Leordeanu v. American Protection Insurance Co.

view, it. in my need to include And including language possible makes it

death will be determined non-compensable though

even the work-related con- injuries

curred with other to cause death

and the death would not have occurred but injury.

for the Some deaths that would

have been compensable Staggs under the may

standard be non-compensable under

the definition the adopts Court because the

injury was not a great-enough cause to be

a “substantial” eye cause

factfinder. The change does not conform previously

to the rule followed this compensation

Court that worker’s statutes

are to be liberally construed favor of the See, Albertson’s, Inc., e.g.,

worker. 961;

S.W.2d at Hargrove, 256 S.W.2d at

75.

III. Conclusion

I require would not inclusion of the

“substantial factor” term in the definition producing cause in compensa- worker’s Otherwise, join cases. I the Court’s

opinion holding. LEORDEANU, Petitioner,

Liana

AMERICAN PROTECTION COMPANY,

INSURANCE

Respondent.

No. 09-0330.

Supreme Court Texas.

Argued April

Decided Dec. Stewart,

Fisher Law Offices Wade F. Houston, Stewart, TX, for Liana Leor- deanu. Latson, Stokes,

Jack W. Robert D. Fla- hive, Latson, Austin, TX, Ogden & Protection American Insurance Co. Chaney, Elaine M. of Legal Director Services, Austin, TX, Gary L. Kilgore, Of- Counsel, Injured Employee fice of Associ- Services, Austin, TX, Legal ate Director of Injured for Amicus Curiae Office of Em- ployee Counsel.

Justice HECHT delivered the opinion of Court, in which Chief Justice JEFFERSON, WAINWRIGHT, Justice MEDINA, GREEN, Justice Justice WILLETT, GUZMAN, Justice Justice Justice LEHRMANN joined. Generally, traveling home from work is not in the “course and scope ment” as defined the Texas Workers’ Compensation Act.1 But is traveling from workplace to another while on the home? The court of answered no.2 disagree. We Leordeanu, pharma- Petitioner Liana representative ceutical sales officing out of her apartment, northwest Austin drove her company car to business appointments southeast, Bastrop forty some miles then back to a south Austin restaurant for din- Afterward, ner with clients. her route home her past company-provided took unit, self-storage adjacent apartment her complex, in which kept drug samples she marketing materials. She intended to McClellan, Bradley Dean stop empty Law Offices of at the unit and her car of Pena, P.C., Austin, TX, Richard supplies Wade in preparation for an Wausau, Emp'rs 2009). 1. Evans v. Ill. (Tex.App.-Austin Ins. 2. 278 S.W.3d 881 (Tex. 1990) ("In general, in juries which occur while the is trav eling to or from work are not Act.”). under the trip day. out-of-town the next sable “sustained —one there, highway But she ran off the midway of employment” include —to injured. seriously and was injuries ... every all kind and charac- having ter to do with in originating Insur- Respondent, American Protection work, business, the trade or ance claim Company, denied Leordeanu’s of the an employ- received compensation. for workers’ The Texas engaged ee while in or about the fur- Department of Insurance Workers’ Com- of the therance affairs or business of his pensation upheld Commission Division employer whether upon employer’s the decision, APIC’s Leor- concluding that premises or elsewhere.4 deanu in the was not accident, employment at the time of her The definition had two components: the appealed. jury and she A to the found (1) injury in, had to originate relate to or contrary, and the trial court rendered (2) of, occur in the furtherance judgment on verdict for their Leordeanu. employer’s business. Both had to be satis- A of appeals divided court reversed and fied.5 APIC, holding judgment

