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Lenhardt Tool & Die Company v. Lumpe
703 N.E.2d 1079
Ind. Ct. App.
1998
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*1 1079 Finаlly, pat- findings the evidence nor thereon at 798. Midland exhibited ther money unauthorized over be- a conclusion NationsCredit com- tern of control approve the hold- criminal term is longing to others. Id. We mitted conversion as § ing in Midland-Guardian but conclude defined Indiana Code 35-43-4-3. clearly not control ease. a conclusion of errone- it does Where law ous, it must be set aside. We direct the Nations- Grauel also findings court to amend its and conclusions in ownership language into “slipped” the Credit this opinion. accordance with disagree Amendments. with that We part, part Affirmed in reversed re supreme characterization. Our remanded. public cently reiterated well-established the freedom policy of this state which favors MATTINGLY, JJ., FRIEDLANDER and parties. In re private between of contract concur. Pond, 1130, Marriage 700 N.E.2d (Ind. 1998); Publ’g, Trimble Ameritech v. 1998). (Ind. Inc., 1128, N.E.2d applies contact even to am

freedom of rule presume that a con

biguous contracts. We freely bargained agreement of

tract is the Trimble, parties. See Moreover, one to know

1129. is bound signs. he

contents of thе contract which Services, Computer COMPANY, Inc. v. Ameri Pinnacle LENHARDT TOOL DIE& Inc., Publ’g, INC., Appellant-Defendant, tech (Ind.Ct.App.1994). Here, counsel represented Grauel LUMPE, Appellee-Plaintiff. Duane negotiating the an accountant when Yet, No. 49A05-9706-CV-216. fact ambiguous despite documents.6 Fourth and Amendments con- Fifth Appeals Court of of Indiana. language that have alerted a tained would terms, change in Grau- party to a substantial Dec. 1998. which created el executed amendments ambiguity Grau- regarding the discounts. any responsibility el cannot now disavow ownership provision.

The trial court found that “NationsCredit’s the nature

representatives understood outright own-

security opposed interest as However, is not

ership.” that conclusion finding criminal conduct.

equivalent to knowingly and inten- NationsCredit

While

tionally over the Reserve exercised control

Account, control was it cannot be that its said acted

unauthorized when NationsCredit interpretation

accordance with reasonable ambiguous contract. legislature ‍‌​‌​‌​‌​‌‌‌​‌​‌​‌‌‌​‌‌​​‌​‌‌‌​‌‌‌‌​‌​​‌​‌​‌‌‌​‌​‍intend to did not Nei- disputes. fide bona contract

criminalize support- Language ferring a dis- the funds income. there was 6. The record shows that here hierarchy ownership agreement con- ing within NationsCredit’s decision was contained into cerning Account take the Reserve provisions and Fifth Amendments. Fourth favor of trans- The issue was settlеd in income. *2 Anderson, Miller & Robert A. Ice Donadío Ryan, Indianapolis, Appellant-Defendant. Johnson, O’Connor, L. D. William Eric Gray, Kightlinger Indianapolis, Appel- & lee-Plaintiff.

