25 A.2d 725 | Pa. | 1942
This is an appeal from the dismissal of exceptions to a decree of distribution in the estate of Leonard A. Lenhart, and involves the construction of two clauses of the will which raise separate and independent questions.
1. The testator died in December, 1938, after having made his last will and testament dated May 3, 1906, wherein he bequeathed $25,000 to his sister, Lizzie B. McCormick, and then provided as follows: "I direct my executor hereinafter named to pay the balance of my subscription to the Capital stock of the Century Coke Co. on Ten Thousand dollars making my interest in said Company Twenty-five thousand dollars. This stock when the assessments hereinbefore provided is paid I give and bequeath to my brother Charles E. Lenhart." The appellants, representatives of Charles E. Lenhart who predeceased testator, claimed in the court below, as they do now, that this legacy to Charles E. Lenhart was general or demonstrative and that they were entitled to receive $25,000 either from the general assets of the estate or from the rentals and royalties arising under the lease referred to in the next paragraph. The court below, properly we think, held that this legacy was specific.
Shortly after execution of his will, testator paid the balance of his subscription to stock of the Century Coke Co. and certificates for 250 shares with a par value of $100 a share were issued to him October 15, 1906. In 1933 he acquired 250 additional shares so that he died possessed of 500 shares. It is conceded that this stock was of no value at the date of decedent's death. Among the assets of the estate were several notes of the Coke *360 Company. The administratrices entered judgment on these, issued execution, bought in the property of the Coke Company on behalf of the estate and with the approval of court leased it to Hillman Gas Coal Company.
"A specific legacy is a gift of a specific thing, or of some particular portion of the testator's estate, which is so described by the testator's will as to distinguish it from other articles of the same general nature": 4 Page on Wills p. 112. Also see Wood's Estate,
An examination of our own cases dealing with gifts of stocks and bonds confirms our conclusion. A gift of a certain number of shares of stock without indicating any specific lot of stock is not prima facie specific but is a general legacy even if the testator owned the exact number of shares of stock (Snyder's Est., supra, p. 75; 4 Page on Wills p. 122), but a reference to a stock as belonging to the testator, as by the use of the word "my", shows that the gift is specific: Horn'sEst.,
The appellants, after citing the general principle that in construing a will the testator's intention should *361 be determined after a consideration of the will as an entire work, called attention to the inequality that would be created if the sister received $25,000 and the brother received worthless stock. The total gifts to the sister and her children and the brother and his children, as viewed when the will was made, were not equal, as an examination of the testament shows. Even if an inequality was created by subsequent events, it would not be sufficient to overcome the plain words of the testament. The same situation existed in Crawford's Est., supra, p. 577, and we there said: "It is a sufficient answer to say that the will so provides and it cannot be disregarded." We can only conclude that this bequest was specific.
2. The testator, after making other devises and bequests, by a residuary clause in his will provided: "Lastly I give and bequeath the balance and residue of my estate to the children of my sister Lizzie B. McCormick and the children of Charles E. Lenhart share and share alike." The court below held that all the children took per capita and not per stirpes. Appellants argue that the children should take per stirpes. The rule generally applicable is thus stated in 2 Jarman on Wills 756: "Where a gift is to the children of several persons, whether it be the children of A and B, or the children of A and the children of B, they take per capita, not per stirpes." This principle was approved by us in Garnier v. Garnier,
The testator passed over his brother and sister, parents of the children who were to take whether the parents were alive or not. This would tend to show that the children were treated as individuals and not as representatives of their parents: cf.Davis's Est., supra, p. *362
218; Scott's Est.,
Fissel's Appeal,
The decree of the court below in each of the above appeals is affirmed at the costs of the respective appellants. *363