rendered require The Act did not that an there ver- support evidence ee injured employer’s premises. be dict.3 applying Cases the Act concluded that The 1917 enactment of the Work- work-required Texas travel is in the course of compen- not, ers’ Act Compensation employment,6 rule, defined a but as a 6. Smith, Id. at 891. 105 ("[Ejmployees S.W.2d at 193 deliverymen, messengers, such as [and] col lectors, 28, 1917, R.S., very ... [are] nature of the Leg., 4. Act of Mar. 35th ch. 103, 1, IV, 1, subjected perils work ... § § to the and hazards Part 1917 Tex. Laws Gen. streets; 292, 269, formerly may of the in which be proper art. case it Tex.Rev.Civ. Stat. Ann. 8309, (1925). ly 1 said that risks are inherent in and employment.”); incident to the Jecker v. W. Co., (Tex. Alliance Ins. 369 779 S.W.2d Emp’rs Page, 5. Tex. v. Ins. Ass’n 1963), (Tex. 1977) (“Thus, grounds by in overruled on other 99 for a claimant to Barber, McKelvyv. 381 S.W.2d 59 recover under statute he two our must meet ("[T]he First, Legislature surely requirements. did not intend to injury must provide employee employment an engaged occurred whose while the claimant was in requires expense him to travel or at his own employer's about the furtherance of his Second, highways, his own automobile on affairs or streets business. the claimant constantly intermittently, injury must either or should show that the was of a kind and be compensation accidently originated character that to do with denied had work, trade, exposed employer’s growing while thus out risks of his holding profession.”); employment. Any Emp'rs’ v. Texas Ins. such would be Smith Assn, servicemen, salesmen, unjust wholly re Tex. S.W.2d (1937) ("It pairmen, deliverymen, firmly is now settled the deci a host others construing may required sions be our statute that in order that who to use their own auto may provi an their recover under the mobiles in and would be a strict Act], proof injury interpretation sions of rather [the that his oc than liberal of the curred, Act.”); Compensation engaged Workmen’s while he in or Shelton about Co., employer's furtherance Ins. affairs busi Standard 1965) ("Most ness is courts considered not alone sufficient. He also which have must regard question show injury that his was of such kind and whose work away employer’s prem character to do originated as had with and entails travel from the work, trade, business, employer's pro being ises as course of his (internal quotation origin fession." brack marks and when the has its in risk created omitted) original)). (emphasis necessity eating away ets sleeping employed for which he is An em- The services home and work. between goes reg- unless he performed cannot be and from work makes ployee’s the work is to ularly where and thus furthers possible done, and in that sense he furthers business, satisfying the second employer’s of his definition, the affairs or business but such trav- component problem The by making journey. ordinarily originate be said to el cannot whether each case is to determine business, of the first requirement the travel and the relationship between risks to which “[t]he because component, fairly that it can is so close traveling to exposed while employees are injury had to do with be said that by society as a are shared and from work work, business, the originated and a result of the not arise as whole and do employer.8 trade or explained employers.”7 We work of way: it this referred to the exclu- Chief Justice Calvert of travel between work and home ordinary an workman who lives at sion When employment from the course and of works at a fixed location is home and going the and rule”9 and noted going returning while to or from as injured work, recognized law had several place injury at the of case presence his causally employment. exceptions.10 to the is related (cita home, employer.” departure profession of the except when a distinct trade or from shown.”); see, omitted)). e.g., quotation personal a errand is tions and internal marks Corp. Kirkpatrick, Emp’rs’ v. 214 S.W. Indem. Shelton, S.W.2d at 292. 389 1919, (Tex.Civ.App.-Austin writ 957 (a laundry employee, though w.o.j.) he dism’d Ass'n, Emp'rs' 9. Janak v. Tex. Ins. 381 S.W.2d away wagon put his horse and in his had ("The 1964) general rule ... is 178 day, employer's for the went to collect stables injury occurring in the that an use he a bill for his on his as public highways going and streets or did, employees frequently and and other so returning place employment of is from performance injured of in the course noncompensable. The rule is known as the duties). his (citation omitted)). 'coming going' rule.” Wausau, Emp’rs 7. Evans v. Ill. Ins. of Coleman, Tex. 10. Am. Gen. Ins. Co. v. ("Had work [the (1957) ("The gener- been while en route from the ers] injury al rule is well settled that an incurred ..., safety meeting primary work site highways public in the use of streets injuries have been covered these returning place going from the to and However, Act. neither of them had be since injury a be- is not gun injuries squarely within their fall in the cause not incurred course of the em- 'coming going' they rule and ployment required There are [the Act]. recovering thereby precluded from workers' injury exceptions to the rule. An incurred in Smith, benefits.”); compensation accord going returning from work is to be to or held ("It firmly S.W.2d at 193 has further been in the of a workman's compensation settled that is not allowable for transportation fur- where the means is injuries employees going while to or re So, also, employer. where the nished turning employment, place of their from employer pays transport in- another to particular except in certain cases. This con jured employee. injury held in the An to be premise that in clusion is based on the go- course of a workman’s if in jured highways go upon the streets or while ing returning place employ- ing injury to or from his to or from his work suffers his as a residence he undertakes consequence of and hazards of the ment or his risks special highways which all a mission at the direction of his em- streets members public subject, ployer, performs are alike a a service furtherance of not as having employer’s express with the consequence of risks and hazards his business work, business, employer.”). originating implied approval of do with and in the his developed in Another rule that the case is directed in his traveling law is an for both proceed this: ment to one place to an- purposes is in the business and place, transportation other such shall employment only if the not be the basis for claim that any purpose necessary is both injury during the occurring course of travel. sufficient cause for the This “dual such transportation is sustained explained by rule was Chief employment. course of Travel Judge Dependents Cardozo in Marks’ employee in the furtherance of the af- Gray, as follows: fairs or business of his shall

