455 Pa. 225 | Pa. | 1974
Opinion by
The sole issue involved in this appeal is whether or not the West Virginia marriage of Sarah T. Lenherr to Leo A. Lenherr, the decedent, will be recognized in this Commonwealth for purposes of the marital exemp
The pertinent facts are as follows. On October 23, 1930, the deceased, Leo A. Lenherr was divorced on the grounds of adultery from his then wife Anna Kelly Lenherr and Sarah Barney [Lenherr] was named as the corespondent. On December 27,1930, Sarah was divorced from her then husband William K. Barney on the grounds of adultery and Leo Lenherr was named as corespondent.
On March 12, 1932, after the two divorce decrees were entered and while William Barney and Anna Lenherr were living, Leo Lenherr and Sarah Gillespie Barney were married in West Virginia. They returned to Pennsylvania where they lived as husband and wife until the death of Leo Lenherr in August of 1971.
At the outset, it should be noted that all parties agree that Leo and Sarah’s marriage was valid under the applicable laws of West Virginia. This dispute arises because of the Act of June 17, 1971, P. L. 174, §1, wnending, Act of March 13, 1815, P. L. 150, §9, 48 P.S. §169 (Supp. 1973-74), which provides: “The hus
The Commonwealth argues that, by virtue of the above statutes, Leo and Sarah were under a personal disability not to marry each other while either former spouse yet lived,
We must determine first whether or not Pennsylvania law forbade the marriage of Leo and Sarah, for if it did not, then appellant must prevail regardless of whether we apply Pennsylvania or West Virginia Law. Section 169 prohibits the marital partner guilty of adultery from marrying his or her paramour during the lifetime of the former spouse. Section 1-5 is a companion provision which prohibits the issuance of a license for such a marriage. While Section 169 does not specify the nature of the judicial proceeding in which the adjudication of guilt is to be made, Section 1-5 specifies that no license shall be issued “to a person divorced ... on the grounds of adultery. . . .” This
Having concluded that the laws of Pennsylvania and West Virginia are in conflict with regard to the validity of this marriage, we must next determine which law should be applied in this case. In addressing choice-of-law problems, several competing principles come into play
Specifically regarding conflicts as to recognition of marital status, there is a strong policy favoring uniformity of result. In an age of widespread travel and ease of mobility, it would create inordinate confusion
The Restatement provides the following guidelines for resolving these conflicting principles :
“(1) The validity of a marriage will be determined by the local law of the state which, with respect to the particular issue, has the most significant relationship to the spouses and the marriage under the principles stated in §6. [See n.2, supra.]
“(2) A marriage which satisfies the requirements of the state where the marriage was contracted will everywhere be recognized as valid unless it violates the strong public policy of another state which had the most significant relationship to the spouses and the marriage at the time of the marriage.” Restatement 2d, supra, §283. Since both Leo and Sarah were residents of Pennsylvania before and after their West Virginia marriage, we have no trouble concluding that Pennsylvania has the most significant relationship to the spouses and the marriage. It remains for us to determine whether the policy behind section 169 is so strong that it must be given extraterritorial effect in this case, thereby destroying the uniformity of result which is so desirable in a case concerning the recognition of a marriage that is valid in the state where it was contracted.
In resolving that conflict, we must realize that the strength of the policy behind section 169 depends to a significant degree upon the incident of marriage under consideration. For example, the legislature has determined that at least one incident of marriage—the legiti
It is apparent from the terms of section 169 that the provision is intended not so much as a penalty upon the parties who failed to recognize the sanctity of the former marriage vow as it is intended to protect the sensibilities of the injured spouse. Were it otherwise, the prohibition would not be limited to the lifetime of that spouse. Compare, Newman v. Kimbrough, 59 S.W. 1061, 1064 (Tenn. Ch. App. 1900). As we said in Stull’s Estate, supra, 183 Pa. at 632: “. . . Now believing, as we do, that the statute in question, which we are called upon to construe in the case at bar, is expressive of a decided state policy not to permit the sensibilities of the injured and innocent husband or wife who has been driven by the adultery of his or her consort to the necessity of obtaining a divorce, to be wounded, or the public decency to be affronted, by being forced to witness the continued cohabitation of the adulterous pair, even under the guise of a subsequent marriage performed in another state for the purpose of evading our statute, and believing that the moral sense of the community is shocked and outraged by such an exhibition, we will not allow such parties to shield themselves behind a general rule of the law of marriage, the wisdom and perpetuity of which depends as much upon the judicious exceptions thereto as upon the inherent right of the rule itself’.”
We are convinced that denying the marital exemption would be all but fruitless in achieving the above goals. Moreover, we must balance any illusory gain from such denial against the need for uniformity of result in this area and against the statutory policy that the property of two persons living as man and wife and held in their joint names with right of survivorship is in reality the product of their joint efforts and should pass to the survivor without the imposition of a tax. Both of those policies would be frustrated by applying section 169 to this marriage. On balance, we find that the degree to which the policy behind section 169 will be fostered by application in this case is significantly outweighed by countervailing policies. We therefore decline to apply Pennsylvania law to invalidate this marriage for this purpose.
The decree of the Orphans’ Court is reversed and the case is remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Since William K. Barney was alive at the death of Leo Lenherr, this alleged disability to marry did not terminate in time to permit validation of the relationship on a theory of common law marriage. See, Warrenberger v. Folsom, 239 IT. 2d 846 (3d Cir. 1956).
The only Pennsylvania case specifically deciding this issue has reached the same result. Kalmbacher v. Kalmbacher, 63 D. & C. 195, 202 (1945).
The Restatement of the Law, Conflict of Laws 2d, §6 outlines those principles as follows: “(a) the needs of the interstate and international systems, (b) the relevant policies of the forum, (c) the relevant policies of other interested states and the relative interests of those states in the determination of the particular issue, (d) the protection of justified expectations, (e) the basic policies underlying the particular field of law, (f) certainty, predictability and uniformity of result, and (g) ease in the determination and application of the law to be applied.”
Such an approach to conflicts is not novel. See, In Re Dalip Singh Bir’s Estate, 188 P. 2d 499 (Cal. App. 1948), suggesting that a polygamous marriage was valid for purposes of succession regardless of whether it might be valid for purposes of cohabitation.