Leo v. Kerr-McGee Chemical Corp.

input into the se- had substantial Petroelean clearly LEO, Tippins relied of the Estate Elaine Administratrix process,

lection Bekes, deceased, ultimately choosing M. Admin expertise special Catherine Prosequendum behalf of County. Ad Four istratrix deceased, Bekes, of Thomas the Estate fa- the CECOS first identified Petroelean Yoder, individually; Linda individu EAF dust cility disposal site as the ally to Tippins with subsequently contracted Later, after there. dispose of the waste disposal CECOS about discussions CHEMICAL CORPOR KERR-MCGEE ac- costs, learned CECOS Petroelean Corporation, TION, succes Delaware A a special dis- only packaged cepted waste Company to interest Welsbach “pro- bags Petroelean considered posal which Incandescent Gas Welsbach and/or thereafter hibitively” expensive. Petroelean Co., Lindsay Co., Light Ameri Chemical completed surveyed alternative landfills and Corp. and can and Chemical Potash disposal loca- possible applications for two Potash, Corpora an American Illinois tions, County. Af- Wayne Four Disposal and Improve tion; U.G.I., United Gas f/k/a disposal costs for the receiving estimated ter Pennsylvania Corpo Company, ment a sites, for- from those Petroelean EAF dust 1-20; ration; Robert Roes 1- Does John Tippins, information to the financial warded 1-20; 20; Corporation XYZ James Joes final upon it to make its selec- which relied 1-20; Rudd, corporation suc Rheem disposal facility.10 County tion Four City Investing Co., to cessor interest Although Petroelean did make fi- Rudd Division and Rudd Waterheater dispose of the at Four nal dust decision Manufacturing Company, Kerr-McGee substantially to and County, it contributed Corporation, Appellant. Chemical locating and sub- shared in that decision potential disposal 93-5730. mitting limited number of No. Tippins could More- from which select. sites Appeals, Court of United States over, Tip- from the it is evident record Third Circuit. upon

pins all relied Petroclean’s at times waste expertise in the field of hazardous Argued Aug. 1994. deciding appropriate management when Sept. Decided dispose EAF location to means facts, was far these Petroelean dust. On conduit of hazardous

more than mere

waste; rather, actively participated in the decision, such Petroelean

site selection working together, Four selected Tippins, Consequently,

County disposal site. under CERCLA

Petroelean liable 107(a)(4) transporter

§ selected as a which disposal facility. judgment district will be

affirmed. Region concerning complete Tippins State of and EPA also relied on Petroelean Indiana County, inquire Tippins and to whether landfill necessary receive an Four forms for number, protection. contact the had insurance EPA waste identification Hagner Freeman, (argued),

Thomas J. Mintz, Hagner Deiches, Haddbnfield, NJ, & for appellee.

Peter (argued), J. Nickles Coleman S. Hicks, Meserve, Schulder, Richard A. Elliott Brown, M. Covington Burling, Caroline & DC, Washington, appellant. BEFORE: GREENBERG and STAPLETON, ATKINS, Judges, Circuit Judge.* District OPINION OF THE COURT GREENBERG, Judge. Circuit I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY following matter is before the court .This entry of our order on November granting defendant-appellant Kerr-McGee Corporation permission appeal Chemical 1292(b). § pursuant to 28 U.S.C. willWe deny- reverse the order of the district ing summary judg- Kerr-McGee’s motion for 8, 1993, September ment entered on and we will remand the matter to the district court entry summary judgment in its favor. and, largely dispute, The facts are not in event, any accept allegations plaintiffs-appellees Elaine Leo and Linda Yo- purposes appeal. prior der for From century continuing to the turn of the 20th Light until the Welsbach Incandescent Company operated factory maintained and * Atkins, da, Clyde designation. sitting by Honorable C. Senior United States Judge District for the District Southern of Flori- allege Yoder cancer. Leo and Jersey, for manufac- bladder City, New

