—In an action, inter alia, to recover damages for defamation, the defendants appeal, as limited by their brief, from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Vinik, J.), dated January 28, 1997, as denied that branch of their motion which was to dismiss the plaintiffs’ second cause of action.
Ordered that the order is reversed insofar as appealed from, with costs, that branch of the motion which was to dismiss the second cause of action is granted, and the second cause of action is dismissed.
The Supreme Court improperly denied that branch of the defendants’ motion which was to dismiss the plaintiffs’ cause of action alleging defamation. “Where a plaintiff alleges that statements are false and defamatory, the legal question for the court on a motion to dismiss is whether the contested statements are reasonably susceptible of a defamatory connotation * * * In making this determination, the court must give the disputed language a fair reading in the context of the publication as a whole” (Armstrong v Simon & Schuster,
