20 S.E. 831 | Va. | 1894
delivered the opinion of the court.
This is an appeal from a decree of the circuit court of Rockingham county rendered on the 31st of October, 1892, in the suit in equity therein then pending wherein John E.
The injunction was granted according to the prayer of the bill. The J. P. Houck Tanning Company demurred to and answered the bill. In its answer, to which only a very brief reference is necessary, this respondent says that it contracted with Charles Lennig as set forth in the copy of the agreement filed with complainant’s bill, and with the full relief that the said Lennig was the legal and rightful owner of the said land, and had the right to contract with respondent as he did ; that respondent company was conducting an extensive tanning business at Harrisonburg, and had recently arranged, at very heavy cost, to greatly extend and enlarge
At the April term, 1891, the death of the defendant Charles Lennig was suggested, and the cause was revived against his executors, the appellants Nicholas Lennig and John B. Lennig. And at the October term, 1891, by leave of court, the executors filed their demurrer to the plaintiff’s bill, assigning several specific grounds of demurrer, to which the plaintiff replied generally, and the same was argued by counsel •, upon consideration whereof the court overruled the demurrer. And thereupon, on the motion of said executors, leave was given them to file their answer, and the same was then filed, with general replication thereto. In their answer they admit that on the 5th day of March, 1196, there was granted by the commonwealth of Virginia to John Barclay, of the city of Philadelphia, a tract of 93,000 acres of land, situated as set forth in the complainant’s bill; they suppose it is true that said Barclay died many years ago, but they say they are not informed whether the persons named in the bill are the heirs of John
Instead of passing seriatim upon the question directly and incidentally .presented by the record, we will present our view of the whole case, in order that the correctness of the conclusion arrived at may be more readily apprehended. The 93,000 acres of land in controversy was granted by the commonwealth of Virginia to John Barclay by patent dated the 5th day of March, 1796, and the same was regularly entered on the land books of the state, and the taxes assessed thereon in his name from the year 1797 to the year 1806, inclusive; not one cent of which has ever been paid by said Barclay or his heirs, or by any other person for him or ■them. Uot only was this land so delinquent and forfeited to the state of Virginia, but it was also delinquent for the nonpayment of the United States direct tax charged thereon in pursuance of certain acts of congress which need not be here enumerated, it being admitted in the plaintiff’s bill that the land was so delinquent, and was in 1806 sold by Jos. Scott, United States marshal for the district of Virginia, for Ahe nonpayment of such taxes, and that the same was at such
Moreover, under the title in question, numerous smaller tracts, parts of the Waterman survey, have been sold and conveyed, and the purchasers thereof have recorded conveyances, which were properly recorded, have been put in possession, and have built on, cultivated, and improved their
In Taylor v. Burnsides, 1 Gratt. 165, Judge Baldwin, at page 192, clearly defines adversary possession and the essential elements thereof. He says : ‘ ‘An adversary possession must also be actual, in reference to the means by which it is acquired. In that sense, I understand an actual possession to be the occupation, use, or enjoyment of the subject-matter of controversy, by residence, cultivation, improvement, or other open, notorious, and habitual acts,,of ownership. Of occupation, use, or enjoyment, residence, cultivation, and improvement, respectively, while they continue, are usually the most obvious and decisive. But there may be other open, notorious, and habitual acts of ownership, of quite equivalent import and effect. Take, for example, the case of a town resident who, claiming title to a lot or tract of woodland in the vicinity, openly, notoriously, and habitually cuts and hauls from it his necessary supplies of fuel, or in like manner makes it a source of revenue, by sales of firewood or timber ; or the case of an uninclosed or unimproved lot in or near á city, devoted by the professed owner to his use or profit as a coal or lumber yard, quarry, or landing place. There cannot be stronger instances of
Counsel for the appellee, seizing upon this criticism by Judge Baldwin, and evidently misled thereby, comes to the conclusion that the doctrine of adversary possession is incorrectly laid down by Mr. Justice Baldwin in Ewing v. Burnet, and has been repudiated by the courts of this and other states. This is obviously a mistake. The doctrine laid down by Mr. Justice Baldwin in Ewing v. Burnet is that held by the supreme court both before and since that decision, and, consequent thereto, has been reaffimed by Mr. Justice Clifford in Harris v. McGovern, 99 U. S. 161, decided in 1878; by Justice Field in Fletcher v. Fuller, 120 U. S. 534, 7 Sup. Ct. 667, decided in 1887; and by Chief Justice Fuller in Coal Co. v. Doran, 142 U. S. 417, 12 Sup. Ct.
