Lead Opinion
Respondents Bernardo and Enrique Ko-pel seek review of the decision ofthe Third District Court of Appeal in Kopel v. Kopel,
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
This case comes to us after twenty-one years of litigation involving claims by Leon Kopel (Petitioner) against his brother, Enrique Kopel, and Enrique’s son, Bernardo Kopel (Leon’s nephew),
Finding in favor of Petitioner on all three counts, the jury found that Petitioner loaned Bernardo $5 million and Bernardo orally agreed to repay $2 million, that Enrique orally agreed to pay $3 million, and that Respondents' were unjustly enriched by Petitioner for a total benefit conferred in the amount of $10 million. Id. After the verdict, Respondents filed a motion for a new trial or for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, alleging inter alia that there was no evidence to prove any of Petitioner’s claims and the jury’s verdicts were inconsistent. The trial court denied the motion and entered final judgment against Respondents, jointly and severally, on the unjust enrichment claim only. Id. Although it reduced the jury award on this claim to $5 million, the trial court entered final judgment in favor of Petitioner for $14,063,164.50, after adding prejudgment interest. Id.
Respondents appealed, and the Third District held that Respondents were entitled to judgment as a matter of law because the evidence did not support any of Petitioner’s claims. Id. at 1149, 1151. Specifically, the court found that there was no unjust enrichment because the benefit of the loan was conferred upon corporate entities rather than Respondents directly. Id. at 1152 (citing Peoples Nat’l Bank of Commerce v. First Union Nat’l Bank of Fla., N.A.,
A trial court’s ruling on a motion to dismiss is subject to de novo review. Mender v. Kauderer,
I. Relation Back
It is undisputed that Petitioner’s original complaint, filed in 1994, did not specifically allege a breach of oral promise claim. Petitioner first asserted this claim in his fourth amended complaint, in 2008 against. Enrique only, and against both Respondents in his fifth amended complaint in 2009. The statute of limitations provides only a four-year period in which to raise such a claim. § 95.11(S)(k), Fla. Stat (1993). Here, the fifth amended complaint alleges that the oral promise was made “during the funding of the loan” to Bernardo, which occurred in 1991. Respondents explain that Petitioner’s July 13, 2010, Answers to Interrogatories state that the oral promise was made in 1991, 1992, and again in 1993. Even using 1993, the statute .of limitations expired on Petitioner’s claim in 1997 at the latest. Thus, for the claim to survive dismissal, it must relate back to the initial complaint. Flores^
There are two lines of district court cases interpreting the operation of the relation back doctrine in Florida. The first holds that an amended pleading does not relate back if it states a new, different, or distinct cause of action from the original pleading. Trumbull Ins. Co. v. Wolentarski,
The second line of cases' instead follows the exact langüage of rule 1.190(c)—allowing relation back where the claims from the amended pleading arise' out of the same conduct, transaction, or occurreftce as in the original, timely filed complaint. Armiger,
In Armiger, the plaintiff sued a company and its janitorial service provider after he slipped and fell on the company’s property.
Essentially, this second line of cases holds that the assertion of a new claim in an amendment is not dispositive as to whether the amendment can relate back. However, these cases recognize that ⅛ newly added claim could fail to meet the relation back test if the new claim is so factually distinct that it does not arise out of the same conduct, transaction, or occurrence as the original. See Fabbiano,
In Caduceus Properties, LLC v. Graney,
We cited three factors in support of our interpretation of rule 1.190(c) that- are equally applicable here. First, this interpretation is consistent with Florida’s, judicial policy of freely permitting amendments to pleadings, as long as they do not prejudice the opposing party, so that cases may be resolved on the merits. Id. at 991-92. Second, “[permitting relation back in this context is also consistent with Florida case law holding that rule 1.190(c) is to be liberally construed and applied.” Id. at 992. Last, this interpretation is consistent with the purpose of the statute of limitations, which is “to protect defendants .from unusually long delays in the filing of lawsuits and to prevent, prejudice to defendants from the unexpected - enforcement of stale claims”—a purpose that is not implicated where the new-claims' concern the same conduct, transaction, or occurrence as the original. Id.
In accordance with rule 1.190 and our prior case law, we disapprove the first line of cases to, the extent that they establish, a bright-line rule that amendments asserting new claims cannot-relate back under any circumstances. As established in Fabbiano, Armiger, and even Caduceus, amendments asserting new claims can relate back to the original pleading as long as they arise out of the same conduct, transaction,, or occurrence as the claims within the original. The proper focus of the inquiry is not whether the amended pleading sets forth a new or different claim, but whether the claims within the amended pleading are part of the same conduct, transaction,' or occurrence as in the original pleading. Accordingly, we approve ’the' second line of cases, which recognizes that while amendments with new claims do not always relate back, they can do so if the claims are not factually distinct from those within the original complaint.
In the instant case, we reject the Third District’s holding, that “because the
Both the original and fifth amended complaints allege that (1) Petitioner and Enrique borrowed $15. million, with Petitioner being liable for $5 million and Enrique being liable for $10 million; (2) Petitioner loaned such amount to either Bernardo individually or Respondents collectively; and (3) regardless of the asserted theory of recovery, Respondents, individually and collectively, have failed and refused to pay this amount. Accordingly, the new claim is not factually distinct, but arises out of the same conduct, transaction, or occurrence as that established in the original pleading. Petitioner’s fifth amended complaint relates back to his original complaint, and we quash the Third District’s decision reversing the trial court’s denial of Respondents’ motion for summary judgment.
