifically Rather, is harmless an error Id.

tion. degree burglary, injury for physical properly consid actually and if “what overwhelmingly showed ‘so evidence decision-making process was ered in during the injuries physical suffered have victim decision overwhelming’ that pool- awith beaten had been burglary. He fac the invalid absent even the same been a meat repeatedly struck 391, Evatt, stick 500 U.S. (citing v. Yates tor.” a severed many cleaver, cuts L.Ed.2d 1884, 1893-94, 114 404-05, 111 S.Ct. skull- from massive 62, thumb, had died McGuire, and he 502 U.S. (1991)); v. Estelle con- injuries. The (1991) penetrating head 482, 116 475, L.Ed.2d 72, 112 S.Ct. physical infliction the intentional cerning be examined must (faulty instruction over- was so during the injury and the a whole of the instructions context the whole context 570, given Clark, whelming that record); Rose v. evidence, any of a error and the 3109, 460 instructions 3101, challenged in- nature (entire be reviewed should beyond a reasonable structions was whether determine Hasting, doubt. harmless); States United n. n. *5 the reverse conditional Accordingly, we (1983) (“Chapman mandates 96 remand corpus and a writ of grant of prior to the entire consideration judgment can be vacated. so er for constitutional reversing a conviction ...”). may be harmless rors that dissenting. HEANEY, Judge, Circuit theo- three alternative jury considered the court on the district would affirm I and returned degree murder first ries of opin- thorough well-reasoned of its basis not does guilty. Seiler verdict of general district court’s agree with each I ion. premedi- complain about the (1) exhausted conclusions, namely partici- felony while or murder tated murder respect to the remedies with state injury. er- The harmless a willful pating in (2) the petition, corpus in his habeas claim the incorrect whether is ror therefore issue felony faulty instruction commit- while murder instruction of a constitutional to the level rose murder contributed burglary ting (3) subject to harmless- violation, is the error conviction. analysis, and that contends Therefore, respectfully dissent. harmless. prevented it fol- instructed trial court offense of considering lesser included lows: fails but his second totality of the to consider 17No. Instruction overwhelming tions and intentionally during struck victim was person commits provides The law it could jury was burglary. The instructed Degree he in the Second Murder if burglary Seiler killed find first implied express or with either another kills participating in while victim aforethought. malice Jury other.” against will of the “force De- in the First However, it is Murder de- 16, to all applied addition, if, in he: gree, theories, jurors informed gree murder premedi- deliberately, and Willfully, mur- guilty of first find Seiler person. kills another tation find reasonable they must circumstances, howev- several There are intentionally vic- struck the that Seiler Murder er, becomes where re- tim, causing his death. Since Degree. it must First guilty, verdict of general turned One circumstance is the so-called “Felo- doubt that instruction 28 inwas error and ny That Doctrine.” is one presented where the error was to the state —Murder person kills another with malice afore- court. thought felony. [*] type (cid:127) Other instructions further of First [*] participating [*] Degree [*] Murder. in a forcible [*] explain [*] one. The Due accused Moreover, the error against proves Process Clause a criminal conviction unless awas a reasonable doubt protects an every fact necessary