in Gloucester cancer mantles, parents contracted their bladder process turing incandescent other waste exposure to thorium and monazite extracting thorium from involving land. deposited on the Welsbach substances generated toxic wastes process This ores. by-products which consisting of thorium 29, 1993, January Leo and Yoder filed On site, factory thus on the deposited Welsbach suit, par- individually, of their and on behalf In surrounding land. contaminating the estates, Superior of New in the ents’ competitor, 1940, Illinois-based Welsbach’s and certain oth- Jersey against Kerr-McGee Company, pur- Lindsay Light and Chemical death, injuries, to recover for er defendants In gas mantle business. chased Welsbach’s arising from potential of cancer and the risk out- sale, Lindsay acquired Welsbach’s exposure to thorium and other waste formulas, records, orders, raw ma- standing gas generated in the Welsbach substances lists, terials, gas mantle inventory, customer deposited on the operation and Glou- mantle line, to use the right production and City germane Leo property. As cester However, Lindsay did ‘Welsbach” name. liability on Kerr- impose seek to and Yoder land acquire the Gloucester liability.1 theory McGee on a of strict While Rather, gas mantle factory. it moved Kerr- Yoder do not claim that Leo and in Illinois. plant business to its own generated the waste which McGee itself they injuries, assert caused the deaths and acquisitions, Kerr- Following a series of by acquisition its that it is liable reason of Lindsay, and it thus con- McGee gas mantle business. On March in Lind- Welsbach’s litigation it stands cedes that in this 4, 1993, removed one of the other defendants Accordingly, we will refer to say’s shoes. District Court the case to the United States Lindsay simply as Kerr- and Kerr-McGee Jersey the District of New on the basis a second line of owned McGee. Welsbach diversity citizenship. it sold to Rheem Manufactur- business which successors, Rheem’s ing Company but Subsequently, filed a motion action, in this though originally defendants 12(b)(6) on the to dismiss under Fed.R.Civ.P. from the case. Wels- dismissed have been ground complaint did not state a in 1944. bach was dissolved may granted inas- claim on which relief Yoder, sisters, owned the 1961, much as Kerr-McGee never has who are In Leo factory. City land and Gloucester parents, and their Thomas Catherine opinion court treated the Bekes, bench the district to a home close to the former moved summary judgment a motion for factory in motion as Gloucester site of the Welsbach than the it material other City, now live else- because considered though Leo and Yoder 5, 1988, complaint on the motion. The submitted Thomas where. On December Jersey predicted court then the New In March died from bladder cancer. Bekes 1991, Supreme Court would extend Department of Envi- the New corporate liability, of successor line doctrine Protection notified Catherine ronmental Indus., explicated as in Ramirez Amsted high gamma radiation Bekes of the levels Inc., 332, (1981), 3, 86 N.J. 431 A.2d 811 property and on June and thorium on her issue, by- toxic 1991, Compensation toxic tort at because the Jersey Spill the New residence, generated directly from the forcing products her to were acquired her Fund manufacturing gas mantles.2 from of Welsbach’s thereafter she also died relocate. Soon merely that an intermediate successor held 1. Leo Yoder also set forth theories of warranty even predicated negligence could be liable under and breach of Ramirez corpora though support there is a later viable successor we find no but we do not discuss them as theory We note that actions similar to do not tion in existence. on either called the one in this case are sometimes “envi advance these theories on a basis distinct from called "toxic ronmental torts” and sometimes the strict claim. convenience, we use the torts.” As a matter of Court of New Bruno Sher- latter term 2. The court also relied Nieves v. Indus., 361, (1981), Safety E Inc. v. used that term in T & man 86 N.J. 431 A.2d 826 We, Light Corp., day 587 A.2d as how- decided on the same ever, Ramirez. Labels, however, (1991). significant, as length are not have no need to discuss Nieves at by by manufactured first the court denied motion Welsbach and then Kerr-McGee’s September order of 1993. Kerr- Kerr-McGee. Instead the an amendment of the then moved for ease were caused conditions McGee created interlocutory appeal, and operations order to allow an Welsbach’s on land which Wels- granted the amendment the district court bach retained at the time the sale of the an order entered on November 1993. We mantle business to Kerr-McGee and on appeal. granted any then Kerr-McGee leave which Kerr-McGee never conducted Therefore," activities. II. must light DISCUSSION determine whether in of these Ramirez, distinctions the New plenary appeal review as the We exercise Court nevertheless would Family presents Epstein an issue of law. in result Ramirez to this ease.3 Partnership v. Kmart 13 F.3d Cir.1994). (3d Furthermore, 765-66 we will predicated The Ramirez court its conclu- Jersey parties agree law as the New sion that the successor could be applicable. that it is we undertake to injuries by predecessor’s liable caused Supreme predict how the Court of New Jer- (1) product defective on three rationales: sey in would resolve the issues this case. J enterprise virtually sale of the destroyed the Corp. R & Ice Cream Smoothie injured party’s remedy against original California (3d Licensing Corp., (2) 31 F.3d manufacturer; 1270-72 the successor has the abili- Cir.1994). ty original to assume the manufacturer’s role; (3) risk-spreading it is fair to re- Ramirez, start, course, We quire responsibili- successor a assume in A.2d which the Court of ty products responsibili- for defective as that Jersey that: New held ty necessarily was a burden attached to the corporation acquires one all where or sub original being manufacturer’s en- stantially all the assets of joyed by the in oper- successor the continued corporation, exclusively another even ation of the business. Id. 431 A.2d at 820. cash, essentially and undertakes the same Clearly support these rationales do not manufacturing operation selling cor liability extension of successor to Kerr- poration, purchasing corporation is McGee this case. strictly injuries liable for the caused product defects in the units of the same factor, The first the destruction of line, previously even manufactured and injured party’s remedy necessary is a but selling corporation distributed or its place not a basis on which to liabili sufficient predecessor. ty Accordingly, on the successor.4 if the 431 A.2d at As selling corporation entity the district court ac- a remains viable knowledged, distinguishable respond damages injured Ramirez is from able to to the Ramirez, injuries party, this case. Unlike the acquiring a successor line Leo, Yoder, injuries parents and their will not be hable for predecessor’s product product’s were not caused a unit in the after the sale leading Actually, we are concerned with the circumstances we are not certain that Leo and Yoder attempt impose liability to the effectively remedy against do not have a Wels- rather than characterization of the U.G.I., claim. formerly bach as have named known Improvement Company, as United Gas as a de- corporate 3. A successor can be liable for its theory fendant on a Gas dominated United predecessor's debts on other than theories “legally respon- Welsbach and therefore U.G.