OPINION SHARPNACK, Judge. Chief Company, Inc. Lenhardt Tool & Die (“Lenhardt”) appeals of its from denial against motion for Duane for negligence claims liability. Lenhardt raises several issues restate as: we consolidate and (1) designated whether Lenhardt sufficient materials of motion require Lumpe designate materials demonstrate mate- that there issue of fact as to a mold machined rial whether inju- by Lenhardt was involved Lumpe; ries to (2) Lenhardt’s failure to include whether in the record materials by Lumpe response summary judg- Lenhardt’s motion ment warrants affirmance motion; court’s denial of Lenhardt’s and, (3) deny- erred in the trial court summary judgment for ing liability gov- Lumpe’s strict claim Liability plugs being the molds used at Product because erned Indiana Act. the time of the accident cannot be identified located, Lumpe prove that cannot affirm. We Lenhаrdt, molds were manufactured let Lumpe, the The facts most favorable to *3 negligently alone manufactured manufac- (“Olin”) nonmovant, man- follow. Olin Brass dangerously tured so as to be defective. manufacturing The ufactures brass bars. argues that Lenhardt once it demonstrated metal into a process pouring involves molten Lumpe prove could not the mold was allows to cool and mold which the metal by Lenhardt, the shift- manufactured burden by solidify into bars. The metal is cooled Lumpe ed to under Ind. Rule 56 Trial flowing through “spirings” “pipes” or water prove with come forward evidence to poured mold. The metal is within the molten by and mold was manufactured Lenhardt the mold over tank. As into a water so, failed as Lenhardt Lumpe to do mold, by formed it lowers bar is brass contends, summary judgment it is entitled to tank to into the water cool. erroneously the trial ‍‌​‌​‌​‌​‌‌‌​‌​‌​‌‌‌​‌‌​​‌​‌‌‌​‌‌‌‌​‌​​‌​‌​‌‌‌​‌​‍court denied. which for a “melter” or Lumpe worked Olin as The issue for us is whether the evidence regu- “pin man.” A man” “pin “melter” designated suffiсiently demon- Lenhardt the mold. lates the flow of molten metal into lack of a of fact strates the material issue molten metal into contact with If the comes Lenhardt manufactured the mold. Sim- water, August explosion may an occur. On may a in a motion ply put, defendant succeed 22, 1992, explosion which occurred Olin summary judgment plain- by showing the for injured Lumpe. the molds used Some of proof an es- tiff lacks sufficient to establish of made explosion at the time were Olin plaintiffs elеment of the claim sential Lumpe complaint a for Lenhardt. filed plaintiff proof. the burden of bears liability against Len- negligence and strict Company, Tool & Die Inc.1 Lenhardt hardt brings of this into focus Resolution issue summary judgment a motion then filed practice the contrast between the federal as which the denied.2 expressed in and our Corp. Celotex v. Catrett practice expressed as Celo state Jarboe. I. v.Catrett, Corp. 106 S.Ct. tex U.S. first issue we resolve is whether The must (1986); v. Land 91 L.Ed.2d Jarbоe sufficiently or not Lenhardt demonstrated Community Newspapers, 644 mark a of fact on a the lack of material issue (Ind.1994), Celotex, reh’g In denied. Lumpe’s of and that material element claim Supreme that: States Court held United a summary judgment entitled to as it was 56(c) plain language Rule man- “... sup- of law. matter Lenhardt entry summary judgment, af- dates the summary judgment port of its motion for upon adequate discovery time and ter including of Jack various items an affidavit motion, a against party a fails to make Lenhardt, who portions deposition of of the the exis- Johnson, showing sufficient to establish portions deposition of Claude par- tence of an essential to Dwayne Lumpe, response Manu- element of Olin case, ty’s party and on which that will bear facturing nonparty production, proof In such a response request for admis- at trial. a the burden situation, interrogatories by Weldaloy genuine there can ‘no issue filed sions Foam, fact,’ any complete fail- Comрany, material since a Products Inc. and Creative items, ele- argued proof concerning an essential on these ure of Inc. Based court, us, non-moving party’s case neces- ment of the to the trial summary against granted Lenhardt and complaint Welda- also filed his 1. Inc., Foam, Inc., loy Company, Creative Fol- Products Delaware. denied Machinery Company, Inc. order, & Tool and Delaware lowing a motion to Delaware filed However, they parties appeal. are not to this granted The trial reconsider. court being appealed. and entered the instant order Delaware and filed motions for 2. Both summary judgment. Initially, the trial rule, seeking sarily party all facts immaterial. der the federal renders other required ne judg- is not moving party ‘entitled movant gate opponent’s ment matter of because non- claim. The as a law1 moving only has make inform of the basis of party failed to a suffi- need the court showing identify portions cient on an еssential element of relevant the motion respect her which she case with record it believes demon ‘which proof.... burden strate the absence of Celotex, [quoting

material fact.’ U.S. s}; i}: 323, 106 atCt # # 2553.] S. course, upon then seeking summary judg- burden rests the non-mov- party

