50 W. Va. 86 | W. Va. | 1901
On the 20th day of May, 1893, William L. Lenhart and Lou Lenhart, his wife, conveyed to G. W. Zents a tract of about fifty acres of land in Preston County, in consideration of nine hundred dollars of which fifty dollars was paid and Zents gave his four notes, one of two hundred and fifty dollars to be paid March 1, 1894-, two hundred dollars to be paid September 1, 1894, two hundred dollars to be paid March 1, 1895, and two hundred dollars to be paid September 1, 1895, and reserved in said deed his vendor’s lien to secure the payment of said notes. Zents failed to put his said deed on record. Shortly afterward the grantor removed with his family to Missouri and left the purchase notes with his father-in-law B. A. Conner. On the 6th day of March, 1894, George W. Zents and his wife made a general assignment by deed of trust to D. M. Wotring as trustee for the benefit of his creditors purporting to convey the real estate and personal property of the grantors, conveying among other property, “also all the legal and equitable interest of said
At the June rules 1897 W. L. Lenhart filed his bill in the circuit court of Preston County against G. W. Zents, Mary F. Zents, Ezra Forman, D. M. Wotring trustee, and others to enforce his vendor’s lien for the unpaid purchase money against
It will be observed that the whole defense is based on the doctrine of estoppel because of the acts of the plaintiff, his agent B. A. 'Conner, and his alleged attorney Wotring. B. A. Conner the father-in-law of plaintiff was present when the sale of the land was made by trustee Wotring to defendant Forman, but said nothing, did nothing to induce Foreman to buy the land, he gave no assurances, no inquiry was made of him by Forman concerning the lien or the title; plaintiff had done all he could and all the statute required of him to secure the deferred payments of purchase money he had reserved in the deed he made to Zents his vendor’s lien on the land and delivered the deed to Zents whose duty it was to have it recorded, this he failed to do from some cause not known to plaintiff. The want of such recordation was notice to Forman of defect in the title which should have put him upon inquiry. And the public advertisement of the sale by trustee Wotring in. response to which defendant was present bidding on the property, stated the fact that the fifty acres for sale “was conveyed to said Zents by W. L. Lenhart and wife by deed dated May 20, 1893, retaining a lien for the deferred purchase money due thereon.”
This brought to the knowledge of Forman not only the fact of the existence of the deed from Lenhart to Zents but notice of the vendor’s lien retained therein. In Coles v. Withers, 33 Grat. 186, (191) it is said, “When a person cannot obtain a title but by a deed which leads to another fact, whether, by description, recital or otherwise, he will be deemed cognizant of such fact. And for the same reason, if the purchaser has notice of a deed, he is presumed to home notice of the entire contents of the cteed “ The purchaser Forman had ample warning that the title was
The deed of trust under which the sale was being made entirely ignored the plaintiff as a creditor and did not mention his lien. Lenhart was absent at his new home in the state of Missouri relying as he had a right to do on the lien he had reserved in his deed to Zents to secure him in his purchase money, he was not made a party to the suit brought by Wotring seeking the - assistance of the court in the distribution of the proceeds of the sale made by him as trustee and had no knowledge of the suit or proceedings therein and the evidence shows that B. A. Conner knew nothing of the pendency of that suit, and at the time of taking his deposition in this cause on the 17th of August, 1897, he stated, “I never knew that he (Wotring) had brought suit to put those notes in until here very recently” and did not know the case was before N. J. Fortney as commissioner. It is true D. M. Wotring claims to have been employed as attorney for plaintiff and that in pursuance of such employment he presented the notes and proved them before commissioner Fort-ney in the suit and had them reported as a debt to share in the general distribution of the proceeds of the sale made by him, but this is positively contradicted by both the plaintiff and Conner, neither of whom had any knowledge of the suit. It is clear from the whole evidence in the case that Wotring was never employed as attorney for plaintiff by himself or by B. A. Conner, from whom he got possession of the notes, not for the purpose of looking after them as attorney but simply to get data from them that he might make settlement as trustee, and was in no way authorized and had no right to lay them before the commissioner Fortney and prove them as a debt to bo provided for in the distribution of the funds arising from the sale made by Wotring trustee.
In his testimony Wotring claims to have been employed as attorney to take charge of the claims of several of the other creditors of Zents but is flatly contradicted by every one of them showing that he had no connection with the claims of any of
The defendant in his answer says that when he made the purchase of the land, by the silence, acts, and conduct of plaintiff he was led to believe that Wotring was authorized to sell said land, that plaintiff had no lien on the same and that he was induced by the silence of plaintiff and of his agent to buy and pay for the land innocently believing from the acts and conduct and silence of plaintiff and his agent that he would 'be safe and protected in his said purchase, but he fails to testify in the cause to show in what the acts and conduct of the plaintiff and his agent consisted which misled or induced him to make the purchase. Defendant says a great moral wrong was committed on the part of Lenhart which a court of equity will not uphold and cites Stone v. Tyree, 30 W. Va. 687; Bates v. Swiger, 40 W. Va. 420; and R. R. Co. v. Perdue, Id. 442. Forman cannot say that he was in fact ignorant of Lenhart’s lien without convicting himself of the grossest negligence in looking up the title he was purchasing. The conduct of Conner whatever his power and authority to act for Lenhart, was not such as to bring him within the reasons given by the court for its conclusion in the case of Stone v. Tyree cited, as there is nothing in the record showing that either he or Lenhart had anything to do in bringing about the sale under the deed of trust or in any manner whatever to place themselves in the position regarding the title and sale that the parties in that case did, nor yet within the purview of the said case of Bates v. Swiger or R. R. Co. v. Perdue, for neither Len-hart nor Conner by words or conduct intentionally or otherwise caused defendant to believe that the trustee had a right to sell the land, nor did they or either of them make any representation to lead defendant to believe that Lenhart had no lion or charge upon the land, nor can plaintiff be brought within the rulé laid down in the Perdue Case cited, syl. 3, “When one of two innocent persons — that is, persons, each guiltless of an intentional moral wrong — must suffer a loss, it must be borne by that one of them who by his conduct, acts or omissions has rendered the injury possible.” It is true a decision of this case is bound to work a hardship, whether the loss is made to fall upon the one
Affirmed.