delivered the opinion of the Court.
This appeal is from the Circuit Court for Montgomery County which reversed a resolution of the Montgomery County Council, sitting as the District Council for the portion of the Maryland-Washington Regional District located in Montgomery County, Maryland, granting appellant’s request to rezone Lot 35 of Block 45 of the Carroll Manor Addition to Takoma Park from R-60 (one-family detached residential) to C-l (local commercial). Originally the application for rezoning covered both Lots 35 and 36 but the applicants were permitted to withdraw their request as to Lot 36 without prejudice.
Preceding the hearing before the County Council, the technical staff of the Maryland-National Capital Park and Planning Commission issued a report recommending that the application for rezoning be denied pointing out that “this area is covered by the Master Plan for Takoma-Langley Park and Vicinity and it is recommended that the area remain in its present single-family residential classification.” However, the Montgomery County Planning Board recommended approval of the requested reclassification on the ground that the area had been given a commercial character by commercial zoning on the opposite side of Carroll Avenue.
Both the appellants and the Mayor and City Council for Takoma Park appeared at the hearing before the Council by their respective attorneys. Certain statements were made by counsel for the applicants who introduced plats and photographs into evidence, but no testimony was taken. The County Council adopted the reasoning set forth by the Planning Board and by its resolution granted the application for rezoning. The appellees here appealed to the Circuit Court for Montgomery County alleging that the individuals were property owners within sight of and within one block of the subject property. The Mayor *109 and City Council joined in the petition for appeal alleging that it has the responsibility of the orderly development of land within its corporate limits and is responsible also for regulating traffic and providing police and fire protection within the city. In reversing the Council, Judge Shure noted from the statements that had been made before the Council, that the entire block was presently and was at the time of the adoption of the master plan made up completely of residential .single family dwellings; that there had been no change in the character of the neighborhood; and that there was no mistake in the adoption of the original master plan. He also noted that there was no evidence before the Council that justified its resolution, since only the statements of attorneys for the parties were before the Council, that the appellees were aggrieved parties, and that the action of the Council was arbitrary, capricious and without any legal' justification. We find ourselves unable to say that the trial judge was clearly erroneous in making his findings of fact or that he erred in applying the laws.
The appellants argued in their brief and before us that the appellees had no standing in the court below as they were not aggrieved parties. To this end they cite cases that say that being in proximity to the rezoned property or being in sight of it is not alone sufficient to justify the striking down of the action of the zoning authority. These cases are clearly distinguishable on their facts. In
DuBay v. Crane,
We need not decide the contention of the appellants that the City of Takoma Park was not an aggrieved party. Judge Shure did not rule on this question, having found that the individual appellants below were aggrieved parties and therefore had standing to appeal. In
Polinger v. Briefs,
The present case is closely analogous to that of
Polinger,
where the Court affirmed an order of the Circuit Court for Montgomery County reversing the action of the Council in rezoning certain property from R-90 (Single-family residential) to R-30 (low density multi-family apartments). In both cases appellants in this Court argued that the evidence made the action of the Council at least fairly debatable and thus not subject to reversal by the Circuit Court since it was not arbitrary and capricious. In
Polinger
this Court found that there had been no mistake in the original zoning classification, that no change had taken place since the original classification, and that the action of the Council was therefore arbitrary and capricious and subject to reversal. See also
Agneslane, Inc. v. Lucas,
Not only has there been no change in the area but there was no evidence that there was any mistake made when the master plan setting up the zoning in the area was adopted. This is supported by the fact that requests to rezone the subject property commercial have been turned down twice before, and in this case the technical staff of the Maryland-National Capital Park and Planning Commission recommended that the application be denied as it did not conform with the master plan and “that there is sufficient commercially zoned land in the immediate vicinity of the application to adequately serve the area.” There is great reluctance to rezone property in the absence of evidence that such a deviation is compelled by a change of conditions or a mistake as to the original zoning designation. In the recent case of
Bd. of Co. Comm’rs v. Edmonds,
Based upon the record before us and the applicable law as indicated by our prior decisions we think Judge Shure was correct in reversing the District Council’s rezoning of the subject property.
Order affirmed with costs.