The test in brief is this: If the work of not be the a claim basis for that an necessity employee creates injury occurring during the course of travel, of his employ- the course such travel is sustained course of ment, though serving he is at the same employment, if said travel is also in fur- If, time some his own. purpose of how- therance of af- ever, the work has had no in creat- fairs of employee, unless the trip to travel, if ing necessity jour- occurrence said ney gone though would have forward the would have been even had there dropped, business been errand had and been private or affairs of the would have failure upon been canceled of employee to by trip, be furthered said though the the purpose, business and unless said trip would have been undone, the errand was travel is then made had there been no affairs or busi- personal, the and risk.11 employer ness of the to be by furthered We indicated our of the in approval rule trip.14 said 1944 case.12 1989, Legislature Then in the rewrote 1957, the Legislature codified the provision this and the 1917 defini- and exceptions its tion, in single and combined them a section sentence, purpose” “dual result, of the Act.15 The minor with edits sentence,13 rule in another placed both 401.011(12) 1993,16 is now section of the in a new Act section of the as follows: Code, Texas Labor which states: transportation Unless is furnished as a

part employment employment” of the of “Course and of contract or is paid activity any means an kind or employer, or unless the of charac- ter originates means of such that has to with and transportation under do trade, employer, business, the control or of the unless 181, (N.Y.1929). Judge opinion 11. 167 N.E. found in Chief See 1 Ar- of Cardozo ]”). thur Larson & K. in [Marks Larson, Lex Larson’s Workers’ (2010) (stating § 16.02 Compensation Law "accepted by 23, 1957, R.S., the rule in Marks has been Leg., May Act of 55th 14. ch. great 397, 3, 1186, majority jurisdictions”). of § Laws 1192- 1957 Tex. Gen. 1193. Co., 12. McKim v. Standard Commercial Ins. 357, 1989, (Tex.Civ.App.-Dallas 12, C.S., Leg., Act of Dec. 71st 2d 15. 1944, ref'd). 1, 2, 1.03(12), § writ ch. Tex. Gen. Laws formerly Ann. art. 8308- Tex.Rev.Civ. Stat. 1.03(12). Janak, (stating 381 S.W.2d at 179-180 Legislature adopted the "dual 12, 1993, R.S., generally accepted May Leg., rule and that test to 16. Act of 73rd "[t]he ch. applying purpose' be used in 'dual Laws rule is 1993 Tex. Gen. (A) three, disjunctive ex- has performed that is Subsection of the met, the exclusion one is ceptions; in or engaged while employee and travel to and apply, does not the affairs or the furtherance about excluded from the course work is not The term employer. (B) has Subsection employment. on the activity conducted includes an two, applies conjunctive exceptions and at other premises (B) met. Subsection unless both are not include: The term does locations. simply put, it convoluted. More somewhat (A) and from the transportation to work-required does not exclude employment unless: from the course furnished transportation the travel also furthers merely because of the contract interests employee’s personal employer; paid ment or is not, alone, have caused him to make transportation the means trip. employer; are under the control of the over- Although completely the Act was operative language hauled (iii) is directed 401.011(12) tracks the 1917 largely section proceed employee’s and the definition of course place; from one to another two travel provision codifying the fur- provisions rules. The revisions to those or business of the therance of the affairs clarifica- attempts have been at appear to in further- employer if the travel is also changes. rather than But substantive the personal private ance of affairs of of the two the 1957 statute’s statement employee unless: rules, in one after the travel two sentences of occur- the travel to the other, any gave no indication of relation- injury would have been rence of the them, while section ship between made even had there been no 401.011(12)’srewrite, as two listing them employee to affairs of exclusions, sug- can be read to disjunctive travel; be furthered and that travel is excluded from gest not have been the travel would if scope either affairs or made had there been no difficulty this con- applies. The with one employer to be fur- business of is that travel between work and struction thered the travel.17 dual-purpose kind of trav- just home is one el, employer employ- and benefitting both