Í. is recognized liability example, Ramirez. , However, obligations sible for the of Welsbach.” imposed can be on the successor if it assumes the assump- Kerr-McGee has briefed the case on the predecessor’s predecessor liabilities or if the remedy tion that Leo and Yoder do not have a Ramirez, merges into the successor. 431 A.2d at Welsbach, against and thus we decide the case opinion question 815. But we confine our on that basis. may of whether Kerr-McGee be liable based on product-line liability doctrine of successor only that is the basis for that Leo and against Yoder advance Kerr-McGee. of toxic tort associat- be no lessen the risks there would circumstance as in that estate. It is doubtful ed with the real liability. Lapollo impose successor reason product-line purchaser would be able such a (D.N. Co., F.Supp. 178 J. Elec. v. General cleanup operations on it land to undertake 1987) after Ra law (applying New Moreover, product-line not did own. mirez). prod initial rationale for This unwilling purchaser undertake merely doctrine of successor uct-line costly projects.5 It potentially seems such imposition of succes the need for focuses on clear, therefore, applies that if Ramirez fair to than whether rather subject product line will be purchaser of a Therefore, we will hold that it. impose unpredictable for toxic torts of to liabilities recover and Yoder cannot proof that Leo Overall, period. scope for an indefinite dis it has been .against because Welsbach that the cannot conceive a sufficient for the is in itself basis solved purchaser believe that the would Kerr- imposition of successor acquiring the real line not estate McGee. product was rea- at which the manufactured predecessor’s sonably assume its risk rationale on which the Su- could second spreading role for toxic torts.6 its result of New based preme Court ability to was successor’s Ramirez contrast, to a predecessor corporation’s risk- the assume steps its may be to take to reduce risk able think that the spreading role. We prede- liability injuries caused the of for recognize that Jersey would of New products through recall and edu- cessor’s capacity prod- to programs does not have include those Kerr-McGee the cational which Furthermore, liability risk-spreading In successor for role. ucts. Welsbach’s assume by units manufactured the regard, point out successor we that compared po- predecessor, at least when to liability imposed for a tort aris- can be toxic liability, á man- tential tort is discrete toxic operations at a ing predecessor’s from First, may be ageable matter. successor facility acquires or which the successor never reasonably anticipate to the risks able associ- controls, acquiring manufacturer a prudent a Second, product acquiring. with a it is ated analysis of product line would make an envi- liability in product-line applied is successor the seller’s risks associated with ronmental production personal property. of cases of the to that now undertaken facilities similar likely property such is not to Inasmuch as purchaser of real estate. The purchasers life, passage time have an indefinite useful of attempt acquire insurance for then would liability being the chance of will diminish associated with the seller’s possible liabilities imposed successor. on the estate. real exposure diminution of This constant impediment to commercial product liability enhanced rule process from such a is evident. transactions in a followed elsewhere that Indeed, might inasmuch as a manufacturer strictly liable cannot be unless manufacturer parts at product component a or its build product it left was a defect in the when there facility, prod purchaser a than one more control. Scanlon Gen manufacturer’s daunting obstacles in uct face Corp., 65 N.J. eral Motors A.2d attempting to assess its risks of successor (1974). that, except apparent It seems property tort for conditions toxic cases, a in a perhaps design in defect defect product by the seller of the to be retained product when the manufacturer distributed Furthermore,, produet-line purchaser line. a likely product is to manifest itself acquiring predecessor’s manufactur a reasonable time after injury not cause within Accordingly, product is manufactured. ing facility probably be able would not Supreme Court of New Dep’t 6. In Corp. 5. In FMC v. United States Com- Ramirez merce, Cir.1994) (3d (in negative acknowledged that the effect succes- 838-39 29 F.3d banc), product sale government in a case on the estimated cost of envi- "legitimate” manufacturing facility assets was a con- in that cleanup of the involved ronmental Thus, $78,000,- appro- $26,000,000 at 822. we think it cern. 431 litigation at between A.2d priate to consider that effect. us matter, liability un- the site at practical which Welsbaeh manufactured the as a Thus, likely imposed product. to be most Leo and Yoder do not der Ramirez is assert cases, all, period.7 for a limited Fur- this is a case in which at Welsbaeh and thermore, injury encouraged purchasers an from a if there is gas manufacturer’s mantles to long time after it leaves the associate them with their source, as, hands, injured may geographical e.g., plaintiff genuine have difficul- “a establishing widget widget the defect existed in the manufactured in the ty center of originally Consequently, product when manufactured and world.” while Leo and point using purchase the time scenario Yoder out that distributed. Kerr-McGee’s successor in it would be unusual for the Welsbaeh mantle line was defending profitable, profit to be an action attribute that case part for a that could have will it in the 1990’s Wels- bach, point built at the latest is immaterial. been reaching result, quite naturally our On the other hand toxic tort opinion City Philadelphia consider our imposed for activities in the distant can be (3d Ass’n, v. Lead Indus. 994 F.2d 112 Cir. Indus., Light Safety T E Inc. v. past. See & 1993). There we indicated that while: (1991).8 Corp., 123 N.J. 587 A.2d 1249 may judicial federal court act [a] as a potential toxic tort fol This tail on pioneer interpreting when the United lowing disposal of chemical wastes is States Constitution and ... federal law to the fact that the toxic wastes attributable case, however, diversity [i]n federal may ground long periods, remain in the may judicial engage courts activism. injury exposing persons property thus require per- Federalism concerns that we Indeed, long after has ended. mit state courts to decide whether and to long this ease demonstrates how the succes they expand what extent will state common for toxic torts. Further sor can face claims apply law.... Our role is to the current more, difficulty purchaser the that the jurisdiction, of law the and leave it undis- assessing in of product line will have its risk turbed. liability compared as to its risk for toxic torts liability of successor is further (internal quotations Id. at 123 citations and injuries