Of showing responsibility ing party to make a sufficient always ment the initial bears *4 challenged each establish the existence of informing of the district court of the basis motion, upon has identifying por- for its and element which the non-movant those proof. of not pleadings, depositions, tions of the ‘the an- the burden Indiana does interrogatories, and the federal method- swers to and admissions adhere Celotex affidavits, file, together any,’ ology. on with the if which it believes demonstrate absence ease, In not present the defendants do genuine of a issue of But material fact. judg- summary their motion Appeals, unlike the of we find no Court any designated with evidence to es- ment express implied requirement or Rule 56 quеstion on the absence of a of fact tablish moving party support that its motion an outcome-determinative issue as to the with affidavits or other similar materials promissory Merely alleg- estoppel claim. claim_ negating opponent’s [R]e- plaintiff failed ing produce moving gardless party of whether the ac- of promissory on each element evidence companies summary judgment its motion entitle estoppel is insufficient to the defen- affidavits, may, with summary judgment dаnt to under Indiana should, granted long be as whatever is so law.” before the district court demonstrates (citations Jarboe, 644 N.E.2d and foot- at entry summary the ‍‌​‌​‌​‌​‌‌‌​‌​‌​‌‌‌​‌‌​​‌​‌‌‌​‌‌‌‌​‌​​‌​‌​‌‌‌​‌​‍standard for the omitted). note 56(c), judgment, set in Rule as forth is did Jarboe court purposes principal One of the satisfied. previous distinguish or hold- overrule summary judgment rule is isolate ing Company, in Hinkle v. Niehaus Lumber dispose factually unsupported (Ind.1988). Hinkle defenses, claims think it and we should 56(E) from T.R. follows: quoted as interpreted way be in a it to allows summary judgment а motion for is “When accomplish purpose.” this supported provided in this made and as Celotex, 322-24, U.S. S.Ct. rule, may upon party an adverse rest Jarboe, supreme In our court held: 2552-53. allegations mere or denials of his imposed upon “The at trial burden pleading, response, but his affidavits on party proof the burden of an issue with rule, provided in this must set otherwise significantly required is different from showing that specific forth facts there is summary of a an Indiana non-movant genuine issue for trial. If he does not so judgment proceeding. Under Indiana’s summary judgment, appropri- respond, standard, party seeking summary ate, against him....” be shall entered must demonstrate absence Hinkle, 1245. The court con- 525 N.E.2d at any genuine of fact as to a determi- tinued: issue, only native then is the non- con- required