policies, In the of insurance parlance (B) (A) apply and ee. If both subsections general coverage, definition describes and (A) situation, merely a every in becomes components travel must meet both its (B). specialized application scope be in the course and (A) way develop are ex- The did not that ment.18 two rules Subsections rale clusions, exceptions. purpose” in the case law. The “dual each followed 401.011(12). necessary ... for the claimant to show still 17. Tex. Lab.Code that is of a kind and character that Bottom, 18. Tex. Gen. Indent. Co. v. originated had to do with and ("The [stat- 353-354 business, employer trade or of his provide employee does not that an shall ute] engaged in or while he was and was received being regarded may deemed or be be furtherance of the affairs or busi- about the course of his when employer.”). ness of the specified It is conditions is satisfied.... employment. distinct in scope satisfy devised for the situation It could was sub- (A) traveling between employee which components section and both than In and a other home. work definition, but it could never meet Marks, in example, employee for (B)(ii). (B)(ii) subsection Subsection ex- nearby en meet jured route to a town to cepts dual-purpose from travel the exclu- wife, visiting who was His his relatives. sion if it only would not have been made given “trifling” job had him employer had it not furthered a purpose. business there, but Marks would do while not any employee intending But to take care of alone, gone that reason nor would way if the business have cancelled had his said never purpose evaporates, go still will home. The held that he court mind.19 (A) provides Subsection home employ the course may work the course and ment, making “coming no mention of the furnishes, if In going” each of the two pays for, or controls the means of trans- rule.20 applied which cases we have subsection portation, or directs the to pro- (B), v. Argonaut Davis Southwest Insurance one place ceed from to another along the Co. Jecker Western Alliance short, if the travel furthers the —in left Insurance had Co.22 employer’s interest. But subsection work to travel out-of-town for both busi (B)(ii) satisfied, cannot be if the employee ness reasons and was killed further his own by going interest26 in a car accident on the return trip.23 regardless home of whether subsection cases, evi both we held there was (A)(I)-(iii) applied, the could not be support jury findings dence to employment. the course and deaths were under “dual (B)(ii) Applying employees subsection purpose” The rule.24 coming home from work limits subsection developed separately, specifically (A) “going” rule. to a travel between home and work.25 problem case That is at hand. If the “dual rule also applied appeals travel to and from The court held there was homeward-bound support jury’s travel could never be and no to finding evidence Dependents Gray, Marks’ v. 19. 251 N.Y. cial mission’ when an 'directed in (1929). proceed from N.E. his to 167 182 ” place’ citing provision another recodi- 401.011(12)(B); noting fied as further 20. Id. at 183. meetings "safety 'spe- the workers' were not regularly cial but rather scheduled missions’ a (Tex. 1971). 21. 464 S.W.2d 102-103 part employee's job”; concluding of each that the workers fell within "com- (Tex.1963), 369 S.W.2d 22. 779 overruled rule, ing they injured were since Barber, grounds by McKelvy on other v. way meeting safety on the and not 1964). 381 S.W.2d 59 site). meeting work between and their Davis, 102-103; Jecker, at 23. S.W.2d Co., Emp’rs Johnson v. Pac. Indem. 26. See S.W.2d at 779. ("As S.W.2d used dual-purpose phrase rule in ’in fur 104; Davis, Jecker, at 464 S.W.2d private affairs of the therance at 781. employee,’ we think the word ‘furtherance’ conferring a benefit connotes on Evans, (noting by helping See at 304-305 or advance forward ”). "exception ‘spe- has been made for a his affairs.... unit, stated, storage The she apartment. in the course was that Leordeanu adjacent apartment complex, her reasoning was employment, of her (B)(ii) to the stor- the route from the restaurant applied and was that subsection home, to the route age that after unit was identical testified not met. Leordeanu dinner, a stone’s except apartment that her was she intended her business she left depicts her throw farther. This schematic storage unit to unload busi- by her stop car, go then to her travel— from her supplies ness restaurant, in a situation. A-l ferent conclusion similar R represents