It should be borne in mind that, prior to the emanation of the title under which the testator of the appellants claimed, the title of John Barclay, the original grantee, had become delinquent, and was forfeited and was extinct, by reason whereof the land was sold and conveyed by the United States, marshal; that it was not only delinquent and forfeited by reason of the nonpayment of the United States direct tax lawfully charged thereon, but was delinquent and forfeited by reason of the nonpayment of the taxes lawfully assessed thereon by the state from the year 1797 to the year 1806, inclusive, not one cent of which was ever paid; that since 1806 this land has never been on the land books in the name of John Barclay, or of any one claiming under him; that from 1806 down to the present time the land has been regularly on the land boobs in the names of the testator of the-appellants and those under whom he claimed, and they have regularly paid all the taxes assessed thereon; that not only
These acts of ownership were so open, notorious, and habitual, continuing, as they did, for over 80 years next
In view of all the circumstances disclosed by the record,, the conclusion is irresistible that the appellee became the so-called purchaser of the claim asserted by him purely as a matter of bold adventure and speculation, and that he made the so-called purchase with full knowledge of the adverse claim of the testator of the appellants, which had stood unchallenged and uninterrupted for over 80 years. Notice may be actual or constructive, and, whether the one or the other, the result is the same. It is the settled doctrine that whatever circumstances are sufficient to put a purchaser upon an inquiry, which, if pursued, would lead to the requisite knowledge and-information, are sufficient to charge him with actual knowledge of the facts to which such circumstances would lead him ; or, in other words, he must look to the title papers under which he buys, and is charged with notice of all the facts appearing upon its face, or to the knowledge of which anything appearing there will conduct him. Or, in the yet more appropriate and expressive language of Mr. Justice Strong, in De Cordova v. Hood, 17 Wall. 1, where that learned judge said: “Whenever inquiry is a duty, the party bound to make it id affected with knowledge of all which he would have discovered had he performed the duty. Means of knowledge, with the duty of using them, are, in equity, equivalent to knowledge itself.” See, also, Long v. Weller, 29 Gratt. 347; Wood v. Krebbs, 30 Gratt. 708; Coles v. Withers, 33 Gratt. 186; Lamar’s Ex’r v. Hale, 79 Va. 147; Hurn v. Keller, Id. 415; Effinger v.
It is in proof that the most diligent and laborious search has been made in the different departments of government, federal and state, and in every other direction where there-could be the least hope of discovering any evidence of the-regularity of the tax sale ; but, after the lapse of so many years, it has been impossible to discover all the evidence-necessary to show affirmatively that said sale was made, in every particular, in conformity to the requirements of law. Moreover, it is in proof that the private papers of the twoWatermans were many years ago destroyed by fire. The law required the marshal in such cases to return and file in the district court at Eichmond the report of sale, who was, the purchaser, and the amount for which the land was sold, with other evidences of the regularity of the sale. In all probability, the papers necessary for the purpose would have been found in the clerk’s office, or among the papers of that court; but, unfortunately, as the proof shows, a large quantity of the papers of that court and office were consumed in the great conflagration which added so much terror to the closing scenes of that great civil strife which devastated and impoverished this commonwealth throughout her borders. Was it possible to do more than was done to protect the title in question ? We think not. In respect to said tax sale, and in view of the peculiar circumstances of hardship attending this case, and the great lapse of time and seeming acquiescence on the part of John Barclay and those claiming under him, and the apparent abandonment of all claim on their part,' it will be presumed that all was done that the law required to be done, and that said sale was regular and valid. In Black on Tax Titles (2d Ed. § 161) it is said : ‘ ‘Mere lapse of time will not, of itself, afford presumptive evidence of the regularity of a tax sale, if the pur
It would be useless to adduce arguments and quote authorities to show the peculiar appropriateness of the principle above stated to the case in hand. We do not assert the proposition that in the present case the marshal’s deed is prima facie evidence of title ; and, while it may not be such, yet we do assert that it constitutes color of title under which the testator of the appellants and those under whom he claimed entered upon and enjoyed the premises ; not by actual residence, cultivation, and improvement, but by “other open, notorious, and habitual acts of ownership,” exercised con
In conclusion, it only remains to say that in the light of all the facts disclosed by the record, it is undeniably true that the conduct of J ohn Barclay and his heirs from the time of the tax sale to the bringing of this suit has'been such as is consistent only with an absolute abandonment, with complete notice of all the circumstances; of all claim to the land
Lace and Fauxtlerov, JJ., absent.