movant come forward with party opposing “A trary evidence. disgorge ‘obliged to sufficient evidence’ genuine summary triable judg In show the existence respect, Indiana’s summary judg- party opposing divergеs from issue. The procedure abruptly ment specific ‘come with facts practice. ment must forth federal Un genuine plaintiffs there issue for one element of the claim showing that is a ” (1990), Corp. relief. Moore Sitzmark trial.’ Ind.App., 555 1307. A court Id. at 1245-1246. grant summary judgment, after ade- must Hinkle, injured plaintiff was when In motion, discovery upon quate time for roofing a failure of sheet metal there was party against a who fails to make show- salt over a shed corrosive installed where ing sufficient to the еxistence establish compounds were Id. at 1244. stored. case, party’s an element essential to that the issue of roofing had corroded. Id. On party and on which that will bear supplier there was evidence that instance, proof at trial. In this burden (Niehaus) knew or had reason to know there is no issue of material likely dangerous when to be fact, complete proof because a failure of manner, court not used a foreseeable concerning element of the essential presented Hinkle had no evidence to ed that nonmoving party’s other case renders all had show that Niehaus knew or should have immaterial. The movant is enti- facts any expectation that the metal reasonable judgement of law be- tled to as a matter in an unusual roofing sheets were used non-moving party has failed to cause ly Id. at 1245. The corrosive environment. showing make a sufficient essential *5 quoted deposition from the of the roof court of his case he the element to which bears had ing contractor as evidence that Niehaus proof at burden of trial. Id.” roofing material how or where its no idea brief, 13; Record, Appellant’s p. pp. 123-124. deposition Id. was was to be used. The quotation Briggs, In Lenhardt from by support Niehaus in of its mo submitted citation, contrast, following immedi summary judgment. omitted which In tion for ately preceded the sen bold and underlined nothing Hinkle whatever plaintiff submitted v. by tence: “Watson Rural Co. Indiana upon the Watеr and relied materials submitted 131, Corp., Water 540 N.E.2d Lumber Cities Niehaus. See Hinkle v. Niehaus 139 Co., (Ind.Ct.App.1989), (quoting trans. Celotex denied (Ind.Ct.App.1987), N.E.2d 198 vacat 510 Catrett, 317, 322-23, (Ind.1988). 477 ed, Thus, Corp. v. 106 it is U.S. 525 N.E.2d 1243 (1986)).” 2552-53, 2548, S.Ct. 91 L.Ed.2d presented clear that Niehaus had evidence Watson, Briggs, relying on It is clear that in knowledge motion support its lack of in of its upon the for review relied Celotex standard summary judgment. in that context for It is summary judgment. ing motions the court referred to Hinkle’s burden that identify present evi come forward clear that anal It is under Jarboe showing that either knew or dence Niehaus designate ysis, Lenhardt would have had to expectation have had some reasonable should manu that was not some evidence the mold roofing metal were to be used sheets require by in factured Lenhardt order unusually environment. in an corrosive that Lumpe to come forward with evidence support Len- Hinkle not at 1245-1246. does by Lenhardt. the mold was manufactured here. position hardt’s not Simply demonstrating Lumpe does that upon Lenhardt аlso relies the case prove the mold have sufficient evidence to (Ind.Ct. Briggs Finley, 631 v. N.E.2d not by Lenhardt was manufactured Briggs involved a App.1994), trans. denied. of this enough. practical consequences injured when his car collid plaintiff who analysis cases sum could be that in some defendant, had a horse of ed with a defen mary judgment denied to would be premises. gotten loose from defendant’s plaintiffs dant where at the conclusion of granted summary judgment evidence, shown if it is no better at trial thаn defendant, appeal. affirmed on to the we summary judg to be the defendant at quotes Briggs from in his brief to Lenhardt ment, granted a mo the defendant would be to the trial us as he did court below: under T.R. judgment on the evidence tion for plaintiffs prove of the failure judgment as a reason “A defendant is entitled to However, case. essential element of his matter of law when he shows with the least of Jarboe is consistent undisputed negate material the dictate facts Raymundo v. upon dent fаcts not before us. recognition termi- Assoc., summary right nates to trial and Hammond Clinic though (Ind.1983). ap- omitting it By will be denied even facts the trial may not pears plaintiff succeed ruling it in on motion for court had before Armstrong, 616 trial. Greathouse summary judgment, precluded Lenhardt has (Ind.1993). Adams, id.; 365-366 review of its claimed error. See 539 N.E.2d at 987-989. designate Because Lenhardt did suffi- cient in of its motion materials designate suffi- Lenhardt failed Because require Lumpe to des- failed to materials to the trial court and cient ignate materials to demonstrate existence appeal include in the record on some genuine issue of material fact as to Lumpe designated by the trial materials in whether Lenhardt machined mold court, we need not consider further whether err it question, trial court did not when denying Lenhardt’s erred summary judg- denied Lenhardt’s motion summary judgment. Specifically, negligence ment on the claim. sufficiency we do not need consider designation the trial of materials to H. court, becаuse the materials addition, Lumpe argues, did not the lack of demonstrate (1) appeal it cannot succeed because genuine issue that it was a Lenhardt designated by failed address material involved the accident. We affirm mold there was a that showed denial. (2) further failed include fact It is some of these materials in record. III. true not include in the that Lenhardt did *6 third issue whether trial court The is portions depositions of record of Claude denying summary judgment in erred Roger Lumpe Lоng desig- that Johnson and liability claim Lumpe’s Lenhardt on strict Lumpe asserted to nated the trial court. governed by Liability the Indiana Product depositions these showed Act”). (“the §§ Act Ind.Code 33-1-1.5-1 mold supporting facts inference through Specifically, Lenhardt 33-1-1.5-10. was a involved in the accident applicable not to this claims that Act is dispute mold. does not that it did services, provides suit not because Lenhardt by Lumpe, the items identified include products, and is not a seller the Act. under responds nеcessary if it omitted but gave At of the which rise to the time accident view, parts in of the record provided, Lumpe’s complaint, per- the Act in a request supplemental was free record. part, tinent that: appellant duty an It is of “(a) sells, leases, who or otherwise One provide with this court a record sufficient puts any into the of commerce stream of review the claim error. enable us to product in a condition unreason- defective (Ind.Ct. ‍‌​‌​‌​‌​‌‌‌​‌​‌​‌‌‌​‌‌​​‌​‌‌‌​‌‌‌‌​‌​​‌​‌​‌‌‌​‌​‍ State, 985, Adams v. 539 N.E.2d 988 ably dangеrous any user or consumer or adequately a App.1989). cannot review We subject liability for property to his is denying in a claim that a trial court erred product harm physical caused ap when the property user or consumer or to his pellant in the record all does include in or is the class of that user consumer designated the trial court and things those reasonably persons that should the seller it it made decision. id. before when See subject being to the harm foresee as requires review us to exam Our standard of condition, if: the defective caused ine the materials (1) engaged in The seller is the business those and limits us to a review of materials. selling product; and of such a Indiana, Society Yin v. Nat’l Bank 665 (2) 58, reh’g product expected to and does (Ind.Ct.App.1996), 62 de is nied, sub- reach the user or consumer without trans. denied. cannot reverse We in ruling in the condition depen- in a stantial alteration alleged for error ordinary repair activity may impaсt the sought to person it is sold goods by in- chapter. economic number of scarce

