Leo Mitchell filed applications with the Social Security Administration seeking disability-insurance benefits in 1990. His application for benеfits was denied and, after a hearing, the ALJ 1 rendered a decision finding that Mitchell was not disabled. The Appeals Council adoptеd the ALJ’s determination, and Mitchell sought judicial review. Both parties moved for summary judgment. The District Court 2 granted summary judgment for the government, holding that there is substantial evidence on the record as a whole to support the Secretary’s decision. We affirm.
I.
At the time of the hearing before the ALJ Mr. Mitchell was 56 years old, 5'11" tall, weighed about 135 pounds, and had past relevant work experience as a laborer. He had completed the eighth grade, and when questioned about whether he could read, he replied that he could “read a little until my
Mr. Mitchell testified that he cares for himself, cooks his own foоd, takes walks during the day, and gets rides from his sons. Although he cannot garden extensively, he does plant a couple of tomato рlants. The claimant was informed that he could have an attorney represent him if he wanted. Mr. Mitchell proceeded without counsel. Dennis Mitchell, appellant’s son, corroborated Mr. Mitchell’s testimony.
The ALJ found that Mr. Mitchell’s impairments precluded him from thе heavy strenuous work that he had done in the past, but that he retained the residual functional capacity to perform a full range of medium work. After finding Mr. Mitchell could not return to his past relevant work, the ALJ shifted the burden of proof to the Secretary, who then had to establish that a substantial number of jobs existed in the national economy which realistically suited Mr. Mitchell’s abilities. The ALJ propеrly stated that this burden can be met by using the Medical/Vocational Guidelines.
O’Leary v. Schweiker,
II.
We limit our review of the Secretary’s decision to a dеtermination whether the decision is supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole.
Neely v. Shalala,
Mr. Mitchell offers three theories. First, he argues that the ALJ failed to call a vocational expert to assess the effect of the plaintiffs non-exertional impairments on his ability to perform the full range of medium work. Second, he urges that the ALJ failed to develop the facts about his impairments fully and fairly, in light of the fact that the plaintiff was not represented by counsel. Finally, he asserts the ALJ erred by failing to apply the “worn-out worker rule.” These arguments are not insubstantial, but we believe the law constrains us to disagree with them.
Applying the criteria set forth in
Polaski v. Heckler,
Mr. Mitchell also alleges that the ALJ failed to develop the record sufficiently to provide a fair heаring to an unrepresented claimant. The ALJ does have a duty to develop facts fully and fairly. This duty is enhanced when the claimant is not represented by counsel.
Highfill v. Bowen,
The ALJ obtained a consultative physical examination for Mr. Mitchell. That examination appears to be the first time Mr. Mitchell complained about his wrist, and the first time his mild degenerative joint disease was recorded. The examination provided the ALJ with а complete medical record. Mr. Mitchell argues that the ALJ should have made further inquiries about his educational level.
Finally, Mr. Mitchell argues that the ALJ should have applied the “wоrn-out worker rule.” See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1562, 416.962 (1993). As we see it, however, the ALJ in effect did apply the “worn-out worker rule” when he applied the Medical/Vocational Guidelines (the Grid), 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, App. 2, in his determination that Mr. Mitchell was not disabled. The ALJ found that Mr. Mitchell (1) could not perfоrm his past relevant work as a laborer, (2) had the residual functional capacity to perform the full range of medium work, (3) was 56 yеars old, ie., advanced in age, and (4) had a limited education. These are the elements the Grid uses to determine whether a clаimant is disabled, and these are the same elements Mr. Mitchell argues should be used to determine whether an individual is a worn-out worker. Thеrefore, this argument also fails.
Appellant informs us that he has filed a motion for relief from judgment under Fed. R.Civ.P. 60(b) in the District Court. The motion is based on newly discovered evidence that is said to show that Mr. Mitchell’s educational level is only “marginal,” rather than “limited.” If this is true, the clаimant would apparently be entitled to benefits under the “worn-out worker rule.” No evidence bearing on this motion is in the record bеfore us. We express no view on the merits of the motion, and our action today is without prejudice to the District Court’s right to decide it in the first instance.
We affirm.