Appellant, Ernesto Lerma, was charged with possession of four grams or more, but less than 200 grams, of cocaine. After the trial court denied Appellant's motion to suppress the cocaine, he pleaded guilty. The court of appeals reversed, holding that the officer's frisk of Appellant, made during an unjustifiably prolonged traffic stop, was not supported by reasonable suspicion. We disagree. We hold that the initial frisk was supported by reasonable suspicion and the original stop was not unduly prolonged. We will reverse the court of appeals.
Background
The only witness to testify at the suppression hearing was police officer Javier *187Salinas, Jr. On the evening of November 2, 2014, Salinas was conducting a patrol of the streets of Corpus Christi. At 10:55 p.m. Salinas stopped a vehicle for failing to stop behind the line at a stop light and failing to use a turn signal at least 100 feet prior to the intersection. The traffic stop was recorded by a video camera; the stop lasted nine minutes from the time of the stop to the moment Appellant fled the scene on foot.
After pulling the vehicle over, Salinas approached the driver's side of the car. There were four occupants in the car: the driver, Appellant, who was in the front passenger seat, and a woman with an unrestrained baby on her lap in the back seat.
Salinas also asked Appellant whether he had any identification. Appellant replied that he did not have any identification on him. During this initial interaction Salinas observed Appellant moving his feet a lot, trying to reach his hands into his pockets, and moving his hands between the seats. Appellant appeared nervous and unsure of himself. These movements caused Salines to move to the passenger side of the vehicle to make sure that Appellant was not trying to grab a weapon. While Salinas was on the passenger side of the vehicle, the driver handed Salinas his driver's license and insurance paperwork. Salinas reviewed the insurance paperwork and gave it back to the driver, but kept the driver's license so he could later determine whether the driver had any outstanding warrants. Salinas also planned to check for warrants for the passengers and investigate the circumstances surrounding the unrestrained child in the vehicle. At this point, Salinas had determined that he would likely issue a warning to the driver if he remained cooperative, though he did not issue either a warning or a traffic citation at that time.
Salinas again asked Appellant if he had any identification. Again, Appellant said he did not. Salinas also asked Appellant why he was so nervous. Pursuant to his typical course of conduct, Salinas asked Appellant to exit the vehicle so he could make a proper identification of Appellant.
Salinas informed Appellant that he was going to conduct a pat-down and Appellant stated that he had a pocket knife.
Salinas then asked Appellant for his name and birth date. Appellant replied that his name was "Bobby Diaz" and his birth date was September 22, 1984.
Another officer arrived on the scene at 10:59 p.m., four minutes after the initial stop. Salinas asked Appellant whether he had any weapons or anything illegal on his person and Appellant said that he did not. Salinas then asked "You okay if I check your pockets to make sure you don't got nothing on you?" Appellant replied "I'd rather you didn't." Salinas then asked Appellant for his name and birth date again; Appellant said Bobby Diaz, September 22, 1984. Salinas instructed Appellant to "chill out" and sit on the curb.
Salinas then went back to his patrol unit and ran the personal information Appellant had given him. At 11:00 p.m., five minutes after the initial stop, Salinas determined that Appellant did not match the physical description of the "Bobby Diaz," with a birth date of September 22, 1984, that he had obtained from his computer.
After Appellant was arrested, he told Salinas that he was a habitual offender, "looking at 25 to life." Appellant admitted to the officers that he had a lot of crack on him, had a warrant for his arrest, and had lied about his name. The officers searched Appellant and recovered a bag of synthetic *189marijuana and a "Tupperware bowl" containing 17 crack cocaine rocks. Appellant indicated that there was more cocaine in the vehicle. Salinas searched the vehicle, but did not find any more cocaine. After searching the vehicle, Salinas reinitiated contact with the driver and female passenger. The woman's friend brought a car seat to the scene for the unrestrained child and Salinas terminated the traffic stop without issuing a citation to the driver. The trial court denied Appellant's motion to suppress without making findings of fact.
Court of Appeals
Applying our decision in St. George v. State,
The court identified only three articulable facts it believed Salinas had knowledge of when he conducted the initial pat-down: (1) Appellant was a passenger in a vehicle that had just been stopped for two minor traffic infractions; (2) Appellant was "moving around on his feet a lot, trying to reach into his pocket," and was reaching in between the seats of the car; and (3) Appellant had no identification on him.
The court noted that, as in St. George , although Appellant gave false identifying information, Salinas did not know the information was false at the time he performed the initial pat-down. The court dismissed the State's argument that St. George was distinguishable because in this case the investigation of the traffic stop had not concluded at the time of the pat-down, stating "that [Salinas] had already completed his investigation as to 'the reason that [the driver] was stopped.' "
Standard of Review
We review a trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress evidence under a *190bifurcated standard of review.
When the trial court does not make explicit findings of fact, as in the case before us, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court's ruling and assume the trial court made implicit findings of fact supported by the record.