heightened by fact that omitted). whereas liability im- We could allow to be products likely are trau from defective to be posed only in this case Kerr-McGee we obvious, matic, inju immediately and thus be beyond original stretched Ramirez far its ry exposure may devel from to toxic wastes and, scope light City Philadelphia in of of period. op over an extended We also ob Ass’n, Inc., Lead Indus. not do that. will likely serve that it would be more that the the' district court believed that this While acquire coverage could insurance successor holding, case could come within the Ramirez flowing for the discrete risks from large part in it reached that conclusion be- directly by predecessor’s product thought it traditional cause of what was “the than for environmental risks from conditions you injured view that are New on real estate. somebody ought to be liable for it.” But we reject approach. While we rationale, that it fair The third Ramirez willing apply precedents of the New require responsi- a successor to assume Jersey Supreme Court circumstances bility products responsi- defective as beyond somewhat the limits of bility necessarily is a burden attached to the cases, recognized in extant we will court has predecessor’s acquisition successor’s Ramirez in the circumstances will, application in this good has no case. beyond which are far the limits of that case. good The will that Kerr-McGee parties in closing, we note that the from Welsbaeh was attached to mantles, involving liability acquired, gas rather than to briefs discuss cases of suc- Indus, course, length period depends recognize person- 8. We that T & E is not a 7. Of of injury al demonstrate how it is quences case. Nevertheless we cite the case to type example, ma- involved. possible that the conse- chinery might longer automobiles. last than disposal may of chemical endure for a long very period. Jersey’s Development New A. The property and contaminated acquiring cessors Line” Doctrine arising “Product involving liabilities other cases real estate. and activities on ownership of plain- the district court denied the When Indus., Safety Light Inc. v. See, E e.g., T & Summary Judgment, it re- tiffs’ Motion for 1249; Jersey, New State A.2d Corp., 587 defining present string of cases lied on a v. Ventron Protection Envtl. Dep’t theory corpora- of successor “product line” (1983). have A.2d 150 We 94 N.J. From liability for strict torts. tion not discuss but do cases these examined opinions, dis- these the trend formed tangential only them, have the most “predicted” how the trict court light of the fact this case relationship to present rule under the would owned, or never controlled that Kerr-McGee district court factual circumstances. on the Gloucester engaged activities product line doctrine succes- held that the property. liability originally adopted in Ramirez v. Industries, Inc., Amsted III. CONCLUSION (1981), applied should be to include A.2d 811 predecessor corpora- September where a the order of circumstances reverse We will improperly disposed of toxic manufactur- tion remand matter factory and then summary judg- ing by-products on its site entry aof court for district patented process, sold entire Kerr-McGee. favor of ment in will, inventory, trade sales records and specially ATKINS, Judge, itself, District name, factory Senior not the site but concurring: corporation which continues the manufacturing process at site. same different fact, not reflect the record does While dealing Upon of the line of cases review judicial proce- notice of judge takes theory corpo- “product line” of successor Supreme Courts dure, by 44 of the adopted cases, I products rate courts, appellate final state comparable or the district court was correct believe that appellate to submit courts permitting federal determining that the New courts, in- by such questions for resolution apply the strict doctrine Court would remain law issues that volving common state liability environmental under to a strict tort cries for deci- procedure out “open.” Such circumstances. these factual judice. The issue appeal sub sion Analysis majority opinion clearly B. concerns, so demonstrates, this should hold whether corporate not a the This is case where degrada- for entity liable environmental an purchases of the land that some engrandizement for commercial tion of land and then con predecessor the contaminated degrada- obviously profited from such after it land. separate tinued a business tion, was not though acquisition of land even Therefore, Dept. Environmental State of purchase. This salu- part product line of N.J.Super. Corp., 151 Protection Exxon procedure avoids tary certification (Ch.Div.1977), 464, is distin 376 A.2d 1339 valid, admittedly the federal charge, is, however, guishable. This case more like extending, gratuitously, avoid courts should Ramirez, supra, in product that Welsbach’s of the states within the law the common as all or substantial line could be considered jurisdiction. Philadel- ambit of of ly manufacturing assets which were all of the Ass’n, 112 F.2d phia Industries 994 v. Lead by predecessors. acquired Kerr-McGee’s (3d Cir.1993). if exclu the assets were even what, cash, and its