Instruction No. for the crime with which charged. accused is In re Winship, 397 In considering Degree First un- Murder 358, 364, 1068, U.S. 1072-73, Doctrine, Felony der the you are —Murder (1970); L.Ed.2d 368 see also Sullivan v. Lou provides instructed that the law that when isiana, 275, 277, 508 U.S. 2078, 113 S.Ct. person [sic] a commits when the 2080, (1993); 124 L.Ed.2d 182 Sandstrom v. performed by force or Montana, 510, 520, the will of the other. (1979); 61 L.Ed.2d 39 Mullaney v. You are further instructed that Wilbur, is a felony. forcible (1975). addition, (J.A. 77.) at 66 and most important element of a defendant’s given general verdict form Sixth Amendment to a trial is the guilty returned a verdict of of first- right to jury, have a judge, not a reach the degree murder. the trial Neither court nor requisite findings Sullivan, of guilt. this court can determine whether the U.S. at Thus, 113 S.Ct. at 2080. “al found Seiler first-de- judge may direct a verdict for the gree first-degree felony murder or murder. if defendant legally evidence is insuffi The state concedes that instruction cient to guilt, 28 was establish may not direct a improper. state, There is also no doubt verdict for that Seiler no matter how over *6 fairly presented his whelming federal claim to the case, evidence.” In this Id. gave court and that he oppor- the state a full trial court neither first-degree defined bur tunity glary to address the constitutional nor violation told the first-degree improperly was could instructed as to enhance offense to first- the essential elements to be beyond found a murder. The court also instructed reasonable doubt for his conviction. felony, is a forcible Virginia, thereby cited Jackson v. impermissibly substituting 318- its own 2781, 2788-89, judgment jury. for-that of agree L.Ed.2d 560 with authority Moreover, for his claim. district court that this amounted to a (Iowa in State v. 342 N.W.2d 264 directed verdict for the state on an element 1983), justice the dissenting first-degree wrote: predi awas first-degree cate for a murder convic

The trial court’s instructions authorized tion. The instruction violated Seder’s to find guilty the defendant process rights-and to a fair finding based on de- trial. fendant perpe- committed murder in the tration of a burglary. The court did not I agree with both the district court and the define or tell the only first- majority that faulty the effect of the degree burglary would enhance the offense jury’s subject tion on the verdict is to harm- first-degree murder, despite timely analysis. less error appropriate inquiry objection defense pointing out the error. for this court is set in Chapman forth v. holding This equivalent court’s is the of California, a directed verdict the State on an issue for (1967): whether the state has obliged the State was proved that the harmless reasonable doubt. majority reasonable doubt. The finds that (McCormick, J., at 268-69 dissenting) the error was in light harmless of “the totali- added). Thus, (emphasis ty there can be no instructions and the over- to re- directions court with to the district inten- victim

whelming evidence trial a new to the state Maj. mand it burglary.” during the tionally struck properly-instructed the extent that To Op., supra of Seiler’s on majority relies proper- that a strong belief own

guilt and its Seil- convicted have jury would

ly-instructed error. grave er, it commits this issue. directly on spoken has Court in a facing this court question , Sheldon, MYERS, Allen David Chris Jr. analysis, Strohbehn, D. and Kurtis that occurred whether, a trial Appellants, would verdict error, guilty without rendered, but whether been surely have in this actually rendered guilty McVay, verdict HUNDLEY, Ruth Jim Thomas to the er- surely Nichols, unattributable Emmett, Helling, Debbie John hypothe- so, Sally must be Welder, That ror. Anderson, Ron Mike never that was verdict guilty size fact Halford, Appellees. inescapable the how matter rendered —no No. 95-3901. might be— verdict support findings to guarantee. jury-trial violate Appeals, States United 2081- Sullivan, 113 S.Ct. at Eighth Circuit. U.S. at added). jury explicitly Had the (emphasis 12, 1996. Sept. Submitted its verdict based 27, 1996. Nov. sufficient evidence Decided certainly would be there However, as jury’s verdict. support nor stands, state court neither the whether the I know majority nor premeditat- believed have It would felony murder. ed murder prepared to have matter simple

been permitted that would form verdict finding each separate

jury to make that, -I cannot conclude Failing

instruction. *7 did this doubt that

beyond reasonable felony- on the erroneous verdict base its instructions.

murder accepts the majority totality light of disagree. The I jury instructions. argument is that basis for possible missing 28 are 17 and supplied when are however, remains, fact together. The

read find permitted in the first guilty of per- burglary that was committed of anoth- against the will

formed force jurors’ minds read the We cannot

er. of that missing elements

supply

tion. to affirm

Thus, hesitate matter remand court and would

Case Details

Case Name: Leroy S. Seiler v. John A. Thalacker
Court Name: Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
Date Published: Jan 2, 1997
Citation: 101 F.3d 536
Docket Number: 96-1157
Court Abbreviation: 8th Cir.
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