—where site, There, intending storage and S.U. the Dr. Confer left work the accident appeals reasoned: supplies unit. The court a store for stop computer killed in a car but going that she was Leordeanu concedes evening from the restau- wreck before he reached the store. The home for the confused, no evidence that Leor- rant. There is in the case is somewhat opinion not have made this travel deanu would “in to travel to stating initially that order drop intend to off items at she did not store], necessary it have been [the contrary, On the storage unit. normal for Dr. to deviate from his Confer going she was concedes that Leordeanu home”,29 route and later that store dropped or not she items home whether along to be the same route as “happened] Therefore, on storage at the unit. off that he his route home” so record, question to [the the answer this regu- ... away to travel his “forc[ed] the travel would not been whether opinion’s lar route From [home]”.30 affairs or had there been no busi- description turn turn of his normal to be furthered ness of the route, appears it that while the store was travel,] “no,” precludes it home, that was not his on a route route that Leordeanu was finding Going to the usual one or the most direct. of her at from his required slight store deviation injury.27 the time of her route, normal and the accident occurred point. before he reached that Schemati- that in The court of noted St. cally, intended travel was as fol- Confer’s Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Co. court had reached a dif- lows— Confer,28a sister (Tex.App.-Austin compensable because the has not

27. 278 S.W.3d 2009) (footnotes omitted). injury occurring completed while an between the business errand and home would (Tex.App.-San Antonio 28. 956 S.W.2d 825 employee’s not be because the denied). pet. finished.”). work would be ("[A]n occurring Id. at 30.Id. errand would between work the business —-where A-2 is the accident site. The errand.31 The court also reasoned that if trip court divided his into segments, two Confer had been diverging after store-to-home, office-to-store and and con- from his normal route but reaching before first, cluded that on which he was store, at site A-3 in the following injured, was in the course and schematic— he because was on a business clearly —he would have been for a purpose with an incidental of employment, since that part component.33 business-related of the trip would have been solely sum, because Legislature said so. for business “Why reasons. should the But that begs question answer wheth- any A-3, result be different” at A-2 or er the Legislature really intended sec- court asked.32 401.011(12)(B) a result that is certain- reasons,

Two answered the court ap- ly peculiar, if not perverse. Confer’s peals present case: travel at site A-3 would not have ex- been cluded from the of his first, the expressly statute declines to (B)(i) employment by the statute because adopt policy of allowing coverage would both be satisfied: whenever there is business-related would have been there even if he had not travel, component to and it mandates going been because of his business different purpose result for dual errand, (ii), he would not have been specific criteria; based on statutory sec- there but for the errand. Yet get ond, statutory scheme has a rational A-3, A-2, pass he had to where he would basis in that a policymaker could well been, even without a pur- come to the conclusion that dual purpose pose, because he going home no mat- should not be unless what, it is predominately for a ter business-relat- and therefore condition purpose ed rather than predominately would not have been met. Id. 33. 278 S.W.3d at 889. Id. purpose answer to treatment of dual travel. appeals’ special the court of

Though would, definition, is unsatisfacto- question purpose rhetorical Dual Confers analysis and, has of ry, component its criticism purpose have a business Confers work- Dividing intended weight. therefore, Confer’s in the always be travel into a work-to-store trip to-store-to-home scope employment.34 of course and followed a store-to- segment business pur- the case. The “dual This overstates not leave him personal segment home does application would still have pose” rule point at A- single, purpose with a business devised, for which it was the situations it, you when the accident 2. However slice Marks, Davis, Jeclcer, like cases occurred, pur- had two concurrent Confer home where the headed go run a errand and to poses: to business destination, but to another both on busi- run, home. If he had had no errand pleasure. But the overstate- ness and trip the same would still highlights ment what we think is the real just on his as he accident site problem: application pur- of the “dual (B)(ii) Thus, can- usually did. subsection pose” “coming going” rule to travel. by dissection. not be satisfied rule, could, purpose” the “dual Leor- Under if it the court of And continued, appointment deanu’s travel from her last there would be need for the restaurant would also purpose” Bastrop “dual rule at all. 401.011(12)(B) have been outside the course and of [Sjection would not exist. if, had the business dinner if simply provide The statute would cancelled, all, she would have continued on to it purpose travel had at Indeed, storage unit and home. had she her business calls that all pur- arranged ment. There would not be a dual so pose along rule because there would be no were the route home— Rather, only

