Leogrande v. GlassLeogrande v. Glass
—In а medical malpractice action, plaintiffs appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Suffolk County (Cannavo, J.), dated January 16, 1984, which denied their motion for an order noting defendants’ default and setting the matter down for an inquest and which granted defendants’ cross motion to direct plaintiffs to accept late service of defendants’ verified answer to plaintiffs’ amended verified complaint.
Order affirmed, with costs.
This action to recover damаges for medical malpractice was commenced by service of summons and verified complaint оn or about October 24,1980. Issue was joined by service of an answer on or about December 3, 1980.
By order dated Oсtober 20, 1983, Special Term (Corso, J.) granted a motion by plaintiffs to amend the complaint to assert an additiоnal cause of action based on lack of informed consent. Special Term directed that the аmended complaint be served within 20 days after defendants’ receipt of a copy of the order. The amended verified complaint was in fact served by plaintiffs on defendants’ attorneys by mail on November 1, 1983, and it was received by defendants’ attorneys on November 3, 1983. However, a verified answer to the amended verified cоmplaint was not served until December 14,1983. By letter dated December 27, 1983, plaintiffs’ attorney rejected and returned the answer as untimely.
Plaintiffs then moved for an order noting defendants’ default and setting the matter down for an inquest. Defеndants cross-moved for an order directing plaintiffs to accept service of their
Service of an answer to an amended complaint must generally be made within 20 days after service of the аmended complaint (CPLR 3025, subd [c]). In the instant case, plaintiffs served their amended verified complaint by mail on November 1, 1983. Moreover, because the amended verified complaint was served by mail, defendants were entitled to an additional five days in which to serve their answer (CPLR 2103, subd [b], par 2). Therefore, defendants would normally have beеn required to serve their answer by November 26, 1983. However, November 26, 1983 fell on a Saturday and, therefore, the answеr had to be served on the next succeeding business day, which was Monday, November 28, 1983 (General Construction Law, § 25-a, subd 1). Dеfendants’ answer was in fact served on December 14, 1983, making it only 16 days late.
Under the present statutory standard (see CPLR 2005; CPLR 3012, subd [d]; added L 1983, ch 318), a defendant seeking to excuse a default in answering must establish a reasonable excuse fоr the delay and a meritorious defense (Fidelity & Deposit Co. v Andersen & Co.,
In this case, the papers filed by defendants in support of their crоss motion to compel acceptance of their untimely answer did not clearly articulate a rеasonable excuse for the delay. Nevertheless, those papers do reflect that defendants hаd served an answer to the original complaint and had continued to defend the action during the ensuing three yеars until the time of their default in answering the amended verified complaint. It is therefore clear that they nevеr intended to abandon their defense of this action. Moreover, plaintiffs’ moving papers raise no claim of prejudice. Under these circumstances, and in view of the public policy favoring determination of cases on their merits (Lindo v Evans,
With respect to the showing of a meritorious defense to the action, we note that the sufficienсy of an affidavit of merit is a matter generally left to the discretion of Special Term (Fidelity & Deposit Co. v Andersen & Co., supra, p 695; Weber v Victory Mem. Hosp., supra) and a verified answеr may constitute a sufficient statement of merit for purposes of vacating a default
Accordingly, we hold that Special Term did not abuse its discretion in this case by excusing defendants’ default in answering. Titone, J. P., Bracken, Niehoff and Rubin, JJ., concur.