Discussion
The Fourth Amendment prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures. A stop and frisk by law enforcement implicates the Fourth Amendment's protections.
In the context of a traffic stop, police officers are justified in stopping a vehicle when the officers have reasonable suspicion to believe that a traffic violation has occurred.
There is no per se rule that an officer must immediately conduct a computer *191check on the driver's information before questioning the occupants of the vehicle.
During the course of a detention, an officer may, in certain circumstances, conduct a pat-down search of an individual to determine whether the person is carrying a weapon.
The court of appeals held that Salinas lacked reasonable suspicion to conduct the initial pat-down of Appellant and that Salinas unreasonably prolonged the stop. We disagree. For the reasons explained below, we find that Salinas was justified in conducting the pat-down search and that the initial detention had not been unduly prolonged at the point Appellant fled.
1. Salinas had reasonable suspicion to conduct a pat-down.
First, we address the reasonableness of the pat-down. We note that Salinas had probable cause to pull the vehicle over
*192We find this case analogous to O'Hara v. State . In O'Hara , we noted that an officer may not conduct a pat-down search as a matter of routine, as Salinas testified he did in this case.
In finding that Muhler had reasonable suspicion to conduct a pat-down, we noted three specific facts:(1) Muhler was conducting the stop alone, (2) it was the middle of the night, and (3) O'Hara had previously been wearing a knife.
Similarly here, Salinas was conducting the stop alone at night. Not only was he alone, but Salinas was outnumbered by Appellant and the two other adult occupants of the vehicle. Although Appellant admitted to having a pocket knife before the pat-down, this did not alleviate the potential threat of additional weapons.
2. Salinas did not unduly prolong the detention.
Next, we address whether Salinas unlawfully prolonged the traffic stop. The United State's Supreme Court recently *193discussed unduly prolonged traffic stops in Rodriguez v. United States .
After the warning was issued and Struble returned the documents to Rodriguez and the passenger, Struble asked permission to walk his dog around Rodriguez's vehicle.
Rodriguez challenged the legality of the search, arguing that the officer had unduly prolonged the traffic stop without reasonable suspicion to conduct the dog sniff.
In so holding, the Court noted that traffic stops may last no longer than necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop.
Salinas's actions in this case are more like Officer Struble's actions in Rodriguez before he issued the written warning. Both Salinas and Struble originally interacted with the driver of the vehicles, then questioned the passenger of the vehicles, and both officers sought to determine the identity of the passenger as part of the traffic stop. Notably, the Supreme Court did not comment on Struble's interactions with the passenger nor indicate that such interactions unreasonably prolonged the traffic stop in any way. It was also reasonable for Salinas to ask Appellant to exit the vehicle in this case because Salinas was the sole officer on the scene and he had observed Appellant making furtive movements in the vehicle.
Most importantly, the prolonged detention in Rodriguez occurred after the officer had completed all tasks associated with the traffic stop. Unlike the officer in Rodriguez , Salinas was still actively involved in the traffic stop when he questioned Appellant and he had not yet completed all aspects of the traffic stop at the point that Appellant fled. Most obviously, Salinas had not yet conducted a computer warrant check on the driver of the vehicle.
We have previously rejected a prolonged detention argument under circumstances analogous to those presented in this case. In Kothe v. State , the officer conducted a traffic stop on a vehicle which matched the car in a radio dispatch about a possibly intoxicated driver.
Kothe sought to suppress the drug evidence, arguing that the continued detention of him after the officer had determined that he was not intoxicated was *195constitutionally unreasonable and illegal.
Under the circumstances in this case, we cannot say that Salinas acted unreasonably by questioning Appellant before running the driver's license for a warrant check. In particular, Salinas acted diligently in his investigation into the traffic stop and questioning Appellant, as indicated by the brief amount of time between the initiation of the stop and Appellant's flight and subsequent arrest. Salinas initiated the stop at 10:55 p.m. and Appellant fled from the officers at 11:04 p.m., a mere nine minutes later. Importantly, Salinas was joined by back-up at 10:59 p.m. and discovered that Appellant had provided a false identity at 11:00 p.m., a mere five minutes after the initial stop. During that first five minutes, Salinas informed the driver of the reason he was pulled over, requested the driver's identification and insurance information, and checked the driver's insurance information. Salinas also asked Appellant to exit the vehicle and conducted a pat-down of Appellant, which he was justified in doing. We cannot say that the five minutes between the initial stop and the moment when Salinas discovered that Appellant had provided a false name was an unreasonable amount of time to investigate the situation. This is particularly true given that Salinas's actions were all connected to the traffic stop during that time.
3. St. George is distinguishable
The court of appeals relied on our decision in St. George in holding that Salinas was not justified in prolonging the stop to question Appellant. We find St. George distinguishable from the present case. In St. George , two deputies stopped a vehicle for having an inoperative license plate light.