be held liable under creasing longevity, it cannot be said (a) their (b) ap- rule in subsection stated ordinary repair produces eco- scarce although: plies goods. nomic (1) exercised all reason- The seller has packaging, preparation, in the able care However, recognized legislature has use, instructing for and sale labeling, consumption exemp- the context [in product; his § tax in 6- tion to state sales codified I.C. (2) 2.5-5-5.1], consumer has not repair The user or point, at some activi- into bought product from or entered trans- ty extensive nature and so is so the seller.” any contractual relation with object it forms the such that cannot Rather, characterized as a mere service. 1995).3 (1983) (amended § I.C. 33-1-1.5-3 activity produces prod- repair a new First, that its transactions Lenhardt claims uct. ...” service, not a the sale of a with Olin involved correctly product. Lenhardt states Corp. Dept. Rotation Products State apply (Ind.Tax 1998). to transactions which Act does not Rev., “wholly predominantly the sale Demi, Whitaker, or involve analysis adopt the We § product.” I.C. 33- Rotation, rather than a a service entity and hold that where 1.5—2(6). However, be the distinction alters, reconditions, product or modifies a or 1— easily so product is not tween service prod to the extent that a new raw material In Denu v. Western Gear determined. into thе stream of uct has been introduced held that “Indiana’s Corp., the district court commerce, entity a manufacturer and an inter limitations would not bar statute of Act. provider products under the More allowing pretation recommencement over, product prior to the exists where been recondi product has repair when statute extent of the performed, the work altered, tioned, to the extent that or modified product determines performed on the work into the product has been introduced a new entity created a new Denu v. Western of commerce.” existing product. stream merely serviced an (S.D.Ind.1983). F.Supp. Corp., Thus, Gear a case is a distinction such Co., Inc., the v. Snow Similarly, Whitaker aon case degree matter of to be determined analy thorough Rotation, on a district court embarked N.E.2d at by case basis. See *7 a product a and the distinction between sis of 802. v. T.J. Snow under the Act. Whitaker service Here, ship solid blocks Olin would Inc., Cо., F.Supp. 1039-1045 drawings and Lenhardt with of metal (7th (S.D.Ind.1997), Cir. aff'd, 151 F.3d then ma would specifications. Lenhardt 1998). repair court concluded per the metal into molds chine the block of constitutes a refurbishing product of a specifica and drawings in the designs found reconditioning or recon the service while Thus, met transformed the tions. product.4 creates a product new struction that is substan product” “a new al block into at 1044. material used. tially from the raw different context, our Therefore, product in different Although a a new it has introduced and provided this same distinction addressed and

