112 Pa. 161 | Pa. | 1886
delivered the opinion of the court, March 1st, 1886.
It is contended that the deed of April 2d, 1866, from plaintiff below and others, conveying the land therein described to Nathan Snyder subject to an annuity, in her favor, of one hundred and fifty dollars, in the nature of dower, etc., was improperly received in evidence, because it was not fully stamped as required by the Act of Congress. The learned judge thought there had been a substantial compliance with the Act, so far at least as the plaintiff below was concerned; that the government had received the full' price of the additional stamp, together with the penalty for omitting to affix it when the instrument was executed. In doing so he took judicial
But, assuming that the learned judge was technically wrong in ruling as he did, wherein have the plaintiffs in error been prejudiced thereby ? The judgment is not only de terns merely, but it is restricted to part of th.e land which the deed purports to convey, subject to the' annuity in favor of plaintiff below. It is not even.alleged that plaintiffs in error, or either of them, have any interest in the land bound by the judgment, except such as may have been acquired by mesne conveyances from Nathan Snyder, the vendee named in the deed in question. If they have any such interest, so far as we know it was acquired and is still held by them under that deed, and of course subject to the payment of the annuity therein provided for. If they have no interest in the land, they cannot be prejudiced by the judgment or sale of the land by virtue of an execution issued thereon. ■ The judgment being strictly de terris it cannot affect either of the plaintiffs in error personally. As the case stands on the testimony before us, excluding entirely from consideration the deed referred to, neither of the plaintiffs has any interest in the land, and hence they cannot be prejudiced by the judgment de terris, restricted, as it is, to that particular piece of land. We never reverse a judgment or decree- unless manifest error has intervened to the prejudice of the party or parties complaining.
The object of the penal provisions of the Stamp Act was to secure observance of its requirements, and the adjudications on the subject have had the same end in view; but now, since the Act is no longer in force, there is not the same necessity for insisting on a literal compliance with the form prescribed for supplying omissions. When it appears that parties, through whose mistake or omission an instrument has not been properly stamped when it should have been done, have paid the full price of the stamp, together with the penalty, and produce the collector’s receipt therefor; in short, when all that is required of them has been done, it would be sticking in the bark to hold that, because the collector, whose duty
Judgment affirmed.