Here, sively for and Kerr-McGee upon called to we are decide essentially facts, predecessors undertook the same under new set of Welsbach, manufacturing operation Kerr- issue it has of would decide an strictly injuries liable for upon to Our McGee should called consider. never been by by in units or by Jersey’s fail- defects waste problem complicated New is prod of the same procedure per- production those units a certification provide ure to of line, previously uct manufactured proper voice even mitting it to have a needed Ramirez, 431 See law of its Welsbach. development in the distributed common A.2d at 825. state.

103 (1981), Ray Corp., policies gauge injury v. Alad was able “to The risks of Cal.Rptr. 560 P.2d 3 from product defects the [Welsbach] Cal.3d line (1977), Ramirez, supra, apply similarly costs,” and to bear accident-avoidance present plaintiffs case. First since intimately Kerr-MeGee was familiar Welsbach, remedy against origi- potential production with the of mantles and the nal manufacturer who caused the contamina- manufacturing unavoidable thorium waste. tion, destroyed by was the Kerr-McGee’s Id. 431 A.2d at support 830. Evidence to assets, name, purchase of Welsbach’s trade this conclusion is Lindsay’s acquisi found good resulting will and dissolu- Welsbach’s tion of all the assets and sources of informa words, acquisi- tion. In other Kerr-McGee’s tion related to the Welsbach line. destroyed remedy plaintiff tion whatever apply also should to Kerr- Second, against have had Welsbach. “acquisition MeGee because Kerr-McGee’s of imposition corporation of successor liabil- manufacturing opera the business assets and ity upon is consistent Kerr-MeGee tion [Welsbach] contributed to the destruc public policy spreading society to the risk plaintiffs against tion of the remedies large injuries at for the costs of from contam- original manufacturer” — Welsbach. Id. 431 ination due to a line. This is be- Finally, A.2d at 831. Dept. like State corporation cause the successor is a better Environmental Protection v. Ventron position to bear accident-avoidance costs. In (1983), 468 A.2d 150 I believe case, position is in a Kerr-McGee better that this Court should follow the New to bear the costs because Welsbach trans- application Court’s of strict ferred to the resource that had torts, in environmental Department see previously been to available Welsbach Resources, Inc., Transportation v. PSC meeting responsibilities persons in- (Law N.J.Super. 419 A.2d 1151 Div. jured Third, operated. 1980), apply product line strict imposition upon responsi- Kerr-McGee of this environmental tort. bility claims of answer “predicted” The district court in this case allegedly caused Welsbach’s Jersey Supreme that the New Court would justified necessarily as a burden attached apply the Ramirez successor name, enjoyment to its of Welsbaeh’s trade liability product strict line doctrine to strict and the continuation of an estab- liability environmental actions. this is Since enterprise. lished impression Jersey, an issue of first in New “[pjublie policy having requires that received truly “predicting” the district court was continuing the substantial benefits Hence, permitted prognosticate, result. manufacturing enterprise, the successor cor- I too would hold that the New Su- poration should also be made to bear the preme Court would the doctrine of operating burden of the costs that other es- strict to this environmental case operations ordinarily tablished business must However, thus affirm the district court. Ramirez, light bear.” 431 A.2d at 822. “[I]n apply while I that the decision believe policy underlying of the social the law of doctrine to environmental cases should be products liability, prede- the true worth of a court, highest left the hands or the state potential cessor must reflect the certify question there is no method to such a liability that the escaped shareholders have to the court. through corporation.” the sale of their Id. City Philadelphia C. Restraint To avoid such Kerr-McGee could products liability have insurance “obtain[ed] Despite my firm conviction that the district claims, contingent liability it [could and affirmed, court should be I am constrained partial have into full or entered] indemnifica- philosophical court in tenet of this agreements selling tion or escrow with the City Philadelphia, supra, respect which I of adopt. 823; corporation.” Id. 431 A.2d at see La appointed are not to be We Co., F.Supp. Pollo v. General Electric interpret activists but to the law as (D.N.J.1987). However, danger- it. I that a we see believe Kerr-McGee, precedent if this court contin- like Bruno in Nieves v. Bru- ous will be set path prohibits no down the which direct Sherman 431 A.2d 826 ues Primarily, the doctrines. application of state will jurisdictional statutes