tax court of commerce into the stream Olin, At oth held that: not mere services. products to damaged times, ship molds would products er Olin no new “[0]rdinary repair creates original de to the to be restored a service. Lenhardt properly characterized and is specifica drawings and signs in the perpetu- found activity merely Ordinary repair degree of work upon the Depending although tiоns. ... and existing products ates gave the suit in rise to accident which 4. The in we use the accident occurred 3. As the Whitaker, 953 occurred in 1993. Whitaker F.Supp. were effective of the statutes versions Thus, Act version of the the at 1039. that time. we analyzed the same as which the court address here. needed, damaged appeal, ... repair of a could court on unless thereafter mold order, appeal any party of new or the court on shall be either the creatiоn a request, the of ... product. shall transmission other repairing original See service 1044; parts Whitaker, F.Supp. of the record. Parts which are Rotation 95B transmitted, appeal to the court on shall Corp., at 801. There- Products fore, on part nevertheless be a record we that there is a issue of hold alleged appeal purposes. all material as to whether the defec- fact tive had been created or serviced mold added). (Emphasis Lenhardt. cоurse, is, appellant’s It an burden Next, it is a seller error, fails demonstrate and if he reversible At the meaning of the Act. time of within the necessary designate portions of the record Act “a explosion, defined “seller” as particular may a error he fail demonstrate person engaged in business as a manufactur- in his burden. dealer, lessor, er, wholesaler, a a retail a or a § 33-1-1.5-2. As have distributor.” I.C. we Secondly, recognize there our rules that Lenhardt created a new determined are calls in much judgment to be made how molds, possi- made product when it necessary appeal. record is For molds, bly repaired Lenhardt is when it permits rule that reason the above-cited properly considered manufacturer of molds. supplement opposing party court or Thus, Lenhardt is seller under Act. See they necessary, frequent- feel record it Therefore, the trial court did not error id. ly this is done. denying in Lenhardt’s motion for Thirdly, appellee’s point from сounsel’s liability claim. on strict view, things gratifying few can more reasons, foregoing For we affirm the potentially being outcome than determinative court. point appellate able to out tribunal that Affirmed. from opponent one’s omitted record clearly dispositive piece all mention of RUCKER, J., concurs. (That, incidentally, is evidence. not the situ- GARRARD, J., part concurs in and dis- us.) ease ation before in part. sents hold, here, majority For as it does bring party’s that a failure to to the record GARRARD, Judge, concurring in result every appeal item to the trial part. part dissenting opposition court in and in of a motion I in the ma concur result reached in order to secure majori jority disagree I. I with the appellate contrary pro- review is both to the ty’s that “Lenhardt would have had assertion wrongheaded. of the rules and visions designate some evidence that the mold *8 was manufactured Lenhardt” order Finally, I concur result in the reached summary judgment. It have to secure would III. sufficient for had been able to had been show made no evidence that Lenhardt the mold get anything able fur

and would not be Lowmaster, Ind.

ther. See Letson (1976). Here,

App. Len- 341 N.E.2d 785

hardt did not shut the door properly denied. Appellate

I as to issue II. Indiana dissent ‍‌​‌​‌​‌​‌‌‌​‌​‌​‌‌‌​‌‌​​‌​‌‌‌​‌‌‌‌​‌​​‌​‌​‌‌‌​‌​‍7.2(B) part: provides,

Rule appellant designate only shall those

parts the record to transmitted to the

Case Details

Case Name: Lenhardt Tool & Die Company v. Lumpe
Court Name: Indiana Court of Appeals
Date Published: Dec 22, 1998
Citation: 703 N.E.2d 1079
Docket Number: 49A05-9706-CV-216
Court Abbreviation: Ind. Ct. App.
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