—even an accident at site A-4 would we hold that subsec (A) applies be excluded from the course and to travel to and from the employment,36 she would have continued and that subsection Call-2, appointments dual-purpose home her at to other travel. applies had Call-3, and R with the cancelled. This would not This is consistent historical devel application opment going” reasonable section 401.01K12).35 rules, purpose” application “dual their sense, course, 34. Id. 36.In a broad all travel is homeward. See Herman Melville, White-Jack- give every 35. We construe statutes to effect to (A.L. 1892) ("Whoever (1850) Burt Co. et provision provision and ensure that no ren us, surround, voyage afflict whatever Life is a meaningless superfluous. dered Columbia homeward-bound!”). It that's is said Colinas, Hogue, Med. Ctr. v. Las Inc. identify among strangers Masons one another (Tex.2008); City S.W.3d Marshall home?”, "Brother, by asking, you headed Uncertain, City is, "Brother, response which the fraternal 2006). apply purpose” To the "dual rule to always aren’t we headed home?”. We do not travel, "coming going” as the dissent today’s expand "coming decision argues, principle would contravene this beyond its traditional boundaries. substantially undermining the "dual (B)(ii). import rule and the of subsection cases, they Accordingly, the judgment and the reasonable results we-reverse our judg- court and affirm the designed to achieve. were trial ment of the court. It that Leordeanu undisputed a dissenting Justice JOHNSON filed employ a car her driving provided

was opinion. at the accident there er time of her and JOHNSON, dissenting. Justice excepted fore from the and (A)(i). argues subsection APIC compensation Workers’ statutes con- liberally strued favor of workers. there is no evidence of the ele re first L.P., Poly-America, definition in ment section (Tex.2008). construing But statutes lib- 401.011(12) at Leordeanu’s travel —that erally not effectively adding does mean time with injury of her to do “ha[d] to language them to alter their meaning, business, originate[d] which what the today. Court does I trade, employer”— of [her] dissent. simply she on her home way because was employee’s For compen- an to be leaving work. aside the from But fact sable the Texas Compen- under Workers’ officed at do she home intended to Act, the injury sation must arise out of and paperwork retiring some there before be in scope employ- night,37 was also her Leordeanu employment. ee’s Tex. Lab. Code from an to way employer-sponsored dinner 401.011(10). The specifically Act ex- employer-provided storage facility injuries during cludes some travel from sup her car of empty company scope being employ- authority plies. suggesting APIC cites no ment: work-related, activity that such not was The term of employ- [“course and we hold it was. As for the second does not include: ment”] time element of the definition—that at the (A) transportation from to and injury, “engaged of her Leordeanu was of employment unless: or about the furtherance of the affairs or transportation is furnished employer” con business of [her] —APIC of the contract of that “there evidence of cedes one paid employer; or is ment purposes trip” more work and that transportation the means of the rule], “[a]part from the [“dual of the employ- are under the control satisfy require the ‘furtherance’ she er; or 38 Thus, sup ment.” there evidence to (iii) the employee is directed in the jury’s port verdict Leordeanu was employee’s employment proceed injured employ the course place; to another challenge to suffi legal ment. APIC’s the fur- ciency of the ver support evidence therance the affairs business of employer if is also in dict fails. the travel retiring. argues Leordeanu that she was her home-office before We do not only this latter contention. address the course storage her because she was on Respondent unit but also she intended to work at 38. Brief at 8. because 250 exclusions, can be read disjunctive af- as two private or personal of