II. Sufficiency of the Evidence
We also disagree with the district court’s holding that Respondents were entitled to judgment as a matter of law based on insufficient evidence. Kopel,
The Third District is correct that to prevail on an unjust enrichment claim, the plaintiff must directly confer a benefit to the defendant. See Peoples Nat’l Bank of Commerce v. First Union Nat’l Bank of Fla. N.A.,
As to Count II, alleging Respondents’ breach of án oral promise, we find that sufficient evidence exists to sustain a verdict in Petitioner’s favor as to this claim. Petitioner testified repeatedly that Respondents had promised multiple times to repay him for the $5 million loan. Petitioner also testified that Enrique had once promised repayment at a meeting with Petitioner’s and Enrique’s parents—a meeting about which their mother, Chana Kopel, testified confirming Petitioner’s testimony. Enrique himself testified about this meeting, stating that a verbal agreement was reached for Enrique to pay Petitioner $5 million in exchange for a release from Petitioner as to any interests Petitioner had in companies the parties owned together. However, Enrique testified that the parties had agreed to put the oral agreement in writing. Although Enrique also testified that Petitioner did not make any loans to Respondents and that Enrique did not promise to repay any loans, the jury could have instead accepted Petitioner’s and his mother’s testimony. Furthermore, the jury expressly rejected, by special verdict form, Enrique’s testimony that the agreement was to be reduced to writing.
Viewing the evidence and inferences of fact in the light most favorable to Petitioner, we find sufficient evidence to sustain the jury’s verdict on Count II for breach of an oral promise. It matters not that the trial court entered judgment only on' the unjust enrichment count because the jury here awarded judgment to Petitioner, by special verdict form, on each of three different theories of recovery and was not asked to apportion the damages between each theory. See Southstar Equity, LLC v. Lai Chau,
CONCLUSION
We hereby quash the -Third District’s decision in Kopel v. Kopel,
It is so ordered.
Notes
. Hereinafter, Enrique and Bernardo Kopel may be referred to collectively as Respondents or individually according to their first names.
. Flores,
. See, e.g., Fabbiano, 91 So.3d at 896 (finding that battery claim related back to negligence claim because both involved same plaintiff, same injuries, and same damages and, therefore, "arose from the same occurrence”).
. See, e.g., Trumbull Ins. Co,,
. We acknowledge that sufficiency is not the conflict issue in this case. However, once we accept jurisdiction to resolve a conflict, we may, in our discretion, consider other issues properly raised and argued before this Court. Savoie v. State,
. ■ We decline to i address any other issues raised by the' parties,
Dissenting Opinion
dissenting.
I agree with the majority “that an amendment asserting a new cause of action can relate back to the original pleading [when] the claim arises but of the same conduct, transaction, or occurrence as the original.” Majority op. at 820. But I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that the decision on review transgresses this rule. Because the result reached by the Third District is consistent with the rule in the supposed conflict cases on which the majority relies,' I would dischargé this case. I therefore dissent.
The majority tellingly relates that— fourteen years after suit was first filed— “[a]t the 2008 trial, Petitioner, for the first time, claimed that settlement conversations between him and Enrique were actually oral agreements whereby Enrique was to pay $5 million to Petitioner in exchange for Petitioner’s interest in certain business entities.” Majority op. at 814. Following the declaration of a mistrial, the Petitioner filed an amended ' complaint alleging a claim based on these new facts. The district court correctly concluded that , under Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.190(c) this new claim did not relate back to the filing of the original complaint and therefore was barred by the statute of limitations.
Under the relation-back rule, a plaintiff may plead new causes of action based on the basic factual narrative previously alleged. But a plaintiff is not entitled to allege new core facts. A plaintiff may supplement—with related, facts and new causes of action—the original narrative, but may not bring forth a new narrative. A claim predicated on such a new narrative is not a claim that “arose out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set forth or attempted to be set forth in. the original pleáding” and therefore does not relate back to the filing of the original complaint. Fla. R. Civ. P, 1.190(c).
To accept the Petitioner’s position requires that the rule’s reference to claims arising from the “conduct, transaction, or occurrence” that was originally alleged be understood to encompass every factual allegation related to the contemporaneous business interactions of a plaintiff and defendant. Under this viéw, a plaintiff who had originally claimed that the defendant had failed to pay for' an automobile purchased from the plaintiff would be permitted—after the statute of limitations hald run—to make a claim based on the alleged failure of the defendant to pay for a horse purchased from the plaintiff. This seriously distorts the rule and would turn litigation into a quest by the plaintiff to find some new winning narrative whenever the original narrative threatens to fail.
Here, the claims previously' pleaded by the Petitioner related to unpaid obligations arising from alleged loan transactions as
So the result reached by the Third District was correct. Admittedly, the Third District erred in making the unqualified statement that “[t]o relate , back, the [amended] pleading must not state a new cause of action.” Kopel v. Kopel,
POLSTON, J., concurs.