It was only after the officer indicated to the driver that the traffic stop was complete, by giving the driver a warning, that the other officer began to question the passenger.
In reviewing the legality of St. George's pre-arrest detention, we held that the deputies unlawfully prolonged the detention because they lacked reasonable suspicion to continue questioning St. George once the initial reason for the traffic stop ended.
One clear difference between St. George and the case at hand is the presence of a second officer in St. George . In St. George , both deputies were involved in issuing the traffic citation and it wasn't until after the citation was given that they turned their attention to St. George. In this case, Salinas was the sole officer at the scene. He was required to conduct all aspects of the traffic stop by himself until his backup arrived. Given that he was alone, it was reasonable for Salinas to briefly question and attempt to identify the occupants of the car before running the driver's information through his computer system in his patrol car. As we have noted, an officer does not have to follow a particular order of events when conducting a stop.
Another key difference between St. George and the case at bar is the timing in which the events occurred. In St. George , the deputy did not begin questioning St. George until after he had completed a computer check on the driver and issued a citation, nine minutes into the traffic stop.
By the time Appellant was arrested following his flight, Salinas had observed at least three criminal offenses committed in his presence: failure to identify,
Conclusion
Salinas was justified in conducting a pat-down of Appellant. Early on in the traffic stop, Salinas developed reasonable suspicion to continue questioning Appellant. After Appellant's flight, the officers had probable cause to arrest Appellant for several offenses. The cocaine in question was found on Appellant's person following a lawful detention and arrest. There was no initial illegality in either the pat-down or the length of detention. So, there can be no taint, and we need not address the State's argument regarding attenuation. The trial court correctly denied Appellant's motion to suppress. We reverse and remand.
Driving with an unrestrained child constituted an additional traffic offense. See Tex. Transp. Code § 545.412(a) ("A person commits an offense if the person operates a passenger vehicle, transports a child who is younger than eight years of age, unless the child is taller than four feet, nine inches, and does not keep the child secured during the operation of the vehicle in a child passenger safety seat system according to the instructions of the manufacturer of the safety seat system."). Though Salinas ultimately gave the driver a warning, he still waited until a friend of the female passenger brought a car seat to the scene before letting the driver drive away.
Salinas testified that when people don't have physical identification on them he usually tries to separate them from the rest of the people in the car to get a proper identification. He stated that "[p]eople give false names, at times. And if the other people in the car hear, they may go along with the story, thinking that there is a reason why that person is lying in the first place."
The initial pat-down occurred at 10:58 p.m., three minutes into the traffic stop. On cross-examination, Salinas testified that he had a hunch that Appellant may be nervous due to having weapons. Salinas justified his pat-down of Appellant as part of his normal protocol when he has someone exit a vehicle during a stop.
Salinas described Appellant's nervousness at the suppression hearing: "His hands were shaking. He just seemed to be very unsure of himself, seemed to not want to have contact with the police.... he did not seem to want to step out [of the vehicle], continuously moved about his-his seat and was reaching towards his pockets."
The record reflects Appellant's actual date of birth is October 24, 1982.
The computer program listed Bobby Diaz as five feet, eleven inches, and 190 pounds. The police reports indicate that Appellant was about five foot, six inches, and 170 pounds.
Lerma v. State , No. 13-15-00417-CR,
Id. at *6.
Furr v. State ,
State v. Ross ,
Carmouche v. State ,
Furr ,
Ford v. State ,
Arguellez v. State ,
Terry v. Ohio ,
Carmouche ,
Terry ,
Guerra v. State ,
See Kothe v. State ,
Arizona v. Johnson ,
See United States v. Brigham ,
Kothe ,
St. George ,
Terry ,
O'Hara v. State ,
Salinas had observed the driver of the vehicle commit two traffic violations: failing to stop behind the line at a red light (see Tex. Transp. Code § 544.007(d) ); and failing to use his turn signal at least 100 feet prior to the intersection (Id. § 545.104(b)).
See Maryland v. Wilson ,
Michigan v. Long ,
See
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Id. at 1614.
Id. at 1615.
Id. at 1616.
Id. at 1615.
Id. at 65.
See Brigham ,
"A person commits an offense if he intentionally gives a false or fictitious name, residence address, or date of birth to a peace officer who has lawfully detained the person." Tex Penal Code § 38.02(b)(2).
"Except as authorized by this chapter, a person commits an offense if the person knowingly possesses a controlled substance listed in Penalty Group 2-A, unless the person obtained the substance directly from or under a valid prescription or order of a practitioner acting in the course of professional practice." Tex. Health & Safety Code § 481.1161(a). Synthetic marijuana is a Penalty Group 2-A substance. See
"A person commits an offense if he intentionally flees from a person he knows is a peace officer or federal special investigator attempting lawfully to arrest or detain him." Tex. Penal Code § 38.04(a).
"A peace officer may arrest an offender without a warrant for any offense committed in his presence or within his view." Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 14.01(b).
Chimel v. California ,