furtherance excluded from the suggest to that travel is unless: employee fairs of if either of of occur- place the travel view, my at 244. applies.” 330 S.W.3d have been rence of that travel only “suggests” not statute per- even had there been the course and of is excluded from of the em- private or affairs sonal (A) (B) it applies, if either travel; by furthered ployee to be says so. plainly that the concluded The court have been the travel would not of al adopt policy statute declines been no affairs or made had there when there is busi lowing coverage to be fur- business of to travel and man component ness-related travel. thered purpose for dates a different result dual 401.011(12). Simplified, the defini- Id. 881, The court travel. 278 S.W.3d at “course and that term specifies tion could come to explained policymaker that does not include employment” purpose that dual travel is the conclusion “(A) place from the transportation to and only predominately if it is (B) exceptions]; employment [with Id. The purpose. a business-related in the furtherance employee the court of downplay appears Court employer if affairs or business of the of the reasoning by summarizing ap appeals’ is also in furtherance of the travel straight peals interpretation court’s unless private affairs of statutory language being “[i]n forward (B)(ii) (B)(i) are satisfied].” [both sum, said so.” Legislature because the added) The concludes (Emphasis Court But when courts inter 330 S.W.3d 239. (A) applies to travel to and that subsection statutory language, they should take pret and subsec- from the Seay v. as it is written. See language (B) trav- applies purpose to other dual (Tex.1984) (“[I]t 19, Hall, 677 S.W.2d 25 el. S.W.3d 239. Under the Court’s 380 usurpation powers of our would be statute, “course and construction of legisla language add to a law where employment” does not include scope of Amim, refrained.”); ture has Simmons v. “(A) transportation to and from the (Tex.1920) 309, 66, 110 Tex. 220 S.W. 70 or, exceptions]; employment [with (“[Courts] law-making body. are dual-purpose travel activities other than They responsible are not omissions (B) (A), by the specified in those legislation.”). generally presume Courts furtherance of the affairs meant, what it Legislature said if the travel is or business Legislature’s omission words also in furtherance of States, Entergy intentional. See Gulf (B)(i) the employee affairs of unless [both 433, Summers, 282 S.W.3d Inc. v. (B)(ii) are satisfied].” (Tex.2009) (“Where [statutory] text its im- The Court reaches conclusion clear, [Legislative] text is determinative reading into the statute properly words Garrett, intent.”); v. Terrell & Cameron Legislature that the did not include. See (Tex.1981); Inc., 618 S.W.2d Hughes, Rockwall v. 246 S.W.3d City Bd., Mauzy Legislative Redistricting the mean- (“[C]hanging (Tex.1971); see Tex. & it, Comm’n, by adding statute words to we ing of Tex. R.R. 145 Tex. [a] Co. v. N.O.R. (Tex.1947). function, believe, judi- not a legislative is a function.”). into a stat noting only cial It does so should read words Courts [401.011(12)(A) necessary ute when those words “listing ] the Act’s legislative effect clear intent or are implicit statute, yields or when the statute

nonsensical or absurd result absent (Dallas), Sys.

words. See Laidlaw Waste City of Wilmer,

Inc. v. 904 S.W.2d

(Tex.1995) (“[Cjourts should not insert except give

words in a statute effect to intent.”); legislative clear City Lee v.

Houston, 294-95

1991) (“A may court not judicially amend a

statute and add implic words are not

itly language contained of the stat

ute.”); Co., Liberty Jones v. Mut. Ins. (Tex.1988) (same). 901, 902

The words the Court adds “construc-

tion” are implicit in the statute. Fur-

ther, appeals’ opinion the court of properly

interprets the Legislature statute as the it,

wrote effects the Legislature’s intent as used,

embodied in the language and dem-

onstrates that construing the statute as it yield written does not a nonsensical or

absurd result.

I agree with the court of

the dual purpose applies to Leor-

deanu’s claim and her is not of her employment. For set reasons out the court of appeals,

I would affirm judgment. its TEMPLE, Petitioner, BAY

CHRISTI

GUIDEONE SPECIALTY MUTUAL CO., al.,

INSURANCE et

Respondents.

No. 09-0683.

Supreme Court of Texas.

Dec.

Rehearing Denied Feb.

Case Details

Case Name: Leordeanu v. American Protection Insurance Co.

Court Name: Texas Supreme Court

Date Published: Dec 3, 2010

Citation: 330 S.W.3d 239

Docket Number: 09-0330

Court Abbreviation: Tex.