34 Ind. App. 383 | Ind. Ct. App. | 1903
In this appeal error is properly assigned, presenting the questions arising out of the action of the trial court in sustaining the demurrer of appellees to the two paragraphs of complaint filed by appellant.
Each paragraph of the complaint seeks to recover damages from appellees for injuries sustained by appellant by reason of the alleged wrongful acts of appellees in procuring their son to cancel and break a marriage contract existing between him and appellant, the said son having at the time seduced appellant and begotten her with child. The averments of the first paragraph of complaint are briefly as follows: That appellees are possessed of a large amount of property; that the families of appellant and appellees resided in the same neighborhood, and were intimately acquainted, and of equal social standing; that the son of appellees was a young man of intelligence and fine address, and was in every way fitted to be the husband of appellant; that said son, with the knowdedge and consent of appellees, for three years was appellant’s suitor, and was often at her home and with her in public; that he won her love, and they became engaged to be married, and that, under such promise to marry, said son seduced appellant and begot her with child; that appellees knew these facts before they committed the alleged wrongful acts. It is further alleged that appellant was in every wray fit and competent to become the wife of said son, and that, being pregnant by him, she requested him to marry her at once, in order to protect her good name; that said son agreed so to do, and applied for a license to
Counsel for appellant, in their brief, say: “The second paragraph is like the first, except that it alleges as additional means used, by appellees to prevent the marriage that they spoke to their son certain false and slanderous words of and concerning appellant, imputing, to her the sin of whoredom and the crime of abortion.” It will thus be seen
Judge Cooley, in his work on Torts (2d ed), p. 277, says: “The prevention of a marriage by the interference of a third person can not, in general, in itself, be a legal wrong. Thus if one, by solicitations, or by the arts of ridicule or otherwise, shall induce one to break off an existing contract of marriage, no action will lie for it, however contemptible and blamable may be the conduct.”
Judgment affirmed.