removal final prevent resolution a sword

used as example, where a defen-

a state claim. highest court the state’s

dant realizes circum- specific factual on their

has not ruled

stance, developed a doctrine has but defendant, then be adverse assuredly most remove will

defendant that, knowing appeal, court

case to federal summary judg- grant court circuit Phila- favor based on

ment create an atmo- The result will delphia. rights will be vindi-

sphere state never where proceed to their cases will

cated and conclusion.

ultimate join reluctantly, I the ma-

Accordingly and remanding this matter to the district

jority summary entry judgment

favor of Kerr-McGee. CO., a New DEVELOPMENT

FISHER Partnership Limited

v. CORPORATION; CASCADE

BOISE Industries, Keystone

Chesapeake Inc.; Company; Reliance Universal

Millwork severally jointly

Chemicals,

the alternative. CORPORATION, CASCADE

BOISE

Defendant/Third-Party Plaintiff COMPANY, PRODUCTS

PACIFIC WOOD P.W.P.; Plywood Panels, Davidson

a/k/a Inc., Third-Party Defendants. Development Co., Appellant.

Fisher 93-5163.

No. Appeals, Court of

United States

Third Circuit.

Argued Nov. Sept.

Decided

Case Details

Case Name: Leo v. Kerr-McGee Chemical Corp.

Court Name: Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit

Date Published: Sep 16, 1994

Citation: 37 F.3d 96

Docket Number: 93-5730

Court Abbreviation: 3rd Cir.