Lenis v. U.S. Attorney GeneralLenis v. U.S. Attorney General
- Reporters:
- , ,
- Before:
- Marcus
Petitioners Clara Ines Lenis, her husband Orlando Herrera, and their two children Tatiana Herrera and Marlon Herrera
The dispositive issue is whether we have jurisdiction to review the BIA’s denial of a motion to reopen the underlying immigration proceedings based on its sua sponte authority. We are, of course, always required to address whether we have subject-matter jurisdiction. Chacon-Botero v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 427 F.3d 954, 956 (11th Cir.2005).
This kind of challenge — asking whether the BIA abused its discretion by refusing to reopen proceedings under
Ten courts of appeals have held that they have no jurisdiction to hear an appeal of the BIA’s denial of a motion to reopen based on its
sua sponte
authority.
See Luis v. INS,
196 F.3d 36, 40 (1st Cir.1999);
Ali v. Gonzales,
448 F.3d 515, 518 (2d Cir.2006) (per curiam);
Calle-Vujiles v. Ashcroft,
320 F.3d 472, 474-75 (3d Cir.2003); D
oh v. Gonzales,
193 Fed.Appx. 245, 246 (4th Cir.2006) (per curiam) (un
It is undisputed that under the Administrative Procedure Act, judicial review is not available when “agency action is committed to agency discretion by law.”
Neither the statute nor the regulation at issue today provides any “meaningful standard against which to judge the agency’s exercise of discretion.” Indeed, no statute expressly authorizes the BIA to reopen cases
sua sponte-,
rather, the regulation at issue derives from a statute that grants general authority over immigration and nationalization matters to the Attorney General, and sets no standard for the Attorney General’s decision-making in this context.
See
The provision reposes very broad discretion in the BIA “to reopen or reconsider” any motion it has rendered at any time or, on the other hand, “[to] deny a motion to reopen.” [ 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a) .] The discretion accorded in this provision is so wide that “even if the party moving has made out a prima facie case for relief,” the BIA can deny a motion to reopen a deportation order. Id. No language in the provision requires the BIA to reopen a deportation proceeding under any set of particular circumstances. Instead, the provision merely provides the BIA the discretion to reopen immigration proceedings as it sees fit.
188 F.3d at 1279;
see also Tamenut,
521 F.3d at 1004 (“The use of permissive and discretionary language in the first sentence of
For these reasons, we hold that the BIA’s decision whether to reopen proceedings on its own motion pursuant to
Accordingly, the petition for review must be and is DISMISSED.
Notes
. This regulation,
. Indeed, the jurisdictional question was never raised in
Anin.
Rather, the parties essentially addressed the merits of whether the BIA abused its discretion under the statute,
.Since Anin, this Court’s unpublished opinions have reached differing conclusions about whether we have jurisdiction to review the BIA’s decision not to reopen based on its sua sponte authority. Compare Tofade v. U.S. Att‘y Gen., 236 F. App’x 526, 528 (11th Cir.2007) (unpublished) (holding that this Court lacks jurisdiction), Lushaj v. U.S. Att‘y Gen., 197 Fed.Appx. 881, 885 (11th Cir.2006) (unpublished) (same), and Umana v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 176 Fed.Appx. 15, 17 (11th Cir.2006) (unpublished) (same), with Finlayson-Green v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 228 Fed.Appx. 919, 921 (11th Cir.) (unpublished) (holding that this Court has jurisdiction), cert. denied, -U.S.—, 128 S.Ct. 733, 169 L.Ed.2d 553 (2007), Banmally v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 199 Fed.Appx. 936, 937 n. 1 (11th Cir.2006) (unpublished) (same), and Rahman v. U.S. Att‘y Gen., 187 Fed.Appx. 962, 965-66 (11th Cir.2006) (unpublished) (same). Because these opinions were unpublished, however, they have no precedential value. See 11th Cir. Rule 36-2; United States v. Taman, 454 F.3d 1259, 1262 n. 4 (11th Cir.2006).
. In an earlier decision, the Ninth Circuit held that it had jurisdiction over a BIA decision under
. The statute provides:
The Attorney General shall establish such regulations, prescribe such forms of bond, reports, entries, and other papers, issue such instructions, review such administrative determinations in immigration proceedings, delegate such authority, and perform such other acts as the Attorney General determines to be necessary for carrying out this section.
. The regulation provides:
The Board may at any time reopen or reconsider on its own motion any case in which it has rendered a decision. A request to reopen or reconsider any case in which a decision has been made by the Board, which request is made by the Service, or by the party affected by the decision, must be in the form of a written motion to the Board. The decision to grant or deny a motion to reopen or reconsider is within the discretion of the Board, subject to the restrictions of this section. The Board has discretion to deny a motion to reopen even if the party moving has made out a prima facie case for relief.
. We note, in passing, that an appellate court may have jurisdiction over constitutional claims related to the BIA’s decision not to exercise its sua sponte power. As the Eighth Circuit observed, “[a]lthough this court lacks jurisdiction over Tamenut’s challenge to the BIA’s decision not to reopen sua sponte, we generally do have jurisdiction over any color-able constitutional claim.” Tamenut, 521 F.3d 1000, 1005 (citations omitted). However, no constitutional claim is raised today, and we, therefore